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Foreword
Klaus T€opfer
We live, as we always have, in turbulent times. Social systems are reflexive in
nature and can and will change pathways step by step, be it over time or instantly
and abruptly. These changes may occur because of learning processes in a society
or in the political culture or may result from changing power structures. These
processes may be smooth and incremental or disruptive and powerful.
Two main changes have altered this already challenging social fabric of the
twentieth century. First, we live in the era of the anthropocene (Paul Crutzen). This
means: Humankind has become a quasi-planetary force, as the first symposium of
Nobel laureates organised in Potsdam, Germany, stated in its declaration in 2007.
This immensely productive first symposium has also provided the seed for the
Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS).
Second, changes at a planetary level take place increasingly often, ever faster
than before and with increasing amplitude. Indeed, it is becoming more difficult to
differentiate between changes and disasters caused by natural forces and man-made
catastrophes, as the reasons are overlapping. The terminology of a ‘great accelera-
tion’ is no longer reserved for special moments in human history. This situation
seems to be a companion of our times.
The main question we are confronted with is as follows: Will we be able to
respond to these challenges effectively? Even more fundamentally: Are we able to
understand the driving forces, and are we in a situation to reduce the complexity of
these planetary interdependencies as a precondition for concrete and targeted policy
making? Do we make sense of what we witness in the reality of life or is it just
happening to us? Will it be possible to transform the wealth of knowledge available
into actions and will we be able to take full advantage of the breath of engaged
citizens? Do we have to complement the acceleration of changes we are facing
nowadays with an acceleration of ideas and solutions as well as ever larger
systematic and holistic changes? Or do we have the chance to reduce the complex-
ity of change in order to realise a piecemeal engineering procedure with the chance
to react to new insights and knowledge and to new or changing values in an open
democratic society?
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At the same time: What can we learn from the puzzling fact that some twenty
years of sustainability governance – the overarching frame for our considerations –
have not led us very far, to say it politely? Should we consider slowing down our
actions and reactions and taking time to reflect in order to move forward more
effectively? Are we aware of the recommendation formulated by the Spanish
philosopher Balthasar Gracian in the sixteenth century: ‘The most difficult part in
running is to stand still’. Are we running too fast whilst not sufficiently questioning
the direction in which we are running?
The foundation of the IASS and its cluster ‘Global Contract for Sustainability’
exists to address questions like these. As a consequence, the TransGov project was
started in the summer of 2010 as the first fully fledged research project of IASS. Its
aim is ambitious and manifold: First, to bring together new and existing ideas on
governance for sustainable development and to develop new, that is, ‘advanced’
insights from them. Second, to provide a platform for exchange for scientists,
including four research fellows forming the forerunners at the IASS literally, and
practitioners. Third, in addressing ‘Science for Sustainable Transformations:
Towards Effective Governance’, TransGov has laid out a conceptional matrix for
further projects at the IASS in order to find effective ways for science-society
collaborations. This book presents the work done by the TransGov project team. It
complements the project synthesis report, written by Roeland in ’t Veld, which was
launched in November 2011.
We are facing enormous environmental, social and economic challenges as well
as opportunities at all levels. These are often not identified early enough, not
analysed deeply enough or not systematically integrated into actions. The problems
are interconnected, but the levels at which solutions may occur are also linked.
People in modern societies are increasingly concerned that they are living in a
‘Nebenfolgengesellschaft’. The fact that science and technology are constantly
cultivating deeper insights into the construction patterns of nature and life means
that there are far-reaching consequences both in time and space which are not
adequately considered. For instance, there is a suspicion that the economic increase
measured via the GNP is mainly due to overcoming the previous negative
consequences of the growth.
In the year of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro
in 2012, it remains essential to address a huge implementation gap with regard to
agreed-upon goals and targets. One approach is to define a new set of goals and
targets, which fit the purpose and are better than those implemented 20 years ago.
These considerations lead to the proposal to work out in Rio+20 additional Millen-
nium Sustainable Development Goals (MSDGs), correcting the failure to concen-
trate at the UNMillennium Assembly on millennium goals more or less globalising
the ‘Western way of development’ to the developing countries as well. The
integration of the sustainable component in the MSDGs would put forward rights
and obligations both for developed and developing countries to a culturally
diversified ‘development’.
Another way of addressing the gap between knowledge and action, or between
words on paper – constituting numerous declarations and Calls for Action – and
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practice, is to define new approaches such as green economy or, even more
important and challenging, a green society. The challenge is to design new institu-
tional arrangements for governing sustainable development, changing technology
and behaviour, and asking for efficiency as intensively as for sufficiency. These are
just two of the areas which this book addresses through its individual chapters.
One of the main building blocks of the TransGov project has been the concept of
‘knowledge democracy’ (in ’t Veld 2010), which addresses these changes and new
dimensions, providing, for example, a better understanding as to why different
traditional ways of developing solutions are frequently not suited to the problem for
which they were created. Complementing this with Ulrich Beck’s approach regarding
Second Modernity reveals that classic institutions and approaches will not just disap-
pear but will coexist with new forms. How to handle such transformation processes
within the conditions of open democratic societies concerns me a great deal.
Sense-making mechanisms and chains in economy and in modern technologies
as well as scientific findings are increasingly global in nature. At the same time –
and this is something I have been following for years from a distance and from
‘within’ – a renaissance of ‘culture’ or ‘traditions’ can be observed. As a conse-
quence, rigidity in thinking and acting, for example favouring one-dimensional
concepts instead of accepting if not appreciating diversity, will certainly not
succeed in bringing us closer to sustainable societies. This is one of the main
messages this book explores from different angles.
We must change course significantly and transform practices across different
sectors of society, as clearly stated by the 2011 report of the German Advisory
Council on Global Change (WBGU). With this said, the question still remains: How
do we think and initiate such transformations? TransGov makes the case that many
transformation processes will have to occur, more often than not, simultaneously,
partially overlapping, at different places at the same time and exercised by people
who are multiply engaged in different forums, roles and levels. It also helps us to
understand why ‘intraventions’ in many cases work better than interventions.
Hence, ‘the global’ does not take centre stage at TransGov in order to tackle
large-scale problems successfully. For example, the emergence of new and power-
ful citizens’ initiatives comes to mind. The ‘Stuttgart 21’ case in Germany kept us
busy thinking throughout the implementation of the project. Participation of the
general public, as integrated in modern regional planning and building legislation,
is no longer able to stabilise the peace-making function of legally based processes.
Processes leading to a transformation of the German energy system, the so-called
‘Energiewende’, after Japan’s nuclear disaster of Fukushima at the beginning of
2011, are another case in point. This has resulted in a call for a
‘Gemeinschaftswerk’, a common effort. In times of knowledge democracies, it is
less of an issue whether or not citizens are allowed to participate and to raise
concerns. Their active engagement, namely intraventions, in domains until now
covered by governmental actors becomes a necessary condition for effective
governance towards sustainable development.
If co-evolution of science and practice is meant to be not just another fancy term
which refers to thinking about the science-practice interface, is it the only way to
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put forth successfully knowledge-based solutions towards sustainability? Answer-
ing this question positively is an easy task. To transform science and practice
accordingly – that is, production of useful knowledge here and knowledge-based
decision-making there – is not easy at all. However, since providing a platform or
interface for science and societal interaction is the mission of the IASS, it was a
logical consequence to put TransGov first, in order to reflect on such challenges in
more conceptional terms in the first place.
Finally, TransGov is without any doubt the beginning rather than the end of our
work on governance for sustainable development. Follow-on activities on gover-
nance research at IASS are implemented by focussing on concrete issues. For
example, IASS is expanding its work on soils – almost a ‘forgotten’ resource
despite its paramount importance – and will set up a knowledge-based monitoring
process for the ‘Energiewende’. Insights from TransGov will help to design these
research activities, inform knowledge exchange platforms therein and put forward
recommendations concerning the ‘how to’ of these challenges. The cultural dimen-
sion will continue to play a major role in our work. In doing so, culture and
governance will alter their roles as ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ variables,
respectively, if one wishes to phrase it this way. Topics such as short-lived climate
forcers present straightforward governance challenges if one addresses their drivers
and possible response options. In addition, it goes without saying that any critical
assessment of climate engineering has at its core a governance challenge as well.
Sustainable development as decided upon at the UN Conference on Environment
and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 is more than an ecological concept. At
this very time, we are confronted with a financial architecture which is far from
sustainable and which is even threatening to destroy the sustainable fundament for
social stability and environmental responsibility. The massive financial turbulences
we are witnessing are irrefutable evidence of the fact that modern societies are
living under the dictatorship of short-termism, externalising social and environ-
mental costs due to the prices we are currently paying for goods and services. The
financial disaster is nothing less than the oath of disclosure of this short-termism. It
is, therefore, a must that we also think ‘out of the box’ with regard to reshaping the
financial architecture in a way which ensures it meets the conditions for
sustainability. Finally, theories of sustainable development, historical analysis
and regional comparisons and reflections on transdisciplinarity more generally
will continue as cross-cutting themes of the IASS and its clusters. TransGov and
its findings will help shaping these research agendas. Hence, I hope that the IASS
with this research project is able to present a modest but at the same time bold
contribution to the discussion on how to improve governance for sustainable
development – for the planet as well as for people and their places.
Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. mult. Klaus T€opfer
Klaus T€opfer is founding director of the Institute




This collection of ‘think pieces’ on advancing the governance of sustainable
development is the result of a remarkable cross-fertilisation between scholars
from different disciplines, practitioners from different levels of government and
business and civil society representatives.
The first to express my gratitude to is Klaus T€opfer, who created with the
Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies a challenging arena in which new
ideas emerge easily. He not only provided us with the workplace and creative space
we needed, but has also been actively participating in our discussions from the very
beginning. In the TransGov team, Roeland in ’t Veld played a crucial role. He is the
author of the first product of TransGov, the report ‘Transgovernance: The Quest for
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tive questions. Also G€unther Bachmann, as member of the steering group, never
stopped asking uneasy questions, which stimulated out of the box thinking. The
four TransGov research fellows, Stefan Jungcurt, Jamel Napolitano, Alexander
Perez-Carmona and Falk Schmidt, who have each contributed a chapter in this
volume, have been a pleasure and joy to work with. Although I needed to manage
the project from a distance, the communication has always been easy, open and
constructive. I am grateful to the staff of IASS who were essential for the project
and have always been very supportive. It has also been a pleasure to work with
IFOK with regard to the organisation of events and other communication issues.
I would also like to thank the participants in the challenging workshops we have
organised, as well as the high-level practitioners we have interviewed, for their
willingness to share their insights and for their precious time. Without Madelon
Eelderink, I would not have finished the editing of this volume so fast and so
thoroughly. Madelon, you have been an enormous support! Last but not least, I am
grateful to all those around the TransGov team, our partners and other close friends
and relatives, for having endured that all of us made the project a first priority.
I suppose I am not the only one who has recently received the urgent request: “No
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Transgovernance: Advancing Sustainability Governance analyses the question
what recent and ongoing changes in the relations between politics, science and
media – together characterised as the emergence of a knowledge democracy – may
imply for governance of sustainable development, on global and other levels of
societal decision-making, and the other way around: How can the discussion on
sustainable development contribute to a knowledge democracy?
This volume is one of the results of the IASS project ‘Science for Sustainable
TRANSformations: Towards Effective GOVernance’ (TransGov). This was the
first project in the IASS cluster ‘Global Contract for Sustainability’. The overall
objective was to present a new context for the sustainability governance debate,
because the mainstream debate in many respects lacks diversity, variety, and
reflexivity. Reframing classical questions in order to find new options for societal
decision-making and identifying starting points and strategies towards effective
governance of transitions to sustainability are important. Our analysis of contem-
porary attempts to understanding transitions towards sustainable societies took the
starting point that we live in tense and turbulent times, in which simple answers to
complex questions not only fail in understanding the challenges but also hinder
solutions and are sometimes even counterproductive. Our aim, therefore, was not to
reduce complexity in our analyses but to find ways to address and appreciate it.
As a matter of fact, many of the current arrangements for collective decision-
making and action on global and other levels are not leading towards sustainable
societies. Therefore, these arrangements should be open to change andmay need to be
rethought in a considerably new way to begin with. The failure of mainstream
sustainability governance arrangements can be explained as a consequence of
misconceptions, such as the belief that only centralised and legally-binding regulatory
arrangements are the best option, that hegemonic thinking is preferable or at least has
to be accepted over pluralist and tolerant attitudes towards other values, that there is no
realistic alternative to mainstream thinking about economic growth, that science can
and should always be ‘objective’ and indisputable, that participation of civil society
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and business is only a fashion or an add-on and that institutions (as the rules of the
game) should be formal by nature and should lead to the creation of formal
organisations. New governance features have to deal with these underlying notions
that are deeply buried into prevailing governance thinking. However, as our reference
to ‘Second Modernity’ (Ulrich Beck) makes clear, this will not be an issue of just
replacing ‘old’ arrangements with ‘new’ ones, but to find ways and means to govern
the relationship between ‘old’ and ‘new’ governance arrangements in a fruitful rather
than conflictive manner.
This volume contains contributions from the TransGov research team members.
The eight ‘think pieces’ take a range of different angles, such as international
relations, governance and metagovernance theory, cultural diversity, economics
and knowledge management. We aimed at offering insights regarding institutions
and transformation processes and to dig a bit deeper in the paradigms behind
contemporary sustainability governance. The chapters focus on different subjects,
taking various perspectives, borrowed from many social science theories. In doing
so, we tried not to hassle to new insights for the sake of translating them into
solutions. However, we have put forward some new ideas and finally provide some
useful recommendations as well.
For example, on one hand, international scholarly and political discussions on
International Environmental Governance (IEG) and the Institutional Framework for
Sustainable Development (IFSD) could profit from such a linkage of governance
theory to conceptional thinking from, for example, sociology, cultural anthropol-
ogy, psychology and various schools of economics. Therefore, the Rio+20 process
is often used as a reference point for our considerations without dominating or
restricting the analysis. On the other hand, those engaged in cultural studies may
perceive this project as an entry point into sustainability studies, as TransGov pays
much attention to this concern.
We tried hard to practise what we preach. If we believe that variety is important
in sustainability governance and in thinking about it, variety should also be
reflected in this book. Thus, while a general conceptional framework guided our
thinking throughout the research process – put forward by the synthesis report
written by Roeland in ’t Veld, of which the summary and recommendations are
presented in Chap. 8 of this volume – each chapter has its own merit and can be
read separately. The chapters are presented in two parts. The first contains general
reflections on the challenges of sustainability governance. The second illustrates the
current discussions regarding a number of very topical themes.
Knowledge Democracy
Part 1 opens with a reflection by Roeland in ’t Veld (Chap. 1) on the problems
sustainable development faces in relation to the tensions he has framed as ‘knowl-
edge democracy’. The argument begins with the observation that the concept of
sustainable development is all over the place, maybe because it is very broad and
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vague. The vagueness of the concept has a Janus face. It has been called a unifying
concept because its vagueness breeds a consensus that might be utilised later on. It
is an asset if it triggers action. On the other hand, if sustainable development is
everything, maybe it is nothing. Although the concept may be vague, it has
overwhelming appeal on political agendas, programmes and dialogues. The pre-
cautionary principle is the nucleus of a powerful moral imperative. The multidi-
mensional nature of the concept, covering ecological, economic and social aspects
of change, relates to our needs for integration. Sustainable development as a
concept bears a persuasive character. Actors of all kinds may contribute to it –
citizens, enterprises, NGOs, governments, etc.
Thinking about the governance of sustainable development leads us to the recog-
nition of a multi-level, multi-scale, multi-disciplinary character of the problematique.
Moreover, development refers to change, to transitions and transformations. Gover-
nance of sustainable development, therefore, has to copewith complex dynamics. The
concept of knowledge democracy sheds new light on the emerging relationships
between politics, media and science. It shows how the emergence of participatory
democracy besides representative democracy, the revolutionary rise of social media
besides corporate media, the emergence of transdisciplinary trajectories besides
classical disciplinary science lead to explosions of complex interactions. The chapter
discusses the variety of possible future variants of knowledge democracies, quiet and
turbulent ones, in relation to the quest for sustainable development. The main conclu-
sion is that strategies for sustainability may vary with the types of knowledge
democracies around.
Cultural Diversity
Chapter 2 by Louis Meuleman concentrates on the crucial role of cultural diversity
in sustainability governance. The cultural dimension is often considered an obstacle
to sustainability, but there are good arguments to reconsider this. It is argued that
many sustainability policies – at least when put into practice – deny complexity and
uncertainty, favour centralised negotiations and institutions, view governments as
exclusive decision-makers and imply hegemony of Western economic and political
principles. Part of the mainstream language of sustainability governance is central-
ist and refers to monolithic concepts (the economy, the climate, the Earth
System. . .) rather than embracing diversity and complexity. These concepts are –
as of now – dominating the discourse.
This chapter aims to shed light on the problematic relations between cultural
diversity, sustainable development and (meta)governance. These three concepts
have a normative character, which is a good predictor of trouble as soon as they
interact. It argues that the implementation deficit of sustainable development can be
traced back to three problems: a neglect of the opportunities cultural diversity
offers, an implicit preference for central steering, a dominance of top-down politi-
cal solutions, such as the idea of a global carbon tax or a global Kyoto regime, and
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an underestimation of the ‘wickedness’ of many sustainability challenges. It is
concluded that unless sustainable development became more inclined to work with
diversity concepts, reflexive and dynamic, it will most probably fail.
This requires institutions, instruments, processes and actor involvement based on
compatibility of values and traditions, rather than on commonality or integration, and
on situationally effective combinations of ideas from hierarchical, network and
market governance. The consequence of this is that we need an approach beyond
traditional forms of governance, towards a culturally sensitive metagovernance for
sustainable development; beyond disciplinary scientific research, towards more
transdisciplinarity; beyond borders formed by states and other institutions, towards
trans-border approaches; beyond conventional means to measuring progress, towards
new and more interactive measuring methods; beyond linear forms of innovation,
towards open innovation; beyond cultural integration or assimilation, towards
looking for compatibility. In other words, governance for sustainable transformations
requires what we have framed in this volume as transgovernance. The chapter ends
with recommendations on how to apply culturally informed metagovernance embed-
ded in the broader approach of transgovernance.
Growth: A Discussion of the Margins of Economic and
Ecological Thought
In the third chapter, Alexander Perez-Carmona reviews the long debate on eco-
nomic growth, by which he touches one of the most disputed dimensions of
sustainable development. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the economic growth
debate hitherto and to review and compare two alternatives to it: the stationary-state
economy of Herman Daly and de-growth of Serge Latouche. The growth debate
emerged out of the convergence of several ecological and political factors in the
late 1960s. The position of economists became divided on the issue, with the
majority maintaining the growth commitment. It was, however, the study ‘Limits
to Growth’ that really projected the debate beyond academia. The debate remained
strongly polarised until the Brundtland report was published, settling the issue
politically. The report, a product inevitably of compromise, neglected many impor-
tant issues, for example the phenomenon of social-engineered wants already well-
documented at that time. Furthermore, it ended up recommending what otherwise
would have been pursued, such as improvements in energy-matter efficiency, while
ignoring scale effects (Jevons paradox) already known too.
International Politics and Cooperation
In Chap. 4, Jamel Napolitano focuses on sustainability governance and interna-
tional politics and cooperation. This chapter argues for a lecture on the notion of
development as strongly linked to the uneven distribution of material and
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non-material sources of power among groups. It thus analyses the rise of a public
environmentalist awareness as a challenge to the capitalist pattern of production
and consumption. Finally, the chapter shed some light on the process of
mainstreaming these claims by subsuming them within the Western model of
societal transformation, under the new, catchy label of sustainable development.
Pressing for institutional solutions to environmental depletion has meant to
further spread the sustainability goal worldwide. On the other hand, it has also
implied a kind of betrayal of the truly transformative instances of many social
movements and local communities, which were seeking for a revolutionary, rather
than reformative, path to societal change. After having set the stage in Part 1, the
second part of the book presents selected issues with a high political and scientific
relevance.
Planetary Boundaries
Falk Schmidt critically reviews one of the new discourses of sustainability science,
namely the challenge to govern planetary boundaries. Schmidt argues that it seems
intuitive to identify boundaries of an earth systemwhich is increasingly threatened by
human activities. Being aware of and hence studying boundariesmay be necessary for
effective governance of sustainable development. However, can the planetary
boundaries function as useful ‘warning signs’ in this respect? The answer presented
in his chapter is: yes, but. Schmidt argues that these boundaries cannot be described
exclusively by scientific knowledge claims. They have to be identified by science-
society or transdisciplinary deliberations. He provides two recommendations for
sustainability governance: to better institutionalise integrative transdisciplinary
assessment processes along the lines of the interconnected nature of the planetary
boundaries and to foster cross-sectoral linkages in order to institutionalise more
integrative and yet context-sensitive governance arrangements. These insights are
briefly confronted in his chapter, with options for institutional reform in the context of
the Rio+20 process.
Governance of Emergencies
In Chap. 6, G€unther Bachmann presents his thoughts on the notion of global
environmental emergencies in the context of knowledge-based action towards
sustainable development. Bachmann argues that responding to emergency
situations is about immediate decisions and action. If carried out incorrectly or
badly performed, it not only fails in substance but is likely to destroy and
delegitimise any further attempts to transform constraints and contingencies
which have caused the emergency situation in the first place. This is why emer-
gency response should play a role in governance concepts. Bachmann refers to
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examples of hazardous substances, impacts of climate change and nuclear
accidents, all of them producing nonconventional risks that need transgovernance
features beyond national borders.
Bachmann suggests that neither the recent debates on international environmen-
tal governance nor those focusing on the multilateral governance framework for
sustainable development emphasise sufficiently the issue of emergency response.
More often than not, dealing with emergency control is regarded as a strictly
national task. This chapter argues that this is inadequate, because the character of
emergencies is changing. Whereas conventional emergencies are mostly local, it is
clear that limited and calculable nuclear accidents and the adverse effects of climate
change demonstrate that the modern generation of emergencies has the potential to
surpass geographic limits and national borders and to be long term. Therefore, this
chapter argues that emergency control policies may play an important role in
clustering change processes and transition efforts, at least under certain conditions
and whilst framed by the concept of transgovernance.
Boundary Work
Finally, in Chap. 7, Stefan Jungcurt concentrates on boundary work between
science and society. He investigates how a systemic approach to the analysis of
interactions between knowledge production and decision-making on sustainable
development could be shaped.
The concept of boundary work has been put forward as an analytical approach
towards the study of interactions between science and policy. While the concept has
been useful as a case-study approach, there are several weaknesses and constraints
when using the concept in a more systemic analysis of the interactions between
knowledge production and sustainable development decision-making at the inter-
national level, for example its inability to capture the diversity of institutions
involved in such boundary work and a lack of conceptualisation of the impacts of
the specific conditions of intergovernmental decision-making, such as rules for
representation and the mode of negotiation. This chapter suggests complementing
the concept of boundary work with a configuration approach based on a two-
dimensional conceptualisation of the boundary space in international decision-
making that allows the positioning of institutions with regard to their degree of
politicisation and their position in terms of national and regional representation.
Such an approach, which is in line with what transgovernance requires, could be a
useful guide in the further conceptualisation and application of the boundary
concept.
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The Quest for Governance of Sustainable Development
The TransGov project not only resulted in this academic volume with reviewed
chapters but also produced a separate monograph authored by Roeland in ’t Veld,
summarising and enriching the main lines of discussion within the project, focusing
on practical suggestions for decision-makers in governments and other relevant
social actors. This report, in line with our view on science as a transdisciplinary
exercise, is open source and, therefore, freely available at www.iass-potsdam.de. Of
course, the open source mechanism also applies to this volume, which is available
at www.springer.de. In order to show the links between both publications, we found
it useful to include the summary and recommendations of the report
‘Transgovernance: The Quest for (Global) Governance of Sustainable Develop-
ment’ in this volume (Chap. 8).
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Part 1
Reflections on Sustainability Governance
Chapter 1
Sustainable Development Within Knowledge
Democracies: An Emerging Governance
Problem
Roeland Jaap in ’t Veld
Abstract Sustainable development is all over the place. The concept is broad and
vague. The vagueness of the concept has a Janus face. It has been called a unifying
concept because its vagueness breeds a consensus that might be utilised later on.
Vagueness is an asset if it triggers action. On the other hand, if sustainable develop-
ment is everything, maybe it is nothing. . . Although – or maybe because – the
concept is vague, it has overwhelming appeal on political agendas, programmes
and dialogues. The precautionary principle is the nucleus of a powerful moral
imperative. The multidimensional nature of the concept, covering ecological, eco-
nomic and social aspects of change relates to our needs for integration. Sustainable
development as a concept bears a persuasive character. Actors of all kinds may
contribute to it, citizens, enterprises, NGOs, governments et cetera.
Thinking about the governance of sustainable development leads us to the
recognition of a multi-level, multi-scale, multi-disciplinary character of the
problematique. Moreover, the term development refers to change, to transitions
and transformations. Governance of sustainable development therefore has to cope
with complex dynamics. This chapter deals with the specific consequences of
sustainability governance inside knowledge democracies. The concept of knowl-
edge democracy sheds new light on the emerging relationships between politics,
media and science. It shows how the emergence of participatory democracy besides
representative democracy, the revolutionary rise of social media besides corporate
media, the emergence of transdisciplinary trajectories besides classical disciplinary
science lead to explosions of complex interactions. We will digress upon the variety
of possible future variants of knowledge democracies, quiet and turbulent ones, in
relation to the quest for sustainable development. Our main conclusion will be that
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strategies for sustainability may vary with the types of knowledge democracies
around.
1.1 Introduction
Since the introduction of the concept of knowledge democracy with the meaning of
enabling a new focus on the relationships between knowledge production and
dissemination (in ’t Veld 2010a), the functioning of the media and the evolution
of our democratic institutions and processes, we have seen remarkable proof of the
vitality of the concept. The concept obliges us to realise that the institutional
frameworks of today’s societies may appear to be deficient as far as the
undercurrents, trends and other developments demand change. Reconsidering the
events in 2011 in the Maghreb, the Middle East and some other regions, the crucial
role of social media besides phenomena of participatory democracy demand our
attention.
Democracy is without any doubt the most successful governance concept for
societies during the two last centuries. It is a strong brand, even used by rulers who
do not meet any substantial democratic criterion. Representation gradually became
the predominant mechanism by which the population at large, through elections,
provides a body with a general authorisation to take decisions in all public domains
for a certain period of time. Representative parliamentary democracy became the
icon of advanced nation-states.
The recent decline of representative parliamentary democracy has been called
upon by many authors. On the micro-level the earlier consistent individual position
of an ideologically-based consistent value pattern has disappeared. The values are
present but the glue of a focal ideological principle is not any longer at stock.
Fragmentation of values has led to individualisation, to uniqueness but thereby also
to the impossibility of being represented in a general manner by a single actor such
as a member of parliament. More fundamentally media-politics destroy the original
meaning of representation. On the meso-level the development of political parties
to marketeers in the political realm destroys their capacity for designing consistent
broad political strategies. Like willow trees they move with the winds of the
supposed voters’ preferences. And on the macro-level media-politics dominate.
Volatility therefore will probably increase.
The debate on the future of democracy has not yet led to major innovations in
advanced national societies in Europe, contrary to sweeping innovation elsewhere.
Established political actors try to tackle populism with trusted resources: a combi-
nation of anti-populist rhetoric and adoption of the populist agenda. Some of the
media have responded by attempting to become ‘more populist than populists
themselves’, almost always at the expense of analytical depth. In other parts of
the world the longing for democracy leads to sweeping movements.
The development in different parts of the world partially points in a variety of
directions: city government in parts of South America is characterised by
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remarkable citizens’ participation in many cases, while in Asia the rule of law is
introduced without classical democracy in influential nations. The recent
developments in the Middle East still await thorough evaluation.
Meanwhile, the worldwide web as well as the evolution of social media provides
for a drastic change in the rules of the game. A better educated public has wide
access to information, and selects it more and more by itself, instead of relying on
media filters as produced by classical media. Moreover citizens themselves have
become media. They may produce, in some cases soon world-famous, YouTube
videos at home or down town. Even more, social media have to the surprise of many
shown to be of decisive importance in drastic changes of government and gover-
nance in several North-African states in 2011.
The relationships between corporate, top-down media and politics may change
considerably as a consequence of the rise of social media because politicians may
utilise social media in order to create direct communication with voters, so their
dependence on the top-down media diminishes. The corporate media are not any
longer the necessary, only intermediaries between politicians and voters. Neverthe-
less, people get tired of social media already too, because the latter produce also
much pulp, and the costs of finding trustworthy information are high; confusion and
ambiguity are all over the place. The crucial combination of a network society and
media-politics provides new problems and tensions. The political agenda is increas-
ingly filled with so-called wicked problems, characterised by the absence of
consensus both on the relevant values and the necessary knowledge and informa-
tion. Uncertainty and complexity prevail.
Today’s societies are characterised by an increasing intensity and speed of
reflexive mechanisms. Reflexive mechanisms in a more or less lenient political
environment cause overwhelming volatility of bodies of knowledge related to social
systems. As all available knowledge is utilised to facilitate reflexive processes, the
result of such processes might establish new relationships that undermine the
existing knowledge. Social reality has thus become unpredictable in principle.
Voß and Kemp in their introductory chapter to Reflexive Governance to Sus-
tainable Development (2006) deal with reflexivity and distinguish first- and second-
order reflexivity. First-order reflexivity
refers to how modernity deals with its own implications and side effects, the mechanism by
which modern societies grow in cycles of producing problems and solutions to these
problems that produce new problems. The reality of modern society is thus a result of
self-confrontation. (Voß and Kemp 2006: 6).
Second-order reflexivity concerns ‘the cognitive reconstruction of this cycle’.
It ‘entails the application of modern rational analysis not only to the self-induced
problems but also to its own working, conditions and effects’. It may be clear that
we mainly deal with second-order reflexivity in the terminology of Voß and Kemp.
The relationships between science and politics demand new designs in an
environment of media-politics, wicked problems and reflexivity. The classical
theory on boundary work as published by Jasanoff and others in order to master
the existing gaps between science and politics is nowadays widely accepted among
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experts. The underlying insight is that scientific knowledge by its very structure
never directly relates to action, because it is fragmented, partial, conditional and
immunised. This observation is valid for both mono- and multi- disciplinary
knowledge. Thus, translation activities are always necessary in order to utilise
scientific knowledge for policy purposes.
The literature on transdisciplinary research is dominated by process-directed
normative studies. It appears to me that the core concept of transdisciplinarity is to
be defined as the trajectory in a multi-actor environment from both sources: from a
political agenda and existing expertise, to a robust, plausible perspective for action.
In the third part of the chapter we reflect upon the specific consequences of the
mixing of governance of sustainability and knowledge democracies. The final part
of this chapter is devoted to observations on quiet and turbulent democracies as
very different typologies of potential evolutionary patterns of knowledge
democracy.
1.2 Sustainable Development
We consider our world through the veils of fundamental normative perspectives
that shape our beliefs, our inspiration and our actions. One of the many disputes
between Plato and Aristoteles concerned the question whether mankind is either
part of nature or has a subject-object relation to nature. The anthropocentric
character of the concept of nature became gradually stronger in the Western
world. The Christian religion defined the duty of men towards nature as steward-
ship, Verwalterstelle, but did seldom practice it. The era of Aufkl€arung, Enlighten-
ment has delivered the perspective of humankind as the master of the universe, with
the perspective of a world governed by reason and by science. But the shadow of
Faust was always near. More recently the metaphor of the exhaustion of the earth,
caused by human irresponsibility, has come to the forefront in disputes. Economic
growth then may be sinful. Perez-Carmona treats this issue more fundamentally in
Chap. 3 of this volume. On the other side of the spectre, commentators consider
technological innovation as the great liberator of the human race, because it will
eradicate poverty, hunger and many other shortcomings.
Statistics indicate that we on the average live longer and in better health than
ever before, but the pursuit of happiness relates to more than statistics. Our values
on distributive justice urge us to pay attention to differences. Many of the normative
perspectives on the environment are formulated in terms of threats that demand
immediate action. While increasing wealth appears to reduce the willingness to
accept risks of wealthy people, these threats are shaped as extreme risks.
It has been generally accepted nowadays that mankind is able to bring about
irreversible change that partially diminishes the options of future generations.
The normative insight derived from this principle is formulated as the precautionary
principle. This principle leads to the norm that we should abstain from action
that reduces the valuable future options for choice. Moreover the concept of
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sustainability now concerns the three major dimensions of human societies,
the economic, social and ecological dimension, collected as the three P’s people,
planet, profit. Van Londen and De Ruijter (2011: 10) define the concept of
sustainable development as the reconciliation of three imperatives: (a) the eco-
logical imperative, to remain within planetary bio-physical carrying capacity;
(b) the economic imperative, to ensure an adequate material standard of living;
and (c) the social imperative, to provide social structures – including systems of
governance – that effectively propagate and sustain the values that people want to
live by, in order to maximise human welfare.
The reconciliatory character of sustainable development raises specific
questions as to the judgment on changes that lead to improvement in two
dimensions but to deterioration in the third. Until now we lack a satisfactory
interdimensional measuring rod in order to judge upon this type of changes. This
deficiency is serious because as a consequence we are unable to provide convincing
criteria to judge upon policy options in a comparative manner.
Many different dialogues about sustainable development take place simulta-
neously: cities, states, enterprises and families discuss sustainable development in
their own specific environment. They use common words, but in various
rationalities. Sustainable development is a container notion. The use of the singular
form fits in holistic viewpoints. The supporters of these viewpoints speak about the
climate, the earth, the emissions, the planetary boundaries (Meuleman 2010b). All
of these are at stake, and disasters threaten. Such constructs enable us subsequently
to deal with a global challenge that should be met in a well-coordinated manner.
Thus, the normative construction of the problematique leads to a specific line of
argumentation on governance. The supporters of this view may be found in
international organisations that make continuous efforts to produce consensus on
international binding agreements, in order to prevent disasters. Basic metaphors
like the exhaustion of the earth, and planetary boundaries, then are very useful.
However, people do not experience the climate but a climate in the
neighbourhood. They pursue a good life according to their own values and in
many cases try to find a satisfactory relationship to the surrounding nature. Their
visible world is not abstract or systemic but specific and concrete. Likewise, until a
few years ago, climatologists distinguished many different climates. Entrepreneurs
make attempts to design and apply more sustainable technologies. They act in a
specific environment too, not in an abstract universe. So Perceptions are not only
context-bound but also acceptable ways of dealing with problematic issues. Thus,
major discrepancies may exist here between the systemic world on one hand and the
daily life world on the other.
The Western world has developed environmental policies during the last half
century. In the international realm younger nation-states, often former colonies,
more recently also become aware of the disagreeable side effects of economic
growth. They want to counterbalance these effects in their own manner. In the
diplomatic arena they however are confronted continuously with urgent calls to
participate in bargaining processes on treaties with the former colonial powers.
These partners now urge for dramatic reductions of emissions and the like. Quota
for a certain future year are symbols of urgency. The young nation that is coping
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with the need for reduction of backwardness in technologies and is just starting to
think about clean technologies will not feel inspired by the short term limits set by
others. It will experience those as unnatural.
Moreover, the language of international traditional diplomacy would not neces-
sarily be accepted by all relevant actors because some could interpret this language
as an expression of hegemony by former colonial powers. Cultural diversity should
be recognised both as a component of sustainability and as a complicating factor,
that prohibits progress in reaching consensus on collective action. Meuleman
devotes a chapter in this book to these questions (Chap. 2).
A society needs a certain cohesion, that is produced as a moral order, based on
consensus on some fundamental values and norms. Therefore, culture within a
society is also the sharing of some common substantial and relational values.
A society consists of configurations. A configuration possesses a specific culture
but as observed earlier, this leads to outside walls, and tensions arise. In particular
the tensions between emerging identities on one side, accompanied necessarily by
outer walls, and the need for cohesion and collective action on the other will never
disappear. Shaping governance thus is walking a high wire.
We should argue that biodiversity and cultural diversity both are components of
sustainability. We may mourn about the loss of a language somewhere on this globe
as about the loss of a species. But our general attitude towards cultural diversity in
daily practice is far more critical than towards biodiversity. We do not believe that
each culture is intrinsically good. On the contrary, some cultures are horrifying to
many. As sustainability also implies the economic and social dimension, we realise
that ‘diversity always is a bedfellow of inequality’ (Van Londen and De Ruijter
2011: 14). Inequality might be a threat to sustainable development, so our attitude
towards cultural diversity is ambiguous.
According to the concept of second modernity (Beck 1992) it is probable that
from the tense relations between emerging opposites variety increases. Striving at
sustainable development urges us to take these tensions fully into account when
dealing with governance.
Because sustainable development is a long range trajectory, with considerable
uncertainty and lack of forecasting options, the notion of resilience is crucial: like
Noah we can act sensibly without any certainty on future events by answering the
question how to avoid a disaster, in casu by building an Ark. Nowadays for instance
it is uncertain which theory on climate change is the right one, but once the theory
that allies climate change to carbon emissions is there, the justification of measures
to reduce emissions can be based on the resilience norm: in order to avoid disasters
we have to take into account the feasible theoretical viewpoints irrespective of our
beliefs.
Some supporters of strict environmental policies consider the sustainability
concept as a watered-down notion. Like T.S. Eliot (where is the wisdom we lost
in knowledge, where is the knowledge we lost in information?) they ask them-
selves: where is the attention for the environment we lost in sustainability?
We should realise in accordance with the view of Grunwald (2004), Grin (2006)
and others that the plurality of notions of sustainable development and their
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normative origins and connotations lead to the necessity of considering the recom-
mendable knowledge-producing and policy-making processes as reflexive.
In Grunwalds terminology:
The normative character of the imperative of sustainability, its inseparable connection with
deep-rooted societal structures and values, the long-term nature of many relevant
developments, as well as the often necessary inclusion of societal groups and actors, result
in specific demands on scientific problem-solving contributions. Research for sustainable
development is a particularly marked type of post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz
1993: 151)
Therefore we will argue that dealing with reflexivity and transdisciplinarity are
necessary once we strive at sustainable development.
1.3 Knowledge Democracy
1.3.1 The Overwhelming Success of Democracy
In 2011 again sweeping moves may be observed, and loud outcries may be heard
demanding more democracy in different parts of the world. As we argued earlier
(in ’t Veld 2010a), democracy is the most successful governance concept for
societies as well as a strong brand. Even the most cruel dictatorships call themselves
democracies.
Democracy according to Abraham Lincoln is a very broad concept: ‘government
of the people, by the people and for the people’. Some centuries later Schumpeter
(1943) however defines it in a minimal manner:
[. . ..] the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote.
From the Greek philosopher Plato onwards, (who inherited some insights from
the vedas) the continuous debates on the relative merits of democracy versus
aristocracy, of consensual versus majoritarian typologies of democracy, of
unicentric versus pluricentric concepts of democracy enrich our thinking.
In the course of the last two centuries, a group of related types of representative
constitutional democracy became the predominant format of the nation-state. It
enjoyed unheard popularity, and still does, all over the globe. All Western and most
Southern political leaders preach democracy as an all-healing recipe. Representa-
tion gradually became the predominant mechanism by which the population at
large, through elections, provides a body with a general authorisation to take
decisions in all public domains for a certain period of time.
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1.3.2 The Curse of Success
Figure 1.1 shows the essential classical characteristics of interactions. In the
twentieth century parliamentary democracy politics and media become more and
more mutually dependent, policies are increasingly funded in science, but at the
same time science gets more and more dependent on public resources, so that the
linkages between politics and science intensify.
The cognitive and emotional investments into the present democratic institutions
have been large. As a consequence the stability of these institutions is embraced.
However, exogenous as well as endogenous developments threaten the continua-
tion of success of representative parliamentary democracy.
The recent decline of the acceptance, the legitimacy and maybe also the effec-
tiveness of representative parliamentary democracy has been called upon by many
authors. Both Castells (1996, 2009) and Dahrendorf (2002) explicitly refer to the
rise of media-politics as a threat to democracy. The reciprocal structural depen-
dence of politicians and media then becomes the focal determinant of political
action. Their explanations are related to the waning role of political parties and the
migration of the political forum from parliaments to television studios. As a result
of the disappearance of compelling political ideologies, political parties have
started to behave like economic actors striving to maximise the number of future
voters: following sole economic marketing theory for as far as their position on the
political spectre is concerned. In the absence of consistent ideologies, the main
parties choose a position very close to their competitors, shrinking the program-
matic space dramatically. Therefore, voters complaining about the diminishing
choice options are right.
Three intertwining simultaneous developments have taken place on the macro-,









Fig. 1.1 Twentieth century relationships between politics, science and media
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of the individual citizen, the classical assumption of a consistent individual posi-
tion, based upon an ideologically-based consistent value pattern has disappeared.
The separate values are present but the glue of a focal ideological principle is often
not any longer at stock. Fragmentation of values has led to individualisation, to
uniqueness but thereby also to the impossibility of being represented in a general
manner by a single actor such as a member of parliament. None of the values
cherished by an individual may be unique, but the combination probably is. The
preference on behalf of individuals for partial representation by an NGO per value-
domain therefore is no mistake, but a logical evolution. On the meso-level the
development of political parties to marketeers, who try to optimise the future
number of votes in the political realm destroys their capacity for designing consis-
tent broad political strategies. They move with the winds of the supposed voters’
preferences. And on the macro-level media-politics dominate. As a consequence
the epicentre of politics is shifting from parliament to the media. Media can handle
personalities better than programmes.
Personalities instead of programmes become the most important discriminating
factor and therefore the voters choose personalities. In the attempt to maximise the
number of voters, political parties are keen to use the media, as it is merely possible
to actually ‘sell’ personalities through mass media. This of course significantly
increases the structural dependence of politicians on the mass media. Media and
politics, a relationship based on mutual interest as on the other hand the media
equally need politicians in order to produce news, one of their main products. So
this dependence is reciprocal. The central position of the media – networks in
themselves – with their natural focus on the production of news, causes the political
debate to become superficial and short-term oriented. The classical function of
democracy to protect the people against tyranny and random or arbitrary action by
rulers is endangered by the stress on personalities instead of programmes. More
fundamentally media-politics destroy the original meaning of representation.
As Castells (2009) points out,
It is not improbable that people will utilise their vote at general elections to show disgust or
disapproval, more than revealing their preference for the favourite representative.
To his judgement, representation does not any longer produce a sustainable
mandate for the representative. It does merely register an instantaneous picture
of disgust at the moment of elections, timeless, without any meaning for future
trust, and certainly not for a longer time span. Volatility therefore will probably
increase.
The arguments in some attempts to gain insight in the consequences of the
decline of democracy, point at the under-institutionalised global developments
characterised by the increasing predominance of global economic conglomerates
and accompanied by the rise of a new global elite. Other comments indicate that
new communication technologies create virtual worlds and weaken the relevance of
a physical stable territory. The notion of state, of territory, of society, of sovereignty
and therefore of democracy appear to be endangered. ICT and mass media are
identified by the above-mentioned analysts as threats for the political realm with a
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specific negative influence on political representation as media-politics develop. All
these trends appear to cause the gradual disappearance of checks and balances,
among which adequate protection against arbitrary or random political action. We
will digress upon these options later. Another group of far more optimistic experts
indicates that ICT enables new types of democracy that could prove to deliver
adequate countervailing powers against the just listed threats.
The debate on the future of democracy in advanced European States has not yet
led to major innovations. Established political actors try to tackle populism with
trusted resources: a combination of anti-populist rhetoric and adoption of the
populist agenda.
We are aware that the development in other parts of the world partially point in
another direction: city government in South America is characterised by remarkable
citizens’ participation in many cases, while in Asia the rule of law is introduced
without classical democracy in important nations.
However, recent changes add to the complexity of the relations mentioned so far.
1.3.3 Wide Access to Information for Everyone
As Fig. 1.2 shows, we envisage a world now in which representative democracy is
supplemented with, not replaced by participatory democracy, in which social media
are added to classical corporate top-down media, and in which disciplinary science
is increasingly accompanied by transdisciplinary trajectories. The evolutionary
patterns in each corner of the triangle are not without tensions: the inner institutions
feel threatened by the younger, outer ones. Each of the corners in the triangle is
prone to profound change, indicated in the second-order relationships:
• The bottom-up media do not only supplement the classical media, but also
compete with them.
• Participatory democracy is complementary to representative democracy but is
also considered as a threat to the latter.
• Transdisciplinary design or research is not only a bridge between classical
science and the real world but also produces deviant knowledge and insights,
in some cases hostile to the disciplinary viewpoints.
The evolution of the worldwide web and the mobile phone, as well as the
evolution of social media provide for a drastic change in the rules of the game.
Acts of harassment on weblogs become political facts; virtual allegations become
unchecked urban myths and pressure groups design increasingly easier ways to find
endorsement on the internet. US president Obama’s campaign was trendsetting for
the latter.
Internet, better education and other societal changes have made knowledge
accessible to many more people than in the past. This leads to an abundance of
knowledge and information that needs to be interpreted. It also leads to different
types of knowledge: not only scientific knowledge appears to be relevant, but also
citizens’ knowledge. This is a huge challenge for policy-makers, for scientists and
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for the media. Politics is not just about how knowledge can be selected for political
decisions, but also about how democratic decision-making processes should change
in order to incorporate the different types of knowledge adequately.
A majority of the population now utilises social media. Castells (2009) speaks
about ‘mass self communication’. Moreover, citizens themselves have become
media: any citizen may produce a YouTube video that becomes famous in a few
days: icons in political turmoil with great political momentum may be created by
amateurs, as the recent events in Iran in 2010 already showed us. The Maghreb and
Middle East uprisings in 2011 were influenced decisively – according to many
observers – by social media. The classical media suffer from the new ones: not only
in a commercial sense, but also because of the influence of the new media. We call
the new media the bottom-up media in order to distinguish them from the classical
media, the top-down media. This distinction does not imply that the top is more
powerful than the bottom. An increasing series of empirical counterproofs is
available.
Many of the new media do not know an editing function: nobody accepts the
obligation to select the rubbish from the trustworthy materials. This results in very
high costs for the recipient of the information in order to make the aforementioned
selection. The developments in and with the media are confusing. Our capacity to
observe appears deficient. Information and knowledge of very different origins are
available within a second but it is hard to judge upon quality. As usual in second
Fig. 1.2 Two orders of tensions (After in ’t Veld 2010a: 11)
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modernity the top-down media do not disappear altogether but develop innovative
strategies, accepting internet options and modes of cooperation with social media.
The social media are in the process of discovering their own deficiencies, and in
some cases organise a revival of editorial functions.
The wicked character of many problems on the political agenda sheds a
fascinating light on the complexities caused by the interaction of top-down and
bottom-up media. Inclusion and exclusion get new dimensions: while the Dutch
authorities promoted a campaign of vaccination in order to protect young girls
against future cervical cancer in the official media, the target group itself
communicated on MSN Messenger, including series of very negative rumours.
A woman in a flower shop started a website that got more hits for some time than
the aggregate number of hits for all websites of Dutch ministries. This website
produced very negative information on vaccination in general, and sketched con-
siderable risks. As a consequence a large part of the target group refused vaccina-
tion. Like ships in the night, the different streams of information passed each other.
Thus important real life consequences came forward from this multiplicity of
information channels and content.
As mentioned above, we can distinguish ‘top-down media’ and ‘bottom-up
media’. Both contribute to the agenda setting of politics. The top-down media
operate in structural interdependency with politics. The expression ‘media-politics’
is devoted to this interdependency. The bottom-up media are to a considerable
degree independent from both the top-down media and politics. Participation in
decision preparation and -making may be invited by public authorities, but unin-
vited participation takes place too, in particular with support of bottom-up media.
We are not in the position yet to draw consolidated conclusions on this develop-
ment: it is fluid, it is fast, and it is reflexive itself so also unpredictable.
1.3.4 From Knowledge Economy to Knowledge Democracy
During the last decade, an influential debate was conducted on the ‘knowledge-
based economy’. This concept even became the main policy objective of the
European Union, the Lisbon Strategy. However, there are signs that the strength
of the argument for the knowledge-based economy is weakening rapidly. The
current worldwide economic crisis leads to new, very challenging questions.
These questions refer mainly to the institutional frameworks of today’s societies.
It is therefore time for a transition to a new concept that concentrates on institu-
tional and functional innovation. As the industrial economy has been combined
with mass democracy through universal suffrage and later by the rise of mass
media, one might suggest that the logical successor of knowledge economy is a
new type of governance, to be called ‘knowledge democracy’.
Which challenges and threats will we be facing? How will the respectable
parliamentary and new direct forms of democracy mix, and which roles will
knowledge play in the transition towards a knowledge democracy? The crucial
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combination of a network society and media-politics provides new problems and
tensions. Earlier we concentrated upon the roles of knowledge and information in
today’s democracies. We further developed the concept of knowledge democracy
in order to analyse whether we might be able to deal with these problems and
tensions. Now we want to discover what new tensions are arising once we practice
knowledge democracy.
Today policy-making in many instances is evidence- or knowledge- based,
providing both legitimacy and effectiveness, according to the supporters. Effective-
ness is assured as the knowledge concerns true statements on the relationships
between political interventions and their societal effects, so is their claim worded.
Legitimacy according to them is furthered when the policies are based upon the
‘objective’ truth. It is not difficult to undermine this belief.
Scientific research is a specific form of research, aimed at the creation or
accumulation of scientific knowledge. Classical scientific research is performed
within disciplines, specialised branches of science with specific theories and
methodologies. This monodisciplinary knowledge is formalised in a particular
way methodologically: it is for example subject to peer review. It is often put into
a rule-based form, such as: ‘A implies B’ in a particular set of circumstances,
whenever these circumstances occur. Such an assertion is known as a hypothesis.
‘The more a child participates in sports, the less likely the child is to turn to drugs’,
is a statement which could originate from empirical research and which probably
holds true for white families in European cities from 1990 to the present time. But
not for rural areas in Colombia. And why should this statement hold true for the
future? Scientific knowledge is therefore by definition both fragmented and condi-
tional. Its scientific value is dependent on the correct application of the agreed
methodology. Scientific knowledge lays claim to validity and is a protection against
criticism. What we are talking about here is what is called ‘normal research’.
It is difficult to integrate different areas of scientific knowledge because scien-
tific knowledge is by its very nature fragmented. And its conditional character
means that in order to apply the knowledge in real-world situations, it is necessary
to verify whether the conditions set have been complied with. In terms of the future,
this question can never be definitively answered. This means that every application
of social scientific knowledge for the purpose of policy bears an element of risk.
If a policy-maker – in the course of preparing policy proposals – wishes to apply
an assertion which is based on a rule, such as ‘for every X, under condition Y: A
implies B’, she first has to verify:
• ‘Is the X that I am talking about the same X as in the assumption?’
• ‘Are the conditions which I am faced with the same as the Y in the assumption?’
• ‘Is there really an A in my situation?’
• ‘Will the implication still apply at the time when the policy is implemented?’
In particular the last question is a nasty one because the consciousness of
reflexivity urges us to wonder whether the drug dealers might have reflected upon
the research results too, and might have ensured for themselves a position in the
boards of the sports clubs.
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This implies that applying scientific knowledge in policy does not always and
should not follow the accepted route of meeting the methodological requirements
which applied when the knowledge in question was developed. The application of
scientific knowledge in a political and governmental context is an exercise in
uncertainty, partly based on suppositions and it also requires competences other
than scientific ones, such as social intelligence and well-developed social intuition.
It appears necessary to link scientific knowledge to other types of insights without
detracting from its relevance and usefulness. Combining knowledge from different
scientific disciplines and mixing it with other insights is an opportunity to try to
maintain the relevance and usefulness of such knowledge in the relevant applica-
tion. Multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary developments in research are in full swing.
Anyone who realises this, cannot fail to be impressed by the speculative nature of
many elements of the methods used. The precision of a great deal of scientific
knowledge very soon gets lost in these methods. Robust concepts are often unrefined.
As Silvio Funtowicz has explained over and over again, this image of evidence
based policies based upon ‘sound’ knowledge is not adequate according to the
advanced science model. We will elaborate upon this later.
Let us now state that knowledge on social systems by definition is volatile as a
consequence of the reflexivity we will discuss below. The predominant position of
wicked problems on political agenda’s as indicated earlier is the main cause that
linear problem solution strategies cannot be used. Wicked problems cannot be
solved, they can be managed. In many cases interactive processes are part of
effective management. Elements of participatory democracy as well as transdisci-
plinarity may be involved, to be dealt with later on.
1.4 Reflexivity
Today’s societies are characterised by an increasing intensity and speed of reflexive
mechanisms. I define reflexive mechanisms as events and arrangements that bring
about a redefinition of the action perspectives, the focal strategies of the groups and
people involved, as a consequence of mindful or thoughtful considerations
concerning the frames, identities, underlying structures of themselves as well as
other relevant stakeholders. Defined in this manner, reflexivity has to do with a
particular kind of learning potential. Reflexive systems have the ability to re-
orientate themselves and adapt accordingly based on available self-knowledge.
Reflexive mechanisms in a more or less lenient political environment cause
overwhelming volatility of bodies of knowledge related to social systems. As all
available knowledge is utilised to facilitate reflexive processes, the result of such
processes might establish new relationships that undermine the existing knowledge.
Social reality has then become unpredictable in principle. The efficacy of reflexive
mechanisms is furthered by institutional arrangements that enable individual liberty
and tolerance.
In a tyrannical environment reflexive learning may take place, but it is not
spontaneously transformed into a change in behaviour because that change
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probably is illegal, and severely punished. Insofar as tyranny is negatively
correlated with democracy, a democratic environment will prove to be more apt
for reflexivity. Extreme profiles in courage however do show behavioural
consequences of reflexive learning in tyrannical environments (for example
Havel, Mandela).
It is necessary to develop this notion of reflexive learning further because it is of
utmost importance for the design of an advanced way of thinking on policy-making:
we should realise that a social theory of any kind may never be used to create policy
measures without an additional research effort on the specific issue. Such an effort
should include the question whether it is probable or plausible that the theory is
already undermined by reflexive reactions in or around the target group of the
measure. This latter effort will never deliver results with an absolute truth claim.
Uncertainty is overwhelmingly present there too. The policy dialogue will then be
characterised by different layers of uncertainty, and so by a discussion on the
impact of the different layers of uncertainty too.
Evidence-based policy-making as a normative concept probably bears some
relevance when it concerns the application of a physical, chemical or biological
scientific theory. But it becomes a hazardous pretention if the decision support
comes from a theory in the social sciences for the reasons just explained. In
particular the claims of economics in important fields as education and health are
sometimes preposterous. More modesty would fit once the complexity jump that
results from reflexive systems is internalised by the expert. Thus, the fashionable
approach towards evidence-based policies in social domains should be moderated
in a more modest and thoughtful framework.
Knowledge democracy could become an emerging concept with political, ideo-
logical and persuasive meaning. The analogy with the concept of knowledge
economy is clear: the latter brought political attention for the economic meaning
of research and development, a focus on the quality of education and political
support for larger public budgets for the domains under consideration. The human
capital theory – although deficient from a scientific point of view – became the
predominating policy paradigm in educational policies.
The concept of knowledge economy has developed as a rather vague persuasive
notion concerning the relationships between advanced research and education on
one hand and economic prosperity on the other. The ‘container’-character of the
concept has not prohibited favourable effects. It has proven to cause a more
conscious approach to the relationships between knowledge production and dis-
semination on one hand and economic innovation on the other. Education has been
recognised fully as a crucial factor in the pursuit of economic progress.
The concept is meant to enable a new focus on the relationships between
knowledge production and dissemination, the functioning of the media and our
democratic institutions. The emerging concept of knowledge democracy moreover
obliges us to realise that the institutional frameworks of today’s societies may
appear to be deficient insofar as the above mentioned undercurrents, trends and
other developments demand change. We explored the directions for institutional
change during the conference.
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In the perspective of new relationships between politics, media and science also
classical problems demand new solutions: the concept of knowledge democracy
concerns a problematique that relates to the intensification of knowledge in politics.
I developed a heuristic scheme in order to think more accurately about the
bottlenecks that threaten optimal trajectories between the realm of politics,
policy-making and useful research (Fig. 1.3). The thunderbolts show possible
bottlenecks in the processes of articulation of the demand for knowledge, as well
as the utilisation of knowledge, for instance:
• The actual political agenda may not correspond with the existing policy theories
that are either laid down in existing policies, legal systems budgeting rules et
cetera and/or are embraced by the top civil servants.
• The translation of policy questions in knowledge demand may prove to be
extremely difficult, for instance because the policy objectives bear a symbolic
character, or because the policy questions are wicked in nature, lacking under-
lying consensus on values.
• Inconvenient truth, newly produced knowledge that attacks the existing policy
theories, will probably not be applied in policy-making.
Fig. 1.3 Bottlenecks between the realm of politics, policy-making and useful research (After in ’t
Veld [Ed.] 2000/2009)
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• Research will produce knowledge in the future but the need is urgent, and the
political agenda is slightly volatile so there is a general problem of timeliness. In
order to recognise the time lags just described on one hand and the legitimate
demand for useful new knowledge on the other we should attempt to design the
policy agenda in the near future instead of only the present one, but that is a
dangerous activity.
The aforementioned bottlenecks can be reformulated as problems that demand a
solution or at least improvements.
The media are far from neutral or passive. The illusion that they are a neutral
mirror of reality belongs to a forgotten past. We have already shed light on the
relationships between politics and media. Media create realities, they also produce
knowledge, and moreover report on citizens’ knowledge. They are the reporters on
scientific findings but also competitors of scientists. The same goes for the
relationships between media and citizens. This increasing complexity demands
efforts in order to gain insight. Other important questions are for instance:
• How do media deal with scientific knowledge, and in particular how do they
select the new knowledge to be reported on from the vast supply of new
knowledge?
• How can scientific knowledge and citizens’ science both be utilised in processes
within politics?
• How can conflicts between both types of knowledge be solved?
• How do supervisors and regulators deal with citizens’ science?
A number of questions concerning the functioning of the democratic institutions
themselves as far as application of knowledge is concerned are very relevant:
• How do parliaments deal with different types of knowledge?
• How do parliaments not only use but also produce knowledge?
• Is parliamentary research to be trusted since parliamentary research committees
never lose their power orientation?
• How do parliaments deal with their dependence on information from ministries?
• Which challenges and threats will we be facing? How will parliamentary and
new direct forms of democracy mix, and which roles will knowledge play in the
transition towards a durable and sustainable knowledge democracy?
In the framework of a knowledge democracy this scheme becomes far more
complicated: the policy-knowledge interaction is not any longer restricted to the
official political institutions but spreads inevitably over society as a whole: citizen’s
groups and initiatives develop viewpoints over any major issue. Moreover citizens
utilise social media independent from authorities either in order to mobilise support
for ideas, or to attack existing policy theories. Science is involved in fierce
competition, in continuous marketing efforts in order to gain support for
viewpoints, based upon research, aiming at the acquisition of public resources for
further research. Advocacy coalitions between the proponents of a certain policy
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theory, the scientific representatives of related scientific theoretical viewpoints, and
sympathetic NGOs and citizen’s initiatives are borne, live and disassemble later on.
1.5 Transdisciplinarity
Much valuable scientific work has been performed on the relationships between
science and politics, in order to answer the last question partially. Jasanoff and
others have argued that it would be wise to design an independent boundary
function in order to foster the quality of the translation. The classical theory on
boundary work in order to master the existing gaps between science and politics is
nowadays widely accepted among experts. The underlying insight is that scientific
knowledge by its very structure never directly relates to action, because it is
fragmented, partial, conditional and immunised. This observation is valid for both
mono- and multi- disciplinary knowledge. Thus translation activities are always
necessary in order to utilise scientific knowledge for policy purposes. Pohl, Scholz,
Nowotny, Regeer and Bunders, and many others have explored this vast domain
and developed the concept of transdisciplinarity in a number of variations.
The literature on transdisciplinary research is dominated by process-directed
normative studies. Many authors suggest that transdisiciplinary research is just a
specific category of scientific research, characterised by the acceptance of some
normative bases for scientific reasoning. Here another viewpoint is defended: it
appears clear that the core concept of transdisciplinarity is to be defined as the
trajectory in a multi-actor environment, a trajectory that leads from two sources: a
political agenda and existing scientific expertise, to a robust, plausible perspective
for action. This trajectory bears the character of a communicative and argumenta-
tive process. Funtowicz’s later models contain both solutions and caveats on this
thorny road.
The terminology of the main authors is still more hesitant and still bears the word
‘research’ in the title. It appears fair, however, to acknowledge that the core activity
of transdisciplinarity is design, more than research. Researchers of course may
contribute to design. Figure 1.4 illustrates the twofold tense relationships between
the corners of the triangle. The original, inner institutional framework was fit for the
application of the fruits of disciplinary science, in order to solve rather simple
policy problems within the framework of representative democracy. Society was
ordered clearly in terms of ideological patterns and classical top-down media
fulfilled their roles. The first-order relationships show this picture. The second
order relationships describe the evolution of each corner. As a consequence of
that evolution we are confronted with tensions, threats and opportunities around the
outer corners of the triangle that are indicated in third-order relationships. As we
may observe the outer points of the extended triangle also strengthen and stimulate
each other. Transdisciplinarity nears participatory democracy, and social media
play crucial roles in large scale communication processes. So the tensions relate
mainly to the inside-outside relations in the triangle while the stimuli relate to the
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outer point of the corners. Hardly any empirical research is available here yet.
Figure 1.5 shows some of the relations between each inner and each outer corner.
This type of relations also has far reaching consequences for the governance of
sustainable development in knowledge democracies. These fourth order relations
might prove to be very diversified: for instance, bottom-up media might be utilised
by representative democracy but also cause conflicts as shown in the case study on
vaccination mentioned above. Citizen’s initiatives might internalise fruits of disci-
plinary science, but also application problems might be caused by it. Top-down
media might orga-nise transdisciplinary trajectories, but they could prove to be
boomerangs for those media themselves, et cetera.
In any society, a wide diversity of actors possesses relevant knowledge
concerning important societal problems. In a knowledge democracy both dominant
and non-dominant actors could and maybe should have equal access and ability to
put this knowledge forward in the process of solving societal problems. We did
already explain why disciplinary knowledge on its own is not fit to solve broader
societal problems.
During the past centuries the specialisation tendency dominated in science,
destroying the practical meaning of the uomo universale, and leading to more and
more disciplines and sub-disciplines. Sometimes innovation was brought about by
new combinations of those, called multi-disciplinary or interdisciplinary coopera-
tion or even mergers. According to the earlier terminology, transdisciplinary
Fig. 1.4 The emergence of the knowledge democracy concept
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research developed during the 1980s and early 1990s of the past century. Multidis-
ciplinary and interdisciplinary research than can be placed in a continuum between
monodisciplinary research and transdisciplinary research. Klein (2001: 7) at the
start of this century defined transdisciplinarity as:
A new form of learning and problem-solving involving co-operation between different
parts of society and science in order to meet complex challenges of society. Transdisciplin-
ary research starts from tangible, real-world problems. Solutions are devised in collabora-
tion with multiple stakeholders.
So she already states that cooperation and mutual learning are key notions in
transdisciplinary trajectories.
It is doubtful whether it is fair to describe transdisciplinarity as research. The end
product of the cooperation is an action perspective, not a truth claim. Not validity
but plausibility, social robustness and support are the decisive criteria. From the
perspective of knowledge democracy, we can distinguish two important dimensions
in transdisciplinary approaches:
• The degree of knowledge input of lay groups that is included in a specific
transdisciplinary project and
• The degree in which non-dominant actors are explicitly involved in the decision-
making of the development process of policies or research agendas.
Fig. 1.5 Old and new forms co-exist and influence each other
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This results in two different styles of transdisciplinary approaches. We discuss
the similarities and differences of these different styles and approaches. We con-
clude this paragraph with a discussion on transdisciplinary research styles in
relation to forms of democracy – on the one hand basic and representative democ-
racy and on the other hand deliberative democracy.
Transdisciplinary efforts are embedded in local scientific, cultural and political
practices that are differentiated in varied cultures and governance styles. Based on
the wide diversity of transdisciplinary efforts we can ask the following questions:
what similarities and differences of these programmes are relevant from the per-
spective of knowledge democracy? Which specific characteristics need to be
analysed if we want to understand how transdisciplinary efforts can contribute to
the process of knowledge democratisation? An initial look reveals a difference in
time scales. We have examples of transdisciplinary research processes that take
only a few months (for example, some consultation exercises), while there are also
programmes that take over 10 years, and all options in between. The methods and
tools used also appear to be quite diverse. Regarding involvement of non-scientific
actors for example, they range from interviews to group sessions in all kinds of
designs (focus groups, expert meeting, dialogues, citizen juries et cetera).
Notwithstanding these differences, we observe following Bunders et al. 2010,
that in scholarly literature the core of transdisciplinary research is most often
presented as a shared set of principles. Principles differ from theories, methods,
tools and conditions because they refer to the attitudes of the researcher-participant;
the researcher is said to perform genuine transdisciplinary research as long as he or
she acknowledges and acts in accordance with the intention of these principles.
These principles relate to process demands like joint problem definition, orientation
towards robust action perspectives, et cetera. As such, a set of principles describes
the intentions that guide the researcher in choices he or she has to make for the
design of the project or programme, which is the choice of methods, tools and the
sequence of these. In other words, ‘the approach’ is the manner in which the issue at
stake is approached. This is in line with the wide-spread convention of labelling
specific realisations of transdisciplinary research as ‘approaches’.
If one concentrates on the essentials of transdisciplinarity as communication and
argumentation, the demands for specific attitudes and even principles concerning
the other participants besides researchers are as crucial. The policy-makers will
tend to accept those scientific viewpoints that are closely related to the predominant
policy theory if present. They however should develop a certain willingness to open
up for other scientific insights because the aim of the exercise could be to end up
with resilient proposals, having answered the question how to avoid disasters. This
demands a sophisticated degree of reflexivity on their part.
Once all participants are touched by the need for mutual adapting, learning and
the common goal of a resilient design, the transdisciplinary process could really be
successful in the sense of supporting sustainable development. Considering the
existing literature one might observe that these conditions are seldom fulfilled.
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1.6 Governance of Sustainable Development in Knowledge
Democracies
Knowledge democracies are examples of second modernity: they develop in evo-
lutionary patterns characterised by tense relationships between opposite
institutions: participatory democracy besides representative democracy, social
media besides corporate media, transdisciplinarity besides disciplinary science,
and not instead of! The outer corners of the evolving triangle seem to reinforce
each other: social media enable participatory democracy, while some categories of
transdisciplinarity demand participatory democracy to a certain degree also.
Sustainable development is also profoundly related to second modernity:
fragmegration and glocalisation illustrate tense relations that characterise the
dynamics. It is a fundamental transition or transformation. It is a multi-scale,
multi-level, multi-aspect problematique. Transition demands restructuration in
the landscape-regime-niches environment. Sustainable development knows a num-
ber of wicked problems. Uncertainty and complexity prevail besides lack of
consensus both on values and on knowledge. Wicked problems cannot be solved
by hierarchical order, but can be managed in a multi-actor environment. Finally,
sustainable development is a long term problematique that demands long term
decisions. This type of decisions – dependent on the structure of the problem –
either demands an attitude of persistence or of resilience.
Because of reflexivity exogenous steering impulses are not effective in the long
run unless the values that determined the steering actions are internalised by the
social system under consideration. So exogenous interventions in general are
deficient. We should instead start to think about intraventions as principles of
governance. These again point in the direction of participatory democracy, but
now considered as a condition for effectiveness. The great governance institutions
‘hierarchy’, ‘market’ and ‘network’ will be amalgamated in a slightly different way
in knowledge democracies that aim at transitions: the different actors should move
in a manner that can be described as congruency.
Governance of sustainable development should not overconcentrate on global
binding environmental agreements as the major tool for progress. The transaction
costs of these agreements are often very high, and their effectiveness is often
deficient. Second modernity points to regional treaties besides global ones, volun-
tary agreements besides binding ones, local programmes besides national ones, city
developments besides nation-state ones. Moreover, we could design all kinds of
private-public arrangements that could stimulate both technological evolution in a
favourable direction and unify forces towards societal evolution in a sustainable
direction.
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1.7 Future Perspectives
In this final paragraph I formulate my insights concerning the predominant tensions
and challenges that have to be envisaged: concentrated in the question whether
democracies – and more in particular knowledge democracies – can participate
favourably to the governance of sustainable development. It is already hard to
imagine how the evolutionary tendencies in politics, media and science that all lead
to more multiplicity, uncertainty and lack of traditional legitimacy and authority,
will have to be coped with simultaneously, and sustainable development is one of
these extremely complex and vague issues.
We have proposed to replace the concept of knowledge economy by that of
knowledge democracy as a focal item of global agendas. The purpose is to illustrate
the necessity to respond to the actual evolutionary patterns of advanced societies.
These patterns are interwoven technological and social complex transitions in the
triangle politics-science-media. Of course the concept has a persuasive nature. We
have fabricated the triangle politics-media-science in order to illuminate the
connections and tensions between them. The analysis by Turnhout (2010) on the
character of the concept knowledge democracy, leading to the conclusion that it is
potentially both utopian and totalitarian should be properly interpreted as an early
warning signal. Applications of institutional and procedural requirements in knowl-
edge democracies, such as participatory decision-making processes, should contin-
uously be tested in the contingent environments of empirical reality. The danger of
totalitarian and technocratic misadventures is always present, but accidents can be
avoided if one is prepared to take a careful look into the value patterns of all
concerned actors. This danger is reinforced once more as we realize that sustainable
development itself is also persuasive, that it easily might be utopian too. And if we
would accept some of the suggestions that due to planetary boundaries and other
threats, the command to lead to sustainable development could also bear a totali-
tarian character itself. Therefore there is ample reason for a lot of attention on
arrangements that could fight hasty hypes and other uttering of ultra- persuasive
politics. Moreover the present dangers once more underline the necessity of
diversified approaches and plurality of methods.
Public authorities within systems of representative democracy are facing legiti-
macy and effectiveness problems. Representation in its historical shape has eroded
because of structural changes in value patterns, and because of the educational level
of the population. Legitimacy and effectiveness of governing and steering in a
classical manner are fundamentally undermined.
Politicians are far from stupid. They have designed lots of strategies in order to
cope with the recently emerged complications. The phenomenon of the spin doctor
with the unique assignment to bend available knowledge and information in a
favourable direction, and if necessary to provide useful information – invented or
not – was temporarily successful until the increasing revulsion of spin doctors
enforced them to go under cover. Politicians themselves participate massively in
social media. More refined practices have developed in order to influence the so
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called independent audits and evaluations of public policies and programmes by
selecting experts who supposedly would give a positive judgement.
Another category of the strategies of these public authorities in order to regain
legitimacy is the introduction of citizen participation. Often it remains completely
unclear whether this participation should contribute to either the collection of
support or to the process of enriching the content of the decision. This is important
because the preferable shape of the processes will depend upon the objectives of the
participation.
When we think about participatory democracy we usually refer to notions like
civil society, stakeholders-citizens, interested parties, et cetera. In the context of
deliberation or participation around a certain issue some public authority usually
decides who the desirable partners are. This type of ‘guided participation’ is often
tolerated if the boundaries of an invited group are experienced as ‘logical’. How-
ever the framing of the problem is decisive for the acceptance of the ‘logic’.
Media play crucial roles in any democracy. We have elaborated upon the
tensions and other interactions between top-down and bottom-up media earlier in
this chapter, and stressed the point that much is still unknown. In September 2010
for instance, the Chair of Dutch parliament suggested the members of parliament to
abstain from the use of Twitter during parliamentary debate, because the different
streams of information – the official debate in parliament and the Twitter stream-
would be ‘unmanageable’. From the viewpoint of checks and balances, and taking
into account the fact that we live in a world where frequently too much rather than
too little information is available, the key role of the media requires a certain degree
of self-reflection regarding the presentation of scientific and other policy-relevant
knowledge. The question stays, if both top-down and bottom-up media are able to
fulfill such a requirement. As Stephan Jungurt explains in this volume, we should
refine our viewpoints with respect to bridging gaps between science and policy in
the context of international decision-making on sustainable development.
The process of formulating research agendas becomes increasingly important in
a knowledge democracy. It cannot any longer be left to scientists alone. Broad
participation is desirable. For assessing the need and usefulness of the generation of
knowledge by policy oriented research programmes, more reflection in advance is
needed. Knowledge democracy therefore appears to demand at least twofold
complex participation processes: the transdisciplinary character is necessary to
transform scientific insights to robust, plausible action perspectives, and the contri-
bution of stakeholders and citizens is necessary to assure that the decision to be
taken will be accepted and effective. Moreover in many cases the specific knowl-
edge of stakeholders and citizens is also necessary to enrich the content of the
decisions to be taken sufficiently. All participants have legitimate interests of very
different kinds that have to be accommodated. The multi-purpose setup of the
processes will vary with the different relative intensities of the objectives: the
amalgamation of values, knowledge and interests, the enrichment of content and
the gathering of support.
The classical political game will have to change profoundly, and this may be the
most important motive for the fierce resistance from many politicians against
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reform in a participatory direction. Loss of power is the main fear. To accept a role
as process architect instead of the position as the final decision-maker is risky
because many fear that the voters may not support the architects, but will favour the
politicians who present themselves as leaders in substantial solutions.
The quest for acceptable mixed systems of representative and participatory
democracy will appear on many agendas in the years to come, and is a focal
research question in the knowledge democracy research programme. Democracies
have basic characteristics that other regimes do not know: the dynamics are
determined by periodical elections that may lead to power shifts. Each politician
inside a democracy is profoundly aware of and sensitive for this. The supposed
preferences of voters are the guides of action. Many authors have argued that as a
consequence of this, democracies are biased towards short term orientations. If this
interpretation would be right, democracies are not fit to govern long term problems
that demand action in contrast with short term viewpoints. This would cause serious
bottle necks with respect to the precautionary principle. But the above mentioned
interpretation is inaccurate: exactly because of the indicated dependencies
democracies will be very well suited to produce decisions in accordance with the
precautionary principle once the formation of citizens’ preferences is dominated by
the same principle. Once again by this consideration the importance of value
dynamics stimulated by value oriented learning processes of populations at large
is underlined. Although the most urgent recommendations concern the processes
aspects of decision-making, transdisciplinarity and participatory democracy, one
may also wonder if structures should change and institutions should be reformed. In
general we would argue that institutional redundancy is often recommendable
because it will enlarge the resilience of a governance system.
The most apparent characteristic of most democracies – after honouring the will
of the people through elections and participatory democracy – is the presence of
checks and balances. The rule of law already moderates the power of the executive
branch of government. The trias politica is the most powerful concept in order to
moderate the absoluteness of power, but it is supplemented by numerous other
arrangements that serve the same purpose. However it is exactly the recent history
of emerging knowledge democracies that puts the checks and balances at risk: this
history is full of new populist political parties, currents and undercurrents that
flourish in an atmosphere where traditional authority of institutions, professionals
and scientists is under attack and fading away. Classical media served the purpose
of reporting on the exercise of power, thereby contributing to checks and balances.
The perverting power of media tycoons shifted this contribution to the exercise of
power by the media themselves and destroyed checks and balances. The social
media may contribute to control of power, but it is to early to standardise the
conditions under which this favourable function could develop.
In order to produce an adequate scheme for analysis the presumption is
formulated that nation-states can be divided in two opposite evolutionary types.
This of course is simplification. In reality we may observe in one and the same
nation-state spurs of various even contradictory developments. Observing both the
available literature and the emerging practice of knowledge democracy in a number
of in particular European nation-states I was struck by the differences in the
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observable tensions between science, politics and media. We therefore design a
distinction between quiet and turbulent democracies. After having defined them we
will analyse the consequences for the governance of sustainable development.
In the quiet democracies the main characteristics to be observed are:
• In important domains there may be conflicts on the preferable substance or
content of policies, as based on value differences and variations, but the knowl-
edge base for those policies is generally not contested; therefore problems do not
bear a wicked character. Moreover complicated two-level conflicts, relating both
to the substance of policies and the credibility of the different knowledge
sources, remain absent or at least an exception.
• The mutual dependence of politics and media is not very strongly developed.
Politicians have realised that the locus for political debate should be parliament,
and therefore oppose actively to the transfer of political dialogue to mass media
orchestrated by journalists; media-politics are not predominant.
• Different types of knowledge – such as scientific knowledge, local knowledge
and/or citizens’ knowledge – are integrated in participatory processes for policy
preparation, aiming at socially robust and plausible perspectives for action;
boundary actors and institutions play important roles.
• The societal attention for the maintenance of adequate checks and balances is
considerable; not only the respect for the classical trias politica is cherished, but
also the awareness on the desirability of free basic research and education – free
in the meaning of: not influenced by either politics or media – is intense.
In the turbulent democracies we find the following phenomena:
• Many political problems are perceived as wicked: neither on the value aspect nor
on the knowledge or information side consensus exists. Many two-level conflicts
complicate the political realm. In political environments with a strong meta-
value, that leads to a high degree of tolerance and mutual respect: this situation
will lead to the development of transdisciplinary trajectories with considerable
participation. Populist politics on the contrary will aim at the decrease of this
type of complexity by establishing a clear, simple and predominating view both
on values and substance.
• The mutual dependence of politics and media is clearly visible: hypes prevail,
the political agenda is mainly determined by media utterances, scandals and
abuses give rise to political action. In extreme instances (for example Italy
around 2010) the reigning political coalition also rules an important proportion
of the top-down media. Publics frequently manifest themselves in relation to
specific hypes.
• Where media-politics dominate, the space for broad citizens’ participation in
policy preparation appears to be limited because politicians and media wish to
establish a collective monopoly on information-gathering and dissemination.
Therefore, the stronger the mutual dependence of politics and top-down media
manifests itself, the more possibilities for unhampered – in the sense of not
orchestrated by mass media – influential argumentation and communication
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seem to be limited. But on the other hand we observed earlier that the existing
technologies enable groups of citizens by internet application as YouTube, MSN
Messenger, e-mail and Twitter to create their own mass media, to produce their
own expressions of interests and views in a manner that cannot be controlled by
commercialised or professionalised media.
• Populist politics disrespect checks and balances: the perceived necessity of
transparency of authority demands hierarchy in the political realm; populist
politicians will continuously criticise any disagreeable action of uncontrolled
professionals, and will try to minimise their influence and to maximise their
dependence. Moreover the internal structure of the public sector will be stream-
lined according to hierarchical principles: as a consequence of which the discre-
tion of agencies and other semi-autonomous bodies, but also of inspectorates and
supervisors will be diminished. It should be mentioned that the response of
established political parties to the successful populists is often a pattern of
imitation: the agenda’s shift towards the populist issues and vie points.
• In the presence of populist success the attack at checks and balances is often
formulated as defence of democracy: independent public decision-making
power, for instance by judges, is described as essentially undemocratic. This
sometimes leads to a plea to gain political control over the judiciary.
The foregoing static comparison neglects of course the important and necessary
analysis of dynamic developments. Castells in particular words his forecasts in
terms of accumulative developments, such as the fatal transition of media-politics
to populism, or worse. Our observations on the increasing importance of reflexive
mechanisms however hamper us to formulate any deterministic forecasts, laws or
regularities as to societal developments. Scenarios, simulations and explorations
could serve as catalysers to enlarge our sensitivity for potential developments, but
the fundamental character of the existing uncertainty and complexity prohibit us to
consider them as building stones for direct action. The indirect use could be that we
try to design action perspectives that are robust, for example, do not have disastrous
consequences in either of the feasible scenarios. It may be clear that the possibilities
for such designs are more feasible in quiet than in turbulent democracies. In
addition, the increasing complexity of societal problems should not lead to the
prohibition of controversial research; to the contrary: such a pluralist approach of
research may open new strategies for problems still unforeseen. In case of doubt as
to the scientific integrity of knowledge for policy, it is useful to organise discussions
on the desirable research agendas, aiming at wide bandwidths of the opinions, and
to seek a common knowledge base, as described by many authors in this book. As a
matter of course also oppositional parties in parliaments should be included in these
processes. The effectiveness of these institutional arrangements may differ in
different domains, so careful choices should be made.
Looking at sustainable development as a major issue in all knowledge
democracies I feel comfortable in the observation that the opportunities for consis-
tent long term policies towards sustainability are more favourable in quiet than in
turbulent democracies. The clashes between insights produced by transdisciplinary
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adventures on one hand and the political priorities on the other will be bitter
in turbulent democracies. Recently in these environments boundary functions
have disappeared, as ministers themselves claim to be competent to fulfil these
functions themselves. On the national level the degree of participation is rather
waining than expanding. This appears to create an unbalance in the relations
between science and politics, but the scientific world often has remained
completely silent. Parliament attempts to decrease its dependence on information
fromministries by strengthening its own research activities, but so far the results are
of varying quality, to put it mildly.
As we have been able to observe, the relationships between science and media in
turbulent environments also lead to scandals and turmoil. The IPPC clashes have
weakened the political positions of pro- sustainability actors. Thus the internal
conflicts in science are aggravated and magnified by media simplifications that on
their turn influence political positions on sustainability issues. On the other hand, in
many democracies top civil servants are sincerely involved in efforts to strengthen
the knowledge intensity of policy preparation. But their position is weakened in
turbulent democracies too, because politicians tend to argue that civil servant do not
need discretionary space. This secret war is hardly visible on the surface of the
political realm.
Disturbing reflexive phenomena complicate the picture further: ministries
design strategic research agendas, but actual research activities sometimes move
in another direction. The number of public affairs officers and controllers at
ministries increases at the cost of cognitive experts. The cleansing operations –
often under the label of ‘lean and mean’ – in order to reduce the number of
relatively independent advisory bodies in the public domain as well as the increas-
ing hierarchy of the political realm support the hypothesis that the evolutionary
pattern of turbulent democracies could be characterised as the gradual decrease of
that type of checks and balances that may be defined as shock dampers. The
extreme phenomena of populist politics to be observed may be summarised in the
expression ‘fact-free politics’. This expression means that political opinions are
formulated irrespective of available information and knowledge so instead of
knowledge the driving force for action is conviction, passion or will or a command
from elsewhere. Of course the erosion of scientific authority has facilitated this
phenomenon, because politicians with fact-free proposals can successfully defend
themselves by pointing at the internal dissensus between scientists, or the earlier
mistakes made by scientists, planning offices, and the like. It is even possible that
the options for fact free politics are influenced positively by the awareness of the
characteristic of reflexivity of social systems. If forecasting is impossible, why then
rely on science that produced causal relationships with only temporary validities? If
evaluation produces meaning, the empirical evidence to be produced later on the
results of fact free politics will reveal its deficiencies. But much time will be lost
then.
The international world in which endeavours to further sustainable development
are taking place is still more varied than the national context of knowledge
democracies, because not only quiet and turbulent democracies are present there,
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but also regimes that could not be described properly as democracies at all. Strange
but understandable alliances can be observed: if one would take the degree of
authoritarian exercise of power as a measuring rod for regimes, one might observe
that the most authoritarian turbulent democracies and the moderated non-
democratic regimes find each other quite easily.
As we find ourselves more and more in environments of turbulent democracies,
it is important to formulate conditions under which the pursuit of sustainable
development is still feasible. How to fight hype orientations, short term oriented
populism, fact-free politics?
Earlier in this chapter we have shown that transdisplinarity and participatory
democracy are prime methodologies within knowledge democracies to produce
those intraventions that reveal the basic values of a society. To protect these
opportunities appears to be the first obligation of responsible actors within turbulent
democracies. Tensions might become intense, and relationships tight because it is
the core belief of the populist that consultations are superfluous because he essen-
tially is the people. Of course, reflexivity is also a source of hope and optimism
concerning future change.
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Chapter 2
Cultural Diversity and Sustainability
Metagovernance
Louis Meuleman
Abstract In the 20 years since the United Nations summit on sustainable develop-
ment in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the world has become more diverse, turbulent, fast
andmulti-polar. Tensions between old and new forms of politics, science andmedia,
representing the emergence of what has been framed as the knowledge democracy,
have brought about new challenges for sustainability governance. However, the
existing governance frameworks seem to deny this social complexity and uncer-
tainty. They also favour centralised negotiations and institutions, view governments
as exclusive decision makers, and imply hegemony of Western economic, political
and cultural principles. This is also reflected in the language of sustainability
governance: it is centralist and is referring to monolithic concepts (the economy,
the climate, the Earth System) rather than embracing diversity and complexity.
This chapter sheds light on the problematic relations between cultural diversity,
sustainable development and governance. These three concepts share a normative
character, which is always a good predictor of trouble if interaction takes place.
It is argued that the implementation deficit of sustainable development can
be traced back to three problems: a neglect of the opportunities which cultural
diversity offers, an implicit preference for central top-down political solutions, and
an underestimation of the ‘wickedness’ of many sustainability challenges. It is
concluded that sustainability governance should bemore culturally sensitive, reflexive
and dynamic. This requires institutions, instruments, processes, and actor involvement
based on compatibility of values and traditions rather than on commonality or
integration. It also calls for situationally effective combinations of ideas from hierar-
chical, network and market governance. This implies an approach beyond traditional
forms of governance, towards a culturally sensitive metagovernance for sustainable
development, beyond disciplinary scientific research, beyond states and other existing
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institutional borders, beyond existing ways to measure progress, beyond linear forms
of innovation, and beyond cultural integration or assimilation, towards looking for
compatibility. Governance for sustainable transformations requires what we have
framed in this volume as transgovernance.
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Sustainability Governance from Rio to Rio
The Rio-Summit of 1992 marked the beginning of a new era. In the aftermath of the
bipolar world, new actors, new challenges as well as new potential solutions
emerged onto the scene. However, the mainstream view concerning this increasing
diversity – both in scholarly circles and by policy makers – viewed it as being at
odds with effective responses to global challenges related to environment and
development. They also felt that it supported common (inter-) governmental
approaches. The main merit of the Rio-Summit was that it sketched out a new set
of challenges and opportunities running counter to this mainstream perception. It
was concluded that issues such as cultural diversity, diversity of actors, diversity of
institutional mechanisms, and response actions cutting-across well-established
sectoral boundaries exemplified the very notion of sustainable development and
hence could not be alienated any longer from an agenda for action.
Twenty years later, we live in a different world; it has become hot, crowded,
spiky, turbulent and multi-polar. Governments on all levels and international
organisations are struggling to implement sustainability strategies, and at the same
time find it difficult to embrace the notion of diversity in their attempts to put the
objectives of the Rio Declaration into action. This poses the question of whether it is
possible to change the common perception of diversity from a potential hindrance to
a genuine part of the solution. Would this imply that cultural diversity should be
translated into political and institutional diversity? If this is the case, it might
threaten vested interests. In addition, how would this relate to the broadly shared
conviction that universal aims are also needed, such as human rights? The paradoxi-
cal challenge is that sustainability requires shared objectives, which should be
achieved by diverse actions pursued through a multitude of governance
arrangements at different levels and with different actor constellations, while
recognising the varying needs of different countries and communities within them.
The question is whether the growing recognition of the need for adaptivity to
different situations could help in bridging the gap between shared objectives and
diverse action. The majority of the different situations referred to above pertain to
the climate change debate, but also emerge from more general lessons learned in
many issue areas spelled out by Agenda 21. As the focus of sustainable develop-
ment has shifted increasingly towards implementation, compared to the days of Rio
1992, we may raise the question, 20 years later, of whether too strong a focus on
common actions, on legally-binding and global agreements alone, has also
contributed to the existing lack of implementation.
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Another contextual change compared to 20 years ago is that the Internet have
made communication and exchange of ideas extremely fast. Social media have partly
taken over from classical media. The world is much more knowledge-based than
two decades ago. However, at the same time classical natural and social sciences
have lost part of their ‘natural’ authority. Like the media, the field of knowledge
production has become more diffused and more participatory. Additionally, in the
sciences there are tensions between classical, disciplinary science and transdisci-
plinary knowledge development in which practical and lay knowledge is taken on
board. Last but not least, political systems are moving towards more participative
forms in many parts of the world. This does not mean that there is a clear
convergence towards one type of democracy, but that pluralism is also increasing
in this domain. The turbulence and tensions within, and between old and new forms
of politics, media and science has been framed as the emerging ‘knowledge
democracy’ (in ’t Veld 2010b).
Other conditions that co-determine which governance designs for sustainable
development could work well in certain situations are a nation or region’s history,
and the existing institutional frameworks. The latter are ‘frozen’ expressions of
policy theories from, in some cases, decades ago.
It is with reference to this context that this chapter analyses how cultural
diversity might contribute to, rather than hinder, sustainability governance. The
key question it addresses is: How can cultural diversity contribute to sustainable
development (meta)governance, and how can it be prevented from being a hin-
drance? Before we embark on this analysis, a short discussion on the ambiguity of
the term sustainable development is presented.
2.1.2 Sustainable Development: A Value-Laden Concept
Sustainable development, as defined by the 1987 World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development (Brundtland Commission), is:
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.
The focus on the freedom of choice of future generations in this widely-used
definition makes sustainability a modern social-ecological version of Kant’s cate-
gorical imperative: ‘everybody should act in a way that the maxim of this behaviour
could become a maxim applicable to all’ (Spangenberg 2005: 31). Since the defini-
tion of the Brundtland Commission, the normative idea of linking sustainability and
development has evolved. During the Rio World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in 1992, the Brundtland norm of intergenerational justice was elaborated with
the aim of bringing about a balance between social, ecological and economic
systems, using the terms people, planet and profit or prosperity. The term develop-
ment can be seen neutrally; like in biological systems, development can be construc-
tive or destructive. With development of societies, economic development (growth)
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can be the intention, but on occasions the motivation is also with regards to the
selection of parameters combined in the Human Development Index. In the context
of sustainable development, development usually points at a process character:
sustainable development is a societal learning process aiming at developing more
sustainable societies. However, it is also based on the concept of progress that may
not be shared by all who are ipso facto interested in sustainable development.
Moreover, the term development can be seen as culturally related to processes of
colonialism, capitalism (including neo-liberalism) and resource exploitation
(Oswald Spring 2009).
2.1.2.1 The Cultural Dimension
Like all normative political concepts, sustainable development means something
different in different cultural and politico-administrative contexts, for example in
Western welfare states, in emerging democracies, and in non-democracies. The
concept is used differently in BRIC1 countries than in many African countries.
Policy makers in Vietnam or Bangladesh use definitions which differ from those
employed by their counterparts in Germany or Paraguay. Moreover, sustainable
development triggers different discussions at the global UN headquarters than it
does locally, for example between villagers and professionals implementing an
irrigation strategy in a Nepali village. Even though this insight seems trivial, it is
surprising to witness the struggles of the international community to draft culturally
and, moreover, context-sensitive policies for sustainable development. A concept
like the ‘Green Economy’ adds a case in point with regards to how difficult
conceptual discussions can become if it is not based to a certain degree on a shared
understanding.
The fact that sustainable development is a normative concept with a Western
cultural flavour implies that it may conflict with non-Western cultures. Indeed, this
has happened in the past and remains a frequent occurrence. However, the fact that
there is, apart from the 1987 Brundtland definition, no global agreement on the
exact meaning of sustainable development, also presents an advantage: the concept
is in principle adaptable to different cultures. In China, for example, since around
2002, the Communist Party has pursued a ‘harmonious society’ in a ‘harmonious
world’, with a development model which is similar to the Brundtland definition
(Ferro 2009).
2.1.2.2 Top-Down Governance
Environmental governance and sustainability governance are currently dominated
by a top-down practice of steering, at least on the global level, although many
1Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
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politicians orally suggest a preference for cooperation and participation. Examples
of the top-down approach can be found in climate policy. Climate change has
politically and scientifically become framed as a global (upcoming) disaster, for
which centralist and legally binding agreements are usually presented as the sole
solution. This has its merits because it enables a bird’s eye, global perspective and is
an expression of political urgency, but also has downsides. The impacts of climate
change vary enormously in different geographical areas, and some argue that the
centralist frame has also centralised the research budgets. The result is that there is a
lack of money for research regarding climate change mitigation and adaptation on
specific regional situations, and that it has led to a focus on globalised knowledge
which ‘erases geographical and cultural difference and in which scale collapses to
the global’ (Hulme 2010). Hulme argues that in a world which ‘possesses a
multiplicity of climates and a multiplicity of cultures, values and ways of life’,
such globalised knowledge is de-contextualised top-down and detached from
meaning-making. Examples mentioned are global climate models, global planetary
conditions to define sustainability, global indices of human vulnerability to climate
change, the Stern Review with its singe metric of globalised monetary value, and
the 2 climate change target. Barnett and Campbell (2010) show how such an
attitude leads to consider Pacific islands as uniform objects: they are always
pictured as vulnerable, powerless and ignorant.
With regard to sustainable development, it is illustrated that much of the energy
during the intergovernmental discussions for the preparation of the UNCSD ‘Rio’
2012 conference has concentrated on the roles and institutional form of a global
sustainability organisation.
2.1.2.3 ‘Wicked’ Sustainability Challenges
This hierarchical bias contradicts the complexity and what political scientists call
‘wickedness’ of the challenges of sustainable development. The notion of ‘wicked
problems’ (Rittel and Webber 1973), which refers to a situation where there is
neither consensus on values nor on knowledge (Fig. 2.1) is crucial for understand-
ing sustainability: ‘wicked problems’ are a permanent sources of conflict. Some of
the typical characteristics of wicked problems are (Rittel and Webber 1973:
162–166):
• Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
• There is no definitive description of a wicked problem.
• Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false but good-or-bad.
• Every implemented solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation’ which
leaves traces: it changes the problem.
• There are no criteria which enable one to prove that all solutions to a wicked
problem have been identified and considered.
In addition, the result of tackling such problems is often path-dependent, and the
problems are characterised by lock-in effects with regard to physical (long lead
2 Cultural Diversity and Sustainability Metagovernance 41
time, bounded by the use of a specific technique or infrastructure) and social
(mentality, life styles). The sustainable development agenda is filled with wicked
problems. Examples are the future of energy production (how can we become
independent of fossil fuels and of nuclear energy?), infrastructure projects (how
can we improve railway systems without destroying historical cities and natural
sites?), biofuels (how can we increase the use of biofuels without decreasing the
land surface available for food production?) and climate change (how can we
achieve a global agreement on carbon-neutral economies while acknowledging the
right of developing nations to increase their prosperity?). Wicked problems are a
product of the increasing complexity and uncertainty of the physical world as well as
our societies, and of our cognitive capabilities and values to cope with these issues.
The point is that governance based on hierarchical or market mechanisms often
fails when it is applied to wicked problems (Meuleman 2008: 348). A hierarchical
view assumes that there are clearly defined problems and that there can be a clear
line of command in the problem-solving process. Market governance assumes that
the ‘invisible hand’ of (internal or external to organisations) markets solves
problems when the ‘right’ incentives and instruments are in place.
Wicked problems are value-laden, as are the terms ‘governance’ and ‘sustain-
able development’, and they are also characterised by disagreement on the level of
values. Therefore, values and traditions, and hence the cultural dimension, must be
included in sustainability governance. Wicked problems escape the logics of
hierarchies and markets. Network governance accepts chaos and unpredictability,
and also assumes that value conflicts are part of the game and should be dealt with.
Therefore, dealing with wicked sustainability problems seems to require at least a
substantial network governance dimension in the total approach. The usefulness of
additional legal constructions and market-type incentives depends on the context.
In this chapter I will focus on the cultural dimension of sustainability governance,
but it is also necessary to relate this to the two other themes, the centralist bias and
the neglect of wickedness of sustainability problems. After this short introduction,
the next step is to discuss the relation between cultural diversity and sustainable
development (Sect. 2.2). This will be linked to the governance debate (Sect. 2.3).
Fig. 2.1 Typology of problems
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Following this, the role of cultural diversity will be discussed in relation to
arguments in favour of uniformity (Sect. 2.4). A framework for a positive contribu-
tion of cultural diversity to sustainability governance will be developed, based on
insights into the governance of governance, ormetagovernance (Sect. 2.5). Sect. 2.6
puts this in the broader context of transgovernance, and conclusions are drawn in
Sect. 2.7.
2.2 The Cultural Dimension of Sustainable Development
If the normative dimension of sustainable development is relevant, as we have seen
in the first section, then we should discuss the cultural dimension of sustainability.
This section first defines culture, and then introduces ideas about the relation
between cultural diversity and glocalisation, sustainability governance, and bio-
diversity. Finally, commonly used arguments are presented for considering cultural
diversity as a hindrance to sustainable diversity.
2.2.1 Cultures
Culture can be defined as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying
assumptions prevalent among (a group of) people in a society. Cultures are dynamic
patterns of assumptions in a given group. They can also be seen as systems of
symbolic communication (Lévi Strauss 1958). In this general definition, the role of
human agency and of power should also be included. The latter is significant when
tackling the universal character of cultural values.
Behaviour is not part of a culture, but is driven by culture. However, the relation
between values and behaviour is part of the discourse on cultural diversity. For
example, if we value altruism, and at the same time behave in an egotistic way, we
create a tension; ‘living your values’ therefore may be a relevant expression in the
sustainability debate.
The concept of culture changes with the development of our societies. In the
beginning of the twenty-first century:
Culture increasingly stands for ambivalent, ambiguous and paradoxical frames of reference
and action. It is increasingly difficult to distinguish between them in a world of shifting
alliances and configurations, a world without hegemony, a world where no agency, group or
person can still define reality for others, a world rife with turbulence, instability and
complexity. In such a world, culture does not succeed in providing clear recipes for action.
(Van Londen and De Ruijter 2011: 7)
Although the idea that hegemony no longer plays a crucial role is contestable,
the central argument in this quotation is important: cultures are dynamical. If we
think that cultures should have operational value for sustainability governance, then
the approach that ‘culture is an instrument, a vehicle in order to organise diversity
(in interests, views, et cetera)’ (De Ruijter 1995: 219) may be quite useful.
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2.2.2 Cultural Diversity and Identity: The Paradox
of Glocalisation
The cultural dimension of sustainable development can be illustrated with the
emergence of what is called globalisation, a phenomenon that has changed the
world economically and politically in a dramatic way. Capital looking for new
markets and for cheap resources has changed the game. Western (economic) values
have dominated the world economy for some time, but with increasing speed, non-
Western economies are taking over, or at least co-determining the shape of
globalisation.
During the 1990s, the global consumption culture which is responsible for many
environmental problems was boosted by the emergence of neo-liberal regimes and
their pro-market policies in many Asian, African and Latin American developing
countries (Haque 1999: 204). High-consumption lifestyles threaten both the natural
environment and the maintenance of the cultural dignity of many societies.
National cultural priorities are being sacrificed in favour of global competitive
trends. It can be argued that focusing on market principles marginalises the long-
term values of cultural and biological diversity (Appadurai 2002: 18, 19). More-
over, the globalisation of Northern consumption culture is leading to levels of
resource use which are unsustainable, and which may lead to more violent conflict
and massive ecological as well as humanitarian degradation (VanDeveer 2011: 45).
Economic globalisation and the ICT revolution have made the world more ‘flat’,
which gives cultures which absorb foreign ideas and meld those with their own
traditions an advantage (Friedman 2006: 410) although it is at the same time also
‘spiky’: differences between e.g. wealth have never been as large as these years
(Florida 2005). This has changed the homogeneity of cultures: there are not many
nations anymore which are geographically congruent with culturally solidary
societies like Japan or Norway (Von Barloewen and Zouari 2010).
The pressure of globalisation has provoked counter-reactions in the form of
nationalism, regionalism, localism and renewed ethnicity (Verweel and De Ruijter
2003: 5). Indeed, glocalisation and localisation are two faces of the same trend (Hall
1991). This paradox has been framed as glocalisation (Robertson 1995).
Globalisation may have made cultures increasingly ambivalent, ambiguous and
paradoxical, but the counter reaction – localisation – is equally important for
effective governance. It is important that people work from their own values, values
in which they believe and which make sense to them, because:
A sense of identity provides the feeling of security from which one can encounter other
cultures with an open mind (Hofstede and Hofstede. 2005: 365)
Therefore, it seems that globalisation on the one hand endangers cultural
diversity, but on the other hand stimulates people to discover the rich diversity of
cultures with its potential for innovation. Glocalisation is an example of the type of
fruitful paradoxes that Beck et al. (2003) suggest will become more abundant in
the current ‘second modernity’. The latter is a concept which explains
characteristics of contemporary societies like plurality, ambivalence, ambiguity
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and contradiction, and claims that a meta-change is taking place from ‘first’
modernity which is based upon the nation state, socially and in terms of possession
of hierarchical knowledge, towards a second form of modernity.
2.2.3 Cultural Diversity and Sustainability Governance
If cultural diversity has ‘survived’ globalisation, and is linked with people’s
identity, it should be a powerful asset in the sustainability debate. Nurse (2006:
45) attempts to make cultural diversity the fourth dimension of sustainable devel-
opment, besides the environmental, social and economic dimensions, because:
. . . sustainable development is only achievable if there is harmony and alignment between
the objectives of cultural diversity and that of social equity, environmental responsibility
and economic viability.
Taking cultural diversity into account in sustainability governance is important
for many reasons, including the following2:
• Different cultures are effective when it comes to living in different
environments. One model does not work everywhere.
• Different cultures carry different types of wisdom – we need access to all the
wisdom we can get.
• Multiple cultures mean multiple options for humanity. We need all the options
we can get.
• Communities and societies are structured around identity, which includes a
sense of place or home. Without attention to this, people lose their connection
to place and are not interested in doing things to protect places over the long term.
• Culture links the larger goals of survival to specific moral visions, and thus
makes it attractive (and essential) for people.
• If we succeed in eliminating cultural diversity, it is open to being replaced by
other world views such as consumerism or fascism or whatever-ism is being
promoted by the strongest, wealthiest or least ethical self-interested party.
There is a huge contrast between these arguments and the little attention that the
cultural dimension of sustainability has received in social sciences. Although it is
broadly accepted that values, traditions and history co-determine how decisions on
public issues are made in different localities, regions and nations (Kickert 2003),
the nature of the relations between cultures and governance has largely been
neglected. Additionally, in other disciplines this interdisciplinary theme has low
priority. For example, although geography investigates man’s relationship to his
environment, references to game theory in geographic literature were almost
non-existent in the 1960s (Gould 1969). Anthropologists and ecologists were the
2 Personal communication Deborah Rogers.
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first to investigate how cultures and the physical environment influence each other
and what this meant for the feasibility of types of common decision-making. The
first link between anthropology and biology, with its ecosystem concept as a useful
unit of analysis, dates from 1963 (Moran 1990: 11). The sociologist Hofstede
(1980) was an early investigator of the impacts of cultures on decision-making
(in business environments) and of the differences between national cultures. In
political science, Thompson et al. (1990: 1, 5) (see also Sect. 2.3.2) were forerunners.
Their seminal book ‘Cultural theory’ links cultures or ‘ways of life’ with the concept
of governance.
It seems therefore that if social sciences are to produce meaningful knowledge
for sustainability governance, interdisciplinary, or moreover transdisciplinary
approaches are crucial. This could start within the social sciences, where anthro-
pology and political science are often organised within one and the same faculty,
without significant cross-fertilisation. New scientific approaches also require a new
vocabulary (Van Londen and De Ruijter 2011: 23) as well as better cooperation
between natural and social sciences (Bennet 1990: 454). In a recent attempt to
analyse the relations between cultural diversity and sustainable development, this
research topic is framed as sustainable diversity. It is defined as:
. . . the ability to structure and manage diversity in such a way that this diversity results in or
promotes (ecological and social) sustainability, implying stable and acceptable relationships
within and between (groups of) people involving the maintenance of biological diversity,
improving material standards of living overall, and equal (or at least fair) access to scarce
resources of all kinds as (paid) labour, health, housing, education, income or whatever. This
definition (. . .) sketches the paradox of sustainable diversity: the realisation of equal rights
and opportunities under conditions of diversity. (Van Londen and De Ruijter 2011: 17)
In this definition, the concept of equality (in e.g. equal rights) plays a central
role. There is an entire literature on defining the concepts of equality and equity.
Bronfenbrenner (1973), for example, argues that equality is in essence, an (objec-
tive) matter of fact. He distinguishes it from equity, which he frames as a matter of
ethical and therefore subjective judgment.
It can therefore be concluded that research on the cultural dimension of sustain-
able development is lagging behind, although cultures and sustainability are in
principle mutually embracing concepts. The consequences are far-reaching: it
implies that political decisions regarding sustainability on all governmental levels
are ill-informed with knowledge about values, traditions and practices, and there-
fore also ill-informed about the possibility of implementation. One could ask why,
if science does not put the issue on the agenda, practitioners – decision makers on
sustainable development – are not pushing for it. The next section attempts to
answer this question.
2.2.4 Cultural Diversity as a Hindrance
A key reason why cultural diversity does not appear on the agenda of most environ-
mental and sustainable development policy debates could be that cultural arguments
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can be easily presented as an obstacle to sustainability, and as an excuse for inaction.
Existing unsustainable practices are sometimes based on essential values and
traditions. National governments argue that for ownership in implementation pro-
cesses, national circumstances and capacities must be taken into account, but it is
often the nations lagging behind in implementation who use this argument. Existing
unsustainable practices can be based on high-tech or high-profit approaches, but also
on non-factual (scientifically tested) indigenous knowledge. An example of the first
is the economic growth paradigm, which, as long as it is based on using more
resources, is physically impossible in the long run. Another argument is that
diversity can counteract equality. It can be seen as a ‘bedfellow of inequality’
(Van Londen and De Ruijter 2011: 14); it can be argued that economic globalisation
has not created more equality, but has made the experienced social deficit even
larger: ‘Poor people can now catch a glimpse of the ‘rich life”.
Some argue that cultural differences can lead to misunderstanding and disagree-
ment, and therefore form one of the risks which must be dealt with when
sustainability partnerships are established and maintained; overcoming these
differences takes time and effort (Van Huijstee et al. 2007: 84). Finally, the
combination of bad communication as well as existing traditions and values can
lead to unintended use or even destruction of sustainable technologies. Local, off-
grid renewable energy technologies like solar home systems, biogas cook stoves
and small hydropower units are sometimes implemented without an understanding
of local cultures, which can lead to unsatisfactory results (Sovacool 2011). In
addition, in some countries, discussing cultural diversity is a societal taboo. The
USA, a nation which is these days less culturally diverse than it was 200 years ago
(Parillo 1994), provides a strong example:
Awareness of their subjective culture is particularly difficult for Americans since they often
interpret cultural factors as characteristics of individual personality. This view of
internalised cultural patterns, disregarding their social origins, is a characteristic of Ameri-
can culture. It is not a universal point of view. (Stewart and Bennet 1991)
This attitude hinders reflection on the merits and risks of living in culturally
pluralist societies, and reflects a hegemonic attitude towards other cultures. Because
values are what you believe in, it is only logical that people consider their own
culture ‘better’ than the cultures of other people. However, cultural hegemonism
creates tensions between cultures.With regards to the implementation of sustainable
development strategies which are inherently normative, not dealing with cultural
differences is a good recipe for further stagnation. In Sect. 2.3.4 alternatives to such
a hegemonic attitude are discussed, of which pluralism is the most important.
2.2.5 Cultural Diversity and Biodiversity
An important contribution to raising attention for the cultural dimension of
sustainability originates from the analogy with biological diversity. Analogies are
2 Cultural Diversity and Sustainability Metagovernance 47
among the policy maker’s best friends: they suggest a clear logic and, moreover,
causality when the inconvenient message would be one of complexity. Hence, it is
no surprise that many have suggested an analogy between cultural and biological
diversity. The UN Millennium Declaration (2000), for example, considers ‘respect
for nature’ as one of the fundamental values for humanity. Therefore, it concludes
that respect for biological diversity also implies respect for human diversity. The
declaration takes one step further in arguing that cultural diversity contributes to
sustainability because it links universal development goals to plausible and specific
moral visions; biodiversity provides an enabling environment for it. TheMillennium
Declaration builds on the conviction that humankind is part of nature. This convic-
tion is deeply embedded in the East, for example in Chinese and Japanese cultures.
The idea that nature and culture are separate categories is a Western invention. It is
an artefact: indigenous peoples are cultural but often have no concept of ‘nature’
(Dwyer 1996: 157, 181). However, there are cultures which share a different belief:
The dominant assumption in the United States is that nature and the physical world should
be controlled in the service of human beings. This has contributed to massive abuse of
natural resources in many parts of the world. (. . .) The American’s formidable and
sometimes reckless drive to control the physical world (. . .) is best expressed by the
engineer’s approach to the world, which is based on technology and applied to social spheres
as social engineering and human resource management. (Steward and Bennet 1991: 115)
UNESCO and UNEP hold that cultural diversity and biological diversity are
central to ensuring resilience in both social and ecological systems. They argue that
both types of diversity are mutually dependent (UNESCO/UNEP 2002: 9, 14),
because:
• Many cultural practices depend on, and are a result of specific elements of
biodiversity. This applies strongly to the 350 million indigenous people,
representing 4,500 of the estimated 6,000 cultures in the world.
• Biodiversity is, in many areas, developed and managed by specific cultural
groups.
Examples of the latter are cultural landscapes and tropical agro-ecosystems. In
indigenous societies, cultural beliefs and traditional spiritual values help in
preventing over-exploitation of resources, and sustaining the ecosystems in and
from which such societies live (UNESCO/UNEP 2002: 14).
The failure of many development projects can be connected to not having linked
the tangible (health, economic capabilities, security, productivity) and intangible
(participation, empowerment, recognition, aspiration) dimensions of development
(Appadurai 2002: 17). This mutual dependency of biodiversity and cultural diver-
sity has been framed as bio-cultural diversity (Posey 1999), a concept which
originally focused on cultures of indigenous people, but meanwhile also applies
to other (e.g. Westernised) cultures like in the South-African suburbs, where for
example certain wild plants still have an important meaning and use, as:
(. . .) even people who have migrated to urban or peri-urban areas and become involved in
modern economic sectors still to varying degrees maintain certain cultural practices,
including the use of wild resources for maintaining a sense of well-being and identity.
(Cocks 2006)
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The connection between both concepts also implies that the study of biodiversity
can be helpful for the understanding of human cultures. The following example is
illustrative. Without understanding the physical environment, anthropology would
probably have never understood why leadership among South American Yaruro
people is primarily ceremonial (Leeds 1969: 378–83):
Briefly, Yaruro chieftainship is characterised by its ineffectiveness. The capitan, as he is
called in Spanish, or o’te-ta’ra (elder head) in Yaruro, rarely commands. (. . .) The capitans
(. . .) complained that no one paid enough attention to them, and the Palmarito chief
complained that he was never kept sufficiently informed of events by his people.
It turns out that the logic behind this is that the ecological conditions of Yaruro
life do not require cooperation, coordination or management. All tools and
techniques demand utilisation by single persons, and hunting is a solo activity.
Therefore, a stronger institutionalisation of the chieftainship is not possible.
The analogy between biodiversity and cultural diversity is, however, not unprob-
lematic. Van Londen and De Ruijter (2011: 4–5) raise three questions. The first is
that while biodiversity provides resilience in ecosystems, it is unclear if cultural
diversity always produces resilience in societies. Cultural diversity can, under
certain political and social conditions, also result in loss of social cohesion, and
in tensions and conflicts over access to scarce resources. A counter-argument is that
cultural diversity implies having multiple models with regards how to approach life.
This provides resilience in the sense that alternative options are available when one
approach no longer works.
Secondly, high levels of biodiversity are considered as insurance to future use of
the biological gene pool, but it can be questioned if this also applies to cultural
diversity. As a response, it could be argued that cultural diversity can also contrib-
ute to the ‘gene pool’ of ideas in a society, leading to innovation and creating new
combinations of cultural approaches, which can produce resilience. The third point
of critique is that culture has, other than biodiversity, an intentional dimension; it is
not an expression of a group but an invitation to become a group (Barth 1969, 1994).
Van Londen and De Ruijter finally question whether or not there are cultural
equivalents for concepts like ecosystem services and keystone species. Apart from
the point that analogies do not need to extend to all aspects of the items being
compared, it could be mentioned here that cultural services can provide mechanisms
for meeting human needs, just like ecosystem services. In addition, key cultural
elements that, if removed, lead to the collapse or complete change of the rest of the
culture, do exist, as with, for example, egalitarian ethics.
The strong analogy and the linkages between the concepts of bio- and cultural
diversity are an argument for incorporating cultural diversity in the objectives of
sustainable development. Understanding sustainability processes requires an under-
standing of cultures, and this again necessitates understanding biodiversity.
Another argument for giving cultural diversity a comparable place as biodiversity
is that natural sciences have shown beyond doubt that people are part of nature, in
the sense that they are taxonomically mammals and are biologically and biochemi-
cally closely related to certain other mammals.
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2.3 Cultural Diversity and Governance for Sustainable
Development
If the arguments that cultural diversity has to be included in the governance of
sustainable development are convincing, why does it then not happen? In order to
understand this, we must know more about how governance definitions deal with
values and norms. In this section it is argued that the mere fact that governance is a
normative concept implies that cultural diversity should be addressed in governance
discussions.
2.3.1 Governance of and for Sustainability
When we discuss governance and sustainability, it can be useful to distinguish
between governance of and for sustainable development. Governance of sustain-
able development refers to the governance dimension as such: which issues are
relevant when we discuss the governance dimension of sustainability? This is a
heuristic issue. Governance for sustainability is normative, prescriptive: it concerns
the methods, tools and instruments specifically considered to be useful for sustain-
able development (e.g. Baker 2009).
This chapter tackles both: what are the specific characteristics of sustainability
governance, and could conditions be created for governance approaches which deal
effectively with sustainable development challenges?
2.3.2 The Cultural Dimension of Governance
Some widely adopted definitions of governance assume a general applicability. An
example is the ‘good governance’ agenda, used by World Bank the IMF and by
development organisations. This concept has become increasingly refined. The
1997 World Development Report contains 45 criteria for good governance, whilst
the 2002 Report lists 116 items (Grindle 2004).
The problem is that there are many competing – but all hegemonic – definitions
of what ‘good’ governance implies. They vary, for example, between European and
American scholars (Robichau 2011: 116). In Anglo-Saxon countries, many political
scientists prefer to present governance as the combination of small government and
market-type instruments. In Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, the ‘gov-
ernance is network’ narrative has become popular among scholars. These different
schools are based on different values and traditions. The market-oriented New
Public Management movement was born in Anglo-Saxon countries which have a
strong individualist and free-market culture. The network-orientation of the
Netherlands can be traced back to centuries ago, when people had to work together
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to fight the water (Kickert 2003). Such different world views lead to different
problem definitions and to different interests of actors (Jachtenfuchs 1994). Dixon
and Dogan (2002: 191) emphasise the incompatibility of these views: Hierarchical,
network and market governance:
derive their governance certainties from propositions drawn from specific methodological
families, which reflect particular configurations of epistemological and ontological
perspectives. They have incompatible contentions about what is knowable in the social
world and what does or can exist – the nature of being – in the social world. Thus, they have
incompatible contentions about the forms of reasoning that should be the basis for thought
and action.
It is difficult to grasp why the cultural dimension of governance has been
neglected for so long. One possible reason is that it does not fit into the dominant
paradigm of the post-war Western world, rational choice theory (Geva-May 2002:
388). In the USA, cultural diversity has been a societal (and scholarly) taboo. This
absence of a cultural dimension in governance is not problematic per se when the
objects of governance are clear-cut and predictable. If it works well in France, there
is no reason why French railways should not be decided upon centrally in Paris. In
addition, the extensive stakeholder dialogues around decisions about fast railway
tracks in The Netherlands are not necessarily an example of ‘best practice’ which
works everywhere. However, when we discuss governance for an inherently value-
laden object like sustainable development, the use of standardised governance
approaches may provoke unnecessary implementation problems. Sustainability
governance therefore requires a definition which is based on the idea that gover-
nance is inherently normative, and that values and traditions are part of effective
governance. The following definition means that different cultural versions are a
possibility, and that the definition itself is only normative in one respect: it is a
definition in which relations are fundamental. Governance is:
. . . the totality of interactions of governments, other public bodies, the private sector and
civil society, aiming at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities.
(Meuleman 2008)
Another, similarly neutral, definition of governance is:
a collection of normative insights on the organisation of influence, steering, power, checks
and balances in human societies. (in ’t Veld 2011)
Three styles of governance are usually distinguished: hierarchical, network and
market governance (Thorelli 1986, Thompson et al. 1991, Kickert 2003). These
styles tend to appear in combinations which can vary over time. Each style or ideal
type is consistent with specific sets of values. For example, a hierarchical gover-
nance style appreciates authority, justice and accountability, network governance
links with empathy, trust and equality, and market governance prefers autonomy,
competitiveness and economic value (price).
There are three problems with the application of these governance styles. Firstly,
they can undermine each other. Secondly, each of them has typical failures or even
perversities. Thirdly, they all have an attractive, even ‘addictive’ logic. The latter
relates to the cultural dimension.
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Thompson et al. (1990: 1, 5) distinguish five human cultures or ‘ways of life’:
Hierarchism, egalitarianism, individualism, fatalism and autonomism. In Fig. 2.2,
the triangle represents the three governance styles, while the dash-lined pentagon
depicts the five ways of life. Hierarchism, egalitarianism and individualism are, in
terms of value orientation, congruent with hierarchical, network and market gover-
nance. The two other ways of life – fatalism and autonomism – are mixed forms.
Fatalism, an attitude in the shadow of strong hierarchism, denies the possibility of
coordination, which is an important function of governance, and autonomism is
individualism (market governance) in its extreme form, which does not accept
social responsibility.
2.3.3 Governance and National Cultures
If cultures and governance styles are so intensely intertwined, to what extent do
national cultures then predict how sustainability policies are designed and
implemented? Does this mean that global sustainability is a fata morgana – because
we do not have a global culture? Although we may speculate whether nations have a
dominant characteristic type of governance, many public administration studies
have shown that at least national administrations can be categorised along cultural
lines. For example, people in Germany and France may prefer hierarchy, while in
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands network governance may be the
preferred ‘default’ style. Regarding the value preferences of (to a large extent
business) professionals in different nations, much empirical work has been
published. The sociologist Hofstede constructs and tests five indexes which may
be useful for understanding different cultural approaches to sustainability: power
distance, the degree of individualism, gender roles, uncertainty avoidance, and








Fig. 2.2 Three governance styles and five ways of life (After Meuleman 2008)
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distance, low uncertainty avoidance and a ‘feminine’3 culture are the Netherlands
and the Scandinavian countries, which also have a tradition of network governance.
People living in nations like Germany and France show, compared to citizens of
Scandinavian countries, a higher acceptance of power distance and a higher level of
uncertainty avoidance. This may be an indicator of a more hierarchical tradition.
The US, Australia and Great Britain rank 1–3 on Hofstede’s list of most individu-
alistic countries and they also score highly on ‘masculinity’.4 This correlates with
the historical fact that market governance has originated in Anglo-Saxon nations.
Even when their geographical distances are small, there can be clear differences
in value orientations between nations. One study, for example, shows such
differences between aWestern European country (the Netherlands) and four Central
European countries, as well as among these four countries (Kolman et al. 2002: 87).
In the context of this chapter it is noteworthy that most environmental policies are
formulated from an individualist point of view, and based on implementation
through market-based mechanisms, but also include a legalist (rights-based,
hierarchical) approach. A comparative study on the relations between national
culture and three basic norms of governance (rule of law, corruption, and democratic
accountability) in some 50 nations reveals that ‘good governance’ is more compati-
ble with cultural profiles in Western European and English-speaking countries than
inmany other nations. The authors of this study conclude that, for example, the value
of individual freedom ‘runs counter to the societal emphasis on embeddedness that is
common in many Asian, African and other countries’ (Licht et al. 2007). In addition,
Cornell and Kalt (e.g. 2005) present an extensive body of analysis with regards to
Native American tribal culture and governing styles. This may well offer an inter-
esting contrast, and may boost efforts to increase cultural diversity.
It seems therefore that it is important to recognise the cultural dimension of
governance if we wish to understand why transferring a successful governance
approach from one country to another in a dogmatic way, without adaptation to the
national socio-politico-administrative culture and other situational factors, can
result in failure (Meuleman 2010a).
The idea of ‘national cultures’ ought to be nuanced, however, because many
countries house different groups of people with their own cultural settings. On the
other hand, there are also communities who share the same values but are not
geographically linked. Good examples are ‘elite cultures’. There may be consider-
able differences between the culture of the governing elite, and the culture of the
general public. For example, international climate negotiations are carried out by
highly educated officers, who share a common working culture with colleagues
from abroad.
3A ‘feminine’ culture is defined as a culture ‘in which emotional gender roles overlap: both men
and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerend with the quality of life’ (Hofstede
and Hofstede 2005: 401).
4 A masculine culture is a culture ‘in which emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are
supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more
modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life’ (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005: 402).
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In addition, Hofstede and Hofstede (2005: 11) argue that the national level of
‘mental programming of ourselves’ is only one of the layers of culture, besides
regional, ethnic, religious and/or linguistic affiliation level, a gender level, a
generation level, a social class level, and an organisational level (socialisation by
a work organisation). Finally, there are combinations of cultural values underlying
governance style combinations which hardly fit with any of the ways of life which
are depicted in Fig. 2.2. For example, bazaar governance as coined for the gover-
nance of Internet communities, is characterised by low levels of control (hierarchy),
weak incentives intensity (market) and a kind of network governance which does
not build on trust – community members seldom know each other personally and
may enter or leave the network unnoticed (Demil and Lecocq 2006).
To summarise, national or regional, and even local governments may be inclined
– for reasons of opportunita, fashion, or compliance with (e.g. World Bank) rules
set by financial sponsors – to use a specific governance style mixture, regardless of
the character of the societal problems to be addressed. However, we know that
local, regional or national values and traditions co-determine which governance
style combinations may work. Sometimes there are clear underlying national
preferences for certain styles, such as a consensus style in the Netherlands and
hierarchy in Germany and France, as well as market styles in Anglo-Saxon
countries. In many other cases such linkages are much less clear.
What can be concluded is that without considering adapting sustainability
governance to what makes sense for, and is acceptable to people, all governance
attempts risk failure. The popular term ‘best practice’ suggests universal applica-
bility and should therefore be exchanged for ‘good practice’. When considering
borrowing a successful practice, it is essential to reflect on the question of whether
such an approach would work in the specific setting of values and traditions.
2.3.4 Governance and the Relations Between Values
The concept of governance is intentional, and we have defined it as a relational
concept. Hierarchy needs dependent subjects, network governance requires inter-
dependency between partners, and market governance necessitates independent
relationships (Kickert 2003: 127). Hence, it is fair to assume that different gover-
nance styles also express how people consider other people’s values. Five relational
values which express different relation types, are (in ’t Veld 2010a):
• Hegemony: “My values are superior to those of other people”.
• Separatism: “I don’t want to be confronted with the implications of other
people’s values”.
• Pluralism: “Other people’s values may be valuable, and I am co-responsible for
protecting them”.
• Tolerance: “I find my values superior to other people’s values, but I abstain from
interventions because of sympathy”.
• Indifference: “I find my values superior to other people’s values, but I abstain
from interventions because I am not interested”.
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To draw a broad typology, hegemony and separatism are related to the top-
down and authoritarian thinking of hierarchical governance, pluralism and toler-
ance to the empathy, trust and respect of network governance, and indifference to
the individualism and autonomy of market governance (Table 2.1). Hegemonic
thinking is congruent with top-down governance, and cultural pluralism seems to
fit better to the character of many sustainability challenges. If the complexity of a
sustainability challenge leads to choosing network governance, pluralism or at
least tolerance are values to be expected. However if, for a specific problem
hierarchical governance is chosen as the main style, its congruency with hege-
mony and separatism should be taken into account: it can destroy trust and
innovation power. If a market-based approach is chosen, the indifference towards
values and traditions related to market governance can become a bottleneck for
implementation. We have already seen that the ‘wickedness’ of many
sustainability problems necessitates a strong network governance touch in the
sustainability governance mixture. This suggests that for sustainable development
at least tolerance, but even more so pluralism are probable and should be expected
to be productive approaches. Earlier I have argued that governance is a normative
concept, and that different governance styles can be linked to different value
systems and traditions. This implies that governance can be both a hindrance and
an opportunity to increase the role of cultural diversity in sustainability. How can
the latter be promoted?
2.4 Cultural Diversity as an Opportunity?
The following paragraphs discuss the arguments in favour of linking cultural
diversity to sustainability governance. In addition, the tension between diversity
and unifying concepts will be addressed.
2.4.1 Cultural Diversity as an Opportunity for Sustainability
Governance
Cultural pluralism is often seen as threatening sustainable development, especially
social sustainability. The dominant attitude therefore is, and has been, assimilation
of cultural and ethnical minorities (often euphemised as ‘integration’) (Verweel and
Table 2.1 Governance styles and relational values
Governance style Relation to other people’s values
Hierarchical governance (dependency, authority) Hegemony or separatism
Network governance (interdependency, empathy) Pluralism or tolerance
Market governance (independency, autonomy) Indifference
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De Ruiter 2003). This policy of assimilation has created social tensions between
different cultural groups in many European countries. Verweel and De Ruijter
(2003: 217–219) presents three arguments against the integration principle:
• An appeal for fundamental, shared values and standards cannot work in our
contemporary plural societies.
• Our cultural diverse societies have become less recognisable and predictable;
institutions turn out to be unreliable.
• Having the same cognitions, standards and values are not functional conditions
for society and communication.
If it is considered important that sustainability governance is grounded in
cultural values as drivers for social transformation, an alternative approach could
be to not focus on communality – commonly shared values – but on compatibility
(De Ruijter 1995). Communality is often politically framed as ‘integration’, for
example in Western immigrant policies. In reality, this is a rather hegemonic
assimilation. The compatibility principle recognises that there are (in principle
valuable) differences, which may cause tensions and incompatibilities:
We should not remove differences, which is both impossible and unnecessary, but regulate
and hence both recognise and appreciate these differences. Since power also implies
inequality, it should also include organising power effects. (De Ruijter 1995: 222)
De Ruijter argues that this means, for example:
stimulating contacts between groups with different identities, without asking these people
to develop a common system of basic conditions.
He adds that this requires participation, which in turn, requires – at least in
Western nations – entrance to the job market, which again requires education,
including learning the social competence to deal with diversity. The latter, De
Ruijter concludes, requires the capability to deal with uncertainty, unknown
situations, limited means and one’s own shortcomings.
A simple example, which many will have experienced, is the fact that different
cultures have a different notion of time (or concrete: being in time for an agreed
meeting). Some people consider it crucial to be exactly in time for a meeting, and
become impatient when others are delayed. The latter, for example, is considered to
breach the value of politeness. Others, who do not put such an emphasis on being
punctual, could be offended if people do not wait until they arrive. Their solution in
such cases is multi-tasking: if a meeting does not take place at all, or not at the
agreed moment, they switch to other useful activities without a problem. The
background of these differences could be found in profoundly different time
conceptions: linear time (e.g. Western) versus circular time (e.g. African) (Du
Pisani, 2006). Striving for compatibility could, in this example, mean creating a
compromise that includes a time window of flexibility (to which the ‘multi-taskers’
should comply), and that the ‘impatients’ move a little towards multi-tasking.
We could ask if striving for compatibility is a one-solution-fits-all approach.
Earlier I have concluded that such panaceas are extremely rare. In nations in which
(cultural) diversity is suppressed and central solutions to sustainability and
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environmental challenges are imposed, this can be successful if people are willing
to accept this hierarchical and authoritarian approach, be it because of a strong
underlying hierarchical value system, or because of fatalism. Although some in the
environmental community dream of the effectiveness of such ‘Chinese gover-
nance’, these dreams contradict my argument that copy-pasting governance from
one culture to another can run the risk of failure.
We have seen that framing cultural diversity as an obstacle to sustainability has
been a welcome political excuse to do nothing, and continues to be the dominant
view, partly because of the lack of inter- and transdisciplinary research. However, if
sustainability can be linked to existing values and traditions, chances are higher that
ownership develops. Ownership is a crucial condition with regards to, for example,
the introduction of ‘forest diplomacy’ which is more based on partnerships
(Hoogeveen and Verkooijen 2010), and is an essential value for multiple inclusion
of actors in problem-solving (as described in configuration theory; Termeer 1993).
Moreover, considering cultural diversity as an opportunity for sustainability gover-
nance may prevent the destruction of already existing sustainable practices.
The argument that social ownership is crucial, and implies co-production of
situationally appropriate solutions rather than ready-made packages (GIZ 2010),
has gained more influence in the field of development cooperation than in
sustainability governance. In order to create a better balance, a different view of
cultures in sustainability governance is required. Cultural change is a requisite of
tackling the great sustainability challenges: we cannot rely on engineering, entre-
preneurship and professional politics alone (Leggewie and Welzer 2009).
To conclude: Building sustainability on cultural diversity and investing in
compatibility of values and practices rather than on assimilation, can lead to a
rich variation of solutions to similar problems, instead of current governance
practice in which centrally proposed solutions are often accepted in some cultures
and rejected in others.
2.4.2 Unity and Diversity?
Besides the challenge of optimising the opportunities and minimising the hindrance
of cultural diversity to sustainability governance, the tensions between diversity as
expressions of pluralism and its ‘enemy’ universalism should be addressed in
sustainability governance. This problem is not only typical for sustainable develop-
ment. Three contrasting approaches are relevant:
• Universalism departs from the idea that cultures are not equivalent. According to
this conviction, some cultures are superior to others, and therefore economic and
cultural imperialism are legitimate (Procee 1991).
• Cultural relativism makes diversity central and chooses tolerance as the main
relational value to cope with power differences between cultures, for example.
Its advocates consider it taking ‘a neutral vantage point’ which ‘calls for
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suspending judgement when dealing with groups or societies different from
one’s own’ (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005: 6).
• Pluralism also approaches cultures as equivalent and gives diversity a central
place, but instead of tolerance, it chooses an active exchange between diverse
cultures. This ‘interactive diversity’ (Procee 1991) considers cultural uniqueness
as a possibility to learn.
Private companies, more than (national) governments, have also discovered the
innovation power of cultural diversity. Referring to De Bono’s advocacy of lateral
thinking and other non-linear approaches to innovation, the Canadian CEO Singer
(2008) holds that culturally diverse organisations can be more innovative when
their ‘cultural intelligence’ is used well. She argues that multinational companies
like Proctor and Gamble have come to understand this, and have developed the
philosophy that diversity outperforms homogeneity. Companies who fail to under-
stand that relationships are much more important in Asian cultures than in the USA
where the focus is on the contract, on money and individual recognition, face
problems. Many northern European companies have failed in India because they
did not adapt their strategies to Indian norms and values (Majlergaard 2006). The
challenge to turn cultural diversity from a hindrance into an asset is the reason why
IBM more than 30 years ago asked the sociologist Hofstede to investigate national
cultural differences by interviewing IBM employees. In addition, corporate gover-
nance theorists have stressed the usefulness of national (or other) cultures. Licht
(2001) even concludes that national cultures can be seen as ‘the mother of path
dependencies’ in corporate governance systems (Licht 2001).
If we conclude that a pluralist approach is most in line with the cultural
dimension of sustainable development, how can we reconcile unity and diversity
or plurality? A first observation is that, although it seems difficult to combine
universalist common values with a pro-active attitude towards cultural diversity,
this has been an attractive paradox for Western politicians. Since 2000, the motto of
the European Union is ‘United in diversity’, reflecting the idea that the EU is an
ambitious common project of people who recognise the richness of their continent’s
different cultures and traditions. More than two centuries before, in 1781, the
American Congress adopted the motto E pluribus unum (One from many) as the
motto of the USA. However, it is not only theWest that feels attracted to this paradox.
The principle of ‘unity in diversity’ is also the foundation of Hinduism, and is
considered to bind India and its 1652 languages and dialects together (Satheye 2001).
Mottos like ‘unity in diversity’ and ‘E pluribus unum’ may have an important
symbolic meaning, but have at the same time little practical use. There are quite
different views on the unity-diversity divide. Pro-diversity advocates argue that:
• Sustainability problems differ so much (geographically and culturally), that we
need different strategies in North and South, between men and women, and poor
and rich (Oswald Spring 2010).
• Acceptance of (sustainability) governance depends on the match with (local/
regional/national et cetera) cultures (Meuleman 2010a).
• The current (global), and not very successful sustainability governance system
has a uniformist bias.
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Pro-unity advocates argue that some environmental problems (e.g. climate
change), economic and social problems cross borders and require universally
binding policy principles. Sustainable development requires that the human rights
are extended to, for example, the right to food (De Schutter 2010).
The most successful example, which is relevant to social sustainability, of a
universalist approach to cultures is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Indeed this declaration has (since 1993) been supported by 171 nations.
In only 30 articles this Declaration formulates more than 60 universal rights. The
Declaration itself is not legally binding, but has been the inspiration for other
declarations which are legally binding, and for national constitutions. The seem-
ingly valid option of an impact-rich universal set of values could be interpreted as
supporting a continuation of the current centralist and universalist focus of
sustainability governance.
However, the Universal Declaration has been, and still is disputed, because of its
presumed incompatibility with certain cultures. This is not the place to elaborate on
it further, but some of the arguments contesting the viability of universal human
rights should be mentioned:
• Many sustainability challenges are of the ‘wicked’ type, which makes them
extremely difficult to tackle with centralist (in terms of governance styles:
hierarchical) processes and instruments, except maybe in nations with an
accepted authoritarian regime.
• Preserving a broad perspective of diversity (including biophysical, cultural,
economic, technological, social, institutional and cognitive issues) can be a
suitable way to reduce socio-ecological vulnerability (Cazorla-Clariso et al.
2008) and create more social resilience.
• It can be questioned whether or not contemporary human rights do reflect a global
consensus, or if the current set of human rights is congruent with all cultures. For
example, they are ‘overtly egalitarian in their aim to secure equal rights for
everyone, regardless of social station or level of achievement’ (Kao 2011: 172).
One area to draw examples from could be the impacts of the rights of indigenous
peoples on sustainable development. The rights-based approach seeks to protect
indigenous peoples’ self-determination and preserve their traditional life styles and
culture, which are often assumed to be more sustainable than industrial lifestyles.
However in practice one can often observe that indigenous peoples’ life styles are
neither sustainable per se nor does the rights-based approach seem to help in
preserving their traditions. Instead, the combination of traditional rights to lands
and resources and a broad interpretation of the right to self-determination some-
times leads to highly disruptive lifestyles (e.g. hunting with skidoos and AK47
rifles). These lifestyles are of course also expressions of culture and a possible
consequence of diversity. Another negative outcome could be that rights-based
diversity leads communities to resist adapting to external influences, such as
climate change. Most indigenous communities in Canada’s north, for example,
will not be able to survive in a warmer climate.
It seems that each discussion on cultural diversity leads to the question of
whether there are also universal values, and if yes, how do they relate to the premise
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of diversity? The question is whether this is a problem, because such a never-ending
discussion can also be beneficial. However, the issue of how to make trade-offs
between unity and diversity in sustainability governance should be addressed, as
there is a dominant coalition in scholarly and political environmental and
sustainability communities pushing the ‘unity’ side of the equation.
An observation based on a comparative investigation of European nations
dealing with these kinds of dilemmas in sustainable development governance is,
that if there is a lack of success, then there is a tendency to move towards the other
end of the pole (Niestroy 2005: 13). Taking this line of thought, it might be possible
to formulate this as a heuristic governance rule: The dominance of centralism in
sustainability governance should lead to the assumption that moving towards more
diversity would lead to better results. It does not however have to imply a break-
down of the universal ‘acquis’ of, for example, human rights.
In addition, a contribution to dealing with the dilemma between univeralist and
pluralist approaches could arise from adopting a formula like Kant’s categorical
imperative (already mentioned in Sect. 2.1.2) for universal values: ‘everybody
should act in a way that the maxim of this behaviour could become a maxim
applicable to all’. Such a governance formula for sustainability governance could
be framed as in the guidelines on cultural impact assessments under the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD 2004; the Akwé: Kon Guidelines), which seek to
bridge the environment/human rights divide in a very concrete way:
Governments should encourage and support indigenous and local communities, where they
have not already done so, to formulate their own community-development plans that will
enable such communities to adopt a more culturally appropriate strategic, integrated and
phased approach to their development needs in line with community goals and objectives.
2.5 Towards a Culturally Sensitive Metagovernance
for Sustainable Development
How can cultural diversity, while respecting the need to have some common values,
be reconciled with different approaches to sustainability governance? This section
seeks an answer using the emerging concept of metagovernance: combining and
managing governance style combinations which take into account the differences
between value systems and traditions in different regions and for different
communities.
2.5.1 Sustainability Metagovernance
I have so far argued that sustainable development cannot be promoted with a one-
style-fits-all governance approach. The consequence of the failure of standard
recipes (be it of the hierarchical, network or market type or a specific combination
like the World Bank’s ‘good governance’ or the ‘governance-as-network-manage-
ment’ paradigm) should be to investigate whether it is possible to design and apply
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governance approaches which allow variation in time and place. For this purpose
Jessop (1997) coins the concept metagovernance, or governance ‘beyond’
governance.
Metagovernance can be defined as ‘producing some degree of coordinated
governance, by designing and managing sound combinations of hierarchical, mar-
ket and network governance, in order to achieve the best possible outcomes’
(Meuleman 2008). A ‘metagovernor’ aims to prevent or mitigate governance
style conflicts, and understands how to combine governance style elements into a
productive approach. He or she also knows when and how to switch from one style
to another. This seems very ambitious, but there are experienced public managers
who do this by intuition and find it nothing special. Two quotes, the first from a
leading manager in the Dutch Environment Ministry, and the second from a police
manager of one of the largest cities in the Netherlands, can illustrate this
(Meuleman 2008: 146, 214):
In a complex and constantly changing environment a Ministry has to be flexible, always
problem-oriented and impact-sensitive, and ask itself: does our governance approach
deliver the expected results?
We are chameleons: We switch between styles depending on the situation at hand.
People in our organisation have a sense for this. When an incident occurs, they know that
there is no time for discussion. Nobody asks “Why?”, “Shouldn’t we involve other
parties?”, “Isn’t this too expensive?”. After the incident, network and market governance
elements reappear.
Biermann et al. (2010) define a similar overarching concept, namely a ‘global
governance architecture’, which concerns the meta-level of governance for global
climate change. However, this approach still has a hierarchical bias. A more
participatory approach is proposed by Hoogeveen and Verkooijen (2010), who
develop a portfolio approach for forest governance, which could be useful for
broader sustainability issues. They suggest moving from negotiating grand
agreements towards negotiating and then managing ‘portfolios of instruments and
the provision of the convening space in which they can operate and be nurtured
coherently’ (ibid. 2010: 154).
If we accept that it is impossible to determine which governance approach is in
general the most successful, it makes no sense to design standardised approaches.
What can be standardised, however, are mechanisms which increase the chance that
successful governance emerges in a certain situation. Such mechanisms should take
into account the existing preferences of powerful actors (governmental or non-
governmental), as well as the cultural and administrative history of a location.
The concept of metagovernance provides such a mechanism. In order to make
sustainability governance culturally sensitive, permanent and systematic attention
is required to translate or adapt possible solutions into ones which work well in a
given cultural setting. This I would call culturally sensitive sustainability
metagovernance.
Several questions arise with regards to the concept of metagovernance. The first
is which dimensions of governance should be involved. Should the focus be on
institutions and transformation processes, or also on leadership styles, core values,
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preferred instruments, and so on? The answer lies in the situational core of
metagovernance: metagovernance implies taking a bird’s eye perspective, and
takes into account all dimensions which are relevant in a given – or framed –
case, and all three prototypical forms of these dimensions. Take the example of the
dimension of leadership: Grint (2010) presents the example that each classical
governance style can lead to an addiction: advocates of hierarchy can become
addicted to command and neglect all ‘wicked’ problems; egalitarians who prefer
consensus tend to turn any problem into a ‘wicked’ problem, and individualists
(often advocates of market governance) tend to turn every problem into a standard
problem which is subject to ‘the correct understanding of cause and effect’.
Another question is who determines the relevant governance dimensions. Some
argue that metagovernance is a return to the central state: a new and hidden type of
hierarchical steering; metagovernance is steering at a distance, but still steering, and
will have some centralising effects (Peters 2011: 9). Moreover, metagovernance
studies are said to rely on a central role of states (Glasbergen 2011: 194). A solution
to this problem has been advocated by Sørensen (2006: 100) and Aagaard (2009).
They position the metagovernor as a ‘hands-on’, neutral actor who takes direct part
in the policy process, but has no formal authority on behalf of the other actors. This
requires that such a metagoverning process manager is trusted by all relevant
parties. It can be questioned whether this is feasible for global governance issues,
because in the global arena trust is a scarce value, as could for instance be observed
during the first two preparatory sessions of the UN Rio 2012 conference in 2010 and
2011. Indeed discussions at this conference between the developing nations (united
as the ‘G77’) and the group of richer nations were tense.
I would propose a different approach, based on two considerations. Firstly, in
line with the situationality of metagovernance, a metagovernor may prefer to force
other actors to comply (hierarchical governance, using coercion, a ‘stick’; or
convince actors of self-regulation and competition mechanisms, which are
principles of market governance, using an incentive, a ‘carrot’). He or she can
also start a process with other actors on the basis of mutual dependency and
voluntary cooperation (network governance; aiming at mutual gains). Mixed
forms have also been described, such as co-opetition (e.g. Teisman 2001), a
neologism originating from game theory, which describes cooperative competition.
The term co-opetition expresses a combination of network and market governance.
A state actor therefore may not have to choose a ‘steering’ approach.
Secondly, metagovernance may be considered as a process approach which can
be used by all involved actors, in their own way. Certainly, a governmental actor
who looks beyond old or new orthodoxies such as Weberian ‘steering’, New Public
Management inspired ‘rowing’ or a consensus-searching network governance
model, acts as a metagovernor. Having said this, there is no reason why a business
actor or a civil society organisation should not also think beyond orthodoxies
(Glasbergen 2011). If such actors embrace the metagovernance philosophy,
a competition might emerge between different actors with regards to who takes
the lead, but it is at least an informed governance competition which may
increase the number of policy options in a given policy theme. Such a multi-actor
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metagovernance means, however, that building governance capacity includes train-
ing in metagovernance. Moreover, such meta-capacity building must be culturally
informed. For example, in consensus-oriented societies such as the Netherlands and
the Scandinavian countries, training would have to emphasise the typical failures of
network governance (never-ending talks, risk of manipulation) and present insights
into how to overcome these failures through introducing structures and rules. These
structures and rules could pertain to issues such as determining the width of a
network, the patterns of relationships of the members of a network, and determining
the main issues on the network’s agenda (Schvartzman 2009). Other compensation
measures are ensuring transparency and introducing values from hierarchical gov-
ernance like legitimacy and reliability. An interesting example of such a ‘bottom-up
metagovernance’ is the successful 2008 action to clean the forests of Estonia from
garbage in 1 day. The organisers, a group of citizens, used network governance as
the key mechanism to motivate 50,000 citizens, but added efficiency (market
governance) and an almost military (hierarchical) operation mechanism.5
Metagovernance therefore does not have to be a new shape of central steering.
Sustainability metagovernance includes the necessity of metagoverning roles of
more than only governmental actors in the sustainability debate. This poses an
important design question for conferences such as UNCSD (Rio) 2012.
In the next section, we will briefly discuss institutions, as a crucial governance
dimension, and question the common assumption that they always epress dominant,
hegemonic approaches; we will also suggest how the mechanisms of culturally
informed sustainability metagovernance could look.
2.5.2 Cultural Diversity and Institutions
The meaning of institutions has been phrased as ‘using rules and tools to cope with
the commons’ (Ostrom 1990: 219). This section discusses the cultural dimension of
institutions relevant for sustainable development. Contrary to the common practice
of considering institutions and organisations as synonyms, the term institutions
should here be broadly defined as sense-making arrangements, which are the rules
of the game. These rules realise values in society and produce meaning. Such a
broad definition includes interpersonal societal structures, organisations,
mechanisms and orientations. Some consider the institutional dimension so impor-
tant for sustainability governance that they propose it as the fourth dimension of
sustainable development (Spangenberg 2005: 28–29), after the environmental, the
social and the economic dimension. However, we have seen that culture can also be
seen as the fourth dimension of sustainability (Nurse 2006:45), and there may be
more candidates queuing. Therefore, here the institutional dimension of sustainable
5A short video summarising this endaveour can be seen on http://bit.ly/DZmMg.
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development will be considered as one of the essential governance dimensions of
sustainability: the rules dimension of decision-making and implementation.
The ‘institutional framework for sustainable development’ was one of the two
foci of the UNCSD 2012 Rio conference. The reason why institutions were chosen
as the focus lies in the weak implementation record of sustainability policies. An
analysis by the Mapping Global Environmental Governance Reform project shows
that:
an impressive institutional machinery has actually been built, but also that the overall state of
the global environment seems not to have improved as a consequence of this. (Staur 2006)
Which governance institutions and mechanisms could generate change? Here we
must heed Machiavelli’s warning to avoid wishful thinking and start with the world
as it is. It is pointless to preach to consumers about abandoning their cars and plane
travel, or to admonish companies to give priority to sustainability. Economic
activity is deeply embedded in economic and social institutions, and companies
are constrained by corporate governance, capital markets, competition, and the
wider consumer culture.
The current institutional framework for sustainability governance is a patchwork
or mosaic which is often labelled as ’fragmented’. This is not a neutral label: behind
the term ‘fragmented’ lies the assumption that integration and centralisation are the
most appropriate principles for institutional design. However, in the diverse,
globalised world of today, other design principles might be necessary. While
recognising that existing institutions will be defended by governmental and other
stakeholders who have been part of their establishment, a first step can be:
. . . the willingness to discuss diverse world views, and to recognise that the situation in
twenty-first-century society can no longer be adequately represented by institutions and
values from times gone by. (Verweel and De Ruijter 2003: 15)
Besides being ‘fragmented’, the framework of (inter)governmental institutions
for sustainable development and climate change contains many political players
who are relatively weak, such as in environmental and sustainability policies like
the UNEP and UNCSD.6 The gap between the knowledge of threats and the
adequacy of institutional response seems at its largest in environmental policy
(Weiss and Thakur 2010: 215). However, decision-making and implementation
concerning environmental and climate change problems is, at least to some extent,
based upon well-defined legally binding commitments. In sustainable development
it is mostly declaratory, defined by corner stones like the 1992 Rio declaration, or
the Millennium declaration.
The institutions we focus on in this section are those which shape or obstruct a
successful governance of sustainability in diverse cultural settings. Like other
institutions, they follow different logics, according to the logic of the governance
6UNEP: United National Environmental Programme; UNCSD: United Nations Commission for
Sustainable Development.
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style (or – combination) in or for which they are designed. If we define governance
as the relationship between government, civil society and business when solving
societal problems and creating societal opportunities, three different institutional
logics should be distinguished through the logic of hierarchies, the logic of
networks and the logic of markets (Meuleman 2008):
• The logic of hierarchies: Hierarchical governance produces centralised institutions,
which work on the basis of authority, with rules and regulations and imperatives.
Institutions are, for example, legally based agreements. This aligns with classical
representative forms of democracy, but also with authoritarian types of ruling.
Decisions are made top-down. Government is central. Blueprinting is an engineer-
ing term which aligns well with the hierarchical logic. Hierarchical institutions are
often best suited for dealing with emergencies and disasters, and for control tasks.
• The logic of networks: Network governance tends to produce more informal
institutions in which trust and empathy are key values. Examples are covenants
and Internet communities. This shares a logic with deliberative forms of democ-
racy. Decisions are made together. Government is a partner in society. Network
institutions have proven to be able to lead to ways out of ‘wicked’, complex and
disputed problems.
• The logic of markets: Market governance aims at small, decentralised govern-
ment, and at using market types of institutions such as contracts, incentives and
public-private partnerships as well as other hybrid organisations. Decisions are
made bottom-up, through mechanisms like the invisible hand of the market.
Government is a societal service-provider. Market institutions with their focus
on autonomy and efficiency are best for routine problems.
Key characteristics of the three prototypical institutional logics are compiled in
Table 2.2. As argued in Sect. 2.5.1, the logic of metagovernance implies that
situationally effective combinations of the three prototypical logics should be
made. It is therefore impossible to describe an optional institutional framework
for sustainable development, even when such a framework would include different
institutions at different levels of government.
Most of the current institutions for climate change mitigation policy – a key
sustainability challenge – are based on the hierarchical logic, and part of the
intergovernmental discussions on renewal of sustainability governance show simi-
lar premises (Meuleman 2010b). Six implicit hierarchical premises can be
observed. The first is a preference for centralised negotiations and institutions,
such as the UNCFFF climate conventions, the Convention for Biological Diversity
and the UNCSD sustainability summits. The second is the conviction that in the
end, governments should be the only decision makers, whereas other actors are also
able to make relevant decisions and take responsibility. Thirdly, there is a broadly
shared belief that only legally binding decisions are effective. This can be
illustrated by the first question on the cover of a recent edited book, written by a
team of 30 leading experts from the European Union and developing countries,
which is: ‘What is the most effective overall legal and institutional architecture for
successful and equitable climate politics?’ (Biermann et al. 2010). The framing of
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their question reveals an assumption that there is one solution to the problem of
climate change, and it is a legal one.
The fourth premise is the preference for (mono)disciplinary, ‘authoritative’
science, which suggests that practical knowledge is not relevant, and that scientific
authority is a given thing. Both climate mitigation and adaptation policy processes
are technology based, large-scale and top-down (Ayers et al. 2010: 271). This
presumes a stable, clear and predictable world. However, the design and implemen-
tation of climate change policy takes place in a changing world, in which we not
only bear witness to a range of interrelated global environmental problems, but also
to turbulent economical and geopolitical changes. Although the IPCC process
Table 2.2 Key characteristics of institutional logics (After Meuleman 2008)
Hierarchical logic Network logic Market logic
Culture/Way of life Hierarchism Egalitarianism Individualism
Theoretical
background
Rational, positivism Social constructivism Rational choice theory
Primary virtues Reliable Flexible, discretion Cost-driven,
maximising
advantage
Motives Minimising risk Satisfying identity
Roles of
government
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seems modern because of its network-type consensual process within the science
community, the results – quite paradoxically – seem to be weighed by politicians
and the media on the parameter of classical scientific authority: science should
produce the truth and nothing but the (one) truth. At this point it is worth referring to
the statement of a Dutch Environment minister on 3rd February 2010, on Dutch
television: ‘I will not accept any more mistakes from the IPCC. As a politician I
must be able to have blind trust in what science says’.
The fifth premise which relies on the assumption of predictability underlying
hierarchical governance is the promotion of ‘best practices’. Notwithstanding the
current implementation deficit of sustainability governance, many seem to believe
that simply copying/pasting successful approaches to sustainability from one situa-
tion to the other, is a guarantee for success.
Finally, the language of sustainability governance is often centralist. There
seems to be a preference for monolithical concepts which make the world less
complex: The climate, the economy, the democracy, the culture – as if there are not
many different forms which should be taken into account. The concept of ‘planetary
boundaries’ is a similar monolithical term (see also Schmidt 2012, in this volume).
Some even go one step further and use capitals for their monolith: the ‘Earth
System’. The current institutional framework is often labelled as ‘fragmented’,
which implicitly means that integration is always better. Indeed, Biermann et al.
(2010: 309) conclude after having framed climate governance as heavily
fragmented, that ‘a strongly integrated climate architecture appears to be the most
effective solution’. Finally, in (global) governance jargon there seems to be a
preference for centralised ‘coordination’ instead of decentralised ‘cooperation’ or
‘collaboration’.
It is difficult to see how such an approach can provide successful answers to the
complexity of climate change and related problems like hunger, water crises and
migration. As long as climate change policy is considered as a top-down, state-run
operation, it is bound to fail (Leggewie and Welzer 2010). Even with the inclusion
of non-state actors, as in the model proposed by the German WBGU (2011), it is
questionable whether central steering models are implementable, as they deny the
complexity and plurality of our times, and of Beck’s ‘second modernity’.
However, all existing governance institutions are embedded in the current
system, and thus it is naı̈ve to simply specify ‘ideal’ governance institutions that
would, for example, create a high global price for carbon, mandate clean production
systems, and empower non-financial stakeholders (Levy 2011: 84).
We have seen that the different assumption values behind hierarchical, network
and market governance are reflected in different institutional logics. When – as this
chapter argues – there is a move away from the unsuccessful dominance of hierar-
chical governance, towards more network governance and some market gover-
nance, this should be reflected in the logic of new institutions: the institutional
framework for sustainable development should, on all levels and scales, recognise
that a shift is necessary from a primarily hierarchical approach towards a more
horizontal logic: more partnerships, new alliances, voluntary agreements, exchange
of practices, capacity building, and so on. There are already numerous examples.
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Firstly, the idea that we live in a networked world, in which the measure of power is
connectedness (Slaughter 2009: 94), has highlighted the enormous possibilities of
large networks which the ICT revolution has made possible. Multinational
companies have already shown the way. Companies like Procter and Gamble,
Boeing and IBM have switched from hierarchical strategy formation to network
forms, with a system of peer production, suppliers becoming partners, and by use of
social network options of the Internet (Slaughter 2009: 97).
Small networks could also be used more often. New informal approaches have
begun to develop. The government of the Netherlands, for example, has decided
after the disappointment of the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference, to apply a
more varied approach to climate governance, which is not directed against
the traditional central (UNFCCC) approach, but complements this. One of the
innovations which have emerged in the aftermath of the Copenhagen conference
is the establishment of the so-called Cartagena Dialogue. This is a parallel process
to the formal UNFCCC negotiations in which approximately 20 nations participate,
looking for new ways forward and concrete action, in an informal way. It is a
network form of governance, based on mutual trust and partnership.
The next example is bilateral cooperation between nations, with the additional
involvement of non-governmental partners. The Netherlands, for example, supports
Columbia with knowledge of the TNO applied research institute, to develop an
emission registration system. This is an investment in good relations, with very
concrete results, and departing not from the premise of what should be done, but
what can be done.
Another innovative approach is the new direction in behavioural economics (see
for example Thaler and Sunstein (2008) which introduces voluntary institutions.
The architecture of choice is then designed in such a manner that people behave
voluntarily in the way the architects feel is desirable. It is about creating new
behavioural defaults. This type of institutional setup is of course subject to the
reproach of manipulation. However, if these architects’ activity is accepted in a
democratic process then maybe these institutions would be sustainable themselves
and at the very least, would be relatively cost-effective. At this point it is worth
thinking about the development of benign markets. This opens up another set of
fascinating ideas about institutional rearrangements which might be utilised for
sustainable development in different cultural contexts. A good example is the
proposal to replace the pollution model of minimising greenhouse gas emissions
with a mutual gains approach based on the right of universal access to clean, low-
carbon energy services (Moonaw and Papa 2012). This is analogous to the ecosys-
tem services approach in environmental policy.
A last example which reflects a more horizontal orientation of institutional
design involves covenants between governments or other public authorities and
private companies, in which common targets are set, and are in use in the UK and
the Netherlands. Such covenants combine the voluntary attitude of market gover-
nance, the network governance principles of mutual dependency and trust, and are
supported by a formal, legal framework (hierarchical view). Such forms of co-
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regulation could also be useful in a multi- or international setting, for example for
climate governance (Telesetsky 2010).
To conclude, it seems important to investigate connectivity strategies between
institutions, and their implications for institutional change. We should also direct
more analytical power to the legal system, and learn from ‘jailed institutions’.
Finally, in line with the ‘and’, not ‘or’ argument of second modernity mentioned
earlier, it might be wise to consider institutional redundancy as useful rather than
inefficient.
2.5.3 Principles for Culturally Sensitive Sustainability
Metagovernance
If there is a strong focus on centralised governance, how can sustainability gover-
nance then become more varied? Ostrom (1990: 14) points out that ‘getting the
institutions right’ is a difficult, time-consuming, and conflict-evoking process. It is a
process ‘that requires reliable information about time and place variables as well as
a broad repertoire of culturally acceptable rules’.
As there is not one singular approach, we should concentrate on which gover-
nance principles could be useful for the design of effective institutions and trans-
formation processes for sustainability. Besides the often-mentioned principles of
reflexivity, resilience, transparency and inclusiveness, others might have additional
value. The first is that problem-orientedness should be a point of departure: any
governance design should start with a transdisciplinary analysis of the problem in
its context. The well-structured internal Impact Assessment procedure of the
European Commission applies for all its proposals and could be a good example.
In addition, temporality is important: The terms ‘time’ and ‘place’ in Ostrom’s
quote above refer to what I would call, respectively, the temporality and the locality
principle. This specifies that governance has the potential to be diverse, and that
governance for sustainability is multilevel, -scalar and -actor. Another principle is
therefore locality: the focus on hierarchical governance leads to a concentration on
administrative areas and scales, and thus to neglecting the need of exceeding such
barriers when dealing with certain societal problems. The feasibility of governance
also depends on what works best given the physical borders of a certain problem;
such borders may be very different from, for example, national borders. Water
systems are a good example: for historical reasons national and regional borders
often follow the course of rivers. Water management should take into account the
whole catchment area of a river. To overcome this problem, by 1950 on the scale of
the Rhine basin, European countries and regions had already established the
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR), an example of
a governance arrangement which follows the geography of a problem.
Ostrom’s references to conflicts and cultural acceptance point at the cultural
dimension. This could lead to a principle which has been framed as culturality
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(Abdallah-Pretceille 2006: 497); culturality refers to the understanding of cultural
phenomena ‘based on dynamics, transformations, fusion and manipulations’.
Abdallah-Pretceille argues that the variety of cultural fragments and cross-cultural
exchange has become more important than cultures in their entirety: they help to
make sense of what happens in our contemporary globalised world. Therefore, an
institutional framework for sustainability governance could profit from a cultural
assessment: what are key values linked to both the objectives of sustainability and
of the problematique, and how can they be reconciled? Simply put, how can they be
made compatible? This could result in different approaches in countries with an
individualist value pattern and in nations with a collectivist culture. In this context,
it is important that we understand that some of the well-known models of value
patterns, like Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, have a strong Western bias. In
Maslow’s model, individualist self-actualisation represents the top of the pyramid,
whereas in collectivist countries like China, the basic need is ‘belonging’, and self-
actualisation concerns societal needs (Gambrel and Cianci 2003).
Another principle could be polycentricity, a concept introduced by Ostrom et al.
in 1961. The basic idea is that ‘any group of individuals facing collective problems
should be able to address that problem in whatever way they best see fit’ (McGinnis
and Walker 2010: 294). Polycentricity shares decentralism and self-regulation with
market governance. It is not anti-state, but ‘building a polycentric system (. . .) acts
as a spur to national and international regimes to get their act together!’ (Ostrom
2010, about climate change governance).
The last principle I propose is historicity. Institutions are mortal, but they can
survive a long time, much longer than the objective or the policy theory from which
an institution originates. There is a gradual dialectic dynamic of funding values, in
which these values are destroyed by non-intentional effects of formalisation. This is
the inherent curse of formalisation. Taking into account the historical experience, or
historicity, is therefore an important principle. Changing the underlying mental
model of current institutions requires an understanding of the mental model on
which they are based (Stahl-Role 2000: 28).
Such principles might help to decide what should be done in a specific situation
with regards to top-down, bottom-up, or a combination of the two.
2.5.4 Actor Perspectives
Princes and governments are far more dangerous than other elements within society.
(Niccolo Machiavelli)
When Machiavelli wrote about state power, he did not think that non-state actors
were very influential in determining the course of society. Of course, this has
changed considerably. Non-state actors have both informal and formal influence
and cannot be neglected when governance challenges are discussed. Public access
to information and to decision-making processes has become a right in many
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countries, and at the UN level, nine ‘major groups’ have been distinguished who are
invited to be involved in the debate on sustainable development.
Therefore, the question which should be answered is that of which role cultural
diversity plays in different actor arenas that are relevant for sustainable development.
In political science, four types of actors are often distinguished: political and
administrative decision-makers, business actors, civil society organisations, and
science representatives. We could distinguish a fifth type: boundary workers, whose
task it is to link and translate between the other types.
Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, as are other frames of reality. Different
societal actors therefore have different opinions on how to design sustainability
governance. Concerning governmental actors, we should realise that classical
bureaucracies modelled on the Weberian ideals are usually fuelled by hierarchical
values. Hofstede (1980) argues that the cultures of political and administrative
cultures are influenced by national cultures. For example, low-trust societies with a
high preference for uncertainty reduction usually have developed large
bureaucracies. The Weberian model has dominated the political style for decades.
Its hegemony was only tested during the 1980s, when in Western countries, but was
also disseminated to developing countries by the World Bank and IMF. With this,
the New Public Management movement became an extremely successful campaign
to undermine public support for government (Lipsky 2008). The result has been a
heightened public distrust in government; governments ‘were denigrated as a set of
failed institutions inherently incapable of responding to critical social needs’
(Lipsky 2008: 143). This is one of the reasons why political and administrative
actors have become dependent on other actors. If the weakness of the state is not
compensated by a broad ‘social pact’ between state and non-state actors,
emergencies such as the Katrina hurricane disaster in the USA and other environ-
mental crises, cannot be dealt with optimally. Governmental actors must therefore
find productive relationships with other actors. This is not only the case for disaster
prevention and management, but maybe even more so for ‘wicked’ problems such
as the vast number of sustainability challenges. The value-laden character of such
problems requires an understanding and preparedness in order to deal with cultural
diversity in a constructive way.
Although environmental concerns are the cornerstone of sustainable develop-
ment, the economic dimension is still dominant. It has been argued that mainstream
notions of sustainable development do not challenge neo-liberal economic hege-
mony because they share hegemonic premises and growth as well as efficiency,
which are part of the sustainable development discourse (Nurse 2006: 35). From a
business perspective, cultural diversity is relevant in corporate strategies, and with
regard to dealing with globalisation and the role of the private sector in economic
development as part of the sustainability challenge. The private sector is increas-
ingly engaged in sustainable development. Frontrunner companies have united in,
for example, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and call for
national governments and international organisations to stimulate sustainable
innovation, create level playing fields and punish free riders and other laggards.
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Civil society organisations are, more than governmental actors, broadening their
institutional perspective with soft, informal structures, often using social media as
their communication platform. They profit from the increasing self-organisation
and capacity of social media through the Internet. At the same time, the existence of
established civil society organisations can also be threatened by the rise and fall of
instable, one-issue, Internet-based pressure groups. A metagovernance perspective
on sustainability governance might offer established civil society organisations
competitive advantage. However, they could choose to not only lobby and influence
governmental and business actors, but to also take more responsibility for action
themselves, by, for example, establishing alliances with private companies and/or
public-sector organisations. The future roles of science in the context of
sustainability governance have already been adequately addressed in this volume
by Jungcurt (2012).
Finally, if the effect of sustainability governance depends on its contextuality,
this implies that there is a need for institutions whose remit is to translate and
transform different visions, knowledge and problem perceptions into situationally
working variations. Such boundary work organisations, such as national sustainable
development councils, have no power themselves, but can be hugely influential
with regards to the institutional framework. Their main functions are giving policy
advice, acting as agent and facilitator, as well as communication and stimulating
involvement (Niestroy 2007).
2.5.5 Sustainability and the Unpredictability of Crowds
A roar of grief and rage rose over the city and boomed, relentless, obsessive, sweeping
away any other sound, beating out the great lie. Zi, zi, zi, He lives, he lives, he lives! A roar
that had nothing human about it. In fact, it did not rise from human beings, creatures with
two arms and two legs and minds of their own; it rose from a monstrous, mindless beast, the
crowd, the octopus that at noon, barnacled, with clenched fist, distorted faces, contracted
mouths, had invaded the square of the orthodox cathedral, then stretched its tentacles into
the nearby trees, jamming them, submerging them, implacable as the larva that overwhelms
and devours every obstacle, deafening them with its zi, zi, zi. (Fallaci 1981)
It is useful for sustainability governance to categorise societal actors into classical
clusters as demonstrated above and because this is the way in which they are usually
organised. However, social reality can also be strongly influenced by ad hoc social
groups with their own, particular behaviour. Basten (2010) introduces the term
‘public’ for a temporary community which only exists around a special event or
emergency, and has an action perspective. This can be the burial of a famous and
loved person like the British Princess Diana, or that of the Greek activist Aleksis
Panagoulis, who is the hero in the above citation.
Publics can have two faces. One is a wise one: according to Surowiecki (2004),
there is a lot of wisdom in crowds. If the success of certain collective actions is
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extrapolated, it may be that unpredictable ‘publics’ will play an important role in
the future of sustainable development.
The other face of such ‘publics’ is a darker one. The description of the ‘octupus’
by Oriana Fallaci is an example of Wallace’s (1970: 234) madness of crowds.
Examples are ‘mass panics, group delusions and illusions, mass hysterias, and mob
violence’. He argues that such events depend either on a specific situational context
(a threat, combined with a limited escape route feeds panic), or ‘the dissociation
effect on the individual of repetitive mass suggestion in a crowd’, which can lead to,
for example, a lynch mob. Interestingly, Wallace observes that such phenomena are
in a way a-cultural: a ‘mad crowd consistently violates culturally accepted norms’.
Social media are twenty-first century creatures, which probably also have this dual
character: wisdom and madness.
2.6 Transgovernance: One Step Beyond. . .
In this chapter I conclude that sustainability governance should be culturally
informed, and that this requires the situationality and multi-perspectivity of a
metagovernance attitude: combining governance style elements together could
function well in a specific situation. I would argue, however, that one step further
is recommendable. Due to the challenges and constraints of an emerging knowledge
democracy, the second modernity concept (not ‘or’ but ‘and’: plurality), and the
wickedness of sustainability problems, an awareness is needed which goes beyond
the metagovernance method. The bird’s eye view, which is typical for
metagovernance, could be useful for sustainability governance in many ways.
We do not need a new paradigm or a new orthodoxy, but should develop a
sensitivity and capability which we have framed in this volume as transgovernance.
The well-known quote attributed to Einstein ‘We can’t solve problems by using the
same kind of thinking we used when we created them’ seems appropriate here. The
challenge is therefore to get politicians and scientists out of their ‘comfort zone’
into trying new approaches. Transgovernance implies looking beyond classical
governance styles and towards a culturally sensitive metagovernance for sustain-
able development. It is an approach beyond disciplinary scientific research, towards
more transdisciplinarity, and beyond borders formed by states and other
institutions, towards trans-border approaches. Transgovernance is beyond conven-
tional means for measuring progress, towards new and more interactive measuring
methods, and beyond linear forms of innovation, towards open innovation. Last but
not least, it is an approach to governance which is beyond cultural integration or
assimilation, and towards searching for compatibility.
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2.7 Summary and Conclusions
Against the background of the multiple tensions between old and new forms of
politics, science and media – the emerging knowledge democracy – we have seen
that sustainability governance is a double normative construct (both terms are
normative). It is currently characterised by a dominance of centralism as design
strategy, a neglect of the complexity and ‘wickedness’ of the challenges, and
ignorance of the cultural dimension. The first two characteristics belong together:
centralist thinking about solutions to societal problems tends to lead to the political
construction of central, simplified problems to which classical hierarchical gover-
nance approaches can be applied. The centralist focus is visible in the belief that
solutions to climate change or biodiversity should in the first place be legally
binding. Such a belief is underpinned with globalised research and knowledge,
based on reductionist, monolithical frames (the climate, the biodiversity, the econ-
omy, the media), and on challenges which, to a large extent, possess the
characteristics of ‘wicked problems’. Each of these problems is unique, value-
laden and reflexive.
Initial conclusions are that the wickedness of many sustainability challenges
implies that sustainability governance will depend largely on the success of non-
hierarchical governance approaches; the usefulness of additional legal
constructions depends on the context. Wicked problems are value-laden, as are
the terms ‘governance’ and ‘sustainable development’. Therefore, values and
traditions, and hence the cultural dimension, must be included in sustainability
governance. The cultural dimension is, for example, embedded in the notion of
‘glocalisation’, which points at a twinning of globalisation and localisation.
Globalisation may have made cultures increasingly ambivalent, ambiguous and
paradoxical, but the counter reaction, localisation, is equally important for effective
governance: identity provides security, which is a condition for relating to other
cultures with an open mind.
In this chapter we have concentrated on the cultural dimension of governance for
sustainable development. The key question is formulated as: How can cultural
diversity contribute to sustainable development (meta)governance, and what can
be done to prevent it from becoming a hindrance? We start with the latter. The
centralist bias in sustainability governance is congruent with a widely shared
conviction among decision makers that cultural diversity is an obstacle. Different
strategies are applied to mitigate the perceived problem, such as considering
cultural diversity as a taboo, and promoting cultural assimilation (often euphemised
as ‘integration’). In social and natural sciences, inter- and transdisciplinary research
on the cultural dimension of sustainable development is lagging behind. Political
science, anthropology, sociology and ecology have continued to study only parts of
the puzzle. This has hindered insight into the broader picture, the consequences
being that political decisions regarding sustainability on all governmental levels
may be ill-informed with knowledge about existing values, traditions and practices,
and therefore also ill-informed about the possibility of implementation.
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This lack of knowledge does not prevent national governments who lag behind
with regards to the implementation of sustainable development objectives, from
playing the cultural card as an argument for not being overly ambitious. Besides
lack of knowledge, another important reason for considering cultural diversity as a
hindrance to sustainability is a hegemonic attitude towards other cultures. Because
values are what you believe in, it is only logical that people consider their own
culture ‘better’ than those of other people. However, this is not the point. Our
conclusion is rather that cultural hegemonism is almost a guarantee for further
stagnation of the implementation of sustainable development strategies; what is
needed is investment in cultural pluralism.
Policy makers and scholars alike have found the analogy between cultural
diversity and biodiversity attractive. It is, however, a problematic analogy: concepts
like risks, resilience, (eco)system services and keystone species may have very
different meanings in biological and social systems. Nevertheless, sustainability
could profit from the introduction of cultural diversity besides biodiversity as an
objective of sustainability. However, as this is based on the conviction that human-
kind is part of nature, this is a normative, not scientific consideration.
In addition, we can conclude that, as biodiversity (or broader, nature) and
cultures are interlinked in many ways, understanding sustainability processes
requires an understanding of cultures, which in turn necessitates understanding
biodiversity.
After having discussed the relationship between cultural diversity and sustain-
able development, a third normative dimension is introduced, governance. Gover-
nance is defined as a relational concept. In order to link cultures and sustainability,
it is crucial to note that three – usually combined – governance styles can be
distinguished: hierarchical, network and market governance. Each of these proto-
typical styles is consistent with specific cultural values and has its own institutional
logic.
National or regional, and even local governments may be inclined to use a
specific style mixture regardless of the character of the societal problems to be
addressed, as well as of local, regional or national values and traditions that co-
determine which governance style combinations may work well. Sometimes there
are clear underlying national preferences for certain styles, such as a consensus
style in the Netherlands, hierarchy in Germany and France, and market mechanisms
in Anglo-Saxon countries. In many other cases this is much less clear. However,
without adapting sustainability governance to what makes sense for, and is accept-
able to people, all governance attempts risk failure. The term ‘best practice’
suggests universal applicability and should be replaced by ‘good practice’.
We have seen that framing cultural diversity as an obstacle to sustainability has
been a welcome political excuse to do nothing, and continues to be the dominant
view, partly because of the lack of inter- and transdisciplinary research. In order to
turn this around, a different view of cultures in the context of sustainability
governance is required. Building sustainability governance on cultural diversity
and investing in the compatibility of values and practices rather than in assimila-
tion, will lead to an increased variety of solutions to similar problems. This is
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superior to the current practice in which centrally proposed solutions are accepted
in some cultures and rejected in others.
Each discussion on cultural diversity leads to the question of whether there are
also universal values, and if yes, how are they related to the premise of diversity?
The paradoxical situation which we apparently want, is expressed both in the
European Union’s and Hindu motto ‘Unity in diversity’ and in the ‘E pluribus
unum’ of the USA. The message may be that there are merits in this being a never-
ending discussion. The question of how to make the trade-off between unity and
diversity in sustainability governance is relevant. This is because, as we have seen,
there is a dominant coalition pushing the ‘unity’ side of the equation. It can be
concluded that the dominance of centralism in sustainability governance leads to
the assumption that moving towards more diversity does not have to imply a
breakdown of the universal ‘acquis’ of, for example, human rights.
The next question is how to design and manage sustainability governance
approaches which are situational. The first conclusion here is that if we accept
that it is impossible to determine which governance approach is generally the most
successful, it makes no sense to design standardised approaches. What can be
standardised, however, are mechanisms which increase the chance that successful
governance emerges in a certain situation. Such a mechanism is ‘governance
beyond governance’, or metagovernance. In order to make sustainability gover-
nance culturally sensitive, permanent and systematic attention is required to trans-
late or adapt possible solutions into ones which work well in a given cultural
setting. This can be called culturally sensitive sustainability metagovernance.
Some have argued that metagovernance is a new form of hierarchy, because it
implies someone (from the government) who coordinates the governance process.
However, this does not have to be the case. There is no reason why business actors
or civil society organisations should not also think beyond orthodoxies and act as
metagovernors when they are involved in sustainability governance.
The different assumptions and values behind hierarchical, network and market
governance are reflected in different institutional logics. This chapter argues that
when there is a move away from the unsuccessful dominance of hierarchical
governance, towards more network governance and some market governance, this
should be reflected in the logic of new institutions. The institutional framework for
sustainable development should, on all levels and scales, recognise that a shift is
necessary from a primarily hierarchical towards a more horizontal logic: more
partnerships, new alliances, voluntary agreements, exchange of practices, capacity
building, and so on.
The same applies to the organisation of transitions or the ‘management’ of
societal transformation. Sustainable transitions/transformations require dynamic
mixtures of different governance logics, adapted to place-based values and
traditions. In addition, leadership should be situational: sometimes steering, some-
times rowing, and sometimes surfing the waves.
I do not claim to have found a general recipe or a panacea for sustainability
governance in a cultural context, but it seems that metagovernance as a mechanism,
and a tool beyond standardised governance, can be useful. The bird’s eye view,
which is typical for metagovernance, could be useful for sustainability governance
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in many ways. We do not need a new paradigm, or a new orthodoxy, but should
develop the sensitivity and capability to apply transgovernance. This is, as with
metagovernance, a method rather than a prescription, and implies looking beyond
classical governance style and towards a culturally sensitive metagovernance for
sustainable development; beyond disciplinary scientific research, towards more
transdisciplinarity; beyond borders formed by states and other institutions, towards
trans-border approaches; beyond conventional means to measuring progress,
towards new and more interactive measuring methods; beyond linear forms of
innovation, towards open innovation; and beyond cultural integration or assimila-
tion, towards looking for compatibility.
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Chapter 3
Growth: A Discussion of the Margins
of Economic and Ecological Thought
Alexander Perez-Carmona
Abstract In the late 1960s a debate about the long-term feasibility and desirability of
economic growth as a one-size-fits-all economic policy emerged. It was argued that
economic growth was one of the underlying causes of ecological and social problems
faced by humanity. The issue remained strongly disputed until the inception of the
Sustainable Development discourse by which the debate was politically settled.
Nevertheless, given that many ecological and social problems remain unsolved and
somehave become evenmore severe, there are renewed calls for the abandoning of the
economic growth commitment, particularly in already affluent countries. This chapter
summarises the growth debate hitherto and examines two alternatives, the steady-state
economy proposed by Herman Daly and economic de-growth proposed by Serge
Latouche. In spite of recent disputes between theAnglo-Saxon steady-state school and
the emerging continental de-growth school, it is argued, consistent with recent
contributions on the issue, that steady-state and de-growth are not mutually exclusive
but inevitably complements. The steady-state has the advantage of comprehensive
theoretical elaboration, while de-growth has the advantage of an attractive political
slogan which has re-opened the debate on the issue. Latouche is also a social thinker
who gives a voice to the critiques of economic growth contained in the notion of
development from outside Europe and the United States. The steady-state economy,
and de-growth are held by some analysts to be beyond what is politically feasible.
Although this argument is valid, it fails to recognise that past desirable societal
changes were made possible through reflexive societal processes conducive to collec-
tive action and institutional change. It is concluded that the debatemust ultimately rest
in the physical quantities that a given economyneeds for the ‘good life’ in the long run,
how to decide on these quantities, how to achieve them, and how to maintain an
approximate global steady-state. Finally, some recommendations for further research
along with some reflections on the potential role of scholars are provided.
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3.1 Introduction
Is there something new under the sun? This is the question asked by Historian John
Robert McNeill (2000) drawing on verse 1: 9–11 from the Ecclesiastes. The verse,
probably written in the third or the fourth century B.C., gave a negative answer to
this question. Although there is much to learn from the verses of the Ecclesiastes,
McNeill claims that there is indeed something new under the sun. True, the ubiquity
of wickedness and vanity may have remained as much as part of human life today as
it was when the Ecclesiastes was written, yet the place of humankind within the
natural world is not what it once was. The global magnitude and devastating impact
of the human scale on the rest of the biosphere is something truly new under sun. In
contrast, while the magnitude and impact of the human scale on the biosphere is
new, the intellectual debate on it is not. It has been taking place for the last 40 years,
albeit with dissimilar intensity. What is meant by the impact of the human scale on
the biosphere? There are two physical interrelatedmagnitudes: the size of the human
population and the size of man-made capital ‘population’. These populations live
off the biosphere; broadly speaking they take its resources, transform them, and
return them back to it in the form of waste and pollution. These physical magnitudes
are commanded by non-physical magnitudes such as preferences, knowledge (e.g.
non-embodied technology) and the social institutions that govern production and
distribution (e.g. markets, the state, et cetera). Both physical and non-physical
magnitudes are parts of what is called the economic system.
On the scale of the population there exists a wide consensus that it cannot
perpetually grow, for the planet does not physically grow and there are limitations
to its ecological functions to support not only but particularly human life. Today,
this debate seems beside the point because some of the most populous countries,
after years of population control policies, already have fertility rates even below
replacement level. Globally, fertility rates are slowly tending towards stabilisation.
In contrast, on the general scale of a given economy the consensus that it cannot
perpetually grow for the same reasons that population cannot do it is still absent.
Economic growth – measured as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant prices
– as an all-encompassing economic policy remains firmly established. Challenging
economic growth started in the late 1960s, when some economists and natural
scientists began to understand that the pursuit of perpetual economic growth was
physically impossible. It will eventually end. Ignoring this physical impossibility,
they argued, would bring a wide array of evils, that is, it would make ecological
problems more intractable, it would make the abusing of other sentient beings
unavoidable, and it would further exacerbate all kind of social conflicts at different
levels. What is new under the sun would intensify what was not new. At the
international level, these arguments remained however, largely without political
implications through the inauguration of the Sustainable Development discourse.
Currently, and in view of the fact that our growing global economy has already
overshot the carrying capacity of the planet, there are renewed calls articulated
mainly from social thinkers in Western Europe for ‘de-growth’.
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The aims of this chapter are (1) to provide a summary and analysis of the growth
debate hitherto and (2) to scrutinise and compare alternative policy proposals. The
structure of the chapter is the following: summary and analysis of the growth debate
from the late 1960s until present are dealt with in the next section. In Sect. 3.3, I
describe the theoretical underpinnings, the basic model and some policy
recommendations for institutional change in order to achieve and eventually to
manage a steady-state economy. The steady-state economy was conceived by one
of the founding fathers of Ecological Economics, Herman Daly. In Daly’s concep-
tion, the optimal scale of the economy replaces economic growth as the overall goal
of macro-economic policy. In Sect. 3.4, I explore the ideas of the principal
intellectual figure behind the emerging de-growth movement, Serge Latouche. He
argues for a cultural change that would, physically speaking, de-grow the
economies of rich countries in order to ‘make room’ for development in poor
countries, while at the same time severely criticising the very notion of ‘develop-
ment’. In Sect. 3.5 a comparative analysis of Daly’s and Latouche’s ideas are
provided. Conclusions and prospects for the social sciences are dealt with in
Sect. 3.6.
3.2 The Growth Debate: Its Sources and Contours
The discussions in this section will be set against two backgrounds: (1) the
prevailing economic doctrine alone with some relevant events, and (2) the global
ecological footprint metric (see Fig. 3.1). Two prevailing economic doctrines can
be distinguished in this period. First, Keynesianism which was adopted and largely
implemented after the great depression of 1930 as well as during the post-war
period in the West. It lasted until the early 1970s. The application of the ideas of J.
M. Keynes constituted incidentally the beginning of an active pro-growth policy
after the great depression and the split of economics between macro- and micro-
economics.1 The 1970s saw the end of the convertibility of the dollar to gold
(1971), high oil prices (1973–1986), a stock market crash, and an economic crisis
(1973–1975) in two core countries, the United States (US) and Britain. Following
this, a political window of opportunity was seized by a revitalised laissez-faire or
neo-liberal intellectual movement prominently represented by F.A. von Hayek and
M. Friedman. Neo-liberal doctrines were partially implemented in the West, but
even more in its zones of influence and later worldwide after the collapse of the
Soviet Union (1991). This phenomenon was later labelled as ‘globalisation’.2 After
the preceding economic crisis (2008–2009), there was a temporary renaissance of
1 The terms economic growth and growth will be interchangeably used.
2 Neo-liberal proponents cling to their classical intellectual precursors. Policy implementation
attempts took place between 1870 until 1930. The central tenets were unregulated markets
(including labour markets), unregulated international trade, stable currency and capital mobility.
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Keynesianism including its ‘greened’ version that had been proposed to come to
grips with the ecological predicament. In recent times, however, Keynesianism
seems to have been reduced to a minor option given the current multi-crisis of high
oil and commodity prices, US fiscal problems, and the Eurozone debt crisis, in
which austerity forces seem to have won the overhand. This information is placed
on the x-axis of Fig. 3.1.
The global ecological footprint is an aggregate index which measures the ability
of the biosphere to produce crops, livestock (pasture), timber products (forest), fish,
to host built-up land, as well as to uptake carbon dioxide in forests.3 Carbon dioxide
emissions are the largest portion of humanity’s current footprint. The ecological
footprint is less controversial than other ecological metrics.4 Figure 3.1 depicts the
ever rising global ecological footprint in the period 1961–2007. Humanity started to
overshoot the world carrying capacity, or ‘biocapacity’, roughly in 1975. By 2007 it
was ‘using’ 1,5 planets.5 In that year, the last one in which the metric was estimated,
half of the ecological footprint was attributable to just 10 countries, whereby the US
and China alone were using almost half of the earths’ biocapacity with 21% and
Fig. 3.1 Global ecological footprint (1960–2007), eight relevant publications and two macro-
economic doctrines (Ewing et al. 2010. Modified by the author)
3 The ecological footprint is a metric developed in the early 1990s by William Rees and Mathis
Wackernagel. For an extensive explanation of the metric see Wackernagel and Rees (1996).
4 It is less controversial in the official sense since it has been endorsed by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP 2010) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP
2011).
5 It is of course impossible to use planets that do not exist. Excessive carbon dioxide emissions are
in reality accumulating in the atmosphere.
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24% ecological footprint respectively (Ewing et al. 2010: 18).6 Figure 3.1 also
shows eight publications which are milestones in the economic growth debate. It is
around the message of these publications that the discussion will be centred,
whereby Steady-State Economics (1977) and Farewell to Growth (2009) will be
dealt with in greater detail in two separate sections.
3.2.1 Scarcity, Pollution and Overpopulation
The origins of the economic growth debate lie in the late 1960s and the early 1970s,
when a bundle of ecological concerns articulated primarily by natural scientists
converged in rich countries.7 A general public preoccupation with pollution and the
political backdrop of the ‘environmental revolution’ was the book Silent Spring
(1962) authored by Rachel Carson. Concerns about scarcity emerged with the
dramatic increase in world population. This concern was epitomised by Paul
Ehrlich’s book The Population Bomb (1968). While the environmental discussion
was primarily framed by natural scientists and the emerging political activism of
the late 1960s, the most important social discipline was also taking position in that
debate: economics.8 In the US the think-tank Resources for the Future was
established in 1952, which, in line with governmental concerns on potential
shortages of raw materials published Scarcity and Growth authored by Barnett
and Morse (1963). This study turned into economic orthodoxy (Daly 1991: 40,
Dryzek 1997: 46). The emphasis of the study was to show that resource scarcities do
not impair economic growth. The authors revised the classical economic doctrines
of resource scarcity and compared them with what they called the contemporary
‘progressive world’ (Barnett and Morse 1963: 234). They concluded that techno-
logical innovation, resource substitution, recovery and discovery of new resources
6 It must be also mentioned that these countries have within their borders a great portion of the
global biocapacity, namely 10% in the US and 11% in China.
7 For reasons of convenience, I will split the world into ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries in the
conventional terms of per-capita income. In other cases, I will use also the notions ‘core’ and
‘peripheral’ in the sense of material and discursive bargaining power of the latter with respect to
the former. Rich or core countries are those located in North America, Western Europe, and the
countries Australia and Japan. Poor or peripheral countries are the rest. When necessary, I will
mention countries, regions or more recent categories grouping countries such as ‘emerging
countries’.
8 An economic system means, stated in its simplest terms, how a given human group attempts to
stay alive, that is, how it acquires food (energy), build housing, organise labour, and how is what is
produced distributed among the members of the group. Given the overwhelming importance for
human affairs of economic systems, it follows that the social discipline that studies it, must be
equally of overwhelming importance, in this case economics. A step further is the distinction
between the dominant school in economics, that is, neo-classic economics, which is also some-
times labeled as ‘economic orthodoxy’, and the less influential schools, such as Ecological
Economics, Economic Anthropology, Old-Institutional Economics, and so on.
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made Malthus’ and Ricardo’s doctrines basically obsolete. These mechanisms
would function not only better within the free-market system, but also more rapidly
as to broaden the availability of resources, even making the definition of ‘resource’
uncertain over time. Therefore: ‘A limit may exist, but it can be neither defined nor
specified in economic terms [. . .]. Nature imposes particular scarcities, not an
inescapable general scarcity’ (Barnett and Morse 1963: 11). With respect to pollu-
tion, economists were borrowing from the thought of its welfare economists’
precursors. The concept of externality, already familiar from the writings of Cecil
Pigou in the 1920s and Ronald Coase in the 1960s fitted nicely into pollution issues
(Pearce 2002). The economist’s mission became the design of allocation
mechanisms capable of realising foregone costs and benefits. As leading environ-
mental economists Baumol and Oates in their textbook observed: ‘When the
‘environmental revolution’ arrived in the 1960s, economists were ready and
waiting’ (1988: 1). For economists, doubts about the feasibility or desirability of
economic growth were not raised. Beyond economic orthodoxy, human ecologists
were further drawing attention to the world’s population increase, mainly territori-
ally restricted to poor countries,9 while the expanding environmental movement
was concluding that the mounting ecological problems were rather caused by
‘consumerism’, and more broadly by wasteful lifestyles. As wasteful lifestyles
became synonymous with the pursuit of economic growth, the ‘antigrowth’ move-
ment was born (Pearce 2002: 60).
However, it was not only the emergent environmental movement which per-
ceived economic growth as the problem. The position of economists concerning the
link between economic growth and the natural environment also began to show
fissures. The discussion did not focus only on the concepts and relationships
between a given set of assumptions, but also on the assumptions which themselves
sustain the superstructure of macro-economic theories which made possible the
belief in perpetual economic growth. In the list of economic assumptions nature
was missing. ‘Land’ had been long since reduced to merely an input factor,
deprived of all environmental functions and any traditional social meaning; and
the newly re-emphasised ‘externality’ was seen rather as an exceptional case,
therefore constituting a half-hearted ad hoc recognition of the sink function of
nature in the economic process. As historian McNeill (2000: 335) put it: ‘if Judeo-
Christian monotheism took nature out of religion, Anglo-American economists
(after about 1880) took nature out of economics’. The expansion of ecological
problems was caused by the fact that economists were living in the ‘cowboy
economy’ of the ‘illimitable plains and also associated with reckless, exploitative,
romantic, and violent behavior’, while humanity were rather approaching the
‘spaceman economy’ in which the earth was a ‘single spaceship, without unlimited
9A trend that continued with Hardin’s controversial piece Lifeboat Ethics (1974) and Catton’s
insightful Overshoot (1980).
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reservoirs of anything, either for extraction or pollution’ (Boulding 1966: 6).10 In
the spaceship economy, perpetual economic growth was physically unfeasible and
given the ensuing social and ecological costs of post-war growth not even desirable,
as British economist Mishan (1967) reasoned. Mishan condemned what he called
the ‘growthmania’ suffered by his fellow economists and professional politicians.
However, comprehensive explanation and modelling of growth-related problems
would only be offered in the following years.
Ayres and Kneese (1969) published their Production, Consumption and
Externalities in which they showed, partially consonant with the arguments already
made before by Kapp (1950) that externalities were not exceptional cases but rather
an inherent part of the economic process. This seminal article would in due course
give birth to the discipline Industrial Ecology. Similarly, Environment, Power and
Society (1971) authored by pioneer ecologist Howard T. Odum attempted to frame
the relationship between human and natural systems in terms of matter and energy
analysis, equally showing the inherent production of waste/pollution which neces-
sarily returns to the natural environment. This work would bring a number of young
ecologists into what later would be called Ecological Economics. Nicholas
Georgescu-Roegen a former student of Schumpeter published The Entropy Law
and the Economic Process (1971), a book in which he explained from a historical
perspective, the weak spot of economic orthodoxy in handling the issues of depletion
andwaste/pollution. In the formative years of economics as a science, it borrowed the
mechanistic/circular outlook from Newtonian physics; hence the economist was
failing to account for irrevocable linear processes occurring to energy/matter in the
process of economic transformation. From this perspective, Herman Daly, a student
of Georgescu-Roegen, proposed the stationary-state economy (1971) which he felt
should replace the growth-policy as an overall societal objective. Georgescu-Roegen
on the other hand would later insist on a de-growth policy.
This fertile intellectual activity and debate between 1966 and 1971 took place
mainly in the limited arena of academia. Projecting the discussion beyond this was
the achievement of a team of natural scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology who published in March 1972 a small report entitled The Limits to
Growth.
3.2.2 Understanding the Whole
According to the scientist team, the failure of adequate political responses to tackle
environmental and resource problems were due to a lack of understanding of the
10 It is widely recognised that the picture of the earth taken by Apollo 8 in 1968, the ‘earthrise’,
gave a massive boost to the environmental movement. The ‘earthrise’ made it possible to
conceptualise the earth as a beautiful, fragile, floating in the middle of nowhere, and especially,
finite planet. It is remarkable that Kenneth Boulding introduced the spaceship analogy 2 years
before the earthrise picture shaped public imaginary.
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human system as a whole: ‘we continue to examine single items in the
problematique without understanding that the whole is more than the sum of its
parts’ (Meadows et al. 1972: 11, italics in original text). Using the new system
dynamics methodology developed by Jay Wright Forrester and the computer model
World3, the authors of Limits to Growth (LtG) examined the interaction of five key
subsystems of the global system: population, industrial production, food produc-
tion, pollution and natural resources. They assumed that population and industrial
production were growing exponentially, in a world with absolute fixed available
resources. The time scale of the modelling ranged from 1900 until 2100. As the
team abundantly emphasised, the world model was not intended to make exact
predictions (Meadows et al. 1972: 93, 94, 122) given the extreme complexity and
uncertainties involved in the real world. Their aim was rather to understand the
global system’s behavioural tendencies and to offer a plausible answer to the
question: are our current growth policies leading to a sustainable future or to a
collapse?
Figure 3.2a, b show two scenarios of the world model from a total of seven.
Figure 3.2a plots historical values from 1900 to 1970 until 2100. It assumes no
major changes in historical socio-economic relationships. It is the ‘standard run’
which illustrates that the world is ‘running out of resources’ in the first decade of the
twenty-first century, while population collapse occurs in the middle of it. As
industrial output increases exponentially, it requires an enormous input of
resources. Resources becoming scarce led to a rise in prices which conversely left
less financial capital to be re-invested for future growth. Ultimately, investment did
not keep up with depreciation and the industrial base fell along with agricultural
systems which became dependent on industrial outputs such as fertilisers,
pesticides, and especially, energy sources for mechanised agriculture. Population
continued to increase for approximately two decades and finally started to decline
when the death rates were driven upward by a lack of food and health services. The
Fig. 3.2 Two scenarios of the world model: (a, left) standard run, and (b, right) comprehensive
use of technology (Meadows et al. 1972)
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team ran five more scenarios in which the initial assumptions made in the standard
run were additively relaxed. Nonetheless, in each case the population inevitably
collapsed during the twenty-first century due to an ever rising pollution, food
shortages, and so on. Figure 3.2b plots an aggregate scenario of several technologi-
cal and political responses to shortages. Technology is being implemented in every
sector: nuclear power, recycling, mining the most remote reserves, withholding as
many pollutants as possible, pushing further yields from the land and having
‘perfect birth control’.11 Population collapse has simply been delayed by several
decades. In this scenario, three crises hit simultaneously, food production drops
because of land erosion, resources are depleted by a prosperous population holding
an average income per capita of close to the US level, pollution rises, drops and then
rises again dramatically causing a further decrease in food production.
The study was presented at a perfect time, as the first United Nation Conference
on the Human Environment was held in June of that year 3 months after the study
was released. Nevertheless, the policy goal of stabilisation which the team proposed
and which happened to resemble Daly’s idea of the stationary-economy (zero-
growth) advanced 1 year before was largely dismissed. According to Beckerman
(1972), delegates of poor countries made it profusely clear that they were not going
to accept any policy arising from the study of some uncertain planetary limits that
would hamper their future development. Henceforth, international relations could
continue to operate under the frame of development set out by the US president
Truman in his inaugural address of 1949, that is, actively reducing trade barriers
and making the benefits of industrial progress available ‘for the improvement and
growth of underdeveloped areas’ (Truman 1949). Additionally, LtG was unani-
mously rejected by leading economists (Beckerman 1972, Kaysen 1972; Solow
1973, 1974; Beckerman 1974). The common argumentative line was that techno-
logical progress and the market mechanism could prevent scarcity and pollution
from constituting a substantial limitation on long-term economic growth. In
essence, their way of looking at the problem was identical to that established by
Barnett and Morse a decade before. Cole et al. (1973) re-ran the world model, yet
they eliminated absolute limits of resources and let them increase pari passu with
population and consumption, assuming additionally total control of pollution. They
claimed if ‘the rates of (technological) progress are increased to 2% per annum
collapse is postponed indefinitely’ (Cole et al. 1973: 118).
The emerging economic heresy also contributed to the LtG debate. They were
particularly emphatic about the incongruences and fallacies committed by their
orthodox colleagues (Daly 1972: 949–950, Georgescu-Roegen 1975: 363–366,
Mishan 1977). Georgescu-Roegen, for example, was impressed by the fact that
many of the critiques made by economists on the methodology employed in LtG,
11 Perfect birth control meant parents wishing and voluntarily having just two children from 1975
onwards.
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was the very same which they themselves routinely used.12 They condemned LtG
for having used the assumption of exponential growth; nonetheless, economists
themselves have always suffered from ‘growthmania’. Economic plans have been
designed with the explicit aim of obtaining the highest rate of growth possible and
the very theory of economic development is firmly anchored in exponential growth
models. Furthermore, some of them used the very same argument of exponential
growth – but applied it to the ‘increase’ in technological progress in order to
criticise LtG. This argument besides being circular, is fallacious on other grounds.
Technology is a non-physical entity – unless it is embodied in capital – that as such
cannot (exponentially) grow as a population does. Georgescu-Roegen concluded
that economists proceeded according to the Latin adage: quod licet Iovi non licet
bovi – what is permitted to Jupiter is not permitted to an ox (1975: 365).
Six years later, after LtG’s release, Daly published his Steady-State Economics
(1977). The book was a collection of essays which dealt with logical
inconsistencies made by pro-growth proponents, and expanded on physical and
economic motives for a stationary but developing economy. Chapter 4: ‘A Cate-
chism of Growth Fallacies’ dealt with 16 fallacious arguments. Four of them were
of particular significance to reproduce here given their endurance: (1) becoming
rich through economic growth is the only way to afford the costs of cleaning up
pollution: as Daly noted, this statement skips the relevant question of when eco-
nomic growth will start to make a nation poorer and not richer. The problem is that
economists do not attempt to compare costs and benefits of growth, apparently
because it is tactility implied that growth is always ‘economic’. (2) Growth is
necessary to combat poverty: Daly argued that in spite of the growth of the
preceding years in the US, there was still poverty. The benefits of the reinvested
surplus which generates growth go preponderantly to the owners of the surplus,
who are not poor and only some of the growth dividends ‘trickle down’. For
growth-economists, Daly further reasoned, growth has become a substitute for
inequality concerns. Yet, with less inequality, less growth and consequently less
ecological pressure would be required. (3) Growth can be maintained by further
shifting the economy to the service sector: Daly argued that after adding the indirect
aspects of services activities (inputs to inputs to inputs, that is, Leontief’s
input–output-analysis), we will likely find out that they do not pollute or deplete
less significantly than industrial activities. Casual observation shows that
universities, hospitals, insurance companies, and so on, require a substantial physi-
cal base. The reason why employment in the service sectors has grown relative to
total unemployment is because of the vast increase of productivity and total output
of industry and agriculture which conversely has required more throughput given
12According to Levallois (2010) the comprehensive review of LtG’s critique made by Georgescu-
Roegen, which I am only partially reproducing here, was an outcome of the contacts that
Georgescu-Roegen entertained with the group. He eventually entered the Club of Rome but
abandoned it later, apparently disillusioned with the club’s fascination for computer-based models
and appetite for public relations. He did not fail to mention the latter in his review.
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the increased scale. (4) Oil is not recycled because it is still uneconomic to do so;
humankind is less worried about the environment because it is currently not totally
dependent on it, and nature imposes no inescapable scarcities: According to Daly
these arguments can only be made given economist’s illiteracy in basic natural
sciences.
Notwithstanding these arguments – which were largely ignored – orthodox
economists contributed to producing the general impression that LtG was simply
pessimistic, and predicting something alone with the reaffirmation that technologi-
cal progress would cope with all sorts of ecological problems. In contrast, LtG did
contribute to popularising the sustainability debate which was emerging at that time
by selling millions of copies and being translated into 30 languages (Meadows et al.
2004: x), even influencing the opinion of leading politicians in Europe. Sicco
Mansholt, the president the European Commission (1972–1973) read LtG and
concluded that growth in Europe should not only be stopped but even reduced,
and replaced with another ‘growth’, that is, the growth of culture, happiness and
well-being (Mansholt 1972).
In the late 1970s, the US was re-entering another economic crisis and successive
efforts were focused on monetary policy in order to fight inflation at the cost of
employment creation, thus risking a deeper recession. Almost simultaneously
humankind was entering a global era of planetary overshoot (Fig. 3.1). The oil
embargo imposed by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
upon rich countries in 1973 helped to trigger not only an economic stagflation but
also a debate on energy dependency. Subsequently, an energy policy embracing (1)
nuclear power and (2) energy efficiency measures was discussed and partially
implemented. As industrial growing economies need correspondingly increasing
amounts of energy, and a part of the energy must be produced at home instead of
being imported from countries located thousands of kilometres away, the vital but
visible nuclear reactors rapidly produced a social response which had been in
gestation years before: rejection. In 1969 physicist Starr had already proposed a
risk-benefit analysis by means of ‘historically revealed social preferences’
(Starr 1969: 1232) with favourable results for nuclear power and speculated on
the causes of the irrational risk perception by the lay public which was generating
the opposition.13 Later on, the social conflict was renamed the not-in-my-backyard
syndrome (NIMBY), elevated into an analytical concept, and extended to all kinds
of facility siting conflicts. Nonetheless, after the Three Mile Island incident of 1979,
it was evident that the risk aversion and the nimbysm of the lay public could not be
13As Otway (1987) explained, risk perception studies appeared as the public entered decision-
making over technological risks, therefore turning upside down the fiduciary trust in public
servants issuing the licenses and even more, antagonising the deep-grained notion of technological
progress. As risk perception studies did not bring the expected results, communicative risk studies
emerged in an attempt to bring public opinion in line with experts’ assessments. It must be
mentioned, however, that communicative risk studies turned out to be useful in dealing with, for
example, occupational and natural risks.
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entirely dismissed as irrational. On the issue of energy efficiency and conservation
policies, two energy economists were raising doubts about the effectiveness of such
policies. They were resuscitating Jevons’ conclusion made more than a 100 years
ago that, contrary to common expectations, energy efficiency improvements would
lead to more energy consumption, that is, such policies would ‘backfire’ (Brookes
1979, Khazzoom 1980). Hence, alone with the revival of the pessimism of the so-
called Neo-Malthusians, the pessimism of Neo-Jevonians also came about. By
1980, another pessimist report was released in the US, the Global 2000 Report
for the President that, as the title implies, did not look as far ahead as LtG. The
major finding was that:
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less
stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption [. . .]. Despite greater material
output, the world’s people will be poorer in many ways than they are today. (Quoted by
Dryzek 1997: 28)
Georgescu-Roegen would have certainly said because ‘of greater material out-
put’. Nevertheless, the timing for pessimistic antigrowth positions could not be
worse, for an era of exuberance would begin which could not handle the pessimism
of the preceding years. In the core countries of the West, the US and Britain, a new
formula for economic growth was proposed, (allegedly) away from state interven-
tionism, and thus strong labour unions would be put in place: neo-liberalism. The
optimism of the new era found its place in the ecological debate concerning
economic growth through what would be later called ‘cornucopianism’.
3.2.3 The Sustainable Development Discourse
In congruence with the rising optimistic era of neo-liberalism but acknowledging
that there were real ecological issues at stake, the United Nations (UN) created the
World Commission on Environment and Development. The commissions was
established in order to investigate the links between the deterioration of ecological
systems and economic growth in 1983, the same year in which the newly formed
Green Party in West Germany managed to win enough votes to trespass the election
threshold for federal parliament. The world commission was the follow up of the
conference held in 1972, and it is better known by the name of its chairwoman, Mrs.
Brundtland. The commission delivered the report Our Common Future in 1987,
roughly a year after the optimism of infinite energy supply was shattered anew by
the disaster of Chernobyl.
On the political consequences of conceptual ambiguities and the strong anthro-
pocentrism of the report enough attention has been drawn.14 For the aims of this
14 For a good overview on the diverse interpretations from different theoretical perspectives and
policy implementation see Sneddon (2000) and Hopwood et al. (2005).
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chapter it is useful to highlight the origins of these ambiguities and the ambiguities
specifically in relation to growth. If Sustainable Development (SD) was to have a
chance of future implementation, it had to have an appeal of political acceptability
in order to initially bring different interests to the table of negotiation. Nevertheless,
and according to political scientist Dryzek (1997: 124), as it was recognised that
sustainable development would become the global dominant discourse, powerful
actors, mainly big businesses, made sure to cast it in terms which were favourable to
them. Ultimately, sustainable development was politically successful, but it
achieved this by sacrificing substance: ‘lots of lobbyists coming together, lots of
blurring going on – inevitably, lots of shallow thinking resulting’ was the judgment
of historian Donald Worster (1993: 143). To be sure, the difficulties lay in putting
together the relatively well-framed ‘sustainability’ and ‘development’. Sus-
tainability was at the bottom an ecological concept traceable to the German
enlightenment. What is to be sustained is the environment, although mainly for
human purposes.15 On the other hand the notion ‘development’, as previously
noted, was established by the emerging leader of the West in 1949.16 Given the
ecological debate of the preceding years in the US, and the increasing appeal of the
notion ‘qualitative growth’, that is, more leisure for family and hobbies during
the 1970s and 1980s in Germany and France among others,17 it was evident that the
general economic policy goal of growth was at stake. The question to be solved was
then: how to maintain the perpetual economic growth policy if the planet has
ecological limits?
Although, as noted before, the report was (inevitably) a product of political
bargain, it is necessary to understand how the report coped with the dilemma,
15 The concept appeared in Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. As
Germany’s economy depended in essential ways on its forests that were rapidly declining,
scientists were consulted to give advice. They started to talk about managing forests as to attain
a sustained-yield so that periodic harvests would match the rate of biological growth (Worster
1993: 144). Southern notions of sustainability, however, had given forests a less anthropocentric
meaning.
16 However, at this time the official meaning of development had undergone several changes.
Development meant practically projecting the US model of society onto the rest of the world, but
in the late 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s too little advancements in this direction could be
attested. As Sachs (1999: 6) explained: ‘Poverty increased precisely in the shadow of wealth,
unemployment proved resistant to growth, and the food situation could not be helped through
building steel works’. Hence, in the 1970s and 1980s the meaning of development was broadened
as to include justice, poverty eradication, basic needs, woman issues, and of course, ecological
problems.
17 During the 1980s, the Green Party and the Social-Democratic Party of Germany had been
advancing a change in the stability-act enacted in 1967 that basically reflected Keynesian doctrines
of high employment through steady-growth and balanced terms of trade. The reform of the
stability-act should aim rather at ‘qualitative growth’ in the sense explained above and ecological
balance. In France, during the 1970s, the demand for more leisure was famously made by
philosopher André Gorz (For the former insight I thank Dr. Angelika Zahrnt, and for the latter
one, Dr. Giorgos Kallis).
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especially the arguments pertaining to needs and ecological limits so central to the
growth debate. The emphasis was first placed on poor countries, who were after all
the ones to be aided with their development. Here, essential needs were defined in
conventional terms: food, clothing, shelter, and jobs. It was also accepted that
beyond them, the poor have the legitimate aspirations for an improved quality of
life (WCED 1987: 43). When the report switches into the realm of the rich, needs
become perceived, socially and culturally determined what possibly drives up
levels of consumption. Therefore, it is reminded that in the context of sustainability,
values encouraging ‘consumption standards within the bounds of the ecological
possible and to which all can reasonably aspire’ (ibid.: 44) are required. Although
reaching ecological limits can be slowed through technological progress ‘ultimate
limits there are’ (ibid.: 45). Since sustainable development also involves equity,
equitable access to the constrained resources ought to be granted before the
‘ultimate limits’ are reached. From these premises relating to frugality, equity
and time-bounded growth because of ultimate limits the conclusion was however:
The Commission’s overall assessment is that the international economy must speed up
world growth while respecting the environmental constraints. (ibid.: 89)
How to speed up world growth, that is, economic growth for both rich and poor
countries, while respecting ecological limits? The solution advanced was a change
in the quality of economic growth, but not in the sense advanced in Europe years
before. Qualitative growth meant rather that growth must become less energy/
matter intensive and more equitable in its impact (ibid.: 52). On this general
recommendation some comments are needed, for the official environmental dis-
course became locked in sustainable development until the present.18
First, the report was advising something that one of the main drivers of global
economic growth, the manufacturing sector, had been doing since the industrial
revolution, namely becoming less energy/matter intensive. In Canada, the US and
Germany, energy intensity (ratio of energy use to GDP) declined after about 1918,
in Japan after 1970, in China around 1980 and Brazil in 1985. The US used half as
much energy and emitted less than half as much carbon per constant dollar of
industrial output in 1988 as in 1958. For the world as a whole, energy intensity
peaked around 1925 and by 1990 had fallen by nearly half (McNeill 2000: 316).
However, these global happy trends of ‘dematerialisation’ and ‘decabornisation’
obscured the trends in industrial expansion. In fact, industry had been too successful
in this domain, inasmuch as when consumers were not able to cope with what
manufacturing industries were putting on the market, it started to produce
consumers at home and to lobby for free trade abroad – a foreign policy already
practiced by the first industrial nation Britain. What was happening entered
the intellectual radar of economist John K. Galbraith (1958), who resuscitated the
forgotten Say’s law: a growing supply creates its own growing demand. Yet his
18 The following analysis is not intended to diminish the advances made in other realms that have
been guided by the SD discourse.
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arguments found little response from his colleagues, who two decades before
restricted the boundaries of the study of economics as being unresponsive about
the inquiry on the origins preferences.19 The social-engineered cultural change
partially accomplished by advertising techniques was investigated in the US by
Vance Packard (1960). He described the birth of easy-credit and the general
inculcation of self-indulgence in the management of money, as well as the
commercialisation of virtually every aspect of life, and the technique of built-in
‘progressive obsolescence’. Progressive obsolesce was introduced by both lowering
standards of quality by design and psychologically outmoding products after a
given time.20 Growth became de facto a self-contained policy rather than a mean
to achieve a societal goal, since the ‘private economy is faced with the tough
problem of selling what it can produce’ (Packard 1960: 17). What is important to
highlight from this process is what Packard and Galbraith troubled at that time,
namely that the consequences for social welfare were neglected, let alone the
political and ecological consequences of which Packard was not unmindful. The
topic would be discussed years later by Erich Fromm (2007) and Fred Hirsch
(1977), yet all of these growth caveats had little incidence in the Brundtland report.
Second, the fact that becoming even more efficient leads to an increase of
throughput (input + output) went rather unnoticed. This was presumably because
the revival of the Jevons’ paradox was accomplished a couple of years before it
became irrelevant at the political level as oil prices returned by the mid-1980s to
their customary level. Third, the rationale that already rich countries must further
pursue economic growth by consuming even more was that of helping poor
countries with their economic growth as they are ‘a part of an interdependent
world economy’ (WCED 1987: 51). The alternative that poor countries could create
their own markets by selling necessities to each other instead of selling ‘even more
extravagant luxuries to the jaded and harried rich’ (Daly 1991: 151) or allowing for
import-substitution as had been put forward by Latin American economists in the
1970s and practiced with some success in the region, was entirely neglected. The
mainstream doctrines of economic development that prevailed at the time in which
the Brundtland report was embedded did not permit this. The policy of perpetual
19 Given the insurmountable problems of direct measurement of utility (happiness), definitional
confusions between utility and usefulness; and the embracing of the logical-positivism of the
Vienna circle in the 1920s, economists decided to focus upon market revealed preferences. The
formation of preferences and their ends were declared beyond the scope of economics (see Cooter
and Rappoport 1983 and Bromley 1990). An interesting account of the debate on commensurabil-
ity and comparison of values between von Mises, von Hayek and Otto Neurath, a member of the
Vienna Circle, can be found in Martı́nez-Alier (1987: 211–218).
20 According to Strasser (1999) the term was coined in the 1920s by Christine Frederick, a US
household economist. Progressive obsolescence was an attempt to introduce what was already
common in the upper-classes regarding clothing. Strasser also explained that the idea had a great
appeal for businesses, and transferring progressive obsolescence from clothing to other
commodities was pioneered by the automobile industry, which at that time was worried with a
saturated middle-class. With progressive obsolescence the ‘throwaway society’ was born.
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economic growth for the entire planet remained virtually intact in spite of
discussions regarding the issue in the preceding years. Indeed with SD, the intel-
lectual debate was politically settled (Du Pisani 2006: 93) – with one single
exception: population growth. The report mentioned as a ‘strategic imperative’
the realisation of a ‘sustainable level of population’ (WCED 1987: 49). The
combination of free trade and population control policies in poor countries were
indeed, mildly put, suspicious.
After the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992, sustainable development became gradually operationalised.
The firmly established ‘qualitative growth’ has made it possible to talk ever since
about ‘patterns’ of consumption and production, and to carefully avoid less con-
sumption and production. This is despite the fact that during the earth summit which
endorsed the Agenda 21, it was argued that global ecological problems arose as a
result of profligate consumption and production in rich countries.21 When the report
was launched, the global economy required roughly 1,1 planets, hence, humanity
had started to live from the natural capital, and not from its income. By the
publication date of the report there was of course no ecological footprint metric,
but LtG had been around for 15 years. Additionally, just 1 year before the report’s
publication, a group of natural scientists had published another study showing that
humans were already appropriating 25% of the global potential product of photo-
synthesis (terrestrial and aquatic), and that when only terrestrial photosynthesis was
considered, the fraction increased to 40% (Vitousek et al. 1986).
By 1989 the Washington consensus was formulated and the receipt was applied
to poor countries which had previously become over-indebted; partially as a result
of the pressures to reinvest the so-called ‘petro-dollars’ gained from the OPEC
embargo in the 1970s which flooded development banks. The Washington consen-
sus contained items such as the redirection of public spending from subsidies into
pro-growth services, namely primary education, health care and infrastructure;
trade liberalisation and privatisation of state enterprises; in short, the well-known
Structural Adjustment Programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the
same year, the Berlin wall fell and the process of German reunification began, thus
shifting attention away from the previous discussions of reforming the Keynesian
stability-act (1967) for the purposes of ‘qualitative growth’ – in the West German
sense. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the ‘end of history’ was
proclaimed, neo-liberal doctrines conquered not only the Soviet Union but also
21 Recently, the nineteenth session of the UN commission on sustainable development concluded
in disappointment as governments were unable to establish a consensus to produce a final outcome
text. Apparently, one of the main reasons for the lack of consensus was the failure to agree over the
10-Year Framework Programme on Sustainable Consumption and Production. To this shortcom-
ing, the UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon stated: ‘Without changing consumption production
patterns – from squandering natural resources to the excessive life-style of the rich – there can be
no meaningful realization of the ‘green economy’ concept’. (Anon 2011). Rio + 20 Expectations
Unclear as CSD 19 Ends on Sour Note [online]. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development. Available from: http://bit.ly/pClJCd. Accessed 24 May 2011. Emphasis supplied).
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its former influence’s zones as to transform them into a more efficient growth
machines than they had been previously (McNeill 2000: 334). The world entered
the era of globalisation institutionally rounded up in 1995 when the World Trade
Organization (WTO) emerged out of the culmination of the Uruguay Round of
negotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
By 1992 the World Bank (WB) published its World Development Report
entitled Development and the Environment embracing without conceptual
difficulties as the following anecdote shows: during a session in which the sche-
matic representation of the economy was being discussed, the WB’s chief econo-
mist Lawrence H. Summers refused to draw a larger box around the smaller box
representing the economy.22 The larger box would represent the natural environ-
ment as suggested by Herman Daly, who was serving as senior economist at the
WB’s environment department. Why refuse something so simple and evidently
true? As Daly explains, it was because of the subversive iconographic suggestion
that the economy could not grow in perpetuity given the limits that the environment
imposes. Moreover, ‘a preanalytic vision of the economy as a box floating in
infinite space allows people to speak of ‘sustainable growth’ – a clear oxymoron
to those who see the economy as a subsystem’ (Daly 1996: 7. Italics in original
text).
3.2.4 Between ‘Cornucopians’ and Cautious Optimists
According to Dryzek (1997: 30–31), the fact that an economist of Kenneth Arrow’s
intellectual calibre and reputation co-authored a paper stating that the resource base
is finite and that there are ‘limits to the carrying capacity’ (Arrow et al. 1995: 108) is
an effect of the field of Ecological Economics pioneered by Kenneth Boulding,
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Herman Daly. The authors focused on unravelling
the fashionable claim that economic growth and free trade (export-led growth) in
poor countries (development23) are in the long run beneficial for the environment, a
claim that, as noted before, had already been made in the 1970s. During the 1990s
it came to be known as the Kuznets’ curve hypothesis. It postulated an inverted
U-shaped curve which described the relationship between per-capita income and
indicators of natural and resource quality, that is, when a poor country becomes rich
through export-led growth, only then will its population start to become
22 In the same year of the WB’s publication Summers attracted international attention through an
internal memo that was leaked to the public. Using impeccably the doctrine of comparative
advantage, he suggested that many poor countries were ‘underpolluted’ and that dirty industries
should be encouraged to move to them (for a retrospective analysis see Johnson et al. 2007).
23 The differentiation of economic growth and development gained support in some sectors of the
development community during the 1990s (see for example Sen 1999), while other sectors where
rejecting the notion outright (see for example Escobar 1992, and Sachs 1992).
3 Growth: A Discussion of the Margins of Economic and Ecological Thought 99
preoccupied with environmental quality. As Arrow et al. explained, the Kuznets’
curve hypothesis had been shown just for a selected set of pollutants, yet orthodox
economists have conjectured that the curve applies to environmental quality in
general. Moreover, they were neglecting the export of pollutants from rich to poor
countries effectively done by offshoring highly polluting industries, the purposeful
policy implementation to reduce environmental impacts in rich countries and
finally, that sometimes environmental concerns are not only about increased
demands for environmental ‘quality’, as the resilience of ecosystems upon which
communities depend can be irreversibly damaged.24
Two years after the article appeared, and 10 years after the launching of the
Brundtland report, the influential British magazine The Economist published in its
Christmas special edition an article with the title Plenty of Gloom (Anon 1997).
The article attempted to show their readers by means of time-series graphs the
predictive errors made in the past by Malthus, concluding that there was no reason
to believe in their modern proponents. The article was important as it epitomised
reasonably well another persuasive position going beyond the trend set by Barnett
and Morse in 1963.25 The so-called ‘cornucopians’, famously represented by
economist Julian Simon. The cornucopian rationale is the following: minerals,
food production have been made plentiful in the past, standards of living and life
expectancy have been risen, and technological substitution has taken place many
times. By extrapolating these past trends into the future, in which the basic metric of
scarcity are market prices, it is concluded that the reason for growth pessimism is
without substance. For example, on the issue of oil which is the ‘master resource’,
Simon stated that we will never run out of it (Simon 1996: 179). His argument was
however, subtler and the phrase misleading. In his view, it is not the oil that is
important, but its service: energy. Indeed, the service of energy can be delivered by
other sources rather than oil (substitution). As we will never run out of oil (energy),
and energy will become increasingly cheap as in the past, it
. . . would enable people to create enormous quantities of useful land. The cost of energy
is the prime reason that water desalination now is too expensive for general use [. . .].
If energy costs were low enough, all kinds of raw materials could be mined from the sea.
(Simon 1996: 162)
All of this is possible because the ‘ultimate resource’ is after all human inven-
tiveness (technology), which is ‘unlimited’. Prominent orthodox economists such as
Beckerman never went so far as Simon, but Beckerman had also been using time-
series in order to show that there is little reason to attend the warnings of natural
scientists and derailed economists – the former ones have been wrong too many
times (Beckerman 1974, 1995). Beckerman additionally disdained the sustainability
24 The argument that only rich countries are preoccupied with the environment was also refuted by
Martı́nez-Alier. He coined the term ‘environmentalism of the poor’ (Martı́nez-Alier 1995).
25 In a subsequent study called Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered (1979), Barnett reaffirmed his
position. Nevertheless, many others authors including Georgescu-Roegen and Daly commented on
the issue.
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discourse for being ‘morally repugnant’ (Beckerman 1995: 125). He argued that
needs are subjective, and poverty is the contemporary world malady to be tackled –
certainly through economic growth, for the entire world, and using the standard
instruments of neo-classic economics to tackle scarcity and ecological problems.
The Economists’ article presented a set of figures taken from the Food and
Agriculture Organisation and the WB, showing declining price of metals and food.
It was argued that despite the fact that the world population almost doubled from
1961 to1995, food production had more than doubled, even resulting in falling food
prices. Other tragedies predicted but which turned out to be wrong, according to the
magazine were rising cancer rates because of pollution, forest decline in Germany
in the 1980s caused by acid rain and famines due to population increase. Later, the
journal of Environment and Development Economics called for a response to the
Economist’s article. It was attended by 12 scientists: 9 environmental economists,
2 ecologists and a climate scientist. They responded in the Policy Forum section of
the journal and argued about the absence of markets and property rights on
environmental services but also about the complexity and uncertainty in socio-
ecological systems, and the non-linearity of numerous ecological processes. I will
go into some detail regarding two arguments which reflect, in my view, the gained
influence of Ecological Economics and Industrial Ecology upon Environmental
Economics. The arguments are: (1) the problem with time series statistics versus
processes and (2) the ‘Heisenberg Principle’ (Portney and Oates 1998: 531) which
is at work when a prediction is made.
1. Time series statistics versus dynamic processes
Using time series to show that natural scientists were wrong is a weak argument
because it does not take into account the natural resource-base upon which produc-
tion depends (Dasgupta and M€aler 1998). In agriculture, for example, increased
food production (green revolution) had been achieved by monocultures, pesticides,
fungicides, soil depletion, and so on (Krebs 1998). Hence, the question to be asked
is not only if we can produce more food, but what are the long term ecological/
social consequences of doing so in the way it is done. On scarcity, Dasgupta and
M€aler (1998) pointed out that price can be a very bad indicator. In fact, prices can
decrease while the resource in question also becomes scarcer.26 Krebs (1998)
argued that for predictive purposes, the understanding and modelling of underlying
dynamic processes are more promissory than simple time series statistics.
2. Heisenberg principle
Portney and Oates (1998) and Polin (1998) stated that the act of observing and
forecasting social events is likely to affect the outcome. Hence, the previous
predictions made by natural scientists raised awareness of looming problems,
26 For a discussion of this paradox see Daly and Cobb (1994: 450) and for more general discussion
on scarcity and prices see Norgaard (1990), Daly (1991: 265–256), and Wackernagel and Rees
(1997: 13–14).
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namely exponential population growth, ozone layer depletion, the effects of
acid rain on German forests, and so on. The raised awareness was conducive to
political action which prevented the prediction from coming true and which stopped
damaging activities. Levin (1998: 527) affirmed that ‘the greatest reward for
one predicting catastrophe is to stimulate the implementation of measures that
invalidate the predictions’.
These answers were very significant, and as far as I know, The Economist did not
refute them – although it might have shaped opinion more effectively than the
responses of a scientific journal with a specific and limited audience. As one of
the main targets of ridicule was LtG, several scientists’ responses sadly repeated the
distortions made years before, for example, on the alleged predictions that LtG
made (Hammitt 1998: 511, Perrings 1998: 491), and the supposed failure of taking
into account technical change (Portney and Oates 1998: 530). On predictions, the
following is one of the many phrases written by the LtG’s authors:
This process of determining behaviour modes is ‘prediction’ only in the most limited sense
of the word . . . these graphs are not exact prediction [. . .] They are only indications of the
system’s behavioral tendencies. (Meadows et al. 1972: 92–93. Italics in original text)
With regards to the fact that technical change was not taken into account
(Fig. 3.2b). Finally and as previously mentioned, Krebs (1998) maintained that
the understanding and modelling of underlying dynamic processes is superior to
simple time series statistics. Nevertheless, Krebs failed to give proper recognition
or to defend the LtG team who inaugurated these types of studies.27
The attention on LtG also raised the central question concerning economic
growth, since after all, LtG’s central tenet is that economic growth (and population
growth) is in the long run simply impossible and a failure to recognise that would be
calamitous. The only comment in this direction was made by environmental
economists Dasgupta and M€aler (1998: 505) who expressed that:
By concentrating on welfare measures, such as GNP and life expectancy at birth,
journalists, political leaders and, frequently, even economists, bypass the links that exist
between population growth, increased material output, and the state of natural-resource
base.
They argued later that environmental problems are sometimes correlated by
‘some people’ with wrong sorts of economic growth. On the other hand, Kneese
(1998) expressed gratitude to the magazine for reminding the readers that the
impacts of economic growth on natural resources can and have been cancelled by
technological progress. He explained that with endogenous growth theory, national
27 I bring LtG to the end-1990s again because the widespread idea that LtG was ‘refuted’
contributed to several issues being left unattended for many years. Presumably, this widespread
perception also meant that the two last updates published in 1992 and 2004 correspondingly were
largely ignored. More recently, Turner (2008) published an analysis of 30 years of historical data
(1970–2000) and concluded that they compared favourably with the key features of the ‘standard
run model’ reproduced in Fig. 3.2a.
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economics do not growth like balloons, for efficiency in the use of energy/matter
prevents them from doing so. Similarly, Kristr€om and L€ofgren (1998: 525) asserted
that endogenous growth theory ‘promises us permanent growth, due to constant
returns to capital’. It may be worth reminiscing that endogenous growth theories
simply attempt to account for the origins of technological progress which was
previously treated as given, that is, ‘exogenous’ to the neo-classical growth models.
However, exogenous or not, it does not handle the issue of scale or the Jevons’
paradox already mentioned, resulting in an impact on the natural environment and
related social conflict. When this discussion was taking place, the global economy
was already necessitating 1,2 planets, from which the largest share was what The
Economist’s author dismissed as the ‘mother of all environmental scares’: global
warming.
3.2.5 Climate Change
From the 1990s on, the focus of the debate on ecological problems shifted progres-
sively from depletion to pollution, more specifically to greenhouse gas emissions
(GHG) causing an increase in global average temperature.28 Climate change was
put on the international political agenda at the Earth Summit in 1992 when
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was
created. The ultimate objective of the convention (article 2) was the ‘stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’, and in line with
sustainable development it re-affirmed the objective of ‘sustainable economic
growth’ within the context of the ‘open international economic system’ (UNFCCC
1992). The convention acknowledged several principles, such as the precautionary
principle, the protection of the climate system on the basis of equity, the necessity
that rich countries take the lead in combating climate change, and a consideration
of the circumstances of developing countries. After 5 years of negotiations, the
Kyoto Protocol with legally binding commitments was agreed in 1997. Thereafter,
a political process of ratification began. The protocol included three international
mechanisms in order to facilitate its implementation: International Emissions
Trading, Joint Implementation Mechanism and the Clean Development Mecha-
nism. According to Munasinghe and Stewart (2005: 2) these mechanisms were
28An emphasis was also set to the state of ecosystems and development/poverty. It resulted in the
release of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005 and in the Millennium Development
Goals in 2000. It is however my belief, that climate change has been more at the centre of public
attention in rich countries than the bad shape of ecosystems and global poverty with reference to
the disposition for real action at the international level. The reason might be that climate change is
logically related to the most sensitive geostrategic concerns of rich and emerging countries:
energy.
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developed to specifically satisfy the conditions required by the US, yet the progress
initially made suffered a reverse when the US government refused to sign the Bonn
agreement – an extension of the Kyoto protocol – in July 2001. Two months later
the US suffered a terrorist attack and the attention of the entire West shifted away
from the climate change issue.
The visibility of the subject was again given a massive boost in 2006, when
British economist Lord Nicholas Stern published his Stern Review. That the atten-
tion on climate change was brought back to the forefront by an economist indicated
once again the extraordinary power of the profession.29 As Jackson (2009: 11) put
it: ‘it’s telling that it took an economist commissioned by a government treasury to
alert the world to things climate scientist [. . .] had been saying for years’, namely
that humanity is at crossroads. Climate change is a global and serious threat – and
there is no doubt that it is anthropogenic. Climate studies have been compiled by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) created in 1988. It has deliv-
ered four comprehensive reports thus far: 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007. The follow-
ing information is taken from the synthesis of the last IPCC report (IPCC 2007a).
Global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) such as carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous dioxide (N2O) and halocarbons have clearly
increased since 1750 (pre-industrial times) as a result of an expansion in ‘human
activities’, whereby halocarbons did not even exist in pre-industrial times. For
example, the global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, the most impor-
tant anthropogenic GHG, increased from 280 parts per million (ppm) to 379 ppm in
2005. The major growth in GHG emissions between 1970 and 2004 has come from
energy supply (fossil fuels), transport and industry. There is convincing evidence
that the rising levels of GHGs emissions have a warming effect on the climate
because of the increasing amount of heat energy (infrared radiations) trapped in the
atmosphere: the greenhouse effect. In fact, the earth has become warmer since
around 1900 by 0.7C and it will continue to do so for the next two decades at a rate
of 0.2C for a range of emission scenarios, and 0.1C per decade even if the
concentration of GHGs is kept constant at 2,000 levels.
Increases in temperature estimates depend on specific emission trajectories for
stabilisation which have been provided by the IPCC since 2001. They show, for
example, that a doubling of pre-industrial level of greenhouse gases is likely to raise
global average temperature by between 2C and 4.5C, with a best estimate of
approximately 3C, and that it is very unlikely to be less than 1.5C.30 Presently
29 Climate change was arguably not the only factor for a revived preoccupation with the topic.
Since 2003 oil prices had been on the rise.
30 The IPCC used three different approaches to deal with uncertainty which depended on the
availability of data and experts’ judgment. Uncertainties’ estimations concerning the causal link
between increased concentration in the atmosphere of GHGs and the rising of temperature
consisted of expert judgments and statistical analysis. Likelihood ranges were then constructed
to express assessed probability of occurrence from exceptionally unlikely<1% to virtually certain
>99%. In this paragraph: likely >66%, and very unlikely <10%.
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neither adaptation nor mitigation can avoid climate change and expected impacts at
all. Adaptation is necessary in both the short and the long term to the warming
which will occur even for the lowest estimated stabilisation scenario: 445–490 ppm
CO2e.
31 Indeed, this will increase global average temperature by 2.0C and 2.4C.
The stabilisation of GHGs’ concentrations in the atmosphere would need to peak
and decline thereafter, and the lower the stabilisation level chosen, the faster the
peak and the decline will occur. By now, humanity has years rather than decades to
stabilise emissions of GHGs.32 The expected impacts of global warming are
unevenly distributed according to sectors and regions. In the following paragraphs
a summary of expected effects taken from the working group II (IPCC 2007b) is
provided.
Ecosystems: The resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this
century. Climate change will lead to increased flooding, drought, wildfire, pest
outbreaks, ocean acidification, land use change, pollution, and overexploitation of
natural resources. With an increase in global temperature which exceeds 1.5–2.5C,
20–30% of plant and animal species assessed thus far are likely to be at risk of
extinction. In Latin America increases in temperature and associated decreases in
soil quality and water availability are projected to lead to gradual replacement of
tropical forest by savannah in Eastern Amazonia. In Asia, climate change will
compound the pressures on natural resources associated with rapid urbanisation and
industrialisation. In both Polar Regions, specific ecosystems and habitats are
projected to be vulnerable as climatic barriers to species invasions are lowered.
Food: Globally, the potential for food production is projected to increase in some
regions by an increased local average temperature in the 1–3C range. Above this
range food production will decrease. In seasonally dry and tropical regions, crop
productivity will decrease for even small local temperature increases (1–2C). It
will augment the risk of malnutrition and weaken political efforts to attain food
security, whereby Africa will be especially affected. By 2030, production from
agriculture and forestry is projected to decline in Southern and Eastern Australia,
and over parts of eastern New Zealand because of increased drought and fire.
Similar projections are made for Southern Europe.
31 The totality of GHGs is usually converted into CO2 equivalents (CO2e).
32 A ‘2-degree goal’ was agreed by G8 leaders in Italy in July 2009. They committed to cutting
their GHGs emissions by 80% by 2050. Nevertheless, they left the baseline year vague. On
December 2009, the fifteenth conference of the parties (COP15) took place in Copenhagen
resulting in a non-binding agreement (Copenhagen Accord). Later, Annex-I-countries, roughly
speaking rich countries, submitted their quantified emission targets for 2020 with baselines which
ranged from 1990 (EU) to 2000 (Australia) and 2005 (US and Canada). One year later, at the
COP16 in Cancun rich countries agreed on a Green Climate Fund worth USD 100 billion a year by
2020. The declared purpose of the fund was that rich countries assist poor countries in financing
GHGs emissions’ mitigation and adaptation. How the Green Climate Fund will be raised is still an
open question. The overall assessment of the COP16’s achievements depends of course on whether
the analysts use political criteria or rather criteria oriented to the mitigation and solution of the
climate problem.
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Coasts: Settlements located in coastal and river flood plains will be severely
affected as sea level is expected to rise due mainly to the thawing of the Greenland
ice sheet. In the meantime, gradual sea level rise is expected to exacerbate
inundations, storm surge, and erosion, therefore threatening vital infrastructure,
and facilities which support the livelihood of island communities. Coastal areas,
especially the heavily populated regions in the South, East and South-East Asia,
will be at the greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and rivers.
Health: The health of millions of people is projected to be affected because of
increased malnutrition, deaths, diseases and injury driven by extreme weather
events such as floods and higher concentrations of ground-level ozone in urban
areas. Some health benefits from climate change are projected in temperate areas,
such as fewer deaths from cold exposure. However, it is anticipated that these
benefits will be outweighed by the negative health effects of rising temperatures.
In Europe and North America climate change is also projected to increase health
risks due to heat waves and the frequency of wildfires.
Water: Climate change will exacerbate current pressures on water resources
from population growth and land use change such as urbanisation. Many semi-arid
areas such as the Mediterranean Basin, Western US, Southern African and North-
eastern Brazil will suffer a decrease in water resources. Runoff from changes in
precipitation and temperature will increase by 10–40% by the mid-century at higher
latitudes. Drought-affected areas are projected to increase in extent, with the
potential for adverse impacts on multiple sectors such as agriculture, water supply,
energy production and health. In Southern Europe, climate change is projected to
worsen conditions due to high temperatures and drought in a region already
vulnerable to climate variability.
It is worthwhile to mention that many causal chains are not completely under-
stood by climate scientists. For example, the understanding of important factors
driving sea level rise is limited, hence, the IPCC does not provide a best estimate for
sea level rise, in part because sea level projections do not include uncertainties
arising from carbon cycle feedbacks which can amplify the warming effect.
Warming amplifying effects are, for example, that natural carbon absorption will
be further weakened as severe increases in global temperature could be caused by
the liberation of methane from peat deposits, wetlands and thawing permafrost. It
means that some effects in their likelihood and magnitude can be underestimated.
An increase in the global average temperature of more than 5C would lead to
major disruption and large-scale movement of population. Catastrophic events of
this magnitude are difficult to capture with current models as temperatures would be
so far outside human experience. What is already well understood is that past and
future anthropogenic GHG emissions will continue to contribute to the warming
and sea level rise for more than a millennium because of the time scales required for
the natural removal of the gases from the atmosphere. Although the prospects of
climate change are appalling, let alone the limited capacity of the relevant political
actors at the international arena to deal with it, even more appalling is that the
warming of the atmosphere is not the only sharpened ecological problem which
humanity is facing. Indeed, other problems are plentiful and include ecosystem
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liquidation, unprecedented biodiversity loss, the collapse of fish stocks, water
scarcity, loss of productive soil and impoverished communities. These ecological
and social problems will simply become more acute through climate change.
The magnitude and urgency of the problem is evident; a notion which was
conveyed by Stern. Nonetheless, his message was one of hope. Taking as the target
the stabilisation of carbon emissions in the atmosphere at 550 ppm CO2e, it would
cost approximately 1–2.5% of annual GDP (Stern 2007: 227). The cost is modest
($1 trillion by 2050) with respect to the level and expansion of economic output
expected over the next 50 years which is likely to be over 100 times this amount
(Stern 2007: 265). He argued that in order achieve that target, strong policy would
be required as to redirect research and investments in green technologies away from
carbon intensive technologies, especially in the area of energy provision. Unfortu-
nately, Stern took as the target the stabilising of carbon emissions in the atmosphere
at 550 ppm CO2e, yet the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report showed 1 year later
that a 450 ppm CO2e will be needed if climate change is to be restricted to an
average global temperature increase of 2C. In fact, the target may be even more
punishing. Jackson (2009: 83–84) explained, drawing on two articles published in
the journal Nature, that 350 ppm target offers the best hope of preventing dangerous
climate change. Stern could not have known this writing 3 years before and using
largely IPCC’s information published in 2001 – even though there was already an
international 350 ppm movement and the European Union (EU) had already
proposed the 450 ppm goal.
When Stern published his review in 2006, the global economy already required
almost 1.5 planets, yet a discussion on the causality’s direction between economic
growth and ecological obliteration so fervently debated prior to the Brundtland
report was completely absent in Stern’s work. Economic growth was Stern’s default
assumption for the entire globe. Finally, some of Stern’s ideas would be eventually
brought to the international political arena after a global shock, which instead of
slowly worsening environmental conditions, expeditiously and decisively set polit-
ical forces in motion.
3.2.6 Greening the Economy
The financial turmoil caused by the housing bubble burst in the US which almost
resulted in a fully-fledged global economic recession between 2008 and 2009 and
which greatly shattered the food crisis of the preceding months, opened a political
window of opportunity for a greened version of neo-Keynesianism worldwide. In
September 2008, the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) at the University
of Massachusetts proposed a fiscal expansion of USD 100 billion (bn) which would
create two million green jobs in key areas such as building retrofitting to improve
energy efficiency, expansion of mass transit/freight rail, the building of a ‘smart’
electrical grid, wind power, solar power and biofuels (Pollin et al. 2008). A month
later, the executive director of the UNEP, Achim Steiner argued for a ‘Global Green
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New Deal’ as to redirect a substantive portion of the stimulus packages and bank
bailouts prepared at the time to the green sector. The green sectors were the same
areas already proposed by the PERI but adding ecosystem ‘infrastructure’ and
sustainable agriculture (Nuttall 2008). Amonth later, a group of investment advisors
of the Deutsche Bank revealed the ‘green sweet spot’ for green investment formed
from the junction of three factors: climate change, energy security and the financial
crisis (DB 2008). Finally, in January 2009, the US president raised the development
of a ‘green economy’ to the top of the US political Agenda (Goldenberg 2009). Since
the EU had for a long time been making active use of fiscal policy to ‘decarbonise’
their economies so as to meet their emission targets,33 a green consensus among rich
countries was achieved. From the global stimulus plans worth nearly USD three
trillion, over USD 430 billion went to the green sector (almost 16% of the total),
primarily for energy efficiency (buildings, rail, and so on), water infrastructure and
renewables (Robins 2009). In absolute terms, the green stimuli in China and the US
took the lead, with USD 221 billion and USD 112 billion respectively. Yet, the real
green new deal took place in South Korea, with more than 80% of the total stimulus
package (USD 38 billion) allocated for the green fund (ibid.).
In the following years, as the dust of the economic crisis temporarily settled, the
idea of the green economy turned into a firmly established notion in the official
environmental discourse through the Green Economy Report: Towards a Green
Economy (UNEP 2011). In this report, the UNEP broadened the focus on green
investments in energy efficiency as to include the main raison d’etre of SD:
development and poverty. It also added many important elements of Ecological
Economics in all the green-investment scenarios such as investment in natural
capital, eco-taxation, shifting away subsidies from harmful industry, and so on.
The topic played a central role during the United Nations Conference on Sustain-
able Development (Rio+20) in June 2012. Despite the fact that the definition of the
green economy is as broad as the definition of SD,34 the authors of the report made a
concise statement about why so little has been achieved in the years since the
inception of the sustainability discourse. Their answer was: ‘there is a growing
recognition that achieving sustainability rests almost entirely on getting the econ-
omy right’ (UNEP 2011: 16), and getting the economy right means in this new
context of Keynsianism active state intervention in order to achieve sustainable or,
by now, green growth.
Although laissez-faire proponents condemn this shift to green neo-Keynesianism,
the authors of the report explain that markets’ instruments alone cannot deal with
pervasive externalities such as climate change in order to globally achieve an economy
less dependent on fossil fuels. On the other hand, green technologies also need public
33 Germany has been the forerunner with the enactment of the Renewable Act from the year 2000.
The government introduced feed-in tariffs encouraging the deployment of onshore and offshore
wind, biomass, hydropower, geothermal and solar facilities.
34 The ‘green economy [is] one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities’ (UNEP 2011: 16).
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procurement so as to protect them against the brutal competition of the market. Many
technologies and public facilities which are taken for granted today, contrary to neo-
liberal beliefs, have been created and built under the tutelage of state such as aviation,
internet, roads and schools. It also seems clear that poor countries, especially the
largest and rapidly growing ones such as China and India must be locked into an
energetic path different from fossil fuels so as to meet their energetic requirements.
Indeed, this is vital if humanity is to have a chance to tackle at least global climate
change – whether this is doable given the gigantic and increasing energetic
requirements, price uncertainties and the changing geo-strategic game remains an
open question.
By and large the report has historical relevance. It captures the changes in the
direction of environmental policy which had been taking place within the borders of
global players such as members of the EU and China, later joined by the US out of a
financial crisis and with a president less hostile to spend taxpayer money for green
investment. These factors might explain the swiftness with which the green econ-
omy became environmental mainstream discourse. To climb up to this status
sustainable development has taken almost 20 years, while the green economy
made it in just 3 years.35 The question that arises and which will be shortly
examined is whether this response is adequate in view of the truly civilisational
shift needed to cope with a worsened ecological and social crisis.
First at all, the report maintains the growth commitment for the globe, after all
growth is also the goal of Keynesianism.36 Keynes made stimulated public or
private demand-driven growth a policy objective in the past century after 1945
(or before, in Roosevelt’s New Deal) as a mean to overcome the vicissitudes of the
Great Depression. However, Keynes himself saw it as a time-limited policy and not
intended to be a perpetual endeavour as implied since the Harrod-Domar growth
models of the 1950s.37 Second, the authors of the report maintain that the ‘funda-
mental’ reason for the social and ecological crisis is ‘the gross misallocation of
capital’ in the last two decades (UNEP, 2011: 14). Certainly, subsidising heavily
polluting industries or failing to respect the regenerative capacity of ecosystems has
been a grave mistake. However, it hardly follows that the fundamental reason for
the ecological and social crisis is because of the misallocation of capital in the
recent past. The general preoccupation with both ecological problems and even less
with poverty did not start with the inauguration of sustainable development, for this
35 The authors of the report assert that the green economy is not meant to replace SD (UNEP 2011: 2).
36 The rationale of Keynsianism is that fiscal stimulus funded by deficit spending will create
employment, employment will generate income, income will generate private spending and
savings, income will spur consumption and savings investment, and consequently employment.
With the revenues raised from a reinvigorate economy the government will pay off the debt. The
whole purpose of the mechanism is economic growth.
37 See in particular his essay Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren written in 1930
(Keynes 2009).
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was a response to the joint-effects of these problems within the constraints of the
political possible. An alternative fundamental reason would be that ecological and
related social problems exist because of the metabolism of the industrial economy,
and the economic policy of perpetual economic growth largely driven by the search
of profits and rents in a non-growing planet. Third, the projections of the report
reach as far as 2050. Assuming that through green investments – which are
absolutely necessary – and further improvements in energy/matter efficiency we
maintained global growth until 2050 what will happen thereafter? It is highly
probable that humanity will end up simply doing the same or even more of the
things which became cheaper because of the very same improvements in energy/
matter efficiency. This is the Jevons’ paradox which has been mentioned several
times in the last sections and which now requires more elaboration.
William S. Jevons in his The Coal Question (1865) was concerned about Britain
losing her economic dynamism and worldwide position because of a foreseeable
depletion of coal reserves. On the one hand, while other countries were living on the
annual regular income from harvest, Britain was living on capital which would not
yield interest as it was being turned into heat, light and power, that is, that capital
was disappearing forever (Martı́nez-Alier, 1987: 161). On the other hand, he
doubted that gains in technical efficiency with regards to the use of coal would
lead in the future to less coal consumption as was argued at that time:
It is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a
diminished consumption. The very contrary is the true [. . .] new modes of economy will
lead to an increase in consumption. (Jevons 1865. Quoted by Polimeni et al. 2008)
The topic remerged almost 100 years later after industrial economies had largely
switched from coal to oil and later on to nuclear power for electricity as a result of
partial oil-demand destruction caused by the OPEC’s embargo during the 1970s and
early 1980s. The article of Khazzoom (1980) elicited a renewed interest on the issue
as he explained that some mandated standards for energy saving would even
‘backfire’ (Khazzoom 1980: 35). From then on an enlargement of the Jevons’
paradox, which has been renamed as the rebound effect has been taking place.
Theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to trace, for example, micro- to
macro-economic effects. Nonetheless, the results of these studies remained uncon-
vincing. For example, increased energy/matter efficiency would make a given
commodity cheaper, what conversely would free household’s income which
would be spent on either more consumption of the same product or on other
products in case of low-demand elasticity. Eventually it will pull up economic
growth, and economic growth will mean, ceteris paribus, more resource extraction
(inputs) and waste/pollution (output). The unconvincing part of this argumentative
line is related to the insurmountable empirical task of following income effects up
to the macro-economy, also aggravated by the different theoretical growth-
approaches and the terminology used (see the following reviews Herring (1999),
Biswanger (2001), Alcott (2005) and Jenkins et al. (2011)). However, and as
already shown when discussing SD, the Jevons’ paradox seems not to be a paradox
at all. It was after all a major component in the pattern of development of theWest –
at least in its own terms.
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The authors of the report fully recognised the Jevons’ paradox in the green
investment scenarios for the manufacturing sector (UNEP, 2011: 257–258), energy
efficiency in buildings (ibid.: 357–361) and green cities (ibid.: 461, 479). Never-
theless, the policy implications which have followed from its recognition are by and
large inconclusive. In the context of increasing energy efficiency in buildings the
report could only simulate power demand and not overall energy use due to a lack
of data. Power demand accounts only, according to the report, for roughly 30% of
total energy used in buildings. In spite of the partial but highly positive results of the
simulation, it is stated that ‘economic growth in the green investment scenarios,
approximately offsets the savings in power demand’ (ibid.: 357). This is the Jevons’
paradox. However, policy implications are left rather inconclusive. It is simply
stated that it ‘highlights the importance of accompanying new technologies with
appropriate behavioral and institutional change’ (ibid.: 357), without specifically
mentioning what kinds of behavioural and institutional changes are needed.
In the context of green cities, an example of a current green community in Britain
is given in which households have achieved 84% of energy reduction and decreased
36% of their ecological footprints. Nevertheless, it is specified (in a footnote) that
although the residents of the community have reduced their footprint on site:
A lot of their ecological impact is made outside of it, in schools, at work, and on holiday . . .
[they also] fly slightly more frequently than the local average, presumably due to their
higher average income. (ibid.: 461)
This is the Jevons’ paradox. The authors argued that these limitations do not
undermine the achievements of the local development, which is utterly correct.
They finally suggested the need for ‘scaling up energy efficiency measures in wider
urban settlement systems’ (ibid.: 461). The problem is that scaling up efficiency
measures will necessarily culminate in efficiency measures for the entire world, that
is, from what is called relative decoupling (energy/matter efficiency gains) to
absolute decoupling. That is precisely what is proposed for the manufacturing
sector. In the context of manufacturing, or green investment scenarios, the report
states that overall emissions, energy and material use have been growing in spite of
efficiency gains. Figure 3.3 depicts a global trend in increasing resource extraction,
population and GDP, while the use of materials has markedly declined (increased
efficiency) in the period 1980–2007. The dilemma is settled by stating that ‘what
economies world-wide need is absolute decoupling of the environmental pressure
with resource consumption from economic growth’ (ibid.: 257). Absolute
decoupling will imply that worldwide total resource extraction is held constant,
while GDP still increases, as the report maintains the growth commitment. This
conclusion may have the following problems. First, resource extraction as depicted
in Fig. 3.3 is an aggregate of metal ores, industrial and construction minerals, fossil
fuels and biomass. Resource extraction could be limited in one of these sectors
because of substitution effects caused by scarcity. However, this would increase
resource extraction in other sectors which conversely may still increase overall
resource extraction. This is at least the pattern which the historical evidence has
shown so far. Second, and provisionally setting aside increasingly political and
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ecological conflicts associated with extractive industries, the problem seems not to
be that the earth’s crust does not contain enough minerals to maintain customary
growth levels in the long run, but in waste/pollution. In other words, currently and
only physically speaking, the problem does not lie in the input-side but in the
output-side of the global economy. This observation does not disclose any recondite
truth. Georgescu-Roegen stated, or rather prophesised 40 years before we became
so concerned with issues such as climate change, that because:
Pollution is a surface phenomenon which also strikes the generation which produces it, we
may rest assured that it will receive much more official attention that its inseparable
companion, resource depletion. (1975: 377)
Thus, it can be argued that once absolute decoupling is achieved, then waste/
pollution problems will be gradually solved, but before this can be concluded,
policy instruments facilitating absolute decoupling should be discussed and pro-
posed. This is what is largely left inclusive in the report. A proposal would be to
restrict the quantities of the resources according to the more stringent ecological or
social necessity, and to let market prices fulfil their function. This proposal will be
examined in detail in Sect. 3.3.5. However, it can be stated in advance that the
chances for its implementation are rather low – as any other alternative whose
Fig. 3.3 The Jevons’ paradox (UNEP 2011. Modified by the author)
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implementation necessarily requires international governance structures dealing
with constraints.
Foreseeable political difficulties at this level are perhaps an approximate expla-
nation of why the report left largely unresolved the Jevons’ paradox and even
included as a major finding that the ‘trade-off between economic progress and
environmental sustainability is a myth’ (UNEP 2011: 622). Industrial ecologist
Robert Ayres, who was one of the chapter coordinators of the report, stated a couple
of years ago that:
None of the important economic actors, whether government leaders or private sector
executives, has an incentive compatible with a ‘no growth’ policy. No economic growth
is evidently not a politically viable proposition for a democracy, at least in a world with
enormous gaps between poverty and wealth. But ‘no growth’ is an imperative as regards
extractive materials, energy and pollution emissions because economic activity is based on
a material function. (Ayres 2008: 290)
And yet, unviable policy proposals do not transform theory and evidence into a
myth.
3.2.7 Wither Economic Growth?
Over the last 40 years economic growth has not only been assiduously cherished,
but it has been elevated from time to time to a truly panacea: unemployment,
development/poverty, overpopulation (‘demographic transition’), and even ecolog-
ical degradation (‘environmental quality’) have been claimed to be solved by
economic growth, nay, by export led-growth.
Of course the problems of unemployment could be, at least partially tackled in
rich countries by working-less/work-sharing. Poverty in rich countries could also be
overcome by using other instruments such as a basic citizen income, and to
effectively tackle the gap between rich and poor which is increasing even in
Western Europe (Jackson 2009). The citizens of the poorest countries in the
world could also be relieved from this malady by a global minimum wage, or if it
is held to be an illusion opposed not only due of ideological concoctions but also
due of foreseeable implementation problems, then at least by a better distribution of
the gains of economic growth that hardly anyone claims they do not need. As
economist Andrew Simms (2008: 49) observed:
During the 1980s, for every $100 added to the value of the global economy, around $2.20
found its way to those living below the World Bank’s absolute poverty line. During the
1990s, that share shrank to just 60 cents. This inequity in income distribution – more like a
flood up than a trickle down – means that for the poor to get slightly less poor, the rich have
to get very much richer. It would take around $166 worth of global growth to generate $1
extra for people living on below $1 a day.
From this perspective, claiming for more export-led growth as a mean for
development and poverty alleviation is misguided and it has been long before
recognised as such.
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On the problem of population, China for instance, did not wait for the effects of a
‘demographic transition’ which should automatically happen once she becomes
rich through growth, instead she preferred active top-down population policy.
Contrastingly, the poor and working class in Western Europe and the US, and in
some countries of Latin America, were practicing a century ago what Martı́nez-
Alier and Masjuan (2008) called ‘bottom-up neo-Malthusianism’. This was a
popular movement which helped to bring down fertility rates in Western Europe
against the pro-population growth policy of the state.38 Respected demographer
Carl Haub explained that ‘well organized family planning campaigns are much
more important than economic growth’ (Hickman 2011). On the other hand, and
although population growth still constitutes a problem for development in some
poor countries, the truly global ecological problem is overconsumption in rich
countries and its increasing emulation in emerging ones, as the very same author
of the Population Explosion Paul Ehrlich maintains nowadays.39 Frugality or
sufficiency (less consumption) is still a necessary condition for environmental
sustainability as it was acknowledged 40 years before. Indeed, it is increasingly
accepted today by social scientists who in the recent past have focused primarily on
technological progress (Weiz€acker et al. 2009: 346). Based on the same rationale,
there is a call to draft the ‘Millennium Consumption Goals’ (Assadourian 2011) and
to implement, in line with democratic traditions and environmental justice, the ‘One
Man – One Vote – One Carbon Footprint’ (T€opfer and Bachmann 2009).
However, since ‘growthmania’ is still in place and ecological problems continue
to rise as expected in a world subjected to the laws of thermodynamics and
ecological limits, the afore-mentioned scattered proposals are barely taken seri-
ously by the social agents who matter: decision-makers in rich and by now
emerging countries. The only way to maintain the growth commitment is to
forcefully presuppose that only technological progress will drastically reduce the
impact of growth on the biosphere. Technology is still ‘the rock upon which the
growthmen built their church’ (Daly 1972: 949) in spite of recent historical
evidence showing that technological progress can bring severe risks (EEA 2001),
that it makes societies prone to fall into ‘progress traps’ (Wright 2005),40 and that
therefore, technological faith encompasses a great deal of utopianism which must
be denounced as such (Jonas 1979: 9). As will be shown later, these caveats do not
38 The arguments for voluntary population control were women’s freedom, relieving pressure on
wages (‘womb strike’), anti-militarism, impeding migration overseas and the natural environment.
Not surprisingly governments at that time harshly repressed the movement on grounds of religion
and national interests (See Martı́nez-Alier and Masjuan 2008).
39 Ibid.
40 The notion of ‘progress trap’ coined by anthropologist Ronald Wright means that the problems
created by technology can usually be solved only by more technology, and the new problems
created by the latter must be solved by even more technology, and so ad infinitum. He also
explained how ‘too much progress’ can be made. For instance since the Chinese invented
gunpowder, there has been great progress in the making of bangs, but ‘when the bang we can
make can blow up the world, we have made rather too much progress’ (2005: 5).
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involve a rejection of technological progress altogether – the problem is (still)
‘growthmania’ and growth.
Although it is probable that the green economy will dominate the environmental
official discourse for the following years, it is convenient to examine less-political
realist but ‘imperative’ proposals which could replace economic growth.
3.3 The Steady-State Economy of Daly
3.3.1 Intellectual Foundations: Mill and Georgescu-Roegen
Classical economists were growth economists.41 Material progress42 was not only
the source of national power – the interests of kings and merchants, but also a
source of prosperity to the population at large (Arndt 1978: 7). Nonetheless, they
all expected with pessimism an economic stationary-state. For Adam Smith
the ‘stationary [state] is dull; the declining melancholy’ (Smith 1991 [1776]: 86).
In the hands of Malthus the stationary-state is not only melancholic but dreadful
given the propensity of humans to increase in numbers faster than the ability to
produce food. Hence, population checks would inevitably arrive either by the ‘vices
of mankind’ such as wars; and in the case it fails then by ‘sickly seasons, epidemics,
pestilence [. . .] plague [and] famine [. . .]’ (Malthus 1998 [1798]: 139–40). The
Ricardian stationary state was not attractive but at least it did not have the horror
portrayed by Malthus, for it can be postponed through laissez faire policy, devel-
oping free trade and the exploitation of the resources in the new world (Hicks 1966:
260). In general, however, the normal expectation of the individual was to live on
the brink of starvation, and material progress would improve the conditions of those
who were already wealthy. Political economy was indeed, as Thomas Carlyle once
judged it: ‘the dismal science’.
It was Mill who introduced a radically different view of the stationary-state. In
his view the stationary state is highly desirable and as such, it deserves to be put as
an overall policy objective. His line of reasoning anticipated many of the ecological
and social arguments made against the perpetual growth policy from the late 1960s
up to now. He saw no reason why the natural environment should be sacrificed
41 Reducing Daly’s intellectual foundations to Mill and Georgescu-Roegen is an arbitrary choice
for his views were also shaped by the works of John Ruskin, Frederick Soddy, Kenneth Boulding,
and Irving Fisher among others. Nevertheless, as it will be shown, Mill’s and Georgescu-Roegen’s
ideas constitute Daly’s strongest foundations.
42 ‘Progress ceased to be an issue of metaphysics as understood in the middle ages, and came to be
a material issue in the early eighteenth century. Material progress or ‘raising standards of living’
became the mean to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number, as the utilitarian
principle proclaimed (Pollard 1968).
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through the combined forces of affluence and population growth. His arguments are
worth quoting at length:
Nor there is much satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing left to the sponta-
neous activity of nature; with every rood of land brought into cultivation, which is capable
of growing food for human beings; every flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all
quadrupeds or birds which are not domesticated for man’s use exterminated as his rivals for
food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and scarcely a place left where a wild
shrub or flower could grow without being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved
agriculture. If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to
things that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would extirpate from it, for the
mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a better or happier population,
I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they will be content to be stationary, long
before necessity compels them to it. (Mill 2004 [1848]: 692)
Although his advocacy for conservation was specially directed at his home
country, Britain, his vision can be enlarged as to encompass today’s rich countries
for:
It is only in the backward countries of the world that increased production is still an
important object; in those most advanced, what is needed is a better distribution, of
which one indispensable means is the stricter restrain of population. (ibid.: 691)
Mill, differing from Ricardo, viewed birth controlling measures as the most
important public policy, so that population becomes the fixed factor of production,
and in so doing, ensuring that a large portion of the production surplus flows to
wages. With regards how to attain distribution Mills stated that:
. . . this better distribution of property [may be] attained, by the joint effect of the prudence
and frugality of individuals, and of a system of legislation favouring equality of fortunes.
(ibid.: 691)
Mill also addressed what Fred Hirsch 120 years later would call the Social Limits
to Growth (1977), whose ideas Daly integrated into his model. Mill could not
conceive as the most desirable state of social life the one in which the norm is:
‘struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing and treading on each
other’s heels’ (ibid.: 690).
The second main intellectual source of Daly’s thought was the work of the
mathematician and economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen,43 who rigorously
treated the implications of thermodynamics in the economic process. He disclosed
the fallacy of misplace concreteness in which the marginalists, and later neo-
classical economists have incurred by forgetting the resource base of the economy
and in viewing the economic process through the lenses of Newtonian mechanics.44
43 For a review of Georgescu-Roegen’s thought see Maneschi and Zamagni (1997) and Daly
(1996: 191–198).
44 Georgescu-Roegen maintained that the fallacy of misplaced concreteness was the cardinal ‘sin’
of orthodox economics from which only Marx, Veblen and Schumpeter offered substantial ways to
transcend it (1971: 231). The fallacy, formulated by philosopher Alfred Whitehead, consisted of
‘neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as
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For the authors of the marginalist revolution,45 the problem of land – until recently
the economic term encompassing all natural resources – was abandoned, and
economic growth ceased to be the central topic. They became rather concerned
with the allocation of given resources (Screpanti and Zamagni 2005: 165), in spite
of Jevons’ energy analysis. Neglecting the role of resources in the economy was so
intriguing, that, as Georgescu-Roegen observed: ‘Not even wars [. . .] for the
control of the world’s natural resources awoke economists from their slumber’
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 2).
On the other hand, the ambitions of the marginalists in making out of economics
a scientific discipline led them to adopt the Newtonian mechanistic worldview into
their modelling. Nonetheless, while the marginalist revolution was taking place in
economics through the adoption of Newtonian mechanics from physics, a revolu-
tion was taking place in physics which was abandoning Newtonian mechanics. The
revolutionaries were Rudolf Clausius, Robert Mayer, and Herman Helmholtz who
grounded the new branch of physics thermodynamics (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:
141–195, Martı́nez-Alier 1987: 73–88) and from which the law of conservation of
energy and the entropy law were postulated. They are correspondingly the first and
the second law of thermodynamics.46 For Georgescu-Roegen the entropy law was
the most relevant physical law in economics, which leaves no room for the
mechanistic view of modern neo-classical economics so clearly implied in
macro-economic books’ charts depicting the economic process as a circular flow
of national product and income in a perfectly competitive market. Entropy means
that in an isolated system, energy would move towards a thermodynamic equilib-
rium in which energy is equally diffused throughout the closed space.
The relation of the two thermodynamic laws and the economic process can be
exemplified as follows: in the combustion chamber of the modern car engine
the fuel is burnt. The resulting heat and the pressure of the gases apply force to
the components of the car engine such as the pistons and the wheels. The evident
result of the combustion process is locomotion: the car moves from A to B.
According to the first thermodynamic law, the quantity of energy has not changed,
yet a qualitative change has taken place. Before the fuel entered the combustion
chamber, its chemical energy was available for producing mechanical work. After
the fuel leaves the combustion chamber the chemical energy loses its quality and
dissipates into the atmosphere where it becomes non-available energy, that is to say,
it can no longer be used for the same purpose. This strict linearity and irrevocability
from order to disorder represents the entropy law. The entropy law has enormous
it exemplifies certain categories of thought. There are aspects of actualities which are simply
ignored so long as we restrict thought to these categories’ (Whitehead 1978: 8).
45 The figures were mainly William Stanley Jevons, León Walras and Carl Menger. For a detailed
account see Screpanti and Zamagni (2005: 163–195).
46 The third law of thermodynamics is less relevant for economics. It states that the entropy of any
pure, perfect crystalline element or compound at absolute zero is equal to zero.
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relevance, from the human perspective, to non-renewable resources.47 If uranium,
petroleum or coal could be re-used ad infinitum, scarcity would cease to be an
economic problem and the resource pressures arising from a growing population
and affluence could simply be solved by more frequently using the flows of the
existing stocks. As much as we might believe in human inventiveness with respect
to technological progress and semantics, it cannot reverse this linearity.
Georgescu-Roegen was also very clear in stating that the dictates of the entropy
law happens whether or not humans are around, for the economic role of humans is
simply that of ‘pushing or pulling’ (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 141). In other words,
the economic process consists of accelerating the transformation from low entropy
energy/matter into high entropy energy/matter,48 that is, from speeding up deple-
tion to speeding up waste/pollution. It also follows, ceteris paribus, the greater the
size and intensity of the economic activity the more depletion/pollution which
occurs. From this perspective it is not surprising that the greatest ecological
problems have been caused by industrial economies based on fossil fuels in spite
of continued efforts in ‘ecological modernisation’. It is worthwhile to emphasise
again that Georgescu-Roegen’s central point is that these physical facts are not
accounted for in economics:
Had economics recognized the entropic nature of the economic process, it might have been
able to warn its co-workers for the betterment of mankind – the technological sciences- that
‘bigger and better’ washing machines, automobiles, and superjets must lead to ‘bigger and
better’ pollution. (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 19)
3.3.2 Unravelling Fallacies of Misplaced Concreteness
Drawing upon the ideas of Mill and Georgescu-Roegen, Daly further pursued the
revision of economic theory disclosing and correcting further fallacies of misplaced
concreteness (FMC). In the next paragraphs, I will discuss two of these fallacies
which are central to understanding the theoretical tenets of steady-state economy:
markets and technology.49
3.3.2.1 The Market
Daly fully recognised the superiority of the market-economy in allocating scarce
resources among alternative uses compared to a planned economy; nonetheless
47 As the earth is not an isolated system (it receives and reflects solar radiation) but a closed system
(it does not exchange relevant amount of matter with the outer space), nonrenewable resources
(fossil fuels and minerals) are in absolute terms finite.
48 Georgescu-Roegen latter extended the entropy law as to include matter and proposed the fourth
law of thermodynamics. It has been disputed whether a ‘fourth law’ can be formally enunciated.
It is however, not disputed that matter inherently tends toward disorder too (see Daly and Farley
2011: 66).
49 The following paragraphs rely heavily on Daly (1991: 281–287), Daly and Cobb (1994: 25–117)
and Daly (1996: 38–44).
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there are some negative features which require correction. They are (1) the ten-
dency for competition to be self-eliminating, (2) the corrosiveness of self-interest
on the moral context of the community that is presupposed by the market, (3) the
existence of externalities which can be localised or pervasive, (4) an implicit amoral
position on the issue distribution, and (5) the lack of defining the optimal scale of
the economy relative to the natural system.
1. The tendency for competition to be self-eliminating.
Competition is cherished by orthodox economists on the grounds that it
improves allocative efficiency, keeps profits at the normal level and avoids, at
least theoretically, the emergence of monopoly which can negatively influence
market prices. The slogan is ‘the more buyers and sellers the better’. Nevertheless,
in the middle run many firms become few firms and monopoly power increases.
In addition, in the long run giant conglomerates appear with their correspondingly
giant corporate bureaucracies making the market economy hardly indistinguishable
from a planned economy. Within a single country this development is economically
and politically damaging, and even more so within the relentless pursuit of a global
integrated economy.
As explained in the last section, as the laissez-faire intellectual movement
gradually gained strength, free trade and capital mobility doctrines were (selec-
tively) re-adopted and re-implemented. In this context, the enforcement of antitrust
laws of individual nations became more costly, if not impossible. One of the
reasons is that the accumulation of wealth tends to increase pari passuwith political
power. Agri-business, energy provision, media-entertainment organised as transna-
tional corporations along with financial institutions are today in a position to
influence polities and politics at different levels through many direct or indirect
means. It ranges from structurally having become ‘too big to fail’, effectively
lobbying for favourable legislation, to simple unspoken and direct threats of
offshoring production or capital flight. Under these circumstances, not only the
credibility but even the actual functioning of representative democracy erodes.
The theoretical foundation of free trade draws from the theory of the compara-
tive advantage as formulated by David Ricardo. However, one of the many
assumptions upon which the comparative advantage was formulated was capital
immobility, an assumption which was taken for granted by Adam Smith prior to
David Ricardo,50 in spite of his famous invisible hand thesis.51 The capitalist would
50 Capital immobility is certainly not the only assumption that does not hold today. Understand-
ably Ricardo could not think of environmental costs (pollution). On the other hand, he also did not
consider transport costs, the costs of specialisation, and more fundamentally, the loss of freedom of
not to trade. For a detailed review and analysis see Daly and Farley (2011: 355–363).
51 The often-quoted passage of the invisible hand of Adam Smith portraying the capitalist as a
simple egoist who through his actions indirectly increased total wealth sometimes overlooks the
very beginning of the quote: ‘By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he
intends only his own security [. . .] he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand
[. . .]’ (Smith 1991 [1776]: 351. Emphasis supplied).
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not invest abroad even in view of larger profit margins, since according to Smith
and Ricardo, the capitalist is primarily a member of the national community which
forms his very identity. She/he would consequently avoid living under customs
alien to her/him. This assumption clearly does not hold in today’s globalised world
of cosmopolitan money managers and global corporations. As Daly and Cobb
observed: ‘it is clear that Smith and Ricardo were considering a world in which
capitalists were fundamentally good Englishmen [and] Frenchmen’ (1994: 215).
2. The corrosiveness of self-interest on the moral context of the community which is
presupposed by the market.
During the LtG-debate, Fred Hirsch authored Social Limits to Growth (1977). He
believed that the growth discussion emphasising distant and uncertain physical
limits was inappropriate, as it was overlooking closer and more certain limits,
namely social limits. Social limits is a dual social phenomenon caused by economic
growth. They are (a) the increasing importance of positional goods and services,
and (b) the decreasing morality of individuals. As economic growth increases,
affluence also increases, and with increasing affluence, individuals tend to value
goods and services rather in relation to the valuations made by other individuals.
In this process individuals are trapped in a spiral of social competition (‘keeping-
up-with-the-Jones’) which conversely makes the social position attached to those
goods and services ‘scarce’. From this process a ‘paradox of affluence’ results
(Hirsch 1977: 175). When the growth process is sustained and generalised the
outcome is frustration instead of happiness. The other social limit is the weakening
of social values. Hirsch argued that the social foundations upon which the contrac-
tual economy works such as truth, trust, acceptance, restraint and obligation are
undermined by the individualistic and competitive ethos nurtured by economic
growth. Both arguments are taken up by Daly and put into the box of FMC’s cases.
It is the fallacy of homo economicus. Orthodox economists abstracting from
community forgot that there are also a homo ethicus, homo politicus, and more
broadly the ‘person-in-community’ (Daly and Cobb 1994: 159).
3. The existence of externalities that can be localised or pervasive.
The standard market argument runs as follows: in a perfectly competitive market
self-interest seeking individuals voluntarily exchanged goods and services. How-
ever, as some of the elements neglected in reality became evident to economists’
experience, their existence had to be somehow acknowledged. It was noticed that
many transactions between self-interest seeking individuals unintentionally
affected other parties which were not involved in the exchange. This acknowledge-
ment was integrated through the concept of externality. While Alfred Marshall was
the first to draw attention to externalities, it was his pupil Arthur Cecil Pigou who
developed a rigorous treatment of the issue in his The Economics of Welfare
published in 1920. As previously mentioned, the concept gained relevance in the
1960s when concerns with environmental degradation emerged, especially those
captured with the label ‘pollution’. Pollution was then integrated in economic
theory with the formerly introduced concept of externality. The concept externality
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primarily suggests that the phenomenon is external to the market, and therefore,
measures to internalise them are proposed, namely Pigovian taxes/subsidies and
Coasian property rights and markets. What is more important is that the phenome-
non is also external to the theoretical edifice that builds on the market as an
economic concept. Hence, the ad hoc introduction of the externality served to
circumvent the revision of the entire theory, just as the ad hoc introduction of
epicycles permitted Ptolemy to not reconsider his astronomy. However, and as Daly
reasoned, when externalities are exceeding the absorption capacity of the biosphere,
and threatening human life support-systems, it is time to rethink the whole theory
and re-start with different abstractions.
4. An amoral position on the issue of distribution.
Markets criterion in the distribution of, for example income, is allocative
efficiency rather than justice. People have no rights excepting the ones which
they can buy according to what they can sell in the labour market. It can be
seen as a sort of morality which was seen as inevitable by Malthus and Ricardo
(‘iron law of wages’), when they, among many other intellectuals at that time, were
intellectually overwhelmed in trying to explain why Britain was becoming so
wealthy while at the same time generating so many poor people. This sort of
morality is however, hardly tenable within the humanistic tradition inherited to
and preached by Adam Smith. For that reason, and as in the case of antitrust laws,
societies have crafted institutions such as minimum wages and income tax progres-
sivity as a societal mechanism of self-protection (Polanyi 2001). However, as in the
case of antitrust laws, such social institutions have been gradually eroding in the
second wave of globalisation.
5. The lack of defining the optimal scale of the economy relative to the natural
system.
Markets do not have an ‘organ’ which tells us when to stop the demands made
from the biosphere. This is the organ that Daly introduced. It is the notion of a
macro-economic optimal scale of the economy, relative to the natural environment.
The optimal scale is at the heart of the steady-state economy, and is what ultimately
gives a sense to any concept of environmental and economic sustainability.
3.3.2.2 Technological Progress
Daly is not a neo-luddite, but equally not a believer in promethean gifts. He claims
that the standard practice of attributing to technology all sorts of mystical faculties
has its origins in ‘growthmania’. The issue of technology is itself broad, so that only
the relationship between scarcity, substitution and technology will be addressed.
Scarcity is the raison d’etre of economic thought. In production, scarcity of a
given input factor is relative to the scarcity of other input factors, such as the fact
that oil has largely substituted coal, aluminium has largely substituted iron and
copper, and perhaps uranium will be substituted on a larger scale in the future by
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thorium. Nevertheless, in Daly’s conceptualisation, this line of thinking is only the
half-truth, and is what makes it a FMC. Resources were and are indeed substituted;
however, substitution occurs within the strictly limited total of low-entropy stock.
In the context of SD, orthodox economists advanced the idea of maintaining
aggregate capital constant, that is, natural, man-made, human and social capital
(Pearce 2002: 63–66). It implies that these forms of capital are substitutable,
specifically, that natural resources can be substituted by reproducible man-made
capital. The strongest position on this issue was once formulated by Nobel-prize
winner growth-economist Robert Solow (1974: 11):
If it is very easy to substitute other factors for natural resources, then there is in principle no
‘problem’. The world can, in effect, get along without natural resources, so exhaustion is
just an event, not a catastrophe.
In the hands of Daly, man-made and natural capital are complements and only
marginal substitutes (Daly 1996: 76). The reason is plainly obvious: there are no
other ‘factors’ apart from natural resources. Producing more of the allegedly
substitute (man-made capital) requires more of what it is substituted for (natural
capital). On the other hand, and as already noted, the overemphasis sometimes
placed on the input-side fails to recognise that abiotic resources (fossil fuels and in
general minerals) do not disappear when they are used up, they return to the
biosphere as waste/pollution causing acid rain, global warming, oil spills, discarded
plastics and e-waste. By now it seems that ‘the sink will be full before the source is
empty’ (Daly and Farley 2011: 81) – as Georgescu-Roegen explained in 1971, and
one of the LtG scenarios suggested in 1972.
Daly saw technological progress as necessary pertaining to what we can get out
of the entropic direction of the flows arising from stocks, that is, energy/matter
efficiency, but not within the paradigm of economic growth. Within the economic
growth paradigm, technological progress will necessarily aggravate ecological and
social vicissitudes.
3.3.3 From Social and Physical Limits to Growth Toward
a Steady-State Economy
Daly departed from the pre-analytic vision that the economy is a sub-system of the
larger environmental system. This pre-analytic vision implies, first, that there are
physical limits to the smaller system with respect to the larger system. Since the
latter does not grow, then the former cannot possibly grow beyond the physical
limits imposed by the larger system. Second, since such physical limits exist, albeit
not always straightforwardly knowable, it is also possible to derive a desirable
(economic) limit of the smaller sub-system.52 Therefore the question is: what is the
52 It is also called sometimes the ‘threshold hypothesis’ enunciated by Chilean economist Manfred
Max-Neef independently from Daly. The hypothesis states that ‘for every society there seems to be
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optimal scale of the economy? Concerning physical limits, and as previously
mentioned in Sect. 3.1, natural scientists have been working for a long time on
indexes which measure both the relative and absolute impact of the economic
activities on the biosphere, such as LtG, the percentage of human appropriation
of the total world products of photosynthesis, the footprint aggregate metric, IPCC
estimations, and more recently, the planetary boundaries (Rockstr€om et al. 2009).
The rationale concerning the optimal scale of the economy is illustrated in Fig. 3.4.
It shows the curve total benefits (TB) and total costs (TC) in relation to the total
stock. Benefits decrease by each consumed unit (marginal benefits-MB), while the
costs of producing a further unit of the stock increases (marginal costs-MC).
Marginal benefits and marginal costs are represented by the corresponding slopes.
Maximum net benefits are reached when marginal costs are equal to marginal
benefits. That is at point A. At point B marginal benefits are zero, and thus there
is no reason for growing beyond B even if costs are zero. C is a turning point, at
which total benefits of past growth are balanced by total costs of past growth. Yet, it
is economically wise to be governed by current marginal costs and benefits instead
a period in which economic growth (as conventionally measured) brings about an improvement in
the quality of life, but only up to a point – the threshold point – beyond which, if there is more
economic growth, quality of life may begin to deteriorate’ (Max-Neef 1995: 117).
Fig. 3.4 Economic and uneconomic growth (Daly 1991. Modified by the author)
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of past costs and benefits. At point D, the marginal costs of growth tend to be
infinite, so even in the case that marginal benefits are still great, economic growth
will cease. On the whole, a sensible policy recommendation would be to stop
economic growth at point A. Beyond point A, economic growth ceases to be
‘economic’ and starts to be ‘uneconomic’, that is, it starts making a country poorer,
not richer.
Note that this argumentative line is far from radical or even novel; the principle
that economic agents should expand the scale of a given activity up to the point
where marginal costs equal marginal benefits is the principle around which micro-
economic theory gravitates. In macro-economics the principle of optimality is
dropped, which is what Daly called the ‘glittering anomaly’ (1996: 60). Given the
physical and economic limits to growth, Daly proposed a simple overall policy
objective: the steady-state economy (SSE). The SSE is the intellectual response for
a world which is no longer empty but full,53 which strongly resembles the cowboy/
spaceship analogy of Boulding.
The SSE has three important components: (1) the stock of capital composed of
people and artefacts (consumer and producer goods), (2) the flow of energy/matter
throughput and (3) the service. The economy, just as animals, lives from its
metabolic flow, beginning with extractions from the biosphere, and ending with
the return of waste/pollution back to the biosphere. Input and output are conflated
into the term ‘throughput’ coined by Boulding, and as already explained, through-
put is entropic (linear, irrevocable and irreversible). The stock of capital needs
throughput because capital is also entropic. The stock of capital is composed by
dissipative structures, that is, structures which decay, rot, die and fall apart.
Although waste materials can be recycled by biochemical processes powered by
solar energy, such recycling is external to the animal or economy whose life
depends on the services provided by the natural environment. Even though
the SSE is primarily a physical concept, Daly acknowledged that the purpose of
the economy is the satisfaction of human needs/wants (Daly 1991: 16), or as
Georgescu-Roegen called it the ‘immaterial flux, the enjoyment of life’ (1971:
18). This is conceptualised as the service. The SSE is defined as: ‘an economy with
constant stocks of people and artifacts, maintained at some desired, sufficient levels
by low rates of maintenance ‘throughput’ (Daly 1991: 17). Hence, the service is the
final benefit of the economic activity, while the entropic throughput is the final cost.
The quality and quantity of services are strictly provided by the stocks and not by
the flows. The relationships of the three components are depicted in the following








53 On several occasions Daly has conceptualised Ecological Economics as economics for a ‘full
world’.
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The ratio (3) represents the maintenance efficiency of the throughput and the
ratio (2) the service efficiency of the stock. Stocks cancels out as in real life they
exhaust, hence the ultimate benefit is the service efficiency of the sacrificed
ecosystem caused by throughput (1). Each component requires a mode of
behaviour: regarding stocks, a level must be chosen which is sufficient for a good
life and is sustainable in the long run. Throughput is to be minimised, while service
must be maximised. Both throughput and service are subject to the maintenance of
the chosen levels of stock. If the SSE’s goal is to maintain constant the stock of
people and artefacts, what is the part which should not be held constant? Daly’s
answer was straightforward: culture, morals, knowledge (technology), distribution,
mix of capital, and so on, that is, qualitative change. Here, Daly differentiated
between economic growth and economic development. Economic growth is quan-
titative change, whereas development is qualitative change. A SSE ‘develops but
does not grow’ (Daly 1991: 17), just as the planet does. Daly in line with Mill
maintained that humankind, especially rich countries, should be more concerned
with being better (development) than with being bigger (economic growth).
3.3.4 ISEW/GPI Instead of GDP
The conception of the SSE necessarily led to a proposal which would replace the
most important national account used to measure economic growth: GDP. The new
metric would attempt to measure human welfare, and not simply unqualified market
activity. Daly and Cobb developed the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare
(ISEW) in 1989 which was improved 5 years later (Daly and Cobb 1994: 62–83,
443–507). It originated in an extensive range of similar studies during the 1990s up
to the present. The ISEW was first tested for the US in the period 1950–1900. It was
shown that from 1975 until 1985, the ISEW started to decline even when GNP54
was rising. From 1985 until 1990 the ISEW raised slightly but much slower than
GNP (Daly and Cobb 1994: 464). Instead of showing numbers and figures, I will
instead discuss the conceptual differences between GDP and ISEW.
GDP is the total monetary value of the goods and services produced annually
with the factors of production located in a particular region, usually the country.
GDP is held to measure only market activity and not human welfare – although it is
widely believed and acted upon the premise that it does.55 This is the idea which
was disputed by Daly and Cobb on the following grounds: (1) GDP considers
54 At that time, Daly and Cobb (1994) were using Gross National Product (GNP). GNP measures
the same as GDP, with the difference that what counts is not the location of the factors of
production but their ownership (the residents of the country). GNP became outdated in the
beginning of the 1990s.
55 On the issue the United Nations System of National Accounts (UNSNA) states the following:
‘GDP is often taken as a measure of welfare, but the SNAmakes no claim that this is so and indeed
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defensive expenditures and other social costs as contributions to welfare and (2)
GDP is a poor measure of income and wealth. Therefore, Daly and Cobb deduct
defensive expenditures and other social costs from the ISEW (Table 3.1, items I-P).
Regarding (2) the prime aim of Daly and Cobb was to produce a metric that tells
us something about human welfare. Since in constructing the components of human
welfare many controversial issues arise, the concept of income is preferred as it has
a stronger theoretical foundation. Additionally, as it is supposed that income
positively relates to human welfare, the ISWE departs from it. Two complementary
conceptualisations of income are used for the ISEW, the first one is from the British
economist John Hicks who explained the purposes of income and offered a work-
able definition. The second one is from the US economist Irving Fisher who
mentioned another dimension of the income concept. For Hicks the ‘purpose of
income calculations in practical affairs is to give people an indication of the amount
which they can consume without impoverishing themselves’ and the practical
there are several conventions in the SNA that argue against the welfare interpretation of the
accounts’ (UNSNA 2009: 70).
Table 3.1 Original items used to estimate the index of sustainable economic welfare in the US
(Daly and Cobb 1994)
Items used to calculate the ISWE for the US (1950–1990) Contribution to the ISEW
Personal consumption expenditures – A
Distributional inequality – B
Weighted personal consumption (A/B) – C
Services: Household labour – D +
Services: consumer durables – E +
Services: highways and streets – F +
Improvement health and education public expenditures – G +
Expenditures on consumer durables – H 
Defensive private expenditures/health and education – I 
Cost of commuting – J 
Cost of personal pollution control – K 
Cost of auto accidents – L 
Costs of water pollution – M 
Costs of air pollution – O 
Costs of noise pollution – P 
Loss of farmland – Q 
Depletion of non-renewable resources – R 
Long term environmental damage – S 
Cost of ozone depletion – T 
Net capital growth – U +
Change in net international position – V +
Index of sustainable economic welfare – ISEW (Sum)
Per capita ISEW
Gross National Product – GNP
Per capita GNP
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purpose is ‘to serve as a guide for prudent conduct’. Income is then defined as ‘the
maximum value which he can consume during a week, and still expect to be as well
off at the end of the week as he was at the beginning’ (Hicks 1948, quoted by Daly
and Cobb 1994: 70). The same practical purposes of income, prudence and eco-
nomic sustainability should be applied for GDP. Yet, GDP does not measure it, as it
excludes capital depreciation while capital depreciation impoverishes a country.
Hence, GDP does not offer a prudent guide as to avoid impoverishment. In this
sense, Net Domestic Product (NDP) would be superior to GDP (NDP ¼ GDP –
capital depreciation).56 On the other hand, NDP is also not sufficient, for it includes
only man-made capital, and ignores natural capital.
The reason is that orthodox economists, as previously shown, have taught that
human made capital is a near-perfect substitute for natural resources, when in fact
they are complementary. Therefore, resource depletion and environmental losses
are included in the ISEW (Table 3.1, items Q-T).
The notions of capital and income of Irving Fisher are of greatest importance for
the SSE, and consequently for the ISEW. For Fisher, capital or wealth is the stock of
physical objects owned by human beings in a period of time, and income is the flow
of service in its psychic magnitudes yielded by the capital owned (Daly 1991: 32).
For example, an LCD television purchased this year is not part of this year’s
income, but an addition to man-made capital from which psychic income flows.
It implies that a proper accounting of income will only reflect the flow of services of
man-made capital enjoyed in the subjective stream of people’s consciousness. As
previously explained, the SSE requires that man-made capital accumulation is
minimised, hence expenditures on consumer durables are accounted as costs,
while their services are accounted as benefits (Table 3.1, items E,F,H).
Finally, since GDP does not include the value of household labour, performed
mainly by women and the welfare effects of income inequality, they are also
included in the ISEW (Table 3.1, items B,C,D). The value of some public
expenditures are also imputed (Table 3.1, item G). Net capital growth (increases
in fixed reproducible capital minus the capital requirement, see item U) means that
for economic welfare to be sustained over time, the supply of capital must grow to
meet the demands of a growing population. However, it is expected, in line with the
SSE, that at some point the population will stabilise.57 Change in net international
position (Table 3.1, item V) is national investment overseas minus foreign invest-
ment in the nation. If the change is positive, the nation has increased its capital
assets. The final ISWE value is then divided by the population yielding ISEW per
capita, and the same operation is conducted with GNP. Finally, both are compared.
56 It must be mentioned the UNSNA recognises the inferiority of GDP to NDP. The problem is that
not all countries make such calculations, and when they do it, it does not meet the requirements of
the UNSNA. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that NPD should be calculated (UNSNA 2009: 34).
Whether the same considerations were made when Daly and Cobb were working on the issue is
beyond my knowledge.
57 The assumption of a growing population is made in the context of the US.
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The ISEW, with some variations in content, and later called the Genuine
Progress Indicator (GPI) has been calculated for the majority of Western European
countries, Canada, Australia, Chile (for a review of the studies see Lawn, 2003) and
more recently in countries of the Asia Pacific region such as New Zealand, Japan,
India, China, Thailand and Vietnam (Clarke and Sardar 2005, Zongguo et al. 2007;
Lawn and Clarke 2010). The frequent result of these studies has been that increas-
ing GDP stops being economic at a certain point. The index remains either constant
in spite of an increasing GDP, or begins to decline. When the index starts to decline,
it simply shows that additional growth is uneconomic. When GDP is growing,
while the ISEW or the GPI remains constant, it is not only economically irrational
but ecologically irresponsible to continue GDP-growth.
3.3.5 Institutional Change for the Steady-State Economy
An economic crisis is today understood as any threat to economic growth. If an
economy fails the perpetual growth promise, it will produce social instability. It is
fairly clear and well-documented: no increase in GDP means no jobs, no revenues,
the collapse of the pension system, hence the rise of radical ideologies and social
conflict. Since the SSE would presumably maintain GDP constant, is the SSE then a
threat to the social fabric? The answer offered by Daly is the following:
The fact that an airplane falls to the ground if it tries to remain stationary in the air simply
reflects the fact that airplanes are designed for forward motion. It certainly does not imply
that a helicopter cannot remain stationary. A growth economy and a SSE are as different as
an airplane and a helicopter. (Daly 1991: 126)
In this section, ten broad policy recommendations for institutional change
required to achieve and eventually manage a SSE are discussed.58 They are
shown in Box 3.1.
Policy recommendations one and two are intended to restore the autonomy of
the ‘community of communities’ (nation-states). Re-regulating international com-
merce means that we should move away from the ideology of global economic
integration: free trade, free capital mobility (financial globalisation) and export-led
growth, in short, the core constituents of what is called globalisation. Daly is not
against international trade, international treaties, international alliances, and so on.
However, as the word suggests international relations are between nations, and they
should remain the basic unit. Global economic integration implies national eco-
nomic dis-integration, the progressive erasure of national boundaries, in order to be
reintegrated into the new whole: the globalised economy.
58 Some of the policy recommendations discussed here can be fairly understood through Daly’s
theoretical tenets explained in the previous sections. There are other policy recommendations
which would require extensive explanation. As extensive explanations are impossible in the
limited scope of this chapter, the reader may consider consulting Daly and Farley (2011).
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Apart from the theoretical flaws upon which this policy is based, globalisation
makes nation-states too dependent even for their basic survival, especially poor
countries. It also pre-programmes international tensions and conflict. Poor countries
should re-direct their efforts to build their agricultural capabilities for their domes-
tic food demands rather than growing cash crops for unstable and highly speculative
international markets. By and large, the development of domestic production for
internal markets deserves priority. According to this policy of development, poor
countries should use, for example, protective tariffs against subsidised agricultural
products from rich countries.59 Conversely, rich countries should also adopt pro-
tective tariffs in order to remain able to enforce rational national policies in the
environmental and labour realm, that is, from standard-lowering-competition of
poor countries with laxer environmental laws and lower wages. In organisational
terms it means the downgrading of the IMF, WB and the newer WTO, perhaps
reconsidering the original idea of Keynes at Bretton Woods. Keynes’ original plan
in Bretton Woods was to create an International Clearing Union, which would
charge penalty rates on trade surpluses as well as on deficits in order to avoid
imbalances of trade among their members.60
Box 3.1: Institutions and the Steady-State Economy
1. Re-regulate international commerce.
2. Downgrade the IMF, WB, and the WTO.
3. Move to 100% reserve requirements.
4. Free up the length of the working day, week, and year.
5. Limit the range of inequality regarding income distribution.
6. Reform national accounts.
7. Enclose the remaining commons of rival natural capital in public trusts.
8. Use cap-auction-trade systems for basic resources.
9. Use ecological tax reform.
10. Stabilise population.
59 The position of Daly also supported by a new generation of so-called ‘post-autistic’ develop-
ment economists such as Ha-Joon Chang. He showed that today’s developed countries, beginning
with Britain, promoted their industrial basis and became rich through all sorts of protectionist
measures, for example tariffs and subsidies, and later on ‘kicked-away the ladder’ for development
in poor countries. Chang attempted to show the little empirical basis of the claim that development
was achieved through free trade embodied in IMF andWB policies. Interestingly enough, the same
argument, based on historical evidence was also formulated by Karl Polanyi (2001) in his critique
of the classical liberal economists. He speculated on the dire consequences for Britain, had she
ever followed the doctrines of Ricardo. I will come to Polanyi later. Chang’s policy recommenda-
tion for development is roughly to repeat this pattern followed by rich countries in the past and
maintained in many respects in the present (see Chang 2003, 2008).
60 Keynes blamed impoverishment, wars and revolutions for trade’s imbalances. The International
Clearing Union would be a similar institutional arrangement which governs payments within
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Policy recommendation 3 is primarily concerned with putting an end to the
fractional reserve banking system (money creation) and implementing 100%
requirements. The reasons are the following: first, and most evident, because
money creation is one of the many institutional arrangements which fuels economic
expansion and increases cyclical instability.61 Money and debt can expand expo-
nentially (‘the magic of compound interest’) while man-made capital cannot do so.
According to Daly there also exists a conceptual confusion between capital and
money: ‘money fetishism’. The abstract symbol (money) came to dominate the
concrete reality being symbolised (man-made capital). Daly treats it as a FMC
(Daly 1996: 38). Second, we came to accept the idea of money creation as normal,
yet ‘the leading economists of the early twentieth century, Irving Fisher and Frank
Knight, thought it was an abomination’ (Daly and Farley 2011: 290). If money
fetishism cannot be avoided, Daly prefers to conceptualise money as a public good
(a non-rival ‘resource’). It follows that seigniorage would be public revenue,
instead of the money supply being privately loaned into existence at interest.
Third, allowing private banks to become too big to fail has always been ill-advised
on the same grounds of allowing industrial monopolies to emerge. Banks and other
private organisations which are too big to fail are simply too big to exist.
Policy recommendation 4 is of overriding importance with reference to the
intentions behind the growth policy, namely, to combat unemployment. The
consumption-driven growth policy was the cure which Keynes proposed to tackle
the disastrous consequences of mass unemployment after the great depression.
Hence, the current disproportionate reliance on economic growth certainly has
historical reasons which explain the ‘glittering anomaly’ noted previously. Never-
theless, other feasible economic policies also exist to combat unemployment in a
SSE, the most obvious one is the shortening/sharing of working hours.
Implementing this policy should be understood in rich countries more as a great
benefit than a cost. It would allow for more options arising for leisure, such as
hobbies, family, friendship, and community – in short, time for all those other
activities which make a human life worth living. I will return to this issue in
Sect. 3.5. It is worthwhile to underline, that this policy is probably the most
amenable of gradual implementation and testing. It is a reminder for those social
thinkers and politicians who are genuinely concerned with the possibility that
nations and would manage an international monetary unit (bancor). Clearance of balances between
countries would be carried out by central banks through the accounts at the ICU. See for a recent
discussion on the issue Piffaretti (2009).
61 For a rigorous treatment of the issue see Biswanger (2009). Biswanger proposes also an
interesting set of policy reforms to cut off the dependency of modern societies to grow. His
monetary explanation of growth led him to propose a change in the stock and bond markets along
with further changes in the institutional setting of joint-stock companies (corporations).
Corporations are in his view the main drivers of economic growth nowadays. The support for
corporations that for economic, political and ecological reasons should be directly challenged
ought to be transferred to other legal forms of entrepreneurship less subjected to growth that are
typical in small- and medium-sized firms. He also proposes to encourage the formation of
cooperatives and foundations.
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people would dedicate their increased leisure time to socially damaging activities.
This policy also offers a possible solution in rich countries facing the problem of
aging populations instead of the highly doubtful ‘productive ageing’.62
Policy recommendation 5 is believed to have direct consequences for the general
welfare of the community and is complementary to the former one. A minimum
wage has popular support and already exists in many countries. What is missing in
Daly’s view is a debate and eventually an agreement upon a maximum wage. Recall
that growth is celebrated as the main means with which to eliminate poverty, and
yet, rich countries categorised as such many decades ago, are experiencing increas-
ing levels of poverty. Growth is by no means an economic policy which replaces
policies fostering equality, such as tax progression. True, complete equality would
be unfair, but unlimited inequality is also unfair even if a country could even
approximate the normative purpose of ‘equality of opportunity’. Furthermore, in
the middle run gross inequality is politically damaging for any society. We might
lack a clear-cut scientific standard which tells us how much inequality is ‘gross’, yet
the same clear-cut scientific standard is missing regarding of how much equality of
opportunity really exists in a given society.
Reforming national accounts is the sixth policy recommendation. The main
message of this policy is to separate GDP into a cost and a benefit account, and
to then compare both accounts at the margins. It is what Daly and Cobb did with the
ISEW, which also operationalised the central tenet that capital drawdown should
not be counted as income. The remaining global commons of rival natural capital,
such as the Amazon basin, should be priced and enclosed in public trusts. This is
policy recommendation 7. At the same time, the non-rival commonwealth such as
knowledge and information should be freed from patent monopolies. The guiding
principle of this policy is to stop the treatment of the scarce as if it was non-scarce,
and the non-scarce as if it was scarce. Intellectual progress is customarily a
collective process. In academia and arts people have freely shared and built upon
the ideas of other’s for centuries. Great thinkers and artists have been driven by the
habitual ‘making a living’, but also by curiosity, intellectual satisfaction and glory
rather than by the profit-motive.63 Copyrights and Patents which were initially
awarded for 14 years have been extended under corporate lobbies up to 95 years
62 This specific argument is advanced by H€opflinger (2010).
63 In 2001, 41 pharmaceutical companies took the South African government to court for
importing cheaper ‘copy’ drugs from countries like India and Thailand to deal with its severe
HIV/AIDS problem that could not be properly tackled given the high costs of these drugs. After
international social uproar that showed the companies in a bad light, they withdrew the lawsuit.
The companies argued that, without enforceable patents, there would be no more incentive for
innovation. The argument that seems compelling is in reality only the half-truth. Many researchers
all over the world come up with new ideas all the time, many government research institutes and
universities even explicitly refuse to take out patents on their inventions. At the height of the HIV/
AIDS debate, 13 fellows of the highest scientific society of Britain, the Royal Society, stated the
following: ‘Patents are only one means for promoting discovery and invention. Scientific curiosity,
coupled with the desire to benefit humanity, has been of far greater importance throughout history’
(The Financial Times 2001 quoted by Chang 2008: 124).
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and in so doing hampering further intellectual progress. On the other hand, since
technologies change so fast, the over-extension of patents keep technologies out of
the public domain until they are obsolete:
The irony is that patent rights are protected in the name of the free market, yet patents
simply create a type of monopoly – the antithesis of the free market. (Daly and Farley 2011:
177)
Policy recommendations 8 and 9 are closely related, however, Daly strongly
prefers cap-auction-trade systems over ecological taxes. He gives two reasons: first
it gives the correct order for institutional design: (1) environmental sustainability,
(2) social justice and, (3) market efficiency. This order is superior to making
environmental sustainability and social justice dependent on market efficiency,
which is too often considered to be an end itself. The cap (or quota) effectively
limits the scale of economic activity according to the resource limitations or natural
sinks constraints, the auction captures scarcity rents for equitable redistribution, and
trade allows for efficient allocation. This greatly resembles the concept of
‘embeddedness’ coined by Karl Polanyi in 1944 which he expected to be operative
in industrial societies. I will address Polanyi’s ideas in Sect. 3.4.1. In addition, it is
worth noting that cap-auction-trade systems cut off the Jevons’ paradox by starting
with a quantitative limit which would raise relative resource prices but not
quantities. Second, caps or quotas are effective in other contexts, that is, protecting
ecosystems or in general renewable resources from liquidation, especially as long
as the global financial system remains unstable and speculative. For instance, if a
country depending on wood exports becomes the victim of an economic crisis, it
might have to devaluate its currency, and consequently it may be forced to
overexploit the forest beyond its sustained-yield.
Whenever the cap-auction-system is not necessary or difficult to enforce then an
ecological tax reform could perform better. The principle underlying this proposal
is to shift the tax base away from the value-added (labour and capital) on to which
the value is added (entropic throughput). This procedure will internalise negative
externalities and will raise revenue. Population control is a central measure for poor
countries when the problem still exists. For the US, which is the exception of a rich
country whose population is still growing and which is the focus of Daly, the policy
is to achieve a balanced population so that births and immigrants are equal to deaths
and out-migrants. Daly, following Mill’s doctrines, has asserted long ago that the
reason for the pro-population attitude of commercial elites is due to the effect on
wages (Daly 1970). When a given population does not grow, commercial elites will
tend to favour laxer migration policy or the moving of production to where labour is
abundant and therefore cheaper. In present circumstances, it moves well-paid jobs
and high environmental standards from the North to bad-paid jobs and lower
environmental standards in the South. It is a transaction which makes the air cleaner
in the North, dirtier in the South, but which effectively warms the atmosphere for
both.
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This short list of policy recommendations for institutional change leaves aside
physical and political complexities which Daly is aware of.64 It is also worth noting
that some of these policy recommendations have been gradually implemented over
the last few years, at different levels and in different regions, namely cap-auction-
trade systems for GHG such as the EU Emission Trading Scheme and ecological tax
reforms in Europe, both certainly not without dispute.65 Other policy proposals
have been made in the past, and partially implemented. Freeing up the length of
working time inWestern Europe was articulated by French Philosopher André Gorz
in the 1970s and was a central condition for attaining the German ‘qualitative
growth’ demanded by labour unions during the 1980s until they became weakened
during the triumphing march of global laissez-faire policies (Loske 2011: 25,
27–28). Equally, the proposal of putting a part of the Amazon in an international
public trust was launched by the Ecuadorian president in 2007: The Yasunı́ ITT
initiative. Yasunı́ is a biosphere reserve with oil reserves in the ground. Enclosing
the national park would tackle three policy goals at the same time: (1) the reduction
of 407 million tons of carbon dioxide (Gobierno Nacional de la República de
Ecuador 2009), (2) the protection of biodiversity and the Amazonian forest, and
(3) the protection of indigenous communities’ rights to live at Yasunı́ in ‘voluntary
isolation’. The initiative which was gradually gaining international support seems
now to be in a deadlock after the German federal minister for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development withdrew his initial commitment to co-finance the trust fund
in September 2010.
There have also been similar policy proposals which are fairly old and highly
controversial not only due to the theoretical background which supports them, but
because of the scale of vested interests involved. For instance, the move to a 100%
reserve requirement is one of the main proposals made by the ex-congressman Ron
Paul in the US, who was running for president in 2008 and who is also in the
presidential race of 2012. He wants to bring the gold standard back which would put
an end to what he sees as an inflationary monetary policy of the Federal Reserve.
Limiting the range of inequality distribution and reversing or at least slowing down
64Daly and Farley (2011: 414–417) advance six policy design principles: (1) Each independent
policy goal requires and independent policy instrument, (2) Policies should strive to attain the
necessary degree of macro-control with the minimum sacrifice of micro-level freedom and
variability, (3) Policies should leave a margin of error when dealing with the biophysical
environment, (4) Policies must recognise that we always start from historically given initial
conditions, (5) Policies must be able to adapt to changed conditions, and (6) The domain of the
policy-making unit must be congruent with the domain of the causes and effects of the problem
with which the policy deals.
65 The institutional design and potential effectiveness cap-and-trade designs depend on several
factors such as the geographical scale of the pollutant, whether the polluter/polluted can be clearly
identified, the physic-chemical characteristics of the pollutant, and whether sanctions are truly
enforceable. On the shortcomings of the implementation of the EU Emission Trading Scheme see
Gilbertson and Reyes (2009) and Clifton (2009). These analysts are claiming to better use eco-
taxation. One of the cap-and-trade creators, economist Thomas Crocker argued in the US against
it, given the little possibilities of enforceability (Hilsenrath 2009).
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the pace of globalisation is a popular demand which took shape almost immediately
when globalisation was pursued in the early 1990s by the IMF and the WB (Stiglitz
2002). The reform of national accounts, especially GDP has been a frequently
discussed topic for almost 40 years, if one set the seminal paper Is growth obsolete?
by Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) as the starting point of the debate and the final one,
the report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and
Social Progress in France published in 2009 (Stiglitz et al. 2009). All in all, there
have been similar policy proposals which have been partially implemented and
which have been the subject of on-going political disputes. Nevertheless, with
regards to all of these policy proposals the overall policy objective has stayed
undisputed: economic growth. The general intellectual contribution of Daly is
having coherently subsumed these policy proposals from the standpoint of Ecolog-
ical Economics into an overall policy objective, the SSE.
3.4 The De-growth of Serge Latouche
3.4.1 Intellectual Foundations: Illich, Bookchin and Polanyi
Serge Latouche is the most visible French anthropological economist behind the
contemporary promotion of de-growth in Western Europe.66 Economically and
politically speaking, his theories reach back to the French utopian socialists and
the following socialist libertarian views – an ecumenical body of anti-authoritarian
ideas – inspired in the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau and Pierre Joseph
Proudhon in its individualist version, and later in Michail Bakunin and Pjotr
Kropotkin in its collectivist version. The latter social thinkers differ from popular
Marxists by favouring and theorising on economic decentralisation and cooperation
rather than the planned economy and a centralised state. Latouche takes the
libertarian socialist ideas from Murray Bookchin’s libertarian municipalism and
Social Ecology, both conflated into ecomunicipalism.
66 As in the case with Daly, the reduction of Latouche’s intellectual foundations to, in this case,
three social thinkers, is somehow arbitrary. Others social thinkers will be briefly mentioned in the
following text. Additionally, two of the external reviewers have raised doubts as to whether
Murray Bookchin is a key reference of Latouche and that in an earlier draft I neglected to mention
Karl Polanyi. From my readings of Latouche’s texts I concluded that Bookchin is, if not a key
reference, at least one of increasing importance (see Latouche 2009: 44–47, 54, 77, 90). Other
social thinkers who have influenced Latouche’s thoughts, perhaps even more than Bookchin, are
André Gorz and Cornelius Castoriadis. Concerning Polanyi, I did not find any important reference
made in the texts consulted. A reason is perhaps that Polanyi is simply ‘too known’ to be explicitly
mentioned, or that I may have missed Latouche’s former texts when the influence was more
evident. Following these recommendations, I corrected this mistake and succinctly describe
Polanyi’s main insights.
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Libertarian municipalism challenges parliamentary democracy as a means for
public representation and policy formulation. In its place, the citizens of the
municipality (the town or the village) through direct democracy should formulate
policy; therefore, decision-making is not a hierarchical activity left to professional
politicians, bankers, or in general, technocrats, but to the municipal assemblies. It
does not mean that expert’s knowledge is discarded; it simply means they do not
take decisions which have overarching impacts on the community. Furthermore,
Bookchin claims that ethics based on the values sharing, cooperation, and solidarity
can only be pursued through direct democracy and politics as was practiced in
classical Athens:
Direct democracy, the formulation of policies by directly democratic popular assemblies,
and the administration of those policies by mandated coordinators who can easily be
recalled if they fail to abide by the decision of the assembly’s citizens. (Bookchin 2007:
48–49)
On a more aggregate level he sees a confederation of eco-communities instead of
the state. For Bookchin the ecological crisis has its roots in the hierarchical mode in
which society currently functions, and he extends this insight for the relationship to
human-nature. In his view, the ecological crisis can neither be understood let alone
solved without this understanding.
Another important part of Latouche’s thought is the European cultural critique of
modernity. Four years before Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful was published,
French philosopher Bernard Charbonneau published his Le Jardin de Babylone
(1969) in which he deplored the ‘gigantism’ and the power of the ‘technique’ in the
industrial world (Martı́nez-Alier et al. 2010: 1742). His reflections on the technique
were further developed by French philosopher Jacques Ellul who pointed out its
alienation effects, whereby humans became the instruments of their own
instruments. According to both philosophers, escaping the dark-side of modernity
requires cultural change, in which the values of productivity and individualism are
replaced for quality of life, solidarity, frugality and voluntary simplicity (Martı́nez-
Alier et al. 2010: 1742–1743). Another highly influential author of the cultural
critique to modernity is the Austrian philosopher Ivan Illich. In the assessments of
Latouche on the notion of development, he would prefer to see ‘convivial societies’
in rich and poor countries, rather than rich ‘developing’ the poor (Latouche 2001,
2003a). The notion of convivial societies is taken from Illich. Illich argued along
the lines of Ellul, that machines were created under the hypothesis that they would
replace slaves. As this hypothesis proved wrong it must be discarded: ‘neither a
dictatorial proletariat nor a leisure mass can escape the dominion of constantly
expanding industrial tools’ (Illich 1973: 10). One of the effects of the hegemony of
the machines was the degrading of humans as mere consumers. From this perspec-
tive, it follows that this expansion must be limited and the positions of dominance
must be inverted if the values of survival, justice and self-defined work are
worthwhile to be fostered and protected. Conviviality is the opposite of industrial
productivity, and it means:
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Autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with
their environment; and this is in contrast with the conditioned response of persons to the
demands made upon them by others, and by a man-made environment. I consider convivi-
ality to be individual freedom realized in personal interdependence and, as such, an
intrinsic ethical value. (Illich 1973: 11)
Illich believed that reversing the direction of dominance between machines and
humans would set in motion an evolution of new life styles and political systems.
Illich then moved on to outline his programme for a convivial reconstruction.
Although Latouche drew on both intellectual traditions of apparently similar
lineage, there exist irreconcilable tensions. Bookchin is a believer of reason and
Hegelian dialectics, therefore he disdains the anti-rational bias of post-modernism,
its anti-technological attitudes, and anti-civilisational tendencies of the central
European cultural critique which emerged in the 1960s. For instance, commenting
on the best known book of Ellul The Technological Society published in 1964 he
stated:
Ellul advanced the dour thesis that the world and our ways of thinking about it are patterned
on tools and machines (la technique). Lacking any social explanation of how this ‘techno-
logical society’ came about, Ellul’s book concluded by offering no hope, still less any
approach for deeming humanity from its total absorption by la technique. (Bookchin 1995:
30. Italics in original text)
Although Illich later corrected this fatalism; he ended up with innocuous
recommendations for lifestyle changes which were rather conducive to inwardness,
narcissism and individual mysticism, therefore nipping in the bud any social
cooperation needed to produce any real social change. Bookchin disliked the
wide-spread anti-technological attitude of the time for two additional reasons:
first it veils the cause of social dislocation and ecological destruction, which are
in his view the hierarchical social relations of capitalism; and second, those thinkers
forget that the same technology which extraordinarily raised productivity could be
harnessed in a more ‘rational’ society as to meet unsatisfied needs and to free
humans of mindless toil for more creative and rewarding activities (Bookchin 1995:
29–30). Bookchin also explained that the minor changes which the cultural critique
of the late 1960s and 1970s produced were easily absorbed and channelled in the
economic and political market, whilst the structures they attempted to change
remained intact.
The economic and environmental vision of Latouche was further enlarged by his
experience as an anthropological economist in Africa being under the intellectual
influence of Polanyi’s Great Transformation written in 1944. Polanyi’s book
offered a vivid description of Britain’s social dislocation during her early paths
towards industrialisation, and examined the idea of the self-regulating market
envisaged by political economists, developed to its fullest by David Ricardo.
Ricardo conceptualised humans (‘labour’) and the environment (‘land’) as
commodities to be exchanged in an ideal self-regulated market. Polanyi insisted,
had Britain and later other European powers ever followed Ricardo’s doctrines,
they would have destroyed themselves – literally speaking. Thus, prior to the Great
War they did so in only limited time spans, given the emergence of mechanisms of
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self-protection such as mandated improvements in working conditions, pension
systems, embryonic environmental legislation, and the like, which laissez-faire
ideologues condemned as market distortions. Strikingly, these mechanisms
emerged uncoordinatedly in countries with exceptionally different cultural and
political outlooks such as the liberal Victorian England and the strong Prussian
state of Bismarck. Another uncoordinated self-protection mechanism which
emerged was the export of social conflict. Polanyi explained the renaissance of
colonialism, outmoded between 1770 and 1880, as an additional societal mecha-
nism of self-protection against the attempts to forcefully implement free trade
doctrines:
The difference was merely that while the tropical population of the wretched colony was
thrown into utter misery and degradation, often to the point of physical extinction, the
Western country’s refusal to trade was induced by a lesser peril but still sufficiently real to
be avoided at almost all cost [. . .] to expect that a community would remain indifferent to
the scourge of unemployment, the shifting of industries and occupations and to the moral
and psychological torture accompanying them, merely because of economic effects, in the
long run, might be negligible, was to assume absurdity. (Polanyi 2001: 224)
It is worth emphasising that Polanyi was neither vilifying Ricardo nor arguing
against markets. Ricardo (and Malthus for that matter) honestly believed that he
was discovering the ‘laws’ which British society should respect for her own long
term benefit. The market, Polanyi explains, is an institution that has existed
virtually since the Stone Age. He was merely warning against renewed attempts
to subordinate the substance of society (humans and nature) to market ‘laws’, for
they will necessarily culminate in catastrophe once again. In the 1930s, the laissez-
faire movement and its counter movement found themselves in political stalemate,
until fascism seized power and broke with laissez-faire, democracy and peace. The
self-regulated market was a strong utopia which Polanyi hoped to see transcended
after the Second World War – as indeed was greatly accomplished in central and
North Europe the years thereafter. Given Polanyi’s insights, Latouche saw the
attempt to replicate Britain’s pattern towards industrialisation in poor countries
under the heading of ‘development’ and ‘progress’ as socially and environmentally
ill-advised, including the persistent practice of exporting social conflict.
Latouche was also aware of Georgescu-Roegen’s work (Latouche 2004a: 63). It
was Jacques Grinevald and Ivo Res who introduced into the Francophone world
Georgescu-Roegen’s writings. The title of the French translation in 1979 of some of
Georgescu-Roegen’s writings was ‘Demain la décroissance’.67 They translated the
English verb ‘decline’ into the French substantive la décroissance, and that word
was translated back to the English language as ‘de-growth’ (Grinevald 2008: 15).
The back-and-forth translations that Georgescu-Roegen himself agreed upon, given
his literacy in the French language and personal relations with French Philosopher
Grinevald,68 fully reflected his opinion that ‘the necessary conclusion [. . .] is that
67 De-growth for tomorrow.
68 I am indebted to Prof. Martı́nez-Alier for this biographical note.
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the most desirable state is not a stationary, but a declining one [. . .] Undoubtedly,
the current growth must cease, nay be reversed’ (Georgescu-Roegen (1975):
368–369. Italics in original text). In this passage he was arguing against the SSE
proposed by his former pupil Daly. This debate will be further examined in the next
section. Latouche also embraced LtG reasoning, especially the immense destructive
forces of exponential growth expressed in the ever expanding ecological footprint
and carbon emissions. For Latouche the major problem of rich countries was that of
overconsumption, and for emerging and poor countries was that of aspiring the
overconsumption of the rich, encouraged by the policies and cultural dominance of
the North and the elite’s corruption of both.
3.4.2 From ‘Developmentalism’ to the Virtuous Cycles of Rs
As previously noted, Latouche belongs to the short but growing list of social
scientists and practitioners who have criticised the so-called ‘developmentalist’
project. Indeed, in their view, this project destroys viable societies by uniform
development and the imposition of the utopic market-society. His critique can be
fairly summarised with the following quote:
As long as hungry Ethiopia and Somalia still have to export feedstuffs destined for pet
animals in the North, and the meat we eat is raised on soya from the razed Amazon
rainforest, our excessive consumption smothers any chance of real self-sufficiency in the
South. (Latouche 2004b: 2)
Since the developmentalist project slipped in the sustainable development
discourse, Latouche rejected sustainable development altogether. In his view, it
was not only a contradiction in terms as Georgescu-Roegen and Daly previously
claimed from an entropic point of view, but also a pain-relieving discourse in view
of the harsh socio-environmental realities that economic growth delivers, which
were further deepened by the progressive re-implementation of globalisation
(Latouche 2003a, b). The political question is then: how to escape the iron cage
of growth which is destroying both nature and humans?
Latouche’s strategy began at the bottom, with localism as a response to devel-
opment and globalisation. At this level a transition process or a ‘virtuous cycle of
quiet contraction’ would be initiated (Latouche 2009: 33). The reason for starting
with the local was simply because it was the only space of political action left by the
overwhelming financial and corporate power of today’s world which have severely
limited the scope of action of politicians. Placing the emphasis on political action,
the term de-growth was the political slogan intended to defeat current pro-growth
ideologies. As advocators of economic growth share a religious belief in it: ‘we
should be talking at the theoretical level of ‘a-growth’, in the sense in which we
speak of ‘a-theism’, rather than ‘de-growth” (Latouche 2009: 8).
An important step which was central to Latouche’s thought was what he
repeatedly called the ‘decolonisation of the imaginary’ from ‘economicism’ and
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the economy (Latouche 2003a, 2004a: 115). This means the pro-active liberation of
the mind from economic thinking which is so hegemonic in social life,69 and the
pro-active liberation in the material sense which is creating new autonomous spaces
of social interaction and production, in which frugality and voluntary simplicity can
be practiced. The requirement is that of a cultural revolution across all levels which
may reach politics. The cultural revolution in politics would reduce the need for
politicking, and will likely re-establish the dignity of the political profession. The
ultimate end is the convivial and sustainable society. The intermediate means are
the serene contraction which is composed of eight interdependent and, so expected,
self-reinforcing R-guiding concepts (Latouche 2009: 33–43).
Re-evaluate: The re-evaluation of social values which are admired but hardly
practiced, namely altruism and cooperation instead of egoism and competition.
Other values re-directing preferences ought to be re-evaluated: local over the
global, autonomy over heteronomy, and appreciation of good craftsmanship over
productive efficiency. A sense of justice, responsibility, and solidarity must be won
back. An example of how the sense of justice has been so badly distorted by
economicist thinking is the accepting of almost everything which creates employ-
ment (growth) as inherently good, such as exporting pollution into poor countries,
‘land grabbing’, exaggerated expenditures in the military and the like. According to
Latouche, re-evaluation along with re-localisation are the most important Rs in
strategic terms.
Re-conceptualise: This means to deconstruct and reconstruct the meanings of
wealth, poverty, scarcity, and needs.
Restructure: When values are changing then the productive apparatus must be
changed accordingly. As the restructuring is on-going, the question about going
beyond capitalism will inevitably be raised.
Redistribute: Within and among the countries. Rich countries should restore or,
depending on the specific situation of the country, improve a system of fair taxation
and the gains of economic booms. Redistributing from the North to the South is
confronted with the ‘payability’ problem of the immense ecological debt
accumulated by the North. Nonetheless, the mechanism is not too much in giving
away but in taking less. Ecological footprints are a good metric for determining
each country’s drawing rights, hence through the mediation of markets, an
exchange of quotas and permits to consume could be made possible.
Re-localise: It deals not only with the re-localisation of productive activities, but
with culture and politics. The strategic importance of re-localising is to show that
the ‘concrete utopia’ is doable in political and economic terms. Of great importance
is the existence of the collective project which is territorially rooted, for example
the town, the village and so on, hence fostering the sense of belonging which will
allow the protection of the common good and the emergence of other values.
Latouche mentioned several examples of on-going projects with differing scales
69 In the texts reviewed Latouche blames the economic discipline on the whole.
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in Europe, such as the province of Milan or in the Tuscany region. In fact, there are
hundreds of on-going local projects which have emerged since the localisation
movement appeared.
Reduce: This means especially reducing consumption. Nonetheless, reduce is
also directed at reducing health risks, working hours, and mass tourism. Less
working hours and work sharing is one of the formulas against one of the main
arguments to keep the growth machine. On the other hand, we must overcome the
‘tragedy of productivism’, that is, our addiction to work (Latouche 2009: 40). It
makes us unable to rediscover the repressed dimensions of life, such as the pleasure
to engage or develop our talents and to practice our hobbies, to play, to enjoy
conversations or to simply enjoy being alive.
Re-use/recycle: It is about the reduction of waste, to fight in-built obsolescence
and recycle waste which cannot be reused. Latouche mentioned examples of firms
which through product design make almost full recycling possible.
Resist: It is said to be the central R of the Cultural Revolution expected to be
triggered and carried out by the rest of the Rs. Resist is contained in the rest of the
Rs.
Against the accusations of the potential intransigent characteristics of the eight -
R-guiding concepts, Latouche defended himself by claiming that they are
a response of the system excesses with all of its ‘overs’: over-development,
over-production, over-abundance, over-extraction, over-fishing, over-grazing,
over-consumption, over-supply, and so on.
3.5 Steady-State or De-growth?
The ideas of Daly and Latouche differ mainly in their grade of theoretical elabora-
tion and completeness. This asymmetry might be explained by the dissimilar time
span in which each of them has been involved in the economic growth debate. Daly
has been writing on this issue for 40 years with remarkable scholarship and in a
holistic fashion. In this time he has covered practically all of the topics related to the
issue. Latouche, on the other hand, started to write about de-growth in the early
2000s although he has already been arguing against the notion of development for a
long time. He also seems less interested than Daly in the growth-debate with
economists, and more interested in broader political, social and cultural aspects.
Although both social thinkers follow largely different intellectual traditions, similar
policy proposals arise, albeit with different wording. This is perhaps a result of the
exchange of ideas in the 1970s between the US and Europeans thinkers,
and recently from social thinkers of southern countries such as India, Ecuador
and Bolivia. Another potential explanation may be that some of these proposals
seem to be sheer common sense.
To make this point, a short review of the most convergent policy proposal shared
not only by both thinkers, but also by a number of their intellectual mentors and
many others should be provided: gaining leisure by working less, what conversely
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might free up jobs for others in the community. Keynes (2009: 198) was already,
one might retrospectively say, dreaming in 1930 that the main problem of the
worker would be ‘how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest
will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well’ and 2 years later
Bertrand Russell even felt the necessity to praise idleness. The very same architect
of the ‘German miracle’, economist Ludwig Erhard anticipated in 1957 a ‘correc-
tion in economic policy’ which would become necessary once people started to ask
about the value of accumulation and eventually conclude that more leisure is more
valuable (Radkau 2010: 46). In the 1970s French philosopher André Gorz was
demanding leisure for French workers, while disenchanted Austrian philosopher
Ivan Illich was blaming ‘the machine’ for robbing it, and even for enslaving
humans. On the other side of the Atlantic, Georgescu-Roegen felt that we needed
to realise that an important prerequisite ‘for a good life is a substantial amount of
leisure spent in an intelligent manner’ (1975: 378). Daly transformed it in a policy
proposal that perfectly fits into his SSE, while Latouche wanted us to move away
from the ‘tragedy of productivism’. From these reflections, it seems clear that the
underlying question has always been: what is after all the purpose of a society
classed as materially rich if not liberating the majority of the population from the
‘toil and trouble’ of work? Not even some societal sectors in peripheral countries
which have recently gained voice are particularly enthused at the thought of
becoming ‘developed’ by means of owning all sorts of gadgetry while losing
leisure – especially due the bleak perspectives of becoming ‘developed’ under the
present global status-quo.
Pertaining to SD, both thinkers are troubled with the current meaning of devel-
opment which so strongly implies export led-growth. Nonetheless, Daly sees the
necessity to maintain the sustainability political forum. Sustainable development is
dialectic more than an analytic concept of the sort of justice or love; therefore it is
preferable to continue the political attempt to shape its meaning. There is after all
no other option in the international realm. Beyond Daly’s ideas of development, he
formulated in the 1970s the ‘impossibility theorem’: US or Western European high-
mass consumption style economy for a world of nearly four billion people (at that
time) is impossible. Even more impossible is the prospect of an ever growing
standard of consumption for an ever growing population. The physical limits of
the earth will not support a world population in a ‘developed’ state (Daly 1991:
151). Latouche on the other hand, sees no reason why poor countries should follow
the development path of rich countries even if globalisation was inexistent.
He introduces four additional Rs: Renew, Rediscover, Reintroduce and Recuperate:
Renew contact with the thread of a history that was interrupted by colonization, develop-
ment and globalization. Rediscover [. . .] cultural identity. Reintroduce specific products
that have been forgotten or abandoned [. . .]. Recuperate traditional technologies and skills.
(Latouche 2009: 58)
Thus, Latouche formulates the Rs in terms of cultural emancipation.
The only sharp difference in their conceptions of development is population
control policy. Latouche rejects it for political and pragmatic reasons. He maintains
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that the intention behind the population control consensus that emerged in the 1970s
was based on hegemonic intentions (Latouche 2009: 25). Furthermore, as the
population rapidly increased in poor countries because of high fertility rates over
the last decades, it will equally rapidly decline with lower fertility rates in the next
ones.70 On the question of technological progress, Daly understands it as a funda-
mental component in the SSE but as highly destructive within the growth paradigm.
Latouche emphasises the alienating characteristics of technology and believes in
simpler and more manageable tools. By and large, Daly’s SSE subsumes virtually
all of Latouche’s Rs in his theoretical framework, excepting his re-use/recycle of
waste, especially recycling of waste. Daly does not reject the practice of waste
recycling, but this activity, independent of how we re-define ‘waste’, does not
defeat the strict linearity of the entropy law. Daly also seems to be more specific
about the ideas on the role of the state and the market-economy than Latouche.
Recently and Kerschner (2010) also attempted to compare de-growth and the
SSE, drawing not only on Latouche but on other de-growth advocates. He
addressed the following specific issue: de-growth proponents reject Daly’s SSE
and blindly cling to Georgescu-Roegen’s judgment that, as mentioned in the last
section, de-growth is preferable over the steady-state. Georgescu-Roegen was
himself indeed highly critical of the SSE developed by his former pupil (see
Georgescu-Roegen 1975: 366–369, 1977; 1979: 102–105). Before examining
Kerschner’s arguments in depth, it is convenient to first consider Georgescu-
Roegen’s arguments against the SSE. They can be reduced to:
1. Growth, zero-growth (SSE) and even de-growth (declining) cannot exist forever
in a finite environment.
2. The SSE offers no basis for determining even in principle the optimum levels of
(a) population and (b) man-made capital.
3. The SEE does not offer a guide with which to determine the appropriate stock of
capital for human’s ‘good life’.
Argument 1 arises simply by the strict application of the entropy law; therefore a
SSE will be of finite duration.71 Yet the same fate is also shared by a declining path.
70 The United Nations’ estimations on global population growth have been recently readjusted.
The current world population (7 billion) is projected to reach 10.1 billion by 2100, reaching 9.3
billion by 2050 according to the median variant. This increase is projected to come from high-
fertility countries (an average woman has more than 1.5 daughters), which are mostly located in
sub-Saharan Africa, but also in nine countries in Asia, six in Oceania and four in Latin America
(UN 2011). On the other hand, as made clear several times, Daly and Latouche agree that current
global threats stem rather from consumption in rich and emerging countries. After all, population
is just one variable which put pressure on the natural environment. Those poor countries with still
high-fertility rates consume virtually nothing compared to the consumption levels in rich
countries.
71 Beckerman (1995) also pointed out that the LtG stabilisation path scenario was cut off in the
year 2100, hence omitting the declining availability of resources that would, according to the same
model, arrive beyond 2100.
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Argument 2a is true, 2b is somehow true and 3 was true when Georgescu-Roegen
was writing on the issue. Concerning 1 the discussion must ultimately rest on the
duration and on the ethics implied, consciously or not, in any economic and
ecological policy in the time span that humanity at large will live, which, needless
to say, is highly speculative. However, for most people it might be unacceptable to
ground public policy for 150 years, that is, roughly the life time of three
generations, and for the majority it would be ludicrous to ground public policy
for 5 billions years, which is the estimated time before the sun becomes a red giant
which vaporises all life on earth, and the earth herself. With this said, one must also
have a sense of proportion. As Daly observed more than 30 years ago:
In the very long run of course nothing can remain constant, so our concept of an SSE must
be a medium run concept in which stocks are constant over decades or generations, not
millennia or eons. (1979: 80)
The question which then arises is: why did Georgescu-Roegen prefer declining
economies if after all humanity is doomed to disappear? His answer was because
‘the population is too large and part of it enjoys excessive comfort’ (1975: 368). His
persistence on extravagant wants (rich’s problem) were more frequent than the
population problem (poor’s problem): ‘If we understand well the problem, the best
use of our iron resources is to produce plows or harrows as they are needed, not
Rolls Royces [. . .]’ (1971: 21). However, this did not come out of a capricious
personal taste, but out of his proposed ethical principle: ‘Love thy species
as thyself’ (1977: 270) that would require the overcoming of the ‘dictatorship of
the present over the future’, and replacing the maximisation of present utility by the
minimisation of ‘future regrets’ (1979: 102).72 The latter requirement is, in his
view, not served by discounting rates arbitrarily set by present people – usually
economists – against the future generations who cannot bid for the choice of present
resources. Once this principle is internalised, ‘right’ prices, production, distribu-
tion, and pollution will naturally emerge. Therefore, in spite of the critical
comments on the SSE, he judged as an improvement the ultimate-means (low
entropy matter-energy) – ultimate-ends (religion) spectrum which Daly (1979:
70) was elaborating:
This paper thus strengthens the impression emerging from his previous writings that the
essence of Daly’s conception is not economic or demographic, but, rather, ethical – a great
merit in a period in which economics has been reduced to a timeless kinematics.
(Georgescu-Roegen 1979: 102)
Argument 2a is true, but this is also only the case when Georgescu-Roegen fills
the void with a proposal. Indeed, the SEE offers no guidance as to determine the
optimum level of population and the guidance Georgescu-Roegen offers is quite
concrete. In his ‘minimal bioeconomic program’ consisting of eight points (1975:
374–379) he advises that world population should gradually be reduced to a level at
72 He was by no means indifferent to the differential gradient between rich and poor nations that
was in his view ‘an evil itself’ (Georgescu-Roegen 1975: 377).
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which it can adequately be fed only through organic agriculture. He considered
modern agriculture (and most modern technologies) as energy squanderers.73
Arguments 2b and 3 are thornier. Concerning the optimum level of man-made
capital Georgescu-Roegen insists that natural resources must be governed by
quantitative regulations/restrictions, strictly rejecting the aiding of market efficient
allocation through Pigovian taxation/subsidies, for these measures would simply
end up benefiting the already wealthy and the political protégés (1975: 377).
Quantitative regulations/restrictions are also Daly’s preferred political instrument,
but he does not reject taxation/subsidies as shown in Sect. 3.3.5. In the case of
quantitative regulations/restrictions, Daly’s aim is to induce substitution through
technological progress once restrictions are set. This is also stubbornly rejected by
Georgescu-Roegen as it precisely implies that an economy cannot possibly be in a
steady-state (argument 1) and that Daly’s proposal would mean ‘joining the club of
the believers in exponential progress’ (1979: 104).
Regarding the appropriate stock of man-made capital for human’s good life
(argument 3), this argument was true, as at that time there was no refined framework
with which to handle the issue. Nevertheless, Daly’s notion of optimal scale was
polished and operationalised years later through his ISEW. Here, Daly allows for
the freedom of the individual to decide about the ‘good life’, which will be
eventually shaped by the forces of market once quantitative regulations are in
place.74 Additionally, Daly is also highly critical of extravagant wants stimulated
by advertising and clings to the old economic principle of declining marginal
utility: ‘if nonsatiety were the natural state of human nature then aggressive
want-stimulating advertising would not be necessary, nor would the barrage of
novelty aimed at promoting dissatisfaction with last year’s model’ (Daly and Cobb
1994: 87–88). In other words, if want-stimulating advertising was absent then
individual choices aiming for the good life would ultimately require far less
throughput. Georgescu-Roegen also advised us to educate ourselves to despise
fashion and to make durable goods even more durable and to design them so they
are repairable. In spite of argument 3 and as noted before, he wanted us to
understand the importance of leisure for the ‘good life’. Similarly, with the
resources freed by the prohibition of the production of all instruments of war, it
would be possible to help poor nations to arrive as quickly as possible at ‘a good
(not luxurious) life’ (1975: 378).
The last paragraphs thoroughly cover Georgescu-Roegen’s criticisms of the
SSE. Coming back to Kerschner’s paper, he is basically troubled with argument
1, especially with the word ‘annihilation’ used by Georgescu-Roegen (1975: 367):
73 By the same token, his advice was to master the harnessing of solar energy which is the most
abundant source of energy (albeit flow-limited) and by so doing lowering the increasing rate of
terrestrial entropy. Additionally, he saw it as the safest technology compared to other technologies
such as nuclear power.
74 As hopefully noticed, Daly is not a radical individualist.
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The crucial error consists in not seeing that not only growth, but also a zero-growth state,
nay, even a declining state which does not converge toward annihilation, cannot exist
forever in a finite environment. (emphasis supplied)
The first problem Kerschner sees is that de-growth proponents have adopted
Georgescu-Roegen’s position against the SSE while conveniently omitting the
word ‘annihilation’ when they cite him (ibid.: 548). The second problem is that
Georgescu-Roegen’s position is ‘a path without a constructive goal for policy
making [. . .]’ (ibid.: 547). This assessment has, however, been previously softened
when Kerschner speculated that Georgescu-Roegen was referring to the entropic
death of the universe. My own assessment is that the issue is to some extent
overestimated. Clearly, neither Georgescu-Roegen, nor de-growth proponents (at
least Latouche) want us to de-grow humanity to death, therefore it is somehow
immaterial whether they quote the annihilation-part of the sentence or not.75 As
mentioned before, Georgescu-Roegen was simply reminding us that humanity is
mortal. Finally, and differing from Kerschner’s view, Georgescu-Roegen did offer
several policy options in his minimal bioeconomic programme. If ‘constructive’
meant ‘politically possible’ that would be a separate discussion which I will return
to later. It is also useful to recall the time at which the debate was being conducted
(Fig. 3.1).
A very interesting point raised by Kerschner is that Georgescu-Roegen appeared
inconsistent in his critique against the SSE, and that he even implicitly supported it.
Kerschner mentioned his organic agriculture/population proposal which would
ultimately imply a stabilised population, as Daly’s SSE requires. One may add
the proposal of helping poor nations to arrive as quickly as possible at a good life,
which would mean a movement towards a SSE – through growth! It is difficult to
accept that Georgescu-Roegen’s erudite mind was being inconsistent,76 but one
must agree with Kerschner’s assessment. Judging from his proposals on population
and aid for the poor, Georgescu-Roegen views favourably fit Kerschner’s observa-
tion that both movements: growth for the poor, de-growth for the rich, and a stable
population for all towards a (quasi) steady-state is required.77
75 Admittedly, Kerschner has been far more involved in the de-growth discussions than I have
been. This experience may have told him that the point ought to be made.
76 Georgescu-Roegen was a trained mathematician, economist, and philosopher of science with
ample knowledge of physics and biology. He was the social thinker who was once called by Paul
Samuelson ‘a scholar’s scholar, and economist’s economist’ and included in economist historian
Mark Blaug’s bookGreat Economists since Keynes published in 1985 (Daly 2007: 125). In Blaug’s
view it was this erudition and complex style that led his colleagues to ignore him so persistently
hitherto. Daly adds as a reason that he, the mathematician, was severely criticising the excessive-
ness of mathematics in economics, the very element of orthodox economists’ proudness which
confers the scientific status of the profession – or at least the appearance thereof (Daly 2007: 126).
77 The term ‘quasi’ steady-state was used by Georgescu-Roegen (1975) when he was explaining
that such societies indeed existed in the past but they were rather culturally and technologically
stagnant.
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Globally understood, both schools are indeed complementary as Kerschner
concluded – in fact they must logically be so. In order to reinforce Kerschner’s
conclusion it should re-emphasised that Daly’s SSE has been continuously refined
and expanded in the last 30 years. He built upon Georgescu-Roegen’s bio-
economics (the lowest part of Daly’s spectrum), improved the body of economic
theory, integrated political/institutional insights and fully handled the ‘ultimate
end’ (the highest part of his spectrum) in For the Common Good co-authored
with theologian John Cobb and published in 1989. The book was available only a
year later after the institutionalisation of the merge between ecology and economics
through the inauguration of the journal Ecological Economics. This was a merge
which Georgescu-Roegen already saw as inevitable in the 1970s – although he was
not fully satisfied with it as his goal was rather to replace the, in his view, fatally
flawed mainstream neo-classic economics with bio-economics and not to be
relegated merely as a school of secondary importance (Levallois 2010). Finally,
the metrics which came out in the late 1980s and have been refined and tested ever
since, could replace GDP and thus must also be mentioned. Indeed, they are the
kind of metrics which would tell us how much growth/de-growth is economic for
the ‘good life’.78 After all, the SSE, as the name implies, is an (approximate) state,
while de-growth, as well as its antithesis growth, are processes. In a nutshell, it
would be incomprehensible if today’s de-growth proponents, for whichever
reasons, deliberately neglected 40 years of intellectual work which is in any case
the outgrowth of Georgescu-Roegen’s ideas, humanism as well as the sense of
responsibility and urgency which flows from his intellectual legacy.
The preceding discussion brings me back to the comparison of Daly’s SSE and
specifically on Latouche’s de-growth. As previously mentioned, Daly’s SSE is
theoretically more elaborated and comprehensive than Latouche’s de-growth, yet
apart from Latouche’s own theoretical contributions, his significance lies undoubt-
edly in the resonance of de-growth as a political slogan which has been capable of
re-launching an academic and public debate in Europe, and to some very limited
extent in the US. In the academic domain three international conferences on de-
growth have been held, the first in April 2008 in Paris, the second in March 2010 in
Barcelona and the third in June 2011 in Berlin. A fourth will be held in Montréal in
78 For sure an index does not do justice to the richness of the meaning of the ‘good life’ that varies
in different cultural settings, but this fact does not make indexes superfluous. As previously note,
Daly is not particularly motivated with the shaky ground upon which the notion ‘development’
rests, and even less is he an enthusiast of bringing it to the rest of the world. This is not only
because of ecological but also because of cultural reasons. After all, he wants to transform
economic thought so that it serves specific communities (see for example Daly and Cobb 1994:
133–137). On the other hand, while developing his ISEW with Cobb, he was keeping an eye on
custom, or ‘path-dependency’ using a more fashionable term. If GDP is the national account in
which statistical efforts have been invested in the last decades one has two options: (1) to disregard
it and to force the introduction of several indexes – as it has been proposed several times, or (2) to
replace it with a better index building on available information currently collected by statisticians,
hence building upon the general obsession with a single index. Daly preferred the latter option.
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2012. Additionally, a new academic journal based in France called Entropia was
launched. A number of books on the issue have recently been published in other
core European countries such as Prosperity without Growth by ecological econo-
mist Tim Jackson (2009) in Britain and the edited book Postwachstumsge-
sellschaft79 by Irmid Siedl and Angelika Zahrnt (2010) in Germany. In the
political domain Latouche explains that by now at least the French public is familiar
with the slogan ‘de-growth’ (Latouche 2010: 201). In Germany, green politician
Reinhard Loske (2011) has argued (again) for abandoning ‘growthmania’, thus
proposing a set of political reforms which would enable this, some of them very
similar to those proposed by Daly and Latouche. Furthermore, the European
Commission published in September 2010 an article dealing with what was called
sustainable de-growth through their news alert service (EC 2010). They drew on an
article authored by ecological economists Martı́nez-Alier et al. (2010). Although
the intensity of the debate on economic growth originated mainly in the US, it
remains today a strong taboo not only for professional politicians but also for the
public at large; nonetheless, some minor ripples from the growth discussion in
Europe have spread back to that country (Schor 2010).
The de-growth slogan advanced by Latouche was also debated in the journal of
Ecological Economics, particularly its feasibility for political implementation. Van
den Bergh (2011) has asked what should de-grow: GDP?, consumption?, through-
put? or work-time? These questions can be answered with what has been written so
far. What is important to highlight is his assertion that GDP de-growth, consump-
tion de-growth and ‘radical’ de-growth80 are likely to meet strong resistance in
democratic systems. He was certainly correct in his judgment that striving ‘for
political feasibility nationally and internationally is an important precondition for
getting such as policy package implemented’ (ibid.: 888). He then proposed what he
sees, an effective policy package of five items, one of them was regulating com-
mercial advertisement more stringently and the other one was taxing status goods. It
seems difficult to realise how such policy proposals will not meet strong resistance
in a democratic system. He also argued in favour of ‘a-growth’, that is, to encourage
economists, politicians and media to ‘ignore’ GDP. In this case, it is also implausi-
ble that propagating an attitude towards GDP will automatically reduce the ecolog-
ical impact of effectively growing economies structurally designed to do so. A
comprehensive and appropriate response was put forth by Kallis (2011). The fact of
the matter is that any policy package which challenges growth will receive strong
opposition and it will be rated as politically ‘impossible’ – as has been the tenor of
the last 40 years. On the other hand, a broader and dynamic understanding of
democracy could be helpful. The preconditions which Van den Bergh accurately
identified can only be created bottom-up, be it for enacting his or Daly’s proposals,
or for that matter any proposal aiming at de-growth towards a (quasi) steady-state.
79 The post-growth society (traduced by the author).
80 A notion too ill-defined as he himself admits.
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It is the role that Latouche and others are playing, which incidentally constitutes
another dimension which makes de-growth and the SSE complementary. Perhaps it
is useful to bring to back to memory that in the West, the ideas upon which social
institutions such as slavery and patriarchy were based went on millennia without
being challenged – not a few decades as in the case of growth – and when
challenges emerged they were held by some to be politically impossible. Finally,
slavery was ended and patriarchy was undermined. In choosing between tackling a
political ‘impossibility’ and a biophysical impossibility, reason tells us to judge the
latter to be more impossible and to take our chances with the former.
3.6 Conclusions and Prospects
The aim of this chapter was to study the economic growth debate hitherto, and to
review and compare two alternatives to it: the SSE of Herman Daly and de-growth
of Serge Latouche. The growth debate emerged out of the convergence of several
ecological and political factors in the late 1960s in rich countries. The position of
economists became divided on the issue with the majority maintaining the growth
commitment. It was, however, the Limits to Growth report published in 1972 which
projected the debate well beyond academia. The debate remained strongly polarised
until the Brundtland report was published in 1987 settling the issue at the interna-
tional political level. The Brundtland report which recognised the natural environ-
ment in essential ways was however, a (inevitably) product of political compromise
that as such, neglected many important issues, namely the phenomenon of social-
engineered wants already well-documented at that time. It also ended up making
recommendations such as improvements in energy/matter efficiency, while ignor-
ing scale effects (Jevons’ paradox) which were also widely known, albeit strongly
disputed. In spite of these disputes, the world economy continued to expand as
measured, for example, by the ecological footprint. Years later, laissez-faire
doctrines took over the world with a new formula for growth which was expressed
in the ecological domain by the radical optimism of economists such as Julian
Simon. From the 1990s onwards the public focus shifted towards climate change
which by the beginning of the 2000s evolved into a political stalemate. Climate
change was given a boost through the Stern report in 2006, whose proposals became
politically feasible only after the last economic crisis prompted a renovate interest
in Keynesianism. The new circumstances allowed for the notions of the ‘green
economy’ and ‘green growth’ to find its way into the official environmental
discourse which have been commonly used in Europe. The Green Economy report
launched by the UNEP in 2011 was more coherent than the Brundtland report and
reflected the tendency of a gradual shift away from market-fundamentalism and the
integration of many elements of Ecological Economics such as state investments in
green research, ecological restoration, public goods and more generally,
investments in the global commons such as the atmosphere. Nonetheless, the report
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failed to get to grips with the issue of scale which logically allows for the
preservation of the growth commitment.
The two alternatives beyond the environmental official discourse remain the
SSE of Herman Daly and the cultural change called upon by Serge Latouche to
realise de-growth in affluent countries. Daly drew on the ideas of Mill and
Georgescu-Roegen. For Mill the stationary-state was highly desirable because of
ecological and social reasons. Georgescu-Roegen examined the implications of the
first and the second law of thermodynamics in the economic process, and concluded
that the growth policy had become untenable. Indeed, he even criticised the SSE
which was being developed by his former student Daly. Daly proposed a SSE in
which low-entropic throughput is minimised but the service maximised. He put
forward economic (qualitative) development instead of economic (quantitative)
growth, and cogently demonstrated that the latter can also be ‘uneconomic’. A set
of policy recommendations for institutional change consistent with the SSE was
suggested covering virtually the entire spectrum of economic and environmental
policy. It is useful to underline his policy of quantitative restrictions proposed in
order to tackle the Jevons’ paradox, a topic left inconclusive in the Green Economy
report. He proposed quantitative limits selected according to the most stringent
necessity (depletion or pollution) and letting production/consumption to adapt to
the new prices. Serge Latouche built upon the cultural critique to modernity of
central European thinkers such as Jacques Ellul and Ivan Illich. From the Economic
Anthropology of Karl Polanyi, Latouche derived his critique against uniform
patterns of development, and from Murray Bookchin’s ecomunicipalism, he
strengthened his cause for the local as a starting point. Latouche advocated for a
cultural revolution which should expand gradually whilst being guided by a set of
interrelating R-guiding concepts.
The set of policy recommendations which arose from both approaches were
greatly similar, such as working-less and work sharing, but using different lines of
reasoning and wording, given their, to a degree, dissimilar intellectual traditions.
The only marked differences were: the waste recycling practices which Latouche
advanced but that Daly saw with reservation given the entropy law; and the
population control policy which Daly supported as a still legitimate means of
development, but that Latouche rejected on political and pragmatic grounds.
Excepting these differences Latouche’s Rs could be subsumed in the detailed
theoretical elaboration on which the SSE rests. The SSE and de-growth are not
mutually exclusive approaches but necessarily complementary, unless we do not
value human existence on the planet. At the bottom, the SSE is, as the name
indicates a state, while de-growth indicates motion. The discussion will ultimately
rest in:
1. The physical quantities which economies need (population and man-made
capital) for the good life in the long run;
2. How to decide on them, that is, biophysical limits, Daly’s metrics, and
Georgescu-Roegen’s organic agriculture/population proposal;
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3. How to achieve them, that is, Latouche’s cultural change and a dynamic
understanding of democracy; and
4. How to maintain an approximate steady-state.
It is nearly impossible to add anything novel to the statements of Boulding,
Mishan, Schumacher, Daly, Georgescu-Roegen, to mention only the most promi-
nent scholars. Indeed they stated with unparalleled clarity, after having understood
that consumption and production became bad things that as such they should be
minimised instead of maximised in countries which had already achieved an
unprecedented level of material comfort. Others such as Hardin placed greater
emphasis on population growth, an emphasis which was frowned upon by many.
The rich were blaming the weakest members of their societies and, at some point of
world’s poor for the calamities they saw looming. The honest mistrustful (and
Hardin himself) too often missed the point that it was the combination of policies
and not singled out policies which mattered. However, the conclusion remains
fundamentally the same. By the present state of things, ‘growthmania’, world
economic growth and population growth must cease, or even be globally reversed.
With the latter objective some advancement has been made, while with the two
formers virtually no strides have been taken in the arena and area which matters: the
political arena of core countries – and newly, the emerging ones.
It has long since been well-understood that with the perpetual quest for eco-
nomic growth instead of for example economic development – in Daly’s sense – or
what Europeans thinkers once referred to as ‘qualitative growth’, everything
becomes more complex, vulnerable and, therefore intractable for human manage-
ment. It has the effect of pushing societies to resort to doubtful plan B’s such as geo-
engineering proposals and the additional scaling-up of institutions. The increasing
acceptance of geo-engineering proposals such as injecting sulphur into the atmo-
sphere strongly correlates with the failure of getting a necessary international
binding agreement on climate change. It is easy to note that this plan B fits perfectly
well within the predominant cultural belief of humans dominating nature through
technology, which conversely allows for the maintenance of the growth commit-
ment. One can almost imagine installing a switch on the planet for when it gets too
hot, similar to calibrating an air conditioning system; while running the risk of
forgetting that climate scientists have not, and maybe never will, completely
understand the wide array of dynamic interconnections between the climate and
life-support systems; that we may run the risk of falling again into a progress trap,
and that at this stage, we just begin to anticipate the potential consequences for
international relations.
Scaling-up institutions which began with mandatory ‘end-of-pipe’ treatments of
waste and pollution can be grasped as the reflexive societal response to tackle
bigger ecological problems in an almost hopeless attempt to cope with increased
entropy and overwhelmed ecosystems. Yet, scaling-up of institutions must be
necessarily accompanied by scaling-up governance structures for the purposes of
enforcement – the rub of the issue. Institutions devoid of feasible enforcing
mechanisms will remain, at least at the international level, simply in good
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formalised intentions. At this juncture it should be acknowledged that this societal
response, albeit necessary, further jeopardises parliamentary democracy and free-
dom, for the institutional scaling-up tends to shift decision-making away from the
sub-institutional units of the nation-states. Additionally, the bargaining costs of co-
shaping the content of these institutions will tend to increase proportionally. If
bargaining costs tend to increase pari passu with scaling-up institutions, it implies
that greater bargaining costs will likely be more easily borne by correspondingly
bigger players, which include not only big states but most importantly nowadays,
big private organisations. This trend conversely reinforces the trend already set by
globalisation – not a natural law but a myth encroached by mere repetition, and in
some instances certainly by deliberate cultivation. From this perspective, the aim of
global de-growth, in terms of energy and material throughput; and de-globalisation,
in terms of free trade and free capital mobility, are perhaps not sufficient but clearly
necessary conditions for achieving environmental sustainability and for protecting,
and in some cases even restoring freedom and democracy.
Contrastingly, arguments for freedom and democracy are raised against policy
proposals aiming at de-growth/growth towards a steady-state. It is believed that by
allowing too much intrusion of the state in the ecological realm, we will be on the
road of serfdom, in which a tyrannymay emerge in the form of an ‘eco-dictatorship’.
It would be foolish to deny this possibility. Although societies may have latent
totalitarian forces waiting for their political window of opportunity to curtail
freedom in the name of ecological salvation – or in the name of other societal
goals for that matter – the arguments laid down above indicate that, the more
accelerate entropy through unnecessary growth, the more likely are the chances
opened to a potential ‘eco-dictator’. Indeed, causal empiricism shows that a strict
hierarchical control of throughput and therefore, of social life is often witnessed in
places where resources are extremely scarce, for instance in small ships, space
shuttles and the like.
On the other hand, those arguing against the intromission of the state for the
reasons of preserving freedom will have a difficult time in arguing against some of
most the famous philosophers of the subject, such as J.S. Mill. Furthermore, a
classical liberal less known than Mill in Anglo-Saxon countries, but from who Mill
took inspiration was Wilhelm von Humboldt. In his inquiry on the Limits of State
Action written in the late eighteenth century, he stressed that theory must be guided
by attempting to achieve the greatest freedom possible, while coercion must be
guided by reality, hence:
Either man or the situation is not yet adapted to receive freedom, so that freedom would
destroy the very conditions without which not only freedom but even existence itself would
be inconceivable [. . .]. (1993: 144–145. Emphasis supplied)
It can be argued that the meaning of freedom has progressed ever since, but if
this progress is meant to be the purposeful conditioning of the human mind as to
disregard the natural tendency of satiation in order to have the freedom of choice
between hundreds of brands given growth-necessities, then this progress would
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appear to be rather a regress in the conceptualisation of freedom. Under this frame,
‘consumer sovereignty’ becomes a cynical notion.
Another argument often put forth against the policy proposals which emerge
from de-growth and the SSE is that their proponents want industrial societies to go
back to the caves, or rather to the trees. This argument overlooks that the challenge
consists precisely of institutionally channelling technological progress, that is,
innovation and efficiency, in a manner which leads us to a material steady-steady
state. This order is necessary, for innovation and efficiency first will not yield
frugality second – unless frugality is dismissed as a precondition to cope with
ecological problems. Besides, there are already hundreds of local projects
attempting to live up frugality in which high-tech is used, thus encouraging self-
sufficiency in energy, that is, photovoltaic and small farms for bio-fuels; democratic
participation and cooperation facilitated through social media; but also urban
gardening, co-housing, local monetary policy, and so on. All of this requires
technical knowledge in agronomy, architecture and economics. It must also be
mentioned that these local projects are not only a product of the bucolic romanti-
cism of the rich, as it is sometimes portrayed, but an act of reflexive self-protection
and justice. It is an act of reflexive self-protection if it holds true that we are on the
downside path of the Hubbert’s curve – let alone the threats of climate change; and
an act of justice if we resist to rationalise under the label of development the
emerging trend of buying large tracts of land in poor countries (‘land grabbing’)
for the purpose of securing future fuel for the globally increasing and constantly
renewed automobile fleet. Those who value tremendously human ingenuity in the
realm of technology, too often do not value human ingenuity in the social realm.
True, ‘social experiments’ have desolately failed in the past, yet the same judgment
can be made on certain technological experiments.
From the previous discussion, what are the emerging prospects for scholars, at
least for those sharing the view that global growth must cease and converge towards
a SSE? In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in re-evaluating GDP-
growth. An example of this can be found in France where a commission led by
Stiglitz published a report on the issue in 2009, and presently a similar commission
is working on the same topic in Germany. Prior to these reports, there was an
increasing number of publications dealing with the measurements of the many
aspects of human happiness and welfare. These studies can be added to the vast
of body on green indexes’ research which emerged from the interrelated debates on
sustainability and growth. Concerning de-growth and the SSE there is still room for
research regarding potential combinations with previous indexes and for different
regions. It is important, however, to highlight that although such indexes are
undoubtedly needed, they must be complemented with the additional study and
evaluation of alternative institutional arrangements. These alternatives may take the
form of encouraging other judicial forms of companies such as cooperatives,
familiar firms and foundations which, different from joint-stock companies, are
more interested in a steady-income stream than in profits and expansion, as
Binswanger (2009) explains. The assessment of these institutional forms which
could make economies less dependent on economic growth with reference to
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factors such as employment is of vital importance. Otherwise, the discussion on
metrics will remain in modern Platonism.
As previously mentioned, there are already hundreds of on-going local
experiments consciously practicing frugality which may require closer study
regarding for example, how they function and what is the potential for extending
these models regionally and beyond. These ‘experiments’ are not only being
pursued in local villages in rich countries using sophisticated tools, but also in
poor countries – poor in income terms. In Latin America there are larger attempts to
re-build sustainable societies, which are guided to some extent by autochthonous
notions. They are, needless to say, highly controversial and even antagonised from
inside and outside. For instance, a couple of years ago the constitutions of Bolivia
and Ecuador introduced the indigenous notion ‘sumak kawsay’ (good life) as an
overriding societal goal instead of economic growth and development. Regardless
of the difficulties of understanding this notion, it is enough to state that it gives
nature or ‘Pachamama’ (mother earth) an overriding place, in which human life and
other sentient beings are contained. It follows that Pachamama cannot possibly be
abused for insatiable human wants. Whilst being cautious with comparisons, it may
resemble the line of argument of Polanyi with his term ‘embeddedness’ unlike the
disembedded spheres or quasi-independent pillars of SD. If this comparison was
allowed, it would support the theory that in the history of humanity nature once had
a sacred place in culture, and that the deviation of this pattern is, by historical
standards, rather novel. Anyhow, the study of these attempts, their on-going
successes and failures open up the possibilities of research for cross-national
comparison and broadly understood, on international research cooperation.
Retrospectively seen, it seemed naı̈ve when ecologists and some economists in
the 1970s assumed that the product of small scientific revolutions, evidence, logic,
refined modelling and common sense, would be enough to induce decision-makers
to actually make rational decisions, thus ignoring the inherent messiness of human
affairs. Although disciplinary research has become more holistic in methodology
and content, it still aims almost solely at the provision of advice to decision-makers.
To tackle this deficit, a new concept has been attracting attention in recent years:
transdisciplinarity. In ’t Veld (Chap. 1 in this book) presents a concise definition:
Transdisciplinarity is to be defined as the trajectory in a multi-actor environment from both
sources: from a political agenda and existing expertise, to a robust, plausible perspective of
action.
From this definition the notion ‘political agenda’ should be underscored. In line
with what has been written thus far, the understanding of political agenda should
not be restricted to the agendas that professional politicians at the regional or
national level and at a given moment happen to have, especially because these
are usually pro-growth agendas. This argument is also supported in the schematic
representation of the ‘knowledge democracy’ also detailed by in ’t Veld. The third
order of the scheme connects transdisciplinarity with participatory democracy and
bottom-up media. These connections support the cause for the local. From this
perspective, the action of ‘boundary workers’ should also include, and maybe even
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rather focus upon the boundary-work between science and community. This is what
is habitually referred to as education, bearing in mind that modern educators mostly
recognise the reciprocal character of their activities, that is, in the act of educating,
they are also educated.
This idea is far from exceptional. In recent history, in the realm of economics
and in a core country, it was Milton Friedman who initially understood that the role
of the scholar should not be restricted to talking or giving advice to professional
politicians, but directly to communities by means of numerous conferences and
videos; in a time when social media was inexistent.81 The redirection of at least a
portion of the academic resources and efforts spent on advising established
decision-makers to educate and learn from non-partisan representatives of civil
society is also necessary for the following reasons: the almost immediate effects of
an economic crisis (no-growth or ‘negative’ growth) mobilise societies in a direc-
tion – whatever it may be – while most of ecological problems seem distant. These
problems happen in slow motion, sometimes not even discovered given many non-
linear processes and middle term uncertainties; and impacting first and predomi-
nantly powerless nations. These features allow for adaptation and oblivion. More-
over, a cornucopian promising Eden on earth by letting business go as usual, and the
neo-classical economist insisting that the only need is to get the prices ‘right’ in
order to internalise social costs, will win over the ‘pessimist’ preaching the old-
fashioned frugality and prudence. Indeed, this will meagrely counteract the enor-
mous advertising budgets and the large adherence of the ‘top-down media’ to the
growth call.
The former reflections do not imply a replacement of disciplinary/interdisciplin-
arity science (in the sense discussed in this book). It would be a mistake to become
too enamoured with the local and transdisciplinarity for the following reasons. In
the social realm, the preference for the local is merely because it is hoped that the
constituents of professional politicians may be able to find new democratic ways of
compelling them to abandon ‘growthmania’ and to correspondingly make policy
proposals for a SSE. In other words, for the social researcher, as a member of the
community, the hope rests in the ability to co-trigger a wide reflexive process or,
being momentarily Hegelian, to further advance the de-growth anti-thesis. How-
ever, any local, regional or even national attempts can be easily discouraged at the
international level which feeds back to the national one given the present forces of
competition under which the current world functions. This case is crystal clear in
the failed ratification of the Kyoto protocol and the uncertainty of the process in the
81 See for instance the internet presence on the popular video portal YouTube of Milton Friedman
(1912–2006) compared with his contemporary fellow economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen
(1906–1994). The former yields 5,740 hits, while the latter only 20 hits. From these 20 hits,
Georgescu-Roegen does not even personally appear in any video. A search on Herman Daly
(1938–) yields 60 hits, while Serge Latouche (1940–) gets 310 hits. Fortunately this trend may be
changing. British ecological economist Tim Jackson, who recently published Prosperity without
Growth (2009) and similar to Friedman back in the late 1970s, has been recently engaged in
proselytising activities, gets 12,600 hits (Search conducted on August 22, 2010).
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following years. The same problem could be predicted if a serious attempt was
undertaken to tackle the Jevons’ paradox in the way proposed by Daly. On the same
grounds, in the realm of the social sciences, it would be a mistake to become too
obsessed with transdisciplinarity. This is because, as usual, any given methodology
must be subjected to the scope and nature of the research problem. At this level, it is
disciplinary/interdisciplinary science which must tackle the most formidable ques-
tion of policy: how to transcend the international growth-race?
Mill, the intellectual grand-father of the stationary-economy explained that
although this state was necessary, for ‘the safety of national independence it is
essential that a country should not fall much behind its neighbors in these things’
(2004 [1848]: 690), ‘these things’ being increased production and accumulation.
Back in the 1970s, Daly and Dutch politician Sicco Mansholt saw as a potential and
promising ‘deal’. This deal was the negotiation of economic de-growth in affluent
countries for population de-growth in poor countries. This door seems to be by now
entirely closed. Would China, for instance, who has saved a great deal of GHGs
through the one-child-policy, who invests vast amounts of capital in green sources
of energy agree with a view to becoming ‘frugal’? Would the Chinese re-vive the
habit of bicycle transportation gradually lost in the last years and stop growing their
car fleet while the most important overgrown countries do not even consider de-
growing their economies arguably for the reasons given by Mill more than one and
half centuries ago? From this angle, it is difficult not to succumb to real pessimism
on the international political ability to reverse what is truly new under the sun: the
disproportionate space taken by humankind within the natural world. Georgescu-
Roegen (1975: 379) with his usual causticity once speculated:
Will mankind listen to any program that implies a constriction of its addiction to
exosomatic comfort? Perhaps, the destiny of man is to have a short, but fiery, exciting
and extravagant life rather than a long, uneventful and vegetative existence. Let other
species – the amoebas, for example – which have no spiritual ambitions inherit an earth still
bathed in plenty of sunshine.
At least his dream of attempting to harness solar energy has recently found its
way in international politics, and his recommended ethical principle of leaving as
much as possible an intact planet, that is, its life-support functions and services for
the future generations was also adopted by the sustainability discourse years later.
I believe it is a good principle in spite of the difficulties in defining the time span
meant by the ‘future generations’ and that it may invite present inaction. It is a good
principle in the sense that it is the only thing that the present generations can indeed
do for the future ones, as happiness, welfare or even dignity are not transferable. If
the future generations made themselves miserable with a relatively intact planet,
this would be a choice which present generations would hardly be able to influence.
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Interview mit Serge Latouche. In: Seidl I, Zahrnt A (eds) Postwachstumsgesellschaft.
Konzepte f€ur die Zukunft. Metropolis, Marburg, pp 201–204
Lawn PA (2003) A theoretical foundation to support the index of sustainable economic welfare
(ISEW), genuine progress indicator (GPI), and other related indexes. Ecol Econ 44:105–118
Lawn P, Clarke M (2010) The end of economic growth? A contracting threshold hypothesis. Ecol
Econ 69:2213–2223
Levallois C (2010) Can de-growth be considered a policy option? A historical note on Nicholas
Georgescu-Roegen and the Club of Rome. Ecol Econ 69:2271–2278
Levin SA (1998) Anticipating environmental disasters. Environ Dev Econ 3:527–529
Loske R (2011) Abschied vom Wachstumszwang. Konturen einer Politik der M€aßigung.
Basilisken Presse, Rangsdorf
Malthus TR (1998 [1798]) An essay on the principle of population. Prometheus Books, New York
Maneschi A, Zamagni S (1997) Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, 1906–1994. Econ J 107:695–707
Mansholt S (1972) Le Chemin du Bonheur. Le Nouvel Observateur No. 396. http://bit.ly/ouuMK4.
Accessed 15 Aug 2011
Martı́nez-Alier J (1987) Ecological economics: energy, environment and society. Blackwell,
Oxford
Martı́nez-Alier J (1995) The environment as a luxury good or ‘to poor to be green’? Ecol Econ
13:1–10
Martı́nez-Alier J, Masjuan E (2008) Neo-Malthusianism in the early 20th century. Ecological
economics encyclopaedia. http://bit.ly/lNZWUe. Accessed 20 July 2011
Martı́nez-Alier J, Pascual U, Vivien F-D, Zacca E (2010) Sustainable de-growth: mapping the
context, criticisms and emergent paradigm. Ecol Econ 69:1741–1747
Max-Neef M (1995) Economic growth and quality of life: a threshold hypothesis. Ecol Econ
15:115–118
McNeill JR (2000) Something new under the sun: an environmental history of the twentieth-
century world. Norton, New York
Meadows DH, Meadows DL, Randers J, Behrens WW (1972) Limits to growth: a report for the
Club of Rome’s project on the predicament of mankind. Universe Books, New York
Meadows DL, Randers J, Meadows DH (2004) Limits to growth: the 30-year update. Chelsea
Green, Vermont
Mill JS (2004 [1848]) Principles of political economy. Prometheus Books, New York
Mishan EJ (1967) The costs of economic growth. Staples Press, London
Mishan EJ (1977) The economic growth debate. George Allen & Unwin, London
Munasinghe M, Stewart R (2005) Primer on climate change and sustainable development. Facts,
policy analysis, and applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nordhaus WD, Tobin J (1972) Is growth obsolete? In: Nordhaus WD, Tobin J (eds) Economic
research: retrospect and prospect, vol 5, Economic growth. NBER, New York, pp 1–80
Norgaard RB (1990) Economic indicators of resource scarcity: a critical essay. J Environ Econ
Manage 19:19–25
Nuttall N (2008) Global green new deal – environmentally – focused investment historic opportu-
nity for 21st century prosperity and job generation. UN Environment Program. http://bit.ly/
qnvbbI. Accessed 4 Mar 2011
Odum HT (1971) Environment, power and society. Wiley, New York
Otway H (1987) Experts, risk communication, and democracy. Risk Anal 7:125–129
Packard V (1960) The waste makers. Pocket Books, New York
Pearce D (2002) An intellectual history of environmental economics. Ann Rev Energy Environ
27:57–81
3 Growth: A Discussion of the Margins of Economic and Ecological Thought 159
Perrings C (1998) Introduction: environmental scares – the Club of Rome debate revisited.
Environ Dev Econ 3:491–492
Piffaretti NF (2009) Reshaping the international monetary architecture: lessons from Keynes’
plan. Pol Res Work Pap Ser World Bank 5034:1–28
Polanyi K (2001) The great transformation: the political economy and economic origins of our
time. Beacon, Massachusetts
Polimeni JM, Mayumi K, Giampietro M, Alcott B (2008) The Jevons Paradox and the myth of
resource efficiency improvements. Earthscan, London
Polin B (1998) Environmental scares, science and media. Environ Dev Econ 3:500–503
Pollard S (1968) The idea of progress. C.A. Watts, London
Pollin R, Garrett-Peltier H, Heintz J, Scharber H (2008) Green recovery: a program to create good
jobs and start building a low-carbon economy. Political Economy Research Institute. Univer-
sity of Massachusetts. http://bit.ly/P6O3X. Accessed 16 Nov 2009
Portney RR, Oates WE (1998) On environmental gloom and doom. Environ Dev Econ 3:529–532
Radkau J (2010) Wachstum oder Niedergang: ein Grundgesetz der Geschichte? In: Seidl I, Zahrnt
A (eds) Postwachstumsgesellschaft. Konzepte f€ur die Zukunft. Metropolis, Marburg, pp 37–49
Robins N, Clover R, Singh C (2009) A climate for recovery. The colour of stimulus goes green.
HSBC Bank. Global Research. http://bit.ly/qNUMCP. Accessed 20 Aug 2010
Rockstr€om J, Steffen W, Noone K, Persson A, Chapin FS III, Lambin et al (2009) A safe operating
space for humanity. Science 461:472–475
Sachs W (ed) (1992) The development dictionary. Zed Books, London
Sachs W (1999) Planet dialectics. Explorations in environment and development. Zed Books,
London
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Chapter 4
Development, Sustainability and International
Politics
Jamel Napolitano
Abstract The chapter argues for a lecture of the notion of development as strongly
linked to the uneven distribution of material and non-material sources of power
among groups. It thus analyses the rise of a public environmentalist awareness in
the late twentieth century as a challenge to the capitalist pattern of production and
consumption. Finally, the chapter aims to shed some light on the process of
mainstreaming these claims by subsuming them within the western model of
societal transformation, under the new, catchy label of sustainable development.
Pressing for institutional solutions to environmental depletion has meant to
further spread the sustainability goal worldwide. On the other hand, it has also
implied a kind of betrayal of the truly transformative instances of many social
movements and local communities, which were seeking for a revolutionary, rather
than reformative, path to societal change.
4.1 Introduction
This chapters deals with the history of sustainable development by going back to
the very notion of development.
As development has mostly been dealt with through international lenses, in spite
of the particular local issues raised by processes of societal change, the international
structure stands back as a framework able to co-explain the main processes which
will be discussed. Once we are aware of the profound power and geopolitical
inequalities among states and – more correctly – social groups worldwide, this
framework in turn proves to lead to a critical understanding of the rise of the
development notion, as well as of its continuous reviews and improvements.
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Beginning from point four of the inaugural address by President Truman, the
first section critically addresses the so-called developmentalist era. Since then there
have been many culturally specific interpretations of social change and transforma-
tion. However, our deep conviction is that, at the apogee of American and – broader
speaking – western pre-eminence, the scientific and cultural mainstream was
scarcely pluralist. Rather, developmentalism modernization-style tended to over-
look the history of colonial exploitation of most of the countries invited to replicate
the western road to well-being. This storyline, in other words, took for granted a
level playing field, thus missing the relational point and looking at any single unit in
the 1950s as if it started from the same departing point as western countries in the
nineteenth century.
Since the 1960s, however, and thanks to the ideological opposition between the
first and the second world, third world countries have expressed their unavailability
to be absorbed into one of the two geopolitical blocs. The rise of the non-alignment
movement coincided with the rise of, and was in turn analytically fuelled by, lines of
thought such as the dependency school. Against the modernization school – whose
main points are mentioned in the first section – many Latin-American scholars have
queried the atomistic understanding of development, outlining themutual relationship
between development and underdevelopment and coming to propose a delinking
strategy for less wealthy countries. To be sure, dependency as well as other counter-
theories had its own internal fallacies. However, it concurred to stimulate debates and
initiatives focused on a fairer economic structure on international grounds.
Criticisms also paved the way for a new attention to non-material dimensions
such as the cultural one. That cultural turn represented a first, highly valuable
breach into the economicist wall of many developmentalist accounts. However,
accounting for cultural particularisms has too often meant keeping the binary
opposition between modern and backward societies, under the label of modern
and backward cultures – with the inevitable and implicit assumption of the superi-
ority of the formers which were, not by chance, the devisors of these asymmetric
and mutually exclusive counter-concepts. Cultural intervening variables’ misuse
has thus led to the attempt to universalise a particular culture, exactly the western
one, as the most appropriate to the goal of economic growth.
As all these competing scientific trends were built, the international hierarchy of
power has experienced its own changes, the most dramatic one being the fall of the
socialist bloc. Thus, after a couple of decades of unquestioned unipolarism, the
most common description of the current distribution of power among nations is
multipolarism. As shown by Sect. 4.3, economic figures confirm the rise of new
economic giants on the international scene. However, outlining the new role of
national powers such as China or India – and thus speculating on a new national
leadership according to a strict hegemonic reasoning – does not seem enough if we
are interested in picking out the new cultural and scientific trends underpinning the
current structure of global governance.
Emphasising the soft sources of international power requires paying attention to
the ideational grip of a set of ideas, beliefs, institutions and so on and their ability to
not only gain the general consensus, but stimulate emulation. In spite of the
longstanding appeal of many dimensions of American scientific and popular
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culture, the main promoters of the new ideational trends are far from representing a
single nation’s worldview. Accordingly, taking for granted the weight of political
collective actors belonging to government levels different from the national one,
one of the core goals of the chapter is to underline the influential role of a broader
group of actors. Epistemic communities, entrepreneurs, media, lobbyists, civil
servants and executives from multilateral organisations, activists from social
movements, volunteers and practitioners from NGOs: they all participate in the
process of shaping the changing rules of the game thanks to a faster scientific and
lay knowledge production and dissemination. When their grip on processes of
submission and selection of social problems, agenda building, decision-making,
policy implementation and evaluation has a worldwide outcome – eventually in
spite of the local feature of the issues addressed – we can talk about them as
transnational elites.
With respect to the development discourse, the role of these elites over the last
decades has been twofold. First of all, they have been able to save developmentalism
from the impasse it precipitated because of the many theoretical criticisms and
empirical failures (exemplified by the lost decade of development), by adjusting it
consistently with sensitivities such as the environmental one. On the other hand, they
have contributed to mitigating the most drastic demands expressed by niches,
incorporating the topic of environmentalism without taking seriously into account
the problems connected to the very topic of development.
This is where sustainable development comes from. It was born thanks to the
popularisation of instances and claims originally disregarded by agencies and
institutions in the development sector during the apogee of western cultural and
scientific power. Actually, environmentalism could be looked at as a part of the
broader anti-systemic movement, aiming at a radical change of the capitalist
lifestyle. Then, it has been legitimised and, as usual, the institutionalisation of
conflict has led to a noticeable reduction of its revolutionary contents. Sustainable
development, as pursued by most of the institutions in charge of global governance,
represents today a reformist strategy, in spite of a long-standing, radical view of it
diffused especially at the base.
This is why, among the most genuine sustainable development promoters, its
development element, with its intrinsic reference to economic growth, still
represents the tricky ingredient of the recipe. The new wine appears to have a
good potential for being a very good one, provided that we are wise enough to throw
away the old bottle.
4.2 Setting the Development Goal
Since the nineteenth century, a divide was established between natural sciences and
the humanities, especially within the English educational and research system, as
synthesised by the title of Snow’s 1959 lecture, the two cultures (Snow 1990).
Between those two poles, a third autonomous field of research, social sciences, had
emerged by the middle of the twentieth century. According to Weber, social
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sciences represent a kind of via media between the search for general laws of
nomothetic sciences on the one hand, and the idiographic accounts of humanities,
on the other. In the aftermath of the Second World War, within social sciences
themselves, the line between sociology (tackling the issues of how people live and
relate to each other), economics (focusing on wealth production and distribution),
and politics (the art of governing the res publica), has been further fixed. Mean-
while, new fields of research had been institutionalised: anthropology, furnishing
usable knowledge on ‘others’ traditions once the decolonisation had been launched;
and psychology, addressing individual behaviour, emotions, shocks and so on.
Thus, different bodies of knowledge have tackled their own issues, mainly
relying either on the nation-state or the individual agent as their basic units of
analysis. ‘The division of labor among the social sciences has been a practical
necessity, but it has had the unfortunate side effect of overspecialization’ (Hofstede
1995: 213). For instance, typical anthropological concerns such as cultural diversity
were paid scarce attention by non-anthropologists during the post-war period.
The developmentalist discourse has risen exactly in the framework of that
general scientific environment (McCarthy 2007). Since the 1950s, the goal of
development became institutionalised on international grounds, put forward by
the United States as a kind of promise of improved living-conditions (So 1990;
Rist 1996; Di Meglio 1997; McMichael 2004).
Before that era, development – as well as the broader issues of change, transfor-
mation and transition – had been a controversial analytical dimension for the social
sciences, be it for the feared, often unspoken link with societal and political
revolutions, be it for the trend to rely on static analytical categories. Thenceforth,
however, development has been understood as a desirable, cumulative and linear
process that every country was supposed to experience in order to replicate the
western path of economic growth grounded on English industrialisation and then on
the mass production and consumption goal reached by the United States. In fact,
Few realize that Americans in 1776 had the same income level as the average African
today. Yet, like all the present-day developed nations, the United States was lucky enough
to escape poverty before there were Developmentalists. [. . .] George Washington did not
have to deal with aid partners, getting structurally adjusted by them, or preparing poverty-
reductions strategy papers for them. (Easterly 2007: 35)
To be sure, the idea of a one-style-fits-all model for the enhancement of living
conditions had been envisaged in the western political, social and economic agenda
well before the 1949 inaugural address by President Truman. However, ‘it is only
from that moment on that development policy became a truly global endeavor in
which the world was divided into two groups of countries or regions, the developed
and the underdeveloped’ (Lepenies 2008: 205), with the formers devoted to provide
the latters with development assistance.
Once that the pre-modern constrains preventing the full deployment of the
economic and political revolutionary processes – respectively led by the UK and
France (Touraine 1994) and epitomised by the rise of a working class employed in
the industrial sector and of national democracies led by elected officials – were
overcome, the goal of western countries had become the accomplishment of
166 J. Napolitano
economic growth, and then the building of representative democracies. Truman’s
speech, and especially its point IV, has thus only contributed to the universalisation
of such aspirations on a world-wide scale, launching the development era and
introducing the notion of underdevelopment and the unit of measurement of Gross
National Product (Rist 1996). In spite of the fact that ‘one can expect definitions of
the quality of life concept to be culturally dependent’ (Hofstede 1984: 389), the
recipe for national development was tailored on the western path of economic,
political and social change, and on western peoples’ experiences and desires in
terms of labour market structure, gender and family roles, religious beliefs and so
on. Drawing upon older analytical oppositions such as those proposed by Maine,
T€onnies, and Durkheim, the gap between modernity and backwardness became the
catching all dichotomy of the post war political, scientific and economic jargons.
4.2.1 Western Social Sciences and Third World’s Claims
During the Cold War, approximately two million people, many barely freed by the
colonial subjugation, discovered their status of underdeveloped or, in the best case,
developing countries: countries and peoples, namely, to-be-developed. Against the
western and Socialist1 worlds, the collective label for the to-be-developed peoples
was Third World.2 Developmentalism found a warm welcome in those target
countries, which enabled the US to pursue its liberal order on an international
basis. In fact,
Rather than involving whole nations, this acceptance came from small indigenous groups
who had been educated in Europe or had in some other ways come into contact with
European ideas. (Tenbruck 1994: 199)
1 The Soviet Union also tried to offer a socialist version of the formula towards the moral and
material progress of backward societies, pointing, alike the US, to gain the loyalty of peoples and
countries against the antagonist geopolitical bloc, consistently with the bipolar geopolitical frame
(So 1990; Di Meglio 1997; McMichael 2004). However, according to some strands of literature,
those two narratives shared many prescriptions for the developmental nation-state – first of all,
industrialization – and aimed at the same goal: bridging the standard of living divide between rich
and poor. For instance: ‘the particular recommendations of the United States and the Soviet Union
were not substantially different: strengthen the urban sector, expand education, engage in judicious
protectionism, mechanize production, and coping the pattern of the leading state’ (Wallerstein
2007: 56). That regimes as different as western liberal democracies and socialist states came up
with a quite similar understanding of development, in spite of the competing visions of social,
political and economic organizations they displayed, is hardly surprising. Indeed, at least since the
eighteenth century, scholars as different in their own political and ideological persuasions such as
‘Comte, Hegel, Marx, Spencer and others [had] described the inexorable, irreversible, stage by
stage and unstoppable advance of humankind through successive stages towards a golden age on
Earth’ (Du Pisani 2006: 84).
2 In 1952, Alfred Sauvy, paraphrasing the 1789 title by Sieyès (Qu’est-ce que le tiers-état?),
introduced in an article called Trois Mondes, Une Planète the notion of Third World, thereafter
become quite common to indicate both less developed countries and non-aligned ones.
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Regardless, this was enough to guarantee the success of developmentalism on
the side of target countries as well.
Thereafter, the process of knowledge production and dissemination in the just
established scientific field of development studies endeavoured to flourish world-
wide, consistently with the model agreed upon by studies of the history of science,
which ‘have shown that science is a cultural, social activity permeated with values
and preferences’ (Turnhout 2010: 26). Social sciences reconciled with the ‘danger-
ous’ topic of change and commenced to understand development through a norma-
tive approach. In other words, the transformation issue gained full legitimacy within
theoretical and practical debates. Drawing upon the former idea of progress – and
legitimising it definitively after centuries of diatribes between conservatives and
progressives – development came to be known as a linear, cumulative and ameliora-
tive trajectory towards modernity, consistently with the older functionalist and
evolutionist approaches. This scientific, political and institutional view of the
so-called modernization school implied the reference to a metaphor, projecting the
main features of the development of natural organism – directionality, continuity,
cumulativeness, irreversibility – onto the social world: this analytical artifice led to
the naturalisation and universalisation of a particular history, the western one (Rist
1996).3 Consistently with an ascending vision of the history which has seldom
recognised other approaches to the temporal dimension as equally legitimate (Pomian
1979; Du Pisani 2006; Featherstone and Venn 2006; Ribeiro 2007), developing
countries were supposed to pass through a number of historical steps until the full
accomplishment of modernisation. ‘The new assumption was that, if the countries of
the South would only adopt the proper policies, they would 1 day, some time in the
future, become as technologically modern as wealthy as the countries of the North’
(Wallerstein 2005: 1264).
Of course, modernity referred to the widespread diffusion of the capitalist mode
of production and consumption. It also implied the downplaying of those unequal
power relations (Pieterse 1994) underpinning western economic path of develop-
ment both with regard to the social imbalances inside the northern states themselves
and the exploitative relationship between richer states and their peripheral colonies.
This is why, among the many criticisms the development discourse has triggered, it
has been defined as a project (McMichael 2004) or a colonial discourse (Escobar
1995). It has also been considered an ideology the same way as communism, for it
favoured the attainment of collective outcomes and presented itself as a scientific
theory framed by technicians, scientists, experts, planners and the like: ‘it shares the
3 ‘This identification of modernity with the process of modernization, this absolute confidence in
the ‘progress of the human spirit’, to quote the title of one of Condorcet’s works, and in the
necessity of destroying the old world was so total, so obvious to the majority of Westerners, that
still today, at the end of a century defined by a great diversity of modes of modernization and
resource development [. . .] the Western countries resist any analysis of their own specific mode of
modernization, so convinced of their own incarnation of universal modernity itself’ (Touraine
1994: 121).
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common ideological characteristic of suggesting there is only one correct answer,
and it tolerates little dissent’ (Easterly 2007: 31).
Thus, during the golden age of developmentalism, the modernization view
informed, first of all, the economicistic approach, epitomised by the evolutionistic
work of Walt Rostow, who equated the stage of mass consumption, following the
phases of take-off and maturity, with the final stage of the path nation-states follow
to become developed. The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Mani-
festo, was published in the early 1960s, at the very end of a more than 10-year
leadership of the MIT Center for International Studies. Rostow’s involvement in
US foreign policy is not astounding; rather, it provides us with a clearer idea of the
link between American geopolitical concerns during the Cold War and the zenith of
the developmentalist discourse. American-style modernisation had to be realised
even at the cost of an externally driven, bloody revolution (So 1990). This was the
view taken within one of the most authoritative schools of economics and interna-
tional politics of the time; a school which has traditionally been ‘more loosely
oriented to democratic values than that by sociologists of modernization or by
comparative political scientists’ (McCarthy 2007: 12).
Indeed, mirroring the disciplinary specialisation of that period, there was also a
strong research line on political modernisation. Under the aegis of the Social
Science Research Council’s Committee on Comparative Politics, and the leadership
of Gabriel Almond previously, and of Lucien Pye later, scholars such as Coleman
carried out their inquiry in the field of political development ‘pervaded by the
dominant ethos of scientificity, with its emphasis on behavioralism, value-free
inquiry, quantitative measurement, the discovery and testing of empirical laws
[. . .]. And it generally underwrote the need for strong postcolonial states to direct
the modernization process through central planning guided by scientifically trained
experts’ (ibid.: 11).
Finally, there was a stricter sociological approach to modernisation, too. Its main
research centre was the Harvard Department of Social Relations, under the leader-
ship of Talcott Parsons. Strongly relying on Darwinian naturalistic explanations and
Weberian culturalistic legacies, Harvard University scholars such as Levy and
Smelser focused on the gap between modern and backyard societies and, with
David McClelland’s works on the achieving society, were also able to propose a
psychological reading of the process of modernisation. Briefly, the general thesis
was that
The development process [postcolonial societies] had already begun under colonial regimes
could best be completing by their adopting Western attitudes, values, practices, and
institutions – including market mechanisms and state bureaucracies, industrialisation and
urbanization, secularization and rationalization, the rule of law and democratization, social
mobility and mass education, and so forth. And all this could best be accomplished with the
assistance of already developed societies and under the management of strong national
states. (ibid.: 10)
On the domestic ground, the main agencies of these developmentalist strategies
were the nation-states, the main unit of analysis in the field of social sciences. Besides
the emphasis on economic growth – to be pursued through industrialisation – the
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second universal ingredient of the development project was thus the nation-state
(McMichael 2004).4 Nation-states were developmental states, strongly involved in
the goal of economic growth – that is to say, of obtaining an increased per capita
GNP, the traditional development measure (Easterly 2007) – and, to a lesser or to a
greater extent, also concerned with citizens’ wellbeing – consistently with the apogee
of Keynesian welfare state (McCarthy 2007) and its implementation within national
frameworks differing with regard to their own specific administrative, social, economic
and religious traditions.
The geopolitical context of the golden age of development was also relatively stable:
Cold war rivalry governed much of the political geography of the development project.
(McMichael 2004: 48)
Among its main political, military and socio-economic effects, Cold War with
its corollary of the balance of power between the US and the URSS and in the more
general framework of decolonisation influenced first of all the developmentalist
discourse. Moreover, it had a dramatic impact on the international relations
between developed and developing countries as well as among the non-aligned
countries themselves.
For instance, the bipolar context both stimulated and somehow frustrated politi-
cal ventures such as the 1955 Bandung Conference hosted by President Sukarno
and joined by many Asian and African countries – against the neo-imperialism
and neo-colonialism of the two major superpowers; as well as the formal establish-
ment of the non-aligned movement led by Indonesia, India, Egypt and
Yugoslavia, and inspired by the principle of non-interference in international
affairs. Since the 1960s, ‘the Non-Aligned Movement shifted from primarily
political preoccupations, such as the liberation of the remaining colonies, towards
a focus upon economic underdevelopment as the root cause of their political
impotence’ (Worsley 1994: 85). From the economic point of view, at stake was
the economic model of development pointed out by the existing multilateral
institutional order and epitomised by the Bretton Woods system.
One of the first collective challenges against the international economic structure
underpinning developmentalism was the establishment of the Group of 77, joined
by Third World countries and attempting to obtain the reform of the international
trade especially through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment. If nothing, these claims had an institutional impact on the way development
was understood by core international agencies: since the late 1960s, for instance, a
new focus on equity was introduced within the developmental discourse, as
demonstrated by the growing attention towards the matter of basic needs – a
topic whose roots were definitely non-institutional. After a strong emphasis on
economic growth as the way to improve material wellbeing, the traditionally
economicistic analyses of development institutions were widened by a new
4 ‘A discipline which emerged in the early post-World War II period, [. . .] development studies
always took for granted the context of national economies and nation-states’ (Rapley 2008: 180).
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attention to social, cultural and political dimensions. It was pursued, for instance,
through the incorporation of the Human Development Index and the Human
Freedom Index, whose establishment and diffusion owed quite a lot to the activities
of the United Nations Development Program (McCarthy 2007). Unfortunately, the
institutionalisation of the basic needs approach led to its adoption as a theoretical as
well as a practical paradigm by many international aid agencies without triggering
any serious reassessment of development projects.
A further expression of the issues collectively raised by many to-be-developed
took the form of the 1974 proposal to the United Nations for a New Economic
International Order. The initiative of the G-77 was strongly influenced by Third
World representatives struggling for a united South and stressing in particular the
aims of economic growth, the expansion of international trade and the increasing
of aid – notions, according to Rist, even too consistent with the old order
dominated by principles of capitalism and thus advantaging, at the best, national
bourgeoisies of the Third World, rather than local populations and communities
(Rist 1996).
4.2.2 The Humanistic Turn
As mentioned, criticisms raised against the old fashion approach to development,
with its technocratic and economicistic bias, have brought back into the develop-
ment discourse an increasing attention towards non-material dimensions of pro-
cesses of societal transformation. Among the most important achievements for
development studies addressing wicked problems such as the material gap between
different areas of the globe and the more sustainable paths to transform this state of
affairs, we should mention the introduction of an increased sensitivity towards
cultural differences.
At the apogee of the development era, the concept of culture experienced many
reformulations, criticisms and rethinks within the anthropological community
itself (Wolf 1984), while other scientific fields have overlooked it completely.
The result was that cultural diversity ‘was neglected for a long time because it did
not fit in the dominant paradigm of the post-war period: rational choice theory’
(Meuleman and in ’t Veld 2010: 276). As for the development field, the acknowl-
edgement that, besides formal laws and institutions, market economies also need
‘norms or social values that promote exchange, savings, and investment’ – that is,
a correlate set of cultural, non-written patterns of thinking and believing fitting
with the economic behavior (Fukuyama 2001: 3130) – has been too often
neglected. In the aftermath of the Second World War, development programmes
aiming at the export of capitalist modes of production and consumption towards
regions whose economies were rather regulated through different mechanisms had
not paid attention to the embeddedment of economics within the social whole
(Polanyi 2001).
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Quite the opposite, nowadays cultural diversity5 can be defined as a global
discourse (Ribeiro 2007), informing a number of social sciences accounts but
still treated with scepticism by many anthropologists, especially those concerned
with cultural (Shweder 2001) and post-colonial studies (Fougère and Moulettes
2006).
Currently, there is a widespread awareness that ‘different cultures have different
need hierarchies’ (Hofstede 1984: 396). For example, while tackling the issue of
closing the material gap between rich and poor, we should be aware of how our
developers approach might fail to fit needs and aspirations of to-be-developed. As
far as quality of life is concerned, ‘researchers approaching the issue in ThirdWorld
countries have relied too much on definition of ‘quality’ derived from North
American and, to a lesser extent, West European countries’ (ibid.: 397). This top-
down decision-making concerning both the identification of the goals and the
one-style-fits-all model to accomplish them, is often condemned and viewed as
hierarchical and unfair by the very people who are supposed both to cooperate in
and to benefit by processes of development.
Moreover, if we adapt Hofstede’s statements on the issue of the humanisation of
work to that of development, we come up with further fruitful insights into the risks
experienced by developers attempting to offer a high quality lifestyle in accordance
with their own, particular value-standards (ibid.). This risk is still high when
development projects involve local practitioners: even developers originally com-
ing from non-western countries are often socialised to the same set of beliefs and
principles as their colleagues and peers from North America or Europe, at least with
regard to their own business.
Many Third World social scientists have been educated in North America or Western
Europe. It is difficult for them to free themselves from the ethnocentricity of the Western
approaches. This ethnocentricity is never explicit but is hidden behind ‘scientific’ verbiage.
(ibid.: 397)
In fact, since the end of nineteenth century, scientific and political paradigms
inspired by the civilising project or the idea of a white man burden, were
condemned due to their developmental or evolutionary approach to culture. How-
ever, as we have briefly mentioned, these criticisms are still being raised specifi-
cally against the use and the meaning of culture often relied upon within fields such
as development studies. This happens because misuses of the notion of culture are
common among many development specialists who still rely on the dichotomy
between modern and backward society, blaming the latter for its cultural inability to
fill the gap with the former. Thus, ‘in development economics [. . .], the view that
‘culture counts’ or that ‘culture matters’ is now popular in part because it is a
discrete way of telling ‘underdeveloped’ nations (either rightly or wrongly) that the
‘Westernization’ of their cultures is a necessary condition for economic growth’
(Shweder 2001: 3155).
5 For an extensive treatment of cultural diversity, see Meuleman, Chap. 3 of this volume.
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For instance, since the 1980s and especially the 1990s, cultural factors have been
evoked by agencies such as theWorld Bank and the IMF ‘as key variables explaining
successful transition strategies’ towards the building of market economies
(Fukuyama 2001: 3132). Asmentioned, the introduction of theHumanDevelopment
Index to measure standard of life improvements from a non-economic point of view
‘was one of the most radical paradigm shifts in development policy ever’ (Lepenies
2008: 207). This innovation, however, lost some of its revolutionary meaning once it
was appropriated by the most powerful western development agencies and thus
institutionalised from the theoretical as well as the practical point of view. Referring
to intervening variables such as human and cultural ones might imply a kind of
blaming the victim logic which does not take into account, for example, the possibil-
ity that development strategies might be useless or even harmful when pursued in
some contexts. The risk, thus, is that of a paternalistic account along the lines of: we
provided youwith the right knowledge, institutions, resources, but you have not been
able to take advantage of them due to your own cultural constraints which prevent
you from appreciating the good quality of this external help.
The point is that cultural variables as evoked by some developmentalist
narratives are often associated with the implicit universalisation of a particular
culture. Indeed, there have been scholars such as Geertz, addressing relativism by
establishing a connection between it and the value system. Furthermore, as for the
anthropological community, the joint influence of history and materialism has led
Wolf to claim that culture is ‘ideology-in-the-making’ (Wolf 1984: 399). The
unidisciplinary world-systems approach, in turn, asserts that ‘the very construction
of cultures becomes a battleground’ as it is a value- and interest-driven process,
rather than a neutral one (Wallerstein 1994: 39). In Europe, Bourdieu has stated that
the classical humanistic notion of culture refers to ‘the beliefs and behavior of the
‘dominant class”. According to him, this ‘culture’ is just a ‘culture’ amongst many
others, but it is imposed as the only legitimate one by school, universities, and other
cultural institutions’ (Harouel 2001: 3182–3).6
As we are about to see, the universalisation of a particularism reflects existent
power relationships at the international level. The ideal of material progress, a
typical trait of western culture, has been ‘exported’ specifically under the scien-
tific and practical umbrella of development thanks to the hierarchical distribution
of power among developed and underdeveloped states. Developmentalism
modernization-style has indeed been sold as a good recipe for every single
country, consistently with American capability to project its own way of life
and to stimulate consensual emulation processes at least until the end of the
twentieth century.
6 Situating culture in the frame of power (and economic) relations, however, is not a specific
feature of Marxist analyses of processes of culture production. Rather, in the 1950 and 1960s, it
also characterised functionalist approaches such as the well-known works by Talcott Parsons
(Paterson 2001).
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4.3 A New National Hegemony?
By the end of the 1980s, state-led developmentalism was dismissed due to market-
driven criticisms aimed at the failure of previous Keynesian recipes and the
corruption they had fostered among most ruling groups. Furthermore, theoretical
and empirical claims concerned with the worldwide diffusion of western liberal
values and practices as both the most desirable and realist scenario for the twenty-
first century experienced a further dissemination since the disappearance of the
Soviet Union, which brought an additional flow of Western economic and political
principles and left the United States as the lonely superpower (Huntington 1999).7
Thus, at the apogee of the Washington Consensus, structural adjustment was at
the core of most development programmes. However, development, understood as
participation in the world market and based on comparative advantage (McMichael
2004), could not represent the suitable catching-up strategy to improve the destiny
of postcolonial states
For the global economic playing field is by no means level. Its general contours were laid
out by the modern history of colonialism. [. . .] Moreover, the rules of the ‘free market’
game are, as usual, heavily skewed in favor of the most powerful players, who dominate
international associations, agencies, and agreements, from the IMF and World Bank to the
G-7 and World Trade Organization. (McCarthy 2007: 16)
Meanwhile, in spite of triumphalist western accounts of the years following the
end of the Cold War, the indisputability of American leadership over the rest of the
world proved to be quite brief. Rather, current years are marked by the decline of
unipolarism and the rise of other state and non-state actors powerful enough to impact
many areas of global governance. While, with regard to new powerful nation-states,
traditional power measures such as GDP still make some sense, the increased
involvement of non-state actors in the current process of reshaping the rules for
global governance requires a new attention to non-material sources of power.
It is true that, after the fall of the Soviet bloc, western liberal values, whose
bishop was obviously the United States, seemed to be finally free to spread across
the world. However, after the initial enthusiasm, it is becoming even clearer that the
US is losing its primacy over the rest of the world from an economic and political
point of view.
Among OECD countries, the growth of Gross Domestic Product is currently
slackening (World Bank 2010). The estimated US GDP growth was 2.4% in
2009, while, according to the World Bank, the Euro area is performing even worse.
We should notice that, around this time, several Asian countries were experiencing
a steady economic growth before September 2008 and were still weathering the
financial and economic crisis better than other economies. For instance, China and
India were growing at rates of 9.5% and 8.2%, respectively. Similarly, while
European recovery appeared the slowest (with an estimated GDP growth of 0.7%
7 See also Fukuyama (1992).
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in 2010 and 1.3% in 2011), and while the US is expected to grow approximately by
3% during the period 2010–2012, both China and India are expected to achieve a
GDP growth higher than 8.0% in 2011 (ibid.).
These figures are hardly surprising. Rather, they perfectly mirror longstanding
Western concerns regarding the economic boom of Asian countries: Japan first, the
Asian tigers next, and finally China or even India.
Among International Politics analysts, these arguments date back to the 1970s,
when several scholars stressed the relative decline in the overwhelming primacy
once enjoyed by the United States, and anticipated that the days of American
leadership were over. Indeed, the latest debates have focused on the supposed
hegemonic decline of the United States (due to its loss of economic pre-eminence
and/or ideological attraction), the identification of rising competitors (e.g. Japan,
Russia, China, India and even the EU), and the projections of upcoming interna-
tional scenarios – a new hegemony, a balance of power or a condominium of great
powers (Kupchan 2002; Sur 2002; Foot 2006; Hurrel 2006).
Hence, global leadership appears today much fragmented with regard to both the
material and the non-material dimensions of power. Indeed, beyond the traditional
measures of power, it is even more noticeable that the shift towards multipolarism is
well felt also within extra-material dimensions. Accordingly, besides the relative
distribution of economic and military power in the international structure, there is a
further point to make about the purported decline of the American ability to lead the
rest of the world. It concerns the so called soft power, the broad cultural appeal that
a powerful actor exercises over the others and through which it either gains a
hegemonic position within the international structure or, at least, strongly impacts
the rules of global governance.
A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries
want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is
just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to get
others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power – that is, getting others to
want what you want – might be called indirect or co-optive power behavior. It [. . .] can rest
on the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that
shapes the preferences that others express. (Nye 1990: 31, emphasis added)
Nye’s now classical notion of soft power resembles, somehow, the notion of
world hegemony. The latter, indeed, when unconstrained by a positivist operatio-
nalisation of power admitting only material, measurable dimensions such as eco-
nomic and military strength, is made up by qualitative elements, too.8 Hegemony,
then, ‘refers to the attainment of ‘common sense’ status by some set of ideas and
institutions’. Furthermore, it implies the ‘rule of a class or class alliance through a
combination of consent and coercion, the capacity for a ruling bloc to set the agenda
8Among the many works making the point of the qualitative dimension of power from an IR point
of view, (see: Cox 1983; Keohane 1984; Rapkin 1990; Wallerstein 1991; The Forum 1994; Rupert
1995; Robinson 1996; Taylor 1996; Modelski 1999; Brzezinski 2004; Fontana 2006; Lentner
2006).
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for various institutions and actors without constantly resorting to force’ (Sherman
1999: 87).
That the US has relied upon immaterial sources of power until now, is a matter of
fact. What is less obvious is whether it will preserve its soft power in the near future.
In recent years, American international behaviour has led to strongly criticised
foreign policy decisions and to a reduced multilateral commitment in many issue
areas,9 such as the environment. Consistently, several analyses – some more, some
less normative – have proliferated, concerning the weight of soft power and the
need for multilateralism and eventually for a policy of burden sharing.10 Even a
former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has called for a more
universalistic model of American leadership, for
To be viewed as legitimate, that leadership has to reflect comprehensive global interests; to
be effective, it must be backed by allies with similar popular convictions and societal
values. (Brzezinski 2004: 87)
To sum up, the appeal of the American dream today appears quite doubtful, as
well as its ability to be considered the best model to emulate and thus to gain the
consensual loyalty of the so-called followers. However, even more controversial is
the issue of the purported challengers’ capability to not become hegemons them-
selves but, at least, to take the lead of global governance by means of the universa-
lisation of their own pattern for action and thought.
China does not seem able to wield a widespread cultural and ideological
attraction. First of all, it is not a democracy, which strongly invalidates its chances
of being welcomed as a leading power by other countries and to project its domestic
structure internationally as an appealing one. China, moreover, lacks any of the
welfare measures which represent the foundations of citizenship within Western
political cultures. Although social protections are more and more under attack even
in European countries, a rearrangement of liberal social democracies consistent
with Chinese political and economic architecture does not seem plausible. Finally,
with regards to the material sources of international influence, we should mention
that China’s economic growth is strongly dependent on exports, as it still lacks a
secure domestic consumption market (IMF 2009) until the full consolidation of its
own middle-class and in spite of its demographic weight; and that its military
capabilities, growing as they may be, still remain weak with respect to US military
primacy (Weber 2005).
9 The traditional anti-Americanism of a few European elites has thus turned into overt popular anti-
Americanism (Markovits 2007) – especially during the Bush administrations (Parsi 2006) – with
both a European and an extra-Western, and much bloodier, declination (Martinelli 2004). Public
disappointment is echoed in academic literature, too: in most recent years, a number of scholars
have expressed their concern about an imperial turn in US foreign policy (Jervis 2003; Golub
2004).
10 Among others, (Calleo 1987; Kennedy 1987; Mastanduno 1997; Posen 2003).
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India, for its part, has passed from the discouraging prospect of the Hindu rate
of growth, to the 1980s Hindu rate of reform, which has driven the country to its
current status of rising economic power (Boillot 2006). Unlike China, India does
not have to face international legitimacy dilemmas such as a very reproachful,
traditional neglect for addressing human rights issues; nor must it demonstrate
to other democracies that its economic development has been matched by
a consistent political development, since it is already a democracy. However,
besides noting its limited military capabilities, it is also questionable
whether India will take the lead for global governance because of its scant
achievements with regard to the fight against poverty and its progress towards
human development.
On the contrary, Europe might succeed in inheriting US strength, and in
matching it with a greater concern for matters such as social justice and environ-
ment. However, aside from the issue of their material sources of power,
Europeans seem unable to mount a cultural and moral leadership whose influence
might supersede weakened US soft power. Quite the opposite, the EU has too
often demonstrated its receptiveness of the American market discipline, as with
respect to the debate about US-style labour flexibility as well as European
rigidities and high unemployment rates. Currently, the EU risks missing the
opportunity to fill the intellectual and scientific vacuum which would pave the
way for the diffusion of fresh policy beliefs for the purpose of economic recovery
and the establishment of a new framework for governance. This happens in spite
of the link between the economic crisis and the mainstream approaches towards
managing of economic and financial matters – approaches which were inspired by
the US, before becoming a shared set of formal models and policy orientations
with universal scope. Finally, the EU suffers because of the well-known problem
of democratic deficit; it lacks a unitary political dimension, as well as a common
defence policy; furthermore, as we have seen, prospects for economic recovery of
the Euro area are not very bright.
Therefore, we are left with the puzzle that while the centre of economic power is
moving away from Washington, it does not allow us to expect the advent of a new
hegemonic nation-state able to lead the international system by means of a cultural
and normative framework. Rather, the analysis should now shift towards the rise of
non-state actors as agents able to impact the system of ideas, beliefs and biases in
many areas of global governance – and thus to impact, even indirectly – decision-
making processes with global reach. In many issue areas, theoretical accounts as
well as practical exercises of global governance are further fuelling a longstanding
dissatisfaction with methodological nationalism (Long Martello and Jasanoff
2004). Global governance, indeed, increasingly claims for the acknowledgement
of the many different actors involved, often informally, in a policy making process
which has worldwide impact (Cerny 2001). There are, first of all, non-state actors
representing either the sub- or the supra-national level to account for. Secondly, and
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especially when wicked problems are on the table, policy making involves actors
from sectors other than politics – such as scientists, entrepreneurs, stakeholders,
activists and so on.
4.3.1 Epistemic Communities and Global Knowledge
Post-war American scientific prominence in the social sciences had stunted a
genuine interest towards non-positivist analysis among IR scholars, and topics
such as non-state actors and discursive power were regularly overlooked. However,
since the 1970s, this trend is reversing with respect to both methodological nation-
alism and utilitarianism (Ruggie 1998).
Nowadays, a growing number of global politics specialists assert that methodo-
logical nationalism provides an inadequate analytical framework for examining the
contemporary reshufflings of power among national and transnational actors. In
fact, they argue that current power relations encompass more territorial levels, as
demonstrated by the flourishing debate on multilevel governance (Pattberg 2006;
Risse 2007).11 Furthermore, the dissatisfaction with the rational assumptions under-
lying the once preeminent approaches to the study of IR, has produced an increasing
interest towards ideas and beliefs (Yee 1996).
These new scientific sensitivities reveal an interesting feature of contemporary
research: the trend to overcome disciplinary boundaries of the past. Thus, after the
overspecialisation of the two more autonomous subfields of political studies,
policy analysis and international relations, we can now notice a fruitful mutual
exchange due to some interesting overlaps between their objects of research. Most
important, current scientific trends mirror the unsuitability of analyses of global
governance as exercised only within formal settings and by national actors. They,
quite the opposite, pave the way for a genuine reconsideration of who are the
main actors impacting the related processes of knowledge production and deci-
sion-making.
Hence, current political studies show an increasing interest in the role of non-
state actors such as policy networks working from outside formal political
structures (Capano and Giuliani 2005). Aside from the great differences among
the possible operationalisation of the network, there seems to be the opportunity to
identify a ‘minimal or lowest common denominator definition’ of it. Indeed, Tanja
B€orzel suggests that policy networks refer to ‘a set of relatively stable relationships
which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors,
11 Recently, and with special regard to the topic of environmental politics, a number of research
themes can be identified, as pointed out by Z€urn. They all admit that ‘international institutions do
matter, world politics is much more than intergovernmental politics and includes a wider range of
actors than states, and world politics is not only about power and material interests but is also about
nonmaterial interests, ideas, knowledge, and discourses’ (Z€urn 1998: 619).
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who share common interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to
achieve common goals’ (B€orzel 1997: 1).12
Policy analysis and international relations share a great concern for a specific
kind of network: epistemic communities. These networks are made up of experts
and technicians relying on scientific approaches and often referring to similar
interpretative and causal framework. They represent ‘a principal channel through
which consensual knowledge about causal connections is applied to policy forma-
tion and policy coordination. [. . .] As a consequence collective patterns of behavior
reflect the dominant ideas’ circulating, often supra-nationally, among epistemic
communities (Haas 2001: 11579).
Epistemic communities, thus, hold a relevant quota of soft power, for they are
able to shape the political agenda through the scientific knowledge produced in
many issue areas. Knowledge-based networks of scholars are directly involved in
the production and dissemination of scientific trends ranging from dominant eco-
nomic doctrines to legitimised knowledge and narratives concerning, for instance,
human rights, social justice and the environment. In turn, and especially when
wicked problems are on the table, politicians may draw upon these scientific
findings, provided that they are consistent with their own systems of ideas and
the available policy choices.
Members of transnational epistemic communities can influence state interests [. . .]. The
decision makers in one state may, in turn, influence the interests and behavior of other
states, [. . .] informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the epistemic commu-
nity. Similarly, epistemic communities may contribute to the creation and maintenance of
social institutions that guide international behavior. (Haas 1992: 4, emphasis added)
Among the most evident feature of that knowledge production and dissemination
process, there is its clear supra-national reach. Current literature on transnational
networks ‘concerns the weight of ideas, the significance of communication along
transnational lines, and the capacity of nongovernmental groups to influence
outcomes in international politics’ (Z€urn 1998: 620). Today, working on the impact
exercised on policy making by transnational networks of knowledge-based experts
in fields such as the environment represents one of the most important contributions
made by the constructivist approach to the IR research community (Ruggie 1998).
Hence, scientific knowledge production can be described as an interactive
process, based on continuative exchanges between scientific communities dispersed
worldwide and yet linked together by similar research interests. The way knowl-
edge is produced, the actors participating in this process, and the geographical
12 Building upon the former concepts of subsystem, subgovernment, iron triangle, Anglo-
American literature has been developing the notion of network since mid twentieth century
(Jordan 1990) to better take into account how actors other than parliaments, governments,
bureaucracies and political parties participate into the process of policy making. ‘With the state
no longer being the sole entity capable of organizing society, there is a dispersion of expertise and
competence, a multiplication of channels for mediation and agreement, and the involvement of
different levels of decision-making from the local to the supranational’ (Coleman 2001: 11608).
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spaces they come from and represent, are all changing from a specialised, hierar-
chical approach to a more transdisciplinary one – which is among the most
pressuring concern of those scholars addressing the topic of knowledge democracy
and societal transformations (in ’t Veld 2010). Most innovative, non-mainstream
approaches are thus making the case for the important role played today by values-
and interests- driven actors, linked together transnationally, often socialised to a
scientific approach that, if it is not the same, is nonetheless based on the same
scientific criteria and able to influence policy making at many government levels.
This does not mean, however, that scientific research, be it produced or not in the
attempt to furnish politics with usable knowledge, is free from value biases and
pressures exercised by core power groups. Featherstone and Venn, for instance,
consider debilitating ‘the hold that western knowledge has on experts internation-
ally, globalized in the form of the social engineering advocated by international
NGOs like the World Bank and WTO and disseminated through countless courses
in universities across the world, where the knowledge is taught as authoritative and
universally valid’ (Featherstone and Venn 2006: 3).
Actually, we should be aware of the mutual influence between epistemic
communities and economic and political vested interests. We should also treasure
classical insights from the sociology of science by Merton, who has underlined
how, ‘even in those countries in which the principle of ‘freedom of science’ is
accepted, states and political decision makers clearly have an influence on the
formation of epistemic communities’ (Z€urn 1998: 645). Indeed, as claimed by
Turnhout,
Science and policy are not separate domains but continuously influence and shape each
other in dialectical processes of coproduction. [. . .] Difficulties in the relationship between
production and use of knowledge are not due to a lack of information and communication.
[. . .] Scientific controversies are often characterised by competing knowledge coalitions
that use and reject knowledge based on vested interests. (Turnhout 2010: 26)
Thus, the innovative character of studies on transnational epistemic communities
notwithstanding, this strand of literature is under attack due to ‘its uncritical, almost
blind confidence in the role of science, which is furthermore detached from the social
context and relations of power in which it is embedded’ (Epstein 2004: 49). For
instance,
Policy-making on complex issue like sustainable development is [. . .] usually a relatively
fuzzy process in which many actors in the ‘policy arena’ are involved and influence each
other. The production of knowledge to support policy-making is also not a neutral process,
but is value-laden and influenced by actors in ‘knowledge arenas’. Therefore, a strict
separation between science (‘the world of measuring’) and the policy arena (‘the world
of weighing’) is not possible. (Meuleman and in ’t Veld 2010: 267)
Not by chance, the role played by politicians, businessmen and scientists within
such a mainstream temple of knowledge as the MIT has been extensively
underlined by Taylor in his critical review of the global discourse on environmental
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problems.13 The scholar also states that too often these storylines neglect the
issue of how social, political and economic inequalities impact negatively on the
way that a truly sustainable transformation is pursued (Taylor 1997). Addressing
the topic of societal transformation then requires the acknowledgement that the
content of legitimate discourses and worldviews, as well as the process of knowl-
edge production itself, are strongly influenced by geopolitical and power
inequalities, as demonstrated by the contents, the methods and the prescriptions
elaborated in many western think tanks, research centres and institutions.
While analysing the globalization of culture and knowledge, for instance,
Featherstone and Venn suggest ‘to give greater consideration to our participation
in the globalization of western-centric knowledge’ (Featherstone and Venn 2006:
1). Odora Hoppers, in turn, draws our attention ‘to the non-neutrality of knowledge,
especially given the unequal power to pre-empt the construction of meanings and to
determine and control the rules governing speech and practise’. In her analysis of
the validity of the centre-periphery dichotomical opposition, she claims for the
‘acknowledgement of the continuing impact of global geo-politics and power
relations on the legitimation of science’ (Odora Hoppers 2000: 285).
Thus, in analysing the process of knowledge production and dissemination, we
cannot overlook the point that even the most informal and avant-garde scientific,
political and media agencies focusing on the ways sustainable transformation can
be pursued, are affected by specific power relations and must always receive a
validation feedback from the outside – usually from authoritative sources holding
the power to decide what kind of knowledge is legitimate enough to circulate and
which is not.
Moreover, since scientists ‘interact closely in a global context’ (Bunders et al.
2010: 126) and tend to adopt the same set of principles and the same approach to
scientific research worldwide, especially when transdisciplinary research is
concerned, the point of a globalised knowledge has been raised (Hulme 2010).
According to Hulme, globalised knowledge ‘erases geographical and cultural
differences [. . .]. Rather than the view from nowhere, global kinds of knowledge
claim to offer the view from everywhere’ (ibid.: 559). Taylor, for example, strongly
criticises the technocratic and moral approach of global environmentalism for it
seldom recognises local differences due to peculiar historical paths. Furthermore,
he states that a globalised understanding of sustainability tends to ignore trans-local
dynamics accounting for how each local community derives its specificities from
the continuous interaction between its own social, economic, political and cultural
features, on the one hand, and external constrains and opportunities originating
from other territorial scales worldwide (Taylor 1997).
These simplifications turn into a very critical issue while we aim to build a fairer
governance structure supporting the transformation towards a more sustainable
society. On a practical ground, it has been emphasised that sustainable development
13 (See also Long Martello and Jasanoff 2004).
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‘as practised in the developing world is largely informed by Western notions and is
often funded in accordance with the agenda of multilateral, bilateral, non-
governmental and philanthropic donor agencies from the developed countries.
This is viewed as problematic because it creates new dependencies for the devel-
oping world and raises concerns about whose agenda is being served’ (Nurse 2006:
36). Accordingly, we agree on the advisability of questioning the assumption of
networks’ neutrality with respect to vested interests – thus standing back from
Haas’ claim regarding the neutrality of epistemic communities (Haas 2001). Con-
sistently with the suggestion that knowledge is situated, it has indeed been argued
that ‘which issues are defined as meriting the world’s attention has everything to do
with who has the power and resources, including scientific ones, to press for them’
(Long Martello and Jasanoff 2004: 5). Then it seems fruitful to enlarge the analysis
of the most influential actors able to reshape the rules for global governance by
taking into account, besides scientists and decision-makers, a larger group of people
informally able to co-lead decision-making and policy implementation processes
with a worldwide impact.
Actors currently involved in the interlinked processes of knowledge production
and policy making come from political parties, lobbies, giant corporations, multi-
lateral organisations, rating agencies, media, NGOs, universities, research centres
and think tanks – as suggested by scholars focusing on many different social
sciences topics (Haas 1992; Sklair 2000; Campbell 2002; Friedrichs 2002; van
Elteren 2003; Brzezinski 2004; Buchanan and Keohane 2006). They tend to share
similar higher education patterns and have an outward-oriented approach; in other
words, they usually belong to the same, particular cultural framework. For instance,
in spite of their legal citizenship and of their own business, we can expect most of
them to have higher education levels – often from well rated, Anglo-American style
colleges attracting a cosmopolitan attendance – and a good record of work
experiences in many parts of the world. Besides the consistency among their formal
CVs, they also tend to rely on a high, shared social capital even from a more
informal point of view.14
Hence, consistently with the transdisciplinarity through which multilevel gover-
nance of wicked problems is exercised, there is, beyond politicians and experts, a
wider range of actors to look at in order to investigate who are the most powerful
figures reshaping the rules of the game in fields such as development and
sustainability in this current era of power reshuffling. For instance, when we look
at a specific working environment such as international development, we are not
14 For example, it has interestingly been noted how scientists, politicians, lobbyists participating in
the British great season of policy change at the beginning of the twentieth century joined ‘the same
clubs, associations and other social venues’ (Campbell 2002: 31). Informal social links also play a
role in the reproduction of a working environment. For instance, ‘within the development field,
personal relations are critical in such relevant moments as recruitment of new staff members and
promotion of like-minded political allies. [. . .] Networks usually congeal into cliques’ (Ribeiro
2002: 173). Grant Jordan (1990), too, recalls the image of revolving door with reference to human
resource exchanges within stable networks.
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surprised by the many, powerful profiles involved. The development sector, defined
by Ribeiro as a power field because of the different power positions occupied by
insiders and outsiders, is said to be made up of
Local elites and leaders of social movements [. . .]; officials and politicians at all levels of
government; personnel of national, international and transnational corporations [. . .]; and
staff of international development organizations [. . .]. Institutions are also important
members of this field: they include various types of government organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), churches, unions, multilateral agencies, industrial
entities and financial corporations. (Ribeiro 2002: 169–170)
Focusing on the broad spectrum of actors involved either in knowledge produc-
tion, decision-making or policy implementation – and stating that those processes
are intimately related – we could conceive them collectively as a kind of elite
which, well beyond scientists and politicians, also includes, for example, influential
members of the media and business sectors.
In broad terms, elites have been sociologically understood as
Small groups of people who exert substantial power and influence over the public and over
political outcomes. This power is based on the possession and control of various resources,
including economic ones [. . .], control of organizations, political supports, symbolic means
[. . .], and personal resources. (Etzioni-Halevy 2001: 4420)
Growing globalisation has paved the way for the advent of transnational elites,
because of the increased weight of multilateral organisations; the legitimacy pro-
gressively gained by several NGOs with a global range; and the proliferation of
many other political, economic and scientific fora. Transnational elites embody the
ideational and practical stances of public and private institutions, usually having
their physical headquarters in the global cities (Sassen 1991).15 They are involved
in governance processes whose reach is a multilevel one.
Most of these institutions and organisations date back to the period of unques-
tioned American leadership over Western political and economic systems and still
maintain the ideational and practical orientation of that epoch. However, they have
also been experiencing a visible de-territorialisation, which means greater reception
of non-US concerns and autonomy from their former, single mentor. This change
mirrors, first of all, the reduced international clout of the US, which justifies a
multipolar description of the current international structure of power. Secondly, the
increasing visibility of global actors tabling the needs and wills from local levels
confirms the urgency to revisit the analytical assumption of methodological
nationalism.
Studies on the superseding of nation-states as the unique and most appropriate
level of analysis are all but new. After the introduction of the notion of transna-
tional society by Raymond Aron (Aron 2003) in the 1960s, scholars such as Nye
and Keohane have pointed out transnational relations, whose key feature is the
involvement of non-governmental actors. They stated that ‘any unit of action that
15 (See also Martinelli 2005).
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attempts to exercise influence across state boundaries and possess significant
resources in a given issue area is an actor in world politics’ (Nye and Keohane
1971b: 733). The analysis of transnational relations raises, among other things, the
attitude issue. Attitudes are beliefs, norms, ‘opinions and perceptions of reality of
elites and nonelites within national societies’ (Nye and Keohane 1971a: 337).
According to Nye and Keohane, attitudes are also shaped by non-state actors, and
the process of new attitudes fostering is an asymmetrical one because only the most
affluent and powerful segments of world population ‘are able to take full advantage
of [this] network of intersocietal linkages’ (ibid.: 345).
Then, transnational elites are, even indirectly, involved in many processes
connected to global governance thanks to their participation in the stages of agenda
setting, decision-making and policy implementation and evaluation. As we are
about to see, they are also the main agents able to legitimise and disseminate
world culture.
4.3.2 Transnational Elites and World Culture
Actors such as experts and scientists specialised in the same field of knowledge
and collectively understood as an epistemic community with a supranational
reach, ‘are often responsible for generating the very ideas that constitute the
world culture’ (Campbell 2002: 30, emphasis added).
Transcending specific scientific fields, this world culture impacts the systems of
ideas and beliefs of many people, thus showing both its popular declinations – for
instance, McDonaldisation – and higher expressions, as we are about to see.
World culture refers to the cultural complex of foundational assumptions, forms of knowl-
edge, and prescriptions for action that underlie globalized flows, organizations and
institutions. It encompasses webs of significance that span the globe, conceptions of
world society and world order, and models and methods of organizing social life. (Boli
and Lechner 2001: 6261)
Recently, the idea of a world culture has been circulating insistently among
social scientists. For instance, since the last decades of the twentieth century, and
consistently with the weakening of both rational choice theory and hierarchical-
bureaucratic approaches, political scientists have devoted much attention to ‘how
ideas, that is, theories, conceptual models, norms, world views, frames, principled
beliefs, and the like, affect policy making’ (Campbell 2002: 21). Surel has adopted
an encompassing label, cognitive and normative frameworks, in order to address
‘coherent systems of normative and cognitive elements which define, in a given
field, ‘world views’, mechanisms of identity formation, principles of action, as well
as methodological prescriptions and practices of actors subscribing the same frame’
(Surel 2000: 496). Thus, one of the outcomes of belonging to the same frame is that
individuals share a collective consciousness, a subjective sense of belonging,
producing a specific identity’ (ibid.: 500).
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The broader definition of culture, as well as its understanding in terms of
dynamic learning processes, leads scholars such as Featherstone (1994, 2006) to
make the case for the globalization of culture. Pieterse, in turn, has outlined how
this global culture must be looked at with reference to a process of hybridization
and creolization. Outlining the continuous, relational process of mutual cultural
exchange and learning would allow us to overcome the bias concerning the
uniformity of culture. He also points out how even western culture has been
made up during the centuries trough the interaction with, and the absorption of,
other cultural forms and practices with no regard for formal political and geograph-
ical boundaries (Pieterse 1994).16
The consolidation of a global culture, moreover, should not be conceived as
referring to a simple dichotomic framework – an either-or logic between diversity
and homogeneity (Featherstone 1994) or local and global.17 In addition, it should
not refer to simple Americanisation and Westernisation. Rather, one of the main
features differentiating today’s global culture from ancient and modern processes of
cultural colonisation lies in the current lack of one or more centres from which
cultural elements irradiate (Appadurai 1994) – a validation of our hypothesis
regarding the transnational combination of elements from many different geograph-
ical scales. Hannerz, for instance, places the origins of world culture in the
‘increased interconnectedness of varied local cultures, as well as [in] the develop-
ment of cultures without a clear anchorage in any one territory’ (Hannerz 1994:
236). Smith, in turn, claims that ‘global culture would operate at several levels
simultaneously: as a cornucopia of standardized commodities, as a patchwork of
denationalized ethnic or folk motifs, as a series of generalized ‘human value and
interests’, as a uniform ‘scientific’ discourse of meaning and, finally as the interde-
pendent system of communications which forms the material base for all the other
components and levels’ (Smith 1994, 176).18
The points to be made here refer, firstly, to the cultural homogeneity of groups
cross-cutting formal national, regional or continental borders; and, secondly, to the
power differentials allowing for the primacy of a few cultural traits over others.
As pointed out by Hannerz, we might recognise cultures transcending arbitrary
territorial boundaries such as nations and regions and carried, rather, ‘as collective
structures of meaning by networks more extended in space, transnational or even
global’ (Hannerz 1994: 239). These systems of beliefs, as this scholar goes on to
say, ‘tend to be more or less clearcut occupational cultures (and are often tied to
transnational job market)’ (ibid.: 243). Hence, we can imagine most liberal
professionals involved in different fields such as politics, media, business, academy
16On the same topic of cultural contamination, (see Gruzinski 1988).
17 See Chap. 2 by in ’t Veld, this volume.
18 Appadurai, too, goes on the difference between the globalization and the homogenization of
culture stating that ‘globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization
(armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies, clothing styles and the like), which are
absorbed into local political and cultural economies’ (Appadurai 1994: 307).
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but all employed in the development sector, as belonging to a common cultural and
scientific framework. These transnational networks encompassing the realms of
politics, media and science, as well as the private business sector (Graz 2003), share
the same world culture in its highest declinations.
Then, we should stress the ideational dimension of power dynamics, which has
been too often underestimated by structural approaches (Golub 2004; Nabers 2008).
In fact, leverage on knowledge and information is a major source for the exercise of
power (Risse 2002) and, not by chance, the highworld culture shared by most of the
actors forming the transnational elite is strongly influenced by initially Western
values and beliefs, and its grounding lies in a positive bias towards market econ-
omy. Supporting the capitalist organisation of economic relations, however, also
involves a consistent vision of socio-political arrangements (Ikenberry 1992),
allowing broad grounds for social, human and environmental concerns. Indeed,
‘western-like aspirations include the desire for liberal democracy, free enterprise,
private property, autonomy, individualism, equality, and the protection of ‘natural’
or universal ‘rights” (Shweder 2001: 3156). As Blyth points out, ‘economic ideas
can create the basis of a mutual identity between differently located economic and
political agents’ (Blyth 1997: 246).
As mentioned, looking at world culture as a simple by-product of American grip
over the rest of the world would seem quite naı̈ve. Instead, with the current multi-
layered distribution of power, transnational elites project their influence at all the
levels of governance because of their grasp on a number of national and sub-
national politicians, policy advisers, lobbyists and intellectuals. Indeed, as
Overbeek states, domestic regimes and ‘internal structures of states are adjusted
so that each can best transform the global consensus into national policy and
practise’ (Overbeek 2004: 11). From their seats within public and private
institutions, transnational elites work as ‘progenitor[s] of ideas, which they suc-
cessfully spread through bringing together senior civil servants, business
executives, and technical specialists in working groups that give real substance to
the concept of epistemic community’ (ibid.: 14). Local populations, in turn, are
socialised to a set of values, beliefs and practices delivered as universalistic in spite
of their particularistic origins.19 They range from consumerism to individualism;
from faith in democratic regimes to implementation of neoliberal recipes; from a
notion of globalisation as a self-generating process to the idea of multilevel
governance as a regime enhancing local populations’ self-reliance while addressing
the most alarming global issues such as environment depletion, global warming and
energy shortage.
It can be said with certainty that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with these
values and prescriptions. However, we have previously urged giving greater atten-
tion to intangible sources of power and to non-state actors as agents of power;
similarly, we shall now stress how systems of formal and informal rules are all but
19 (See Sp€ath 2002; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2007).
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neutral. Quite the opposite, they constitute hegemonic discourses framed and
delivered by the most powerful actors.
Summing up, the notion of culture is, firstly, becoming even broader to include
knowledge, beliefs, ideas, biases. In this regard, it is flowing into research areas
traditionally less sensitive to the findings of the anthropological scientific commu-
nity – as proved by the constructivist turn leading many post-positivist research
programmes. Secondly, the notion of world culture enables us to escape the fixed
borders of nation-states, by explicitly referring to many coexisting and overlapping
scales, consistently with the transnational character of both the cognitive paradigms
and the normative frameworks constraining the options perceived as either useful or
legitimate by ruling groups and other elites (Campbell 2002). Finally, as we will see
within the specific field of development, a prominent trait of this world culture is
represented by a wider inclusion of different narratives within the main story line.
Nowadays, ‘the voices and the views of the Third World are increasingly prominent
in world-cultural development’ (Boli and Lechner 2001: 6262), thus provoking
increased conflicts and fragmentation between the competing and concurrent pro-
cesses of cultural homogenization and cultural differentiation (Appadurai 1994).
Developmentalism was one of the cultural and scientific product of American
and – more generally – Western soft power, as shown by its broad application in
domains such as international power politics, national policy making, scientific
research, campaigns of NGOs, individual humanitarian concerns and the like. Since
addressing the changing nature and scope of hegemonic discourses and agents
responsible for their formulation is one of the major challenges for social sciences,
we will describe how – among the non-economic claims underpinning the current
world culture – we can recognise wicked problems such as environmentalism.
4.4 Whither Governance for Sustainable Transformation?
Since the 1970s, a vitriolic discontent with developmentalism has been circulating
among most Third Word populations.
The development process itself had displaced them from traditional lands and ways of life,
but without corresponding opportunities for absorption into the modern cash economy.
Dispossession, marginalization, hyper-urbanization, and the explosion of precarious
settlements and informal economies became symbols of a development enterprise that
had gone tragically wrong, betraying its most fundamental promises. (Carruthers 2001: 96)
While the days of developmentalism seemed to be over, today the development
machine is alive and well. How was its survival possible?
Today, the topic of international development goes hand in hand, on the theo-
retical as well as on the empirical ground, with the notion of global governance. The
latter is said to be ‘based on shared expectations, as well as on intentionally
designed institutions and mechanisms’ (Benedict 2001: 6237). Global governance
has a Western or, better, Anglo-American root (Friedrichs 2002; Martinelli 2005),
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is strictly connected to the process of globalisation (Friedrichs 2002; Pattberg 2006)
and is carried out according to the assumption that ‘human rights, monetary affairs
or security are to be governed by a global elite, because otherwise the realm of
chaos and violence [. . .] takes place’ (Sp€ath 2002: 1–2). Global governance
includes many levels for governmental functions, consistent with the current pre-
eminence of actors belonging to agencies which cut across state boundaries, with
the changing role of nation-states, and with the increasing regionalisation
connected to a multipolar structure (Pattberg 2006).20
Global governance can be understood as a common framework of principles,
rules and laws necessary to tackle decision-making in several issue areas which are
upheld by a diverse set of institutions at the sub-national, national and supra-
national levels (Benedict 2001). In spite of the claims for truly multilevel processes
of decision-making empowering local communities as depositaries of lay knowl-
edge and practices, this set of guidelines is mostly set by transnational elites. To be
sure, this is not always a unidirectional, top-down process. However, the concrete
opportunity for common people to effectively lobby top managers, chief
executives, leading politicians and intellectuals of the OECD countries remains
scarce (Risse 2002), the connections between several NGOs and grass-roots
movements notwithstanding. This is why the global character of governance
has been questioned (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2007) or why it is said to create
‘new borders of inside/outside’ (Sp€ath 2002: 1). Nevertheless, similar to
developmentalism, global governance needs and actually has an ideological appeal
for many people. It entails a vertical process of interiorisation of the transnational
elites’ policy beliefs by local officials and intellectuals, thus representing a consen-
sual tool for the management of global affairs.
Accordingly, the current rules for management of matters perceived as having a
worldwide impact are mostly set by restricted inner circles whose membership is far
from mirroring old binary differentiations such as developed and developing/
underdeveloped states or western and non-western countries. This means that the
view understanding global governance as a subtle synonymous for an enduring
American leadership or, even worse, a new empire, is a very naı̈ve one.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the US deployed its hegemonic
project by establishing organisations and agencies with a considerable supra-
national reach – such as the Bretton Woods and the UN institutions, as well as
the original nuclei of the OECD and WTO. At the zenith of the Pax Americana,
these institutions acted consistently with their major mentor. However, in the
course of time, they gradually started losing their territorial connotation and
attracted agents and goals from other emerging powerful players in the global
20 On the functionalist research program, pointing to neutral or, in the worst case, technocratic
expertise replacing several political tasks and responsibilities, (see Dingwerth and Pattberg 2007).
For an evaluative notion of global governance as a favourable instrument for the empowerment of
global civil society by the means of a multilevel, non-hierarchical and democratic exercise of
governmental functions, (see Scheuerman 2007).
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arena, thus incorporating competing demands and claims as the US economic pre-
eminence was declining in relative terms. For instance, the older IMF and World
Bank experienced an enhancement of their commitment towards and compliance
with economic and political concerns of transnational elites: there was a normative
turn towards neo-liberal programmes in the economic dimension (Harvey 2005)
and democracy promotion in the political one (Robinson 1996). At the same time,
new institutions for the management of world politics and economy – such as the
G7 and the Trilateral Commission, later replaced by the World Economic Forum –
were established. Finally, interventions of and prescriptions by NGOs gained
greater legitimacy, thus concurring with the present awareness for social, political
or environmental needs of several non-OECD populations.
To be sure, the Washington Consensus is not being seriously undermined, even
in the context of US economic decline relative to other powers. However, shared
goals, values and beliefs establishing common standards have evolved over the last
decades. Formal and informal rules have been adapted to one of the most important
structural changes, the end of the Cold War, as well as to the advent of new great
powers with their own international ambitions. Moreover, non-state actors such as
multinational corporations, financial agencies and international organisations have
consolidated their own roles in the process: while they had been mostly set since
late 1940s, we should actually appreciate that they have evolved through the course
of time. One of the core changes we notice with regard to leverage positions in the
context of globalisation concerns the increased assimilation of non-US officials,
purposes and values within global governance institutions. Currently, transnational
elites seem to be involved in a wide range of issue areas and frequently pursue their
own agenda through international organisations, independently from and some-
times even contrary to the declared policies of national governments. Indeed, their
American trademark notwithstanding, global governance institutions are increas-
ingly straying beyond US control because of both the institutionalisation processes
and the rise of new agents of power, be they state or non-state actors.
This dramatic political and economic turmoil challenging the international
structure of power is allowing an increased space for new criticisms within the
social sciences themselves. This is not a peculiar feature of the end of the twentieth
century. Rather, the literature linking previous hegemonic transitions and cultural
change suggests that a critical review of ‘the foundations of knowledge has
characterized each transition’ (Sherman 1999: 110).
As for development studies, we experienced the birth and the consolidation of
the modernization theory – with its assumption of a step-by-step transformation of
backward/underdeveloped societies until the goal of reproducing the western pat-
tern – in the 1950s. Not by chance, it was precisely during the post-war era that the
western pre-eminence and especially American primacy over the rest of the world
reached its zenith. The dissolution of the Soviet bloc, leaving former socialist states
with no developing model, enabled the diffusion of post-Keynesian doctrines based
on economic liberalisation and shrunk government. The modernization school
meanwhile had been by and large questioned by other schools of thought – such
as the dependencia, the école de la régulation, and the world-systems analysis – since
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the 1970s. Following this, post theories cast many doubts on the notion of modernity
as one of the most catching all metaphors underpinning developmentalist theoretical
as well as empirical narratives.
Current diffusion of post-positivism and post-modernism signals that ‘a new
battle of the books has been engaged’ (Sherman 1999: 111). This dispute on tools
and methodologies is consistent with the weakening of the old positivist monop-
oly related to the Western, hegemonic worldview. Among the many outcomes of
the current intellectual and scientific turmoil – named by Cerny (2001) as a small
kuhnian revolution – we should notice an increased consideration of ideological
and cultural factors underpinning scientific knowledge production and dissemina-
tion, as well as the most popular systems of ideas and beliefs. A growing number
of social analysts are paying greater attention to how cultural elements might
mediate or even influence trends and phenomena into the social, political, eco-
nomic as well as scientific arena. Since the 1990s, the post-development
approach, for example, has made a strong case for the interaction between
power and knowledge within the development field, claiming that ‘the knowledge
deployed in development is a product of epistemic perspectives of the ‘West”
(Jakimow 2008: 312).
Furthermore, growing criticisms against modernization and developmentalism,
have led to greater attention being paid not only to the human dimensions of
development but to the environmental ones as well. Sustainable development
. . . became part of the critique of neo-liberal development models [. . .]. In this sense the
sustainable development paradigm should be viewed as [. . .] part of the growth of new
social movements and the rising wave of discontent with conventional development theory
and practice. (Nurse 2006: 35)
As pointed out by Du Pisani, environmental damage, natural resources exploita-
tion and population growth were concerns already raised in many classical books.
However, they have become truly popular issues only in the second half of the
twentieth century, when ‘the Enlightenment promise of the linear and continuous
improvement of the human condition had proved to be a Myth of Progress, because
it was based on human hopes and aspirations rather than human potentialities and
limitations’ (Du Pisani 2006: 89).
Hence, since the beginning of the 1960s, western people’s consciences were
shocked by the publication of Silent Spring, which cast a shadow on that phase of
economic boom. In 1968, Garret Hardin tabled the Malthusian issue of the expo-
nential growth of the population size. The tragedy of the commons, the paper said, is
related to the inevitable destruction of those common-pool resources by the users:
‘a finite world can support only a finite population; therefore, population growth
must eventually equal zero’ (Hardin 1968: 1243).
During this initial phase, the United States took the lead of the rising green
politics. Consistently with its international primacy, it demonstrated its potential for
innovation in that new field of policy, thus stimulating, in turn, the distinguishing
emulative effect that great powers are able to set in motion with regard to their own
innovations. The US:
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. . . was one of the first leading industrialized nations to develop comprehensive environ-
mental legislation and regulatory institutions. [. . .] Much of this state activity was
underpinned by the world’s most dynamic environmental movement, which came into
existence in the mid-1960s. US environmental groups ranging from the more traditional
bodies [. . .] to modern environmental nongovernmental organizations [. . .] worked to
create broadly based domestic support for a more ambitious environmental policy at
home and abroad. US scientists and activists came to play a leading role in the global
environmental movement that began to emerge in the 1970s. (Falkner 2005: 590)
Over time, however, the US shifted towards a reduced commitment in the
environmentalist field, acting sometimes even as a veto power. In spite of that,
green initiatives were in the meantime being emulated by other countries. Many
cultural meanings of development, questioning the often unsustainable western
equation between it and economic growth, had begun to circulate outside few,
narrow and heterodox strands of literature and social movements. Green
sensibilities flowed into the official discourse proposed via science, media, politics
and business; at the same time, an environmentalist awareness grew among middle
and especially upper classes all over the world. Among the core agents of change –
whose common trait is the global reach – a critical role for the aim of a new
sustainability paradigm might be assigned to the ‘wide public awareness of the
need for change and the spread of values that underscore quality of life, human
solidarity and environmental sustainability’ (Global Scenario Group 2002: X)
At the end of the day, in spite of many dramatic changes experienced by the
global structure of power and of the rise of new intellectual trends, the development
discourse had found a way to keep afloat by co-opting in its rhetoric pre-existing
environmental concerns: ‘Green thinking about sustainability, a radical position 15
or so years ago, has long been institutionalized as ‘sustainable development”
(Pieterse 1998: 350). Public environmental awareness, defined by Levy (1997) as
a challenge to hegemony, has thus been co-opted into the hegemonic discourse
itself.
4.4.1 The Institutional Discovery of Environmentalism
In 1968, the UNGeneral Assembly launched the project of the Human Environment
Conference. Under the leadership of Maurice Strong, it was held 4 years later,
representing the first international acknowledgement of the need to address envi-
ronmental problems – mainly, pollution and acid rains. Kanie and Haas, thus, link
the date of the Stockholm conference to the beginning of the ‘institutionalization
of international environmental policy-making’, whose narrow focus was, at that
time, ‘on the conservation and management of natural resources’ (Kanie and Haas
2004: 1).
The same year, the newly established Group of Rome was laying the foundations
of a holistic understanding of the links between phenomena such as industrial
activities, natural resources deterioration and environmental exploitation. One of
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the core findings of their work regards the clear acknowledgement of earth’s
limitedness. Thereafter, ‘their ‘limits to growth’ arguments were successfully
used, on occasions, to challenge the dominant Enlightenment ideal of progress,
which could only ultimately be sustained by pursuing industrial and technological
growth wherever and whenever, at all costs’ (Doyle 1998: 772).21
However, the political and economic international shocks of the 1970s opened a
window of opportunity for once isolated environmental warnings to reach the
general public, the broader scientific community as well as the more open-minded
figures of politics and business. It was during this hard decade that ‘proto-
sustainability gained real social momentum via populist Green movements in
America and Europe when global catastrophe seemed to be imminent’ (Petrucci
2002: 104).
The 1975 Dag Hammarskj€old Report on Development and International Coop-
eration seems to represent one of the more challenging documents of the decade.
Perhaps this is the reason why it has been left mainly unmentioned; on the contrary,
it deserves more than a brief mention here.
What now was prepared for a Special Session of the UN General Assembly and
wishes for another development – a need-oriented, endogenous, self-reliant and
environment-friendly development, that is, a qualitative one – to overcome the
crisis of contemporary development, whose little successes had been achieved only
with regard to ‘the privileged minorities who remain in most parts of the Third
World [. . .]. For them the ‘gap’ has been bridged’ (Dag Hammarskj€old Report
1975: 37).
The report, thus, takes its cue from the recognition of a critical situation, to be
looked at as a whole made up of ‘a few dominating countries and the majority of
dominated countries’, tied up by unfair, exploitative economic links (ibid.: 5).22
Analysing the potential for structural transformation, it clearly states that the most
critical point does not relate to resources’ limits, but to their asymmetrical and
unjust distribution, an obvious but too often downplayed outcome of economic,
political and cultural power differences at the international level.23 Given the
‘diversity of starting points’ (ibid.: 35) among the nations, the idea of a one-style-
fits-all model is rejected; rather, ‘the plurality of roads to development answers to
21 For an extensive treatment of the debate raised by The Limits to Growth (and then by Our
Common Future), see Chap. 4 by Perez-Carmona, this volume.
22 ‘The crises are the result of a system of exploitation which profits a power structure based
largely in the industrialized world, although not without annexes in the Third World: ruling ‘élites’
of most countries are both accomplices and rivals at the same time’ (Dag Hammarskj€old Report
1975: 5).
23 ‘Sometimes, transgression of the limits results directly from a system of un equal economic
relations: peasants deprived of accessed to fertile soils monopolized by large land-owners or by
foreign companies have no other resource but the cultivation of marginal zones, contributing to
erosion, deforestation and soil exhaustion, while consumption by the rich, modelled on that of the
industrialized societies, adds the pollution of wealth to that of misery. An unequal distribution of
wealth threatens the outer limits from both sides at once’ (Dag Hammarskj€old Report 1975: 37).
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the specificity of cultural or natural situations’ (ibid.: 7), which should be
opportunely enhanced through processes of multilevel democratisation and
decentralisation.
Arguing for ‘radical changes in development policies and in international
relations’ (ibid.: 105), this report came up with policy proposals that would have
produced, besides a number of green side-effects, an increased government
involvement in the production and management of goods. As for the most affluent
regions of the world, the pillars of the sustainable transformation envisioned by the
authors refer to ceilings on, and price control of, meat and oil consumption;
rationalisation of living units to be built as greenhouses; a less consumerist
approach to consumer goods and the selling, on a non-profit basis, of high quality
basic commodities; the abolition of private cars, to be replaced with public trans-
portation in city centres and motor-cars rented by public owned companies for long
drives. With regard to Third World countries,
At the socio-economic level the reform implies ownership or control by the producers [. . .]
of the means of production [. . .]. Commercial and financial structures must equally be
changed in such a manner as to prevent the appropriation of the economic surplus by a
minority. At the political level, the reform of structures means the democratization of
power. [. . .] This is only possible through a thoroughgoing decentralization [. . .]. In other
words, each local community should be able, on the basis of self-reliance and eco-
development, to manage its own affairs and to enter into relations on equal footing with
others. (ibid.: 38–39)
Quite the opposite, a first glance at 1980s economic theories prevailing among
the main international institutions traditionally in charge of the delivering and
administration of magic recipes to developing countries, would let to conclude
that that was the decade of structural adjustment.
However, going beyond that still economistic understanding of development
drawn upon by agencies such as the World Bank and especially the IMF, we notice
that something was changing in the consciences of the more enlightened sections of
science, politics, media and business.
In 1986, after the Chernobyl disaster had shocked the world, Our Common
Future was published, stemming from the work of the World Commission on
Environment and Development chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland. The report
focused on the link between social and economic development, on the one hand,
and human environment and natural resources, on the other – thus building on the
suggestions and findings of the 1972 Stockholm Conference. The Brundtland
Commission questioned the old assumption that ‘economic objectives, such as
poverty alleviation and economic growth, should take precedence over environ-
mental concerns’, thus paving the way for current ‘integrative and holistic manage-
ment approaches’ (Jabareen 2008: 185).
The Brundtland Report admitted the existence of natural limits; nonetheless, it
also envisioned the chance to overcome them thanks to technical improvements and
economic growth. Overall, northern lifestyle was not disputed: those affluent
countries should pursue the target of a 3–4% economic growth, thus helping both
the general economic activities worldwide and the recovery of poorer countries.
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According to Rist, the Commission succeeded in outlining the imbalances menac-
ing human beings. However, it missed topics such as mutual exchanges between
societies and environment, and the cultural and historical dimensions of growth.
This meant that the Brundtland Report was unable to come up with serious
proposals for the solutions of said dilemmas (Rist 1996).
Almost 20-years on, an evaluation of the impact of Our Common Future states
that critics were right in raising the problems of uneven power relations and,
especially, of the ‘fundamental contradictions between the renewed call for eco-
nomic growth in developing countries and enhanced levels of ecological conserva-
tion’ (Sneddon et al. 2006: 254). However, the non-mutual exclusion between
economic growth and nature respect and preservation had been definitively
legitimised at the international level thanks to one of the most mediatised event
of the 1990s, the Earth Summit (Carruthers 2001; Bernstein 2002).
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
welcomed almost 30,000 people, coming from national governments, NGOs, and
the business sector.24 On the UN side, besides the third generation rights and
principles enumerated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
the endorsement of the programme contained in the final text of Agenda 21must be
mentioned. Instead of the strict separation between environmental, social and
economic dimensions, ‘it proposed integrated systems of management to ensure
that environmental, social and economic factors are considered together in a
framework for SD’ (Jabareen 2008: 186). At the local, national and international
level, the implementation of the programme for the century to come was supposed
to strongly rely on initiatives and ameliorations achieved by science, technology,
education and economy. Accordingly, Agenda 21 launched an innovative vision of
transdisciplinary, multilevel governance for sustainable development, referred to as
the procedural component of sustainable development by Kanie (2007).25
Summing up, by the end of the century, green concerns experienced a broaden-
ing of scale, from the local level to the global one (Levy 1997; Carruthers 2001).
Sustainability ‘has become the central adage of environmental policies around the
24Among the documents produced by representatives of the civil society gathering around the
Global Forum at Rio de Janeiro, there was Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on
Development, a report written by the Business Council on Sustainability. It exemplifies, with its
technocratic and mainstream understanding of sustainable development as a combination of
economic growth and environmental preservation, the new interest towards environmentalism
among multinational corporations. For a network analysis of the corporate/policy interlocks with
regard to the WBCSD as one of the most influent transnational policy groups, (see Carrol and
Carson 2003). From a more general point of view, an increased involvement of private firms as
sustainability partners has been wished for in Daily and Walker (2000) and critically analysed in
Levy (1997).
25 Kanie notices the request for a ‘broader participation in decision making. Sustainable develop-
ment is no longer the pure domain of national sovereignty. Agenda 21 calls for multiple stake-
holder participation, or ‘major groups’, at multiple levels of international discussions, including
NGOs, scientists, business/industry, farmers, workers/trade unions, local authorities, as well as
indigenous people, women, and youth and children’ (Kanie 2007: 70).
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globe, and the environmental discourse has been globalized and transcended
national boundaries’ (Jabareen 2008: 187), thus being subsumed by the exercise
of global governance. Moreover, the echo of Our Common Future has gone down
well with the specialised inner circles of development, and started reaching western
middle and especially upper classes consciences, thus affecting their sensitivities
and belief systems. Indeed,
Since the UN Summit 1992 in Rio de Janeiro the agenda of sustainable development is
programmatically linked to the inclusive and consensus-orientated decision-making that
gets people involved as actors rather than only as voters, and that gets sustainability
thinking mainstreamed in parliaments, the private sector, and science and humanities.
(T€opfer and Bachmann 2010: 58–9, emphasis added)
4.4.2 Mainstreaming Sustainability
Accompanied by liberal democracy and free markets, sustainable development is now a
pillar of contemporary universalism, embraced from industrialized north, to the less-
developed south, to the post-communist east. (Carruthers 2001: 93)
The new century approach to development, with its joint interest in the material
well-being of the poorer, the ‘traditional’ cultural systems of non-western people
and the preservation of natural environment and resources, strongly requires a
change of perspective. After the rigid disciplinary specialisation dominating exactly
when the developmentalist story-line was set, today coping with development
studies requires genuine but challenging exchanges and comparisons between as
many fields of knowledge as possible. Besides this interdisciplinary enhancement
on the scientific side, we can also notice a trandisciplinary shift with reference to the
increasing institutionalisation of partnerships between science, politics, business
and so on (Bunders et al. 2010). Furthermore, scholars and practitioners have begun
to enrich their analysis with factors and variables once neglected such as non-
material dimensions and non-state actors. Sustainable development is certainly one
of these wicked problems requiring the empowerment of actors belonging to
different circles and geographical levels as well as the promotion of different
cultural settings and belief structures. A genuine governance towards sustainable
transformation requires that local contexts have always to be allowed for, since any
specific place has its own characteristics and ‘what is thought of as ‘sustainable’ is
often dependent on assumptions and values’ (T€opfer and Bachmann 2010: 60).26
26 Indeed, for example, during a 1996 conference joined by the Environment and Developing
Areas Research Groups of the IBG ‘speakers analysed how far researchers can collect information
about environmental change and physical processes in a manner which allows researchers to be
aware also of their own social and cultural settings’. Moreover, they underlined the need to reform
the knowledge production processes in the environmental field in order to ‘enable new agendas to
emerge, that might support previously unrepresented groups’ (Batterbury et al. 1997: 126).
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As mentioned, Western developers have discovered a new interest in local
traditions and cultures underpinning lifestyles whose environmental impact seems
less dangerous than the western one. Besides the realms of politics and science,
media too have engaged in the processes of knowledge production for sustainable
development within knowledge democracies, thus affecting the following process
of decision making. Finally, environmental concerns are being incorporated into the
vision and the strategy of many private, profit seeking firms, too. To sum up, as
noticed by Du Pisani, even before the 1970s economic downturn,
Ecological disasters received much media publicity. Films, TV programmes and pop music
popularized the idea of an imminent ecological crisis. Earth Day was celebrated for the first
time in 1970. The Green Movement took off, the first environmental non-governmental
organizations (ENGOs), Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, were established, environ-
mental groups became more outspoken, ecologism became an ideology of some importance
and green political parties started making an impact. (Du Pisani 2006: 89)
Hence, our thesis is that the acceptance of the environmental issue among
decision-makers has followed the outside initiative model diffused, according to
Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976), into egalitarian contexts. Strongly felt, at the begin-
ning, among a few sectors of the civil society – such as activists and grass-roots
movements – collectively referred to as anti-systemic movement, environmental-
ism has entered the public and, finally, the formal agenda. ‘The language of
sustainability was once a discourse of resistance, fusing radical environmental
consciousness with a critical rethinking of a failed development enterprise. It
provoked challenging questions about scarcity and limits, affluence and poverty,
global inequality, and the environmental viability of westernization’. It has passed,
however, from opposition to orthodoxy, argues Carruthers (2001: 93).
Of course, the rise of the environmentalist issue at the top of the policy agenda
mirrored the difficult circumstances of the times and the absence of good
alternatives: ‘there were few ideational competitors. Resource management bodies
had traditionally been staffed by neoclassical economists and resource managers,
who had been discredited by broadly publicized environmental disasters and the
energy crisis of the 1970s as well as the limits to growth debate, [. . .] and attendant
popular fears of widespread resource depletion’ (Haas 2001: 11584).
Anyhow, as far as our knowledge democracies are concerned, we might maybe
see the glass at least as half full compared to the post II World War times. It is true
that ‘poorer and more peripheral societies are less able to bring their cultural models
to the world-cultural table, but many participants in the global arena from richer
societies have become strong advocates of the poor and peripheral’ (Boli and
Lechner 2001: 6264). Indeed, transnational elites involved into the development
business are more aware than before of the need to take into account different
development paths and to discard the previous dominating focus on material and
economic factors. ‘New formulations – grassroots development, pro-peasant devel-
opment, eco-development, bottom-up development, people-centered development,
and so forth – opened up myriad paths in the quest to conceive an alternative,
ecologically sustainable, socially-just development trajectory for the South’
(Carruthers 2001: 96). Development discourses have also incorporated a noticeable
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concern for matters of inter-generational equity and justice. As synthesised within
the three Ps strategy, calling for economic, social and environmental responsi-
bilities, development processes and transformations must pursue the joint goals of
Profit, People and Planet, with a careful evaluation of long-term outcomes produced
by policy implementation. Consistently, 1990s scientific literature ‘presented
evidence to show how environmental problems in developing countries are not
the result of short-term impacts of rising population or economic growth,
but instead the result of complex long-term human-environment interactions’
(Batterbury et al. 1997: 127).
Global governance for a more environmentally friendly management of the
twentieth century changes at the economic, political and social levels seems to
have more chance of success than in the previous epochs of great transformations.
The broad goal of sustainability has been adopted worldwide, thus facilitating the
embracing of green policy alternatives that would have found many vetoes only a
couple of decades ago. Haas can thus evoke a ‘consensual wisdom within the
international community of environmental policy analysts’. They share, indeed, a
simultaneous concern for environmental degradation, economic growth and the
material gap between the richest and the poorest segments of world population. The
new policy doctrine associated to sustainability ‘argues that most social ills are
nondecomposable, and that environmental degradation cannot be addressed without
confronting the human activities that give rise to it. Thus sustainable development
dramatically expanded the international agenda by arguing that these issues needed
to be simultaneously addressed, and that policies should seek to focus on the
interactive effects between them’ (Haas 2004: 570). This picture, however, also
has a negative side.
There is also the view that mainstream notions of sustainable development co-opt rather
than challenge, for example, neo-liberal economic hegemony because it shares a similar
foundational premise as hegemonic development approaches in that it still prioritizes
capital accumulation, for example, concepts like growth and efficiency remain part of the
sustainable development discourse. [. . .] Mainstream notions of sustainable development
fall within the narrow confines of modernization theories of development which prioritizes
an image and vision of development scripted in the tenets of Western technological
civilization that is often promoted as the ‘universal’ and the ‘obvious’. What it does is to
legitimize so-called modern Western values and to delegitimize alternative value systems
thereby constructing a global cultural asymmetry between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest.’ (Nurse
2006: 35)27
And what is more, even after sustainability gained its current status of buzzword
in the 1990s, ‘the Northern way of life – with all its internal contradictions and
stresses – remained on a non-negotiable track’ (Petrucci 2002: 105). On the other
hand, most of the local roads to sustainability sometimes compete with western
theoretical and empirical understanding of (sustainable) development itself. For
instance, local communities whose lifestyles are at odds with the tenets of individ-
ualism, hierarchy and commodification are often the real inhabitants of
27 For a radicalisation of the opposition between the West and the Rest, (see Huntington 1997).
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geographical areas representing a strategic environmental resource for the entire
globe; they know how to take care of these environments and landscapes in a way
which is consistent with their own beliefs and values systems.
Quite the opposite, common use of the notion of sustainable development
involves, implicitly or explicitly, an enduring reference to notions of industria-
lisation and modernisation which are, in turn, linked to the idea of economic
progress (Nurse 2006). Consistently, ‘quality of human life is routinely measured
in terms of access to, and possession of, tangible objects, particularly manufactured
goods’ (Frazier 1997: 184).
Thus, it seems correct to conclude that the developmentalist worldview has been
gradually reformed, rather than revolutionised. Decades of dramatic challenges
have produced many adjustments, but have not succeeded in eradicating the
developmentalist forma mentis from the cultural and scientific systems of beliefs
shared by the most important actors in charge of global governance and thus
assimilated by a vast majority of global citizens. These reformative changes
affecting the developmentalist weltanschauung might be understood by referring
to the Gramscian notion of transformism, ‘the cooptation of potential leaders of
subaltern groups and the assimilation in a more innocuous form of their most
subversive discourse. Transformism is an integral part of a managerial understand-
ing of power seeking to rebalance the deep social tensions arising out of global
capitalism’ (Graz 2003: 327).
Environmentalism had been downplayed by mainstream knowledge, science,
politics, business and media as a critical counter-discourse carried out by grass root
groups in the non-western world and by social movements in western(ised)
countries. Actually, it has now been assimilated as a legitimate aim within the
development discourse. The latter, however, is not fully consistent with the original
needs and wills of many local communities:
Southern grassroots movements, in particular, regard global environmental managers and
their powerful state allies as focused on managing the global environment to ensure the
profitability of global economic activity. (McMichael 2004: 253–254)
The point to make here is that the co-optation of the more radical understandings
of environmentalism would have meant a critical review of the capitalist mode of
production, which is based on material growth. In fact, as claimed more than 20
years ago, potential public problems win the race for societal attention due to ‘a
complex organizational and cultural competition’ (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988: 58)
and the selection of social problems is strongly influenced by their fitness with
‘shared cultural preoccupations and political biases’ (ibid.: 64). In addition, current
analyses also stress that
New ideas must find some ‘fitness’ with the existing international social structure – or
broader sets of institutionalized norms already accepted as legitimate bases of governance
in the international system. (Bernstein 2002: 8)
Thus, the incorporation of sustainability into the mainstream storyline has been
made by establishing the feasibility of two different goals, regarded by many as
strongly conflicting: economic growth and nature preservation. ‘For the Northern
governments and multinationals, this form of sustainability has the allure of
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requiring very little actually to change, particularly in terms of key values that
continue to be expressed, in spite of some policy concessions, throughout the global
political economy’ (Petrucci 2002: 105). Bernstein, thus, makes the case for the
compromise of liberal environmentalism, built upon the findings of the 1992 Rio
Summit, which ‘has enabled environmental concerns to rise to a much more
prominent place on the international agenda that would otherwise have been
possible, even if the original goals and transformative hopes of global environmen-
talism have been altered in the process’ (Bernstein 2002: 2).
The progressive overlap among mainstream, on the one hand, and human and
social concerns, on the other, can be tracked in the past decades, as implicitly
suggested by Rist (1996). Since the 1970s, an interesting alliance was reached
among NGOs and the development establishment represented mainly by the World
Bank through the diffusion of the basic needs approach – as already mentioned.
Following this, in the 1980s, the antagonism between UN style programmes, on the
one hand, and the economic and policy recipes originating from agencies such
as the World Bank and especially the IMF, on the other, could be overcome as
structural adjustment began to be understood in both the institutional settings as
structural adjustment with human face. Finally, ‘sustainable development ideas
found support within other UN institutions previously reluctant to incorporate
environmental concerns, such as the World Bank, which could now formulate
environmental policies that it viewed as consistent with its broader goals of
promoting economic growth and liberalization’ (Bernstein 2002: 10). Currently,
the general notion of human development – capturing many non-economic
dimensions such as sustainability – has reached a general acknowledgement,
which leaves, at least in rhetoric, almost in a marginalised position the tougher
stances of the IMF and more in general Northern radical liberalist views stemming
from the Washington Consensus.28
Because the new sustainability no longer threatens other priorities, First World
governments are just as pleased as their southern counterparts to grant it a high institutional
and policy profile. So too have supranational bodies, including the United Nations, the
OECD, the World Bank, the European Union, and the North American Free Trade Area.
Because it emphasizes technology, private initiative, and enhanced market competition,
business leaders have also responded, eager to shake off the image of rapaciousness and be
refashioned as defenders of nature. Finally, sustainable development is most concretely a
reality in the transnational universe of NGOs, from the smallest local grassroots
organizations in the shantytowns of the Third World, through the middle terrain of
28 The human development trend, however, does not fail in rising criticisms, at least within the
scientific community. It has been labeled, for example, as a final insult by Doyle, for its insisting
that ‘poor training and lack of ‘human development’ have led to these inequities; not maldistribu-
tion or exploitation by transnational corporations and elites existing both in the North and the
South’. This kind of blaming the victim approach mostly circulating among elitarian groups,
Doyle goes on, claims for a learning process enabling people to endorse the sustainability
discourse everywhere: ‘this is Northern imperialism, using the language of ecology as its vessel’
(Doyle 1998: 782).
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supportive intermediary organizations, up to the gleaming offices of the wealthy interna-
tional organizations of the north. (Carruthers 2001: 102)
Currently, a distinction between two environmentalist lines is quite common in
scientific debates. For example, Gilbert Rist’s analysis of the legitimation of the
environmentalist trend followed the publication of Our Common Future and the
Earth Summit outlines a contradiction between two main environmentalist houses.
The first group seems willing to accept production increases as long as they respect
the ecosystem, and thus to recognise the need to respect external limits to human
(and economic) activities (Rist 1996). This approach resembles the doctrine of deep
ecology which, according to Jabareen (2008), valorises the intrinsic right of nature.
It is also very close to environmental sensitivities of some grass-roots movements,
focusing on ‘the growing conflict on the margins between local cultures and the
global market’ (McMichael 2004: 249) and strongly criticizing attempts by both
states and firms ‘to ‘monetize’ and harvest natural resources on which human
communities depend’ (ibid.: 247). According to Goodin, often this ‘environmental-
ist action takes the form of protest politics’, thus resembling other contemporary
social movements with which environmentalists ‘share the same broad concern
[. . .] with the socioeconomic institutions of contemporary capitalism and the
acquisitive, materialist values underlying them’ (Goodin 2001: 4686).
On the other side, the mainstream understanding of sustainable development
remains focused on the universalisation of a faster pattern of economic growth (Rist
1996), consistent with Jabareen’s doctrines of light ecology, which tend to the
domination of nature (Jabareen 2008). Here, environmentalists’ key claims refer to
a better regulation of natural damages triggered by economic growth, and ‘chal-
lenge the assumptions and practices of unbridled economic growth, arguing for
scaling back to a renewable economic system of resource use’ (McMichael 2004:
246).
Generally speaking, that latter strand of environmentalism does not seem seri-
ously interested in negotiating the life patterns of the richest segment of the world
population. Rather,
Since attaining intragenerational equity requires immediate adjustments in power and
wealth within the present generation [. . .], the sacrifices contemporary individuals would
have to make can be avoided by deferring the equity issue to the future, when members of
coming generations will have to make even greater sacrifices. (Frazier 1997: 187)
Thus, this approach is almost forced to rely, at least rhetorically, on the goal of
the universalisation of a lifestyle currently enjoyed by a small minority of the world
population. This aim, however, encounters some strong limitations from both the
environmental and the distributional points of view. First of all, it seems doubtful
that the current models of production and consumption – beneficiating a small
segment of the world population – are sustainable in the long run. Then, there is of
course the point of intra-generational equity, whose urgency had been already
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outlined by the Dag Hammarskj€old Report.29 This argument is often disregarded in
favour of the inter-generational one. However, if we are unable to set a fairer
agenda for the present, the respect of the rights and the needs of future generations
become a lot harder to achieve.
Thus, while addressing the issue of the current unjust distribution of resources,
we are left with the auspice to universalise as soon as possible the wellbeing of the
smallest fraction of the world population. This wishful thinking seems to have been
fully absorbed within the current global culture. Unluckily, this goal is an unsus-
tainable one!
Current rates of growth in the consumption and transformation of environmental resources
are threatening the sustainability of this life support system and of our security. (T€opfer
2004: 1)
Herman Daly, for instance, considers sustainable development as a ‘synonym for
the oxymoronic ‘sustainable growth”, which represents, in turn, an impossibility
theorem (Daly 2010: 12) since, as pointed out by Carruthers,
The planet could not handle, ecologically, the universalization of a European or North
American mass-consumption lifestyle. [. . .] Global sustainability would ultimately require
facing up to the formidable political challenge of a significant redistribution of wealth and
resource use. (Carruthers 2001: 95)
Again:
Our way of life is unglobalizable; ‘levelling up’ all national economies to approach the
production and consumption patterns of the most developed would make the planet
uninhabitable. In particular, the levels of resource depletion and environmental degradation
they entail are physically unsustainable. (McCarthy 2007: 26)
Finally:
Any increase in [the poor’s] share of resource implies a colossal change in accessibility as
well as in processes of distribution and allocation. However, material reserves are finite;
consequently, a major change in allocation will mean increasing resources in some places
while limiting or decreasing them in others. (Frazier 1997: 185)
Put simply, alleviating poverty (development) without destroying natural
environments (sustainability) would require, by and large, a reversal of the current
patterns of consumption, rather than the globalisation of the high-consumption
lifestyle. Taking a longitudinal approach different from the one pointing out the
current, simultaneous presence of two environmentalist houses, a 2002 report
focusing on great transition claims that ‘the first wave of sustainability activity,
in progress since the Earth Summit of 1992, is insufficient to alter alarming global
developments. [. . .] A new sustainability paradigm would challenge both the
viability and the desirability of conventional values, economic structures and social
arrangements’ (Global Scenario Group 2002: X).
29 As the redistribution of resources is concerned, ‘it will be too late tomorrow to seek new
solutions. The future depends on choices made now’ (Dag Hammarskj€old Report 1975: 26).
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The environmental and distributive dilemma raised by reformist environmental-
ism willing to green the economy and not the whole societal organisation is not
accidental. Quite the opposite, this state of affairs is a direct consequence of the
diffusion of environmental awareness of the last decades.
Greening the developmentalist discourse has meant, first of all, a public attention
towards environmental damages. However, as we have seen, it has done so by
incorporating into that approach concerns, originally expressed by anti-systemic
movements, that do not go as far as to challenge the common view of the growth
imperative. Jabareen, using a conceptual analysis methodology, finds that linking
the notion of sustainability to that of development has meant a change of focus from
environment to capitalist economy. This ethical paradox implies that sustainable
development ‘is accordingly deemed able to cope with the ecological crisis without
affecting the existing economic relationships of power. Capitalism and ecology are
no longer contradictory when brought together under the banner of SD’ (Jabareen
2008: 181–2).
The so-called alternative soul of the post development approach to global
inequalities has thus lost its more critical features while being incorporated within
a unique, mainstream approach to development. The old opposition between
alternative and mainstream development has been replaced by a weaker opposition
within the mainstream itself. Since the 1990s, ‘several features of alternative
development – the commitment to participation, sustainability, equity – are being
shared (and unevenly practiced), not merely in the world of NGOs but from UN
agencies all the way to the World Bank’ (Pieterse 1998: 370). The continuum
within current development discourse, then, runs from the human and social
approach to the recipe of structural adjustment. ‘Institutionally this rift runs
between the UN agencies and the IMF, with the World Bank – precariously –
straddled somewhere in the middle’ (ibid.: 360).
In order to tackle the environmental degradation, our current approach to policy-
making requires, instead, a more radical ‘approach to governance – a paradigm shift
in the way that governance is carried out and decisions are made and implemented’
(T€opfer 2004: 2). In other words, there is still a long way to go if we want to adjust
current cultural understanding and technical practice of governance to the goal of
sustainable transformation.
4.5 Summary
In the aftermath of the Second World War, within the international framework of
bipolarism, the goal of development as the main strategy to be pursued by new
independent states was set. In fact, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, this
aim has definitively been transformed into the ambition of Sustainable Develop-
ment, a more encompassing process of societal transformation to be experienced by
every human community in the new framework of a multipolar and chaotic
international setting.
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What has happened over the past half century? This chapter has attempted to
explore the process of mainstreaming sustainable development, critically examin-
ing its roots and thus looking at its progenitor, the developmentalist approach.
Situating that discourse in the broader picture of power changes at the international
level, we appreciate how we have moved from a very restricted understanding of
development to a multidimensional, qualitative concept.
The original developmentalist programme has been analysed with special regard
to the modernization school, a twentieth century American version of evolutionism,
which has underpinned this discourse both in academic theories and empirical
practices in a specific international environment, the Cold War.
Currently, we tend to describe, in spite of the post 1989 claims of enduring
unipolarity, the current structure of power as a multipolar one, especially from the
economic point of view. However, this does not mean that we are about to see the
rise of a new hegemonic country able to produce an agreed scientific worldview and
to shape popular sets of ideas and beliefs about how the world should work and
actually works. In other words, economic multipolarism is not matched by the rise
of a powerful nation-state whose scientific mainstream in the development sector
has been universalised as the dominant paradigm and whose lifestyle, broadly
understood, has stimulated consensual emulation abroad. Soft power, quite the
opposite, appears much more fragmented than in the past.
Today, recognising the main decision-makers is a hard task, consistently with
the increasing overlapping of both institutional and informal power loci at the
international level. In many issue areas, such as those related to environment,
theoretical works on, and practical exercise of, global governance are stimulating
a review of the old assumption of methodological nationalism. Besides the
flourishing of sub- and supra-national government levels, many other actors from
any geographical scale are engaged in the current process of laying the foundations
for the governance of issues perceived as global, even in spite of their possible local
origins. The increasing role of organisations, agencies and institutions, far from
embodying a simple American worldview, reflects both the multipolar character of
the international structure and the opportunity to replace a hegemonic understand-
ing of social change with a new attention to non-state actors.
This chapter has thus stressed specifically the role of non-state actors, able to
participate in processes such as selection of social problems and agenda-building,
decision-making, policy implementation and evaluation. They belong to sectors
such as politics, scientific research, media, and private business. They also impact
the system of knowledge, ideas and beliefs in many issue areas of global gover-
nance thanks to the peculiar features of knowledge democracies. As the fall of a
dominant mainstream has stimulated the rise of smaller, less powerful and yet
influential storylines, it is our conviction that the analysis of governance towards
processes of societal transformations must be enriched by paying greater attention
to those non-state actors.
Specifically, we have worked on the role of epistemic communities, stressing
their increasingly trans-national reach, their ability to influence decision-making as
well as their non-neutrality with regard to topics such as power and geopolitical
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inequalities. This has led us to look at a wider group of actors impacting global
governance, and so with this we moved to the more encompassing notion of
transnational elites. We can now conclude that these variegated groups of actors
actively participate into the current reshaping of global agenda by means of either
knowledge production in many scientific sectors or global culture – the latter
indirectly impacting policy making through its hold on the public’s sensitivities.
In this setting, development is pursued, at least theoretically, through a greater
awareness of cultural diversity, for instance. Human dimensions are always
accounted for, even within development projects funded by promoters of economic
growth. Furthermore, which is our key concern, development has taken a green
colour, and since we have tried to underline how people directly or indirectly
involved in the process of policy making are socialised into similar patterns of
world culture and globalised knowledge, we finally moved to current environmen-
talism. It has here been understood as both a by-product of the increased pluralism
and a further stimulus towards the inclusion and the enhancement of smaller, local
scales within the global picture worked at by transnational elites.
The aim of sustainability is today an agreed one, and demonstrates the potential
for reception of arguments originally articulated by small groups outside formal
governmental structures. The genuine advantage over the old developmentalist
approach mainly carried out by Western developers, lies in the broader intellectual
horizon of the actors involved in the process of knowledge production and policy
making: community centred approaches, basic needs and sustainability represent
now important cornerstones of the mainstream development discourse, at least on a
theoretical ground. Global recognition of environmental issues mirrors the still
weak but increasing empowerment of small communities, sub-national policy
levels, anti-systemic and grassroots movements, as well as scientific vanguards.
From the scientific point of view, greening the development concept appears to be
the right strategy in order to keep the developmentalist machine working on; it also
represents a small paradigm shift whose accomplishment mirrors, among other
things, the increased pluralism at the international level.
At the same time, sustainability is still a controversial goal, as shown by the very
definition of sustainable development proposed by the Brundtland Report and then
agreed upon by most accounts specifically thanks to its open-ended and vagueness
features. In other words, the broad goal of sustainability has been adopted world-
wide, thus stimulating a multilateral policy-making that would have found many
vetoes only a couple of decades ago. Unluckily, this process shows also a negative
side, as sustainability has been absorbed within the same ideational framework as
old developmentalism, so that it is today pursued conjunctly with the goal of
economic growth. The dominant discourse of sustainable development does not
go as far as to question the inequalities among countries and groups, which remains
at the base of the longstanding, unsustainable pattern of production and consump-
tion enjoyed by a small minority of the world population.
This happens because the transformation of radical environmentalist claims into
a mainstream discourse that enabled development to survive the long list of
criticisms it had attracted was mostly realised without a serious review of the
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capitalist mode of societal organisation. Rather, environmentalism had to be made
consistent with the pre-existing worldviews in the economic field. Among the many
constrains current governance towards sustainability encounters, there is thus the
longstanding imperative of economic growth, recognised by many analysts and
practitioners as hardly consistent with an enhanced care for environmental (as well
as social and human) matters.
Moreover, the very fact that environmental issues are addressed at the global
level makes the concrete opportunity for common people to lobby transnational
elites very hard. We are familiar with claims for truly multilevel processes of
decision-making that would finally empower local communities as depositaries of
lay knowledge and practices. However, in spite of the attempts to overcome top-
down and hierarchical approaches to local problems, the framework of guidelines
represented by global governance is mostly set by transnational elites socialised
into a particular system of beliefs involving, among other things, the unquestioned
primacy of the capitalist mode of production and consumption.
The impasse of sustainable development is thus explained, at least in part, by the
fact that the reception of green concerns within the formal agenda has meant
the institutionalisation of a reformist view, in spite of the bottom-up path that the
selection of this social problem had followed from grass-roots movements to the top
of the agenda of the most important global institutions. Today, this fitness between
green claims, on the one hand, and economic liberalism, on the other, stands thus as
both the reason for the success of environmentalism and the constraints which it
encounters.
This is where we stand today. Where do we want to go tomorrow? Currently, we
are still laying the foundations for more sustainable organisations of social life, and
environmental issues are at the top of the international agenda, under the name of
sustainable development. Accordingly, we are left with the hard tasks to eradicate
the imperative of economic growth from sustainability and strengthen the multi-
level dimension of governance, instead of the global one – the final goal being the
full inclusion of, and the acknowledgement of dignity to, social systems far from
assimilating all the western features connected to a capitalist understanding of well-
being.
This is not just utopistics. This is a challenging scientific, political and cultural
programme which requires a consistent effort on scientific, political and cultural
grounds. As we have already experienced the change from a hierarchical and
economicistic understanding of development to a view stressing its human and
environmental dimensions, we should still try hard to further ameliorate the gover-
nance structure in a sustainable way. Taking advantage of the turbulence of our
times, scientists first of all, but also politicians, activists, and media, should not be
afraid of making attempts to revolutionise, in a kuhnian mean, the current
paradigms whenever they suspect it is essential in order to make both the present
and the future world a better one. As the story we have proposed teaches us,
continuing to table even the most drastic of claims – for example, those involving
a change in current path of production and consumption – is the only available
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strategy to see them, sooner or later, finally taken into account by the public as well
as by decision-makers.
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Governing Planetary Boundaries: Limiting
or Enabling Conditions for Transitions Towards
Sustainability?
Falk Schmidt
Abstract It seems intuitive to identify boundaries of an earth system which is
increasingly threatened by human activities. Being aware of and hence studying
boundaries may be necessary for effective governance of sustainable development.
Can the planetary boundaries function as useful ‘warning signs’ in this respect? The
answer presented in the article is: yes; but. It is argued that these boundaries cannot
be described exclusively by scientific knowledge-claims. They have to be identified
by science-society or transdisciplinary deliberations. The discussion of governance
challenges related to the concept concludes with two main recommendations: to
better institutionalise integrative transdisciplinary assessment processes along the
lines of the interconnected nature of the planetary boundaries, and to foster cross-
sectoral linkages in order to institutionalise more integrative and yet context
sensitive governance arrangements. These insights are briefly confronted with
options for institutional reform in the context of the Rio + 20 process. If humankind
will not manage a transition towards sustainability, its ‘safe operating space’
continues shrinking. Governance arrangements for such ‘systems at risk’ may
then be, first, more ‘forceful’ and, second, may run counter to our understanding
of ‘open societies’. It is not very realistic that the world is prepared to achieve the
first, and it is not desirable to get the effects of the latter. Scholars and practitioners
of sustainability may find this a convincing argument to act now.
5.1 Targets
The two-degree target concerning climate change has been vigorously debated
during the run-up to and the aftermath of the Copenhagen Climate Conference
COP 15 (WBGU 2009; Berkhout 2010; Geden 2010; Hulme 2010a; Jaeger and
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Jaeger 2010; Von Storch and Bray 2010; Bachmann 2012). The idea of setting
global targets has also become part of a broader concept of ‘Planetary Boundaries’,
which goes beyond climate change and applies an earth systems perspective
(Rockstr€om et al. 2009a, b; Steffen et al. 2011).1 In its report ‘World in Transition –
a Social Contract for Sustainability’, the German Advisory Council on Global Change
(WBGU) addresses the need for a ‘great transformation’ (WBGU 2011). The report
recommends ways to shift our societies towards sustainability, in order to avoid, among
other things, crossing planetary boundaries or ‘guard rails’ as it is often referred to by
the WBGU.2
This article does not address major challenges related to ‘great
transformations’, but focuses on specific aspects related to governance challenges
of the planetary boundaries concept. This concept can be interpreted as a set of
conditions to be respected by human activities and in this sense as a rationale for
transitions towards sustainability as well.3 At its core, this article addresses two
questions. First, is the concept of planetary boundaries useful in governing
transitions towards sustainability in coupled socio-ecological systems? Second,
how could such a concept be applied and institutionalised in governance pro-
cesses? In this context, some ideas are discussed in this article, how the insights
from the debate about ‘planetary boundaries’ could be put in practice at the time
of Rio20+.4
My research interest in ‘planetary boundaries’ is as follows: It seems intuitive to
identify boundaries of an earth system which is increasingly threatened by human
activities. Being aware of and hence studying boundaries may be necessary for
effective governance of sustainable development, if crossing a boundary would
result in an abrupt and difficult to reverse change (Folke 2006; Lenton et al. 2007).5
1 The work on planetary boundaries has identified seven plus two ‘boundaries’ (see Fig. 5.1) among
which is the earth system science rationale for the two-degree target as one of the boundaries.
2 See the discussion in Rockstrom et al. (2009b: 5), where it is said that the WBGU guard rails
concept comes very close to the planetary boundaries approach.
3 There are obviously many reasons for changing common practices including considerations of
social equity and fairness. See for a discussion on transformation particularly related to socio-
technological systems Grin et al. (2010) or Berkhout et al. (2009).
4 In writing about ‘Rio20+’, I am following the perception discussed in the TransGov project and
which was originally put forward by G€unther Bachmann, arguing that the main perspective applied at
the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 in Rio should not be backward – but forward
looking. If the planetary boundaries concept bears indeed fruitful applications for governance of
sustainable development, Rio 2012 would rather be the beginning than the end of this process.
5 Specifically governance challenges of such abrupt changes are discussed, for example, in the
special issue called ‘Governance, complexity, and resilience’, edited by Duit et al. (2010). The
accelerated phase out of nuclear energy in Germany and the related ‘Energiewende’ after the
Fukushima nuclear disaster of March 2011, Japan, presents a recent example that the idea of
‘societal tipping points’ is less abstract as one may think.
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Assuming that such thresholds exist, and we may or may not be able to identify
them precisely, the practical concern is how to detect proximity to the boundary.6
Boundaries, in short, could function as ‘warning signs’ that provide important
orientation for complex systems in turbulent times. A closer look at a subject matter
reveals that the problems start with the details. Due to the author’s familiarity with
global freshwater governance, which refers to one of the nine boundaries identified
so far, special emphasis will be on this issue area. As freshwater is certainly not the
best case example of a global boundary due to the place-specific character of water-
related problems, a meaningful application of the planetary boundaries concept to
freshwater issues would de facto present a contribution to the ‘proof of concept’ as
well.
5.2 The Planetary Boundaries Concept
Those pursuing the idea of planetary boundaries have identified nine (or ten)
‘boundaries’ so far (see Fig. 5.1). By such a boundary, ‘a specific point related to
a global-scale environmental process is [meant] beyond which humanity should not
go’, because this could hamper human development profoundly (Steffen et al.
2011: 2). In this context it is frequently said that due to the massive alteration of
the earth system by humankind in the past 200 years or so, humanity has
transitioned from a stable global environment conducive to human development
called ‘Holocene’ to a new, unstable, at least unknown era called, by Paul Crutzen,
‘Anthropocene’ (Steffen et al. 2004). The inner circle of Fig. 5.1 in light grey
presents the ‘safe operating space for humanity’. The dark grey related to the
individual boundaries expresses whether or not a boundary is crossed related to a
given sub-system. As the figure shows, this is already the case according to this
concept for climate change, biodiversity loss and the nitrogen cycle.
The concept presents under the rubric ‘safe operating space’ further arguments
for an idea widely recognised and intensively discussed within global environmental
governance for a while. Since the ‘safe operating space’ consists of a combination of
all boundaries or sub-systems – and some may still be identified in the future – it
emphasises both the systemic and interrelated nature of the challenges at hand
(Young 2002; Gehring and Oberth€ur 2008; Oberth€ur and Stokke 2011). Hence, it is
6 Beck (2010), Hulme (2010b), and Jasanoff (2010) argue convincingly that the current ‘climate’,
for example, is co-produced by nature and humankind, which makes the line of argument about
system’s thresholds less straightforward. However, it remains plausible that also such co-produced
climates function as socio-ecological systems partially according to the ‘rules of nature’. While we
may be able to de-construct the ‘idea of climate change’, (Hulme 2010b: 273), the climate system
may not be fully at our disposal for (de-) construction. To engineer the climate opens a can of
worms and it may indeed shift the boundaries in any possible direction. Again, also climate
engineering follows the ‘rule of nature’, with the slight but important difference that humankind
intends to become the master of these rules.
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not sufficient to analyze and ‘manage’ these boundaries in isolation; they must be
addressed in an integrative manner. Since the global freshwater availability is limited
– a challenge that is severely aggravated by the fact that water resources are very
unequally distributed globally – other sectors relying on freshwater such as food or
biomass production have to take the ‘freshwater boundary’ into account. If an
increased use of biomass for fuel production is one strategy to mitigate climate
change, for example, the integrative nature of the boundary concept could present a
useful tool for making decisions in an integrative way. That is, if strategies related to
climate change have a negative impact on other boundaries such as freshwater and
land, they should be applied with care and they have to be taken in full awareness of
the choices to be made.
Furthermore, the actual proximity to a boundary may provide a rough indication
of whether certain options are still at our disposal. If we are already well within the
‘dangerous zone’, i.e. beyond the point that should present a boundary for a given
sub-system, human activities should not add further pressure to this area. For
example, if the challenge of food security is continuously rising as currently
anticipated (Ingram et al. 2010; Brown 2011: 175–191), necessary resources such
as freshwater, land/soils or phosphorous may not be available at an equal scale for
other services.
As a consequence of our emerging understanding of such interdependencies, the
planetary boundaries concept is used to call for major governance and/or institu-
tional reforms already within its initial or ‘proof of concept’ stage. In this respect,
the (supposed) fragmented or (often) non-legally binding character of the global
Fig. 5.1 Rockstrom et al. (2009a)
218 F. Schmidt
environmental governance system in place is often presented as a major weakness
and is diagnosed as a ‘patient’ who needs to be cured (Hoff 2009; Walker et al.
2009; Steffen et al. 2011).
5.3 What Is (Not) Addressed
Because this article focuses on the governance implications of the planetary
boundaries concept, it will not thoroughly discuss whether these nine candidates
present the right set of boundaries, or if the boundaries in Fig. 5.1 are set correctly
or arbitrarily. The issue of setting the boundaries at all, however, should be
emphasised as an act of governance itself. This shifts the focus of analysis related
to the planetary boundaries concept away from identifying the ‘right’ point where
the boundaries have to be located towards governance concerns.
The correct identification of the individual boundaries may be a major reason for
criticism within the academic community, but it may turn out that the fundamental
challenge of very precisely setting the boundaries does not present a major problem
of the concept. If we understand the planetary boundaries as ‘boundary objects’ – as
introduced and elaborated upon by Stefan Jungcurt in this volume (Jungcurt 2012) –
this may offer a different way of thinking about the concept. It would frame the nine
boundaries as knowledge-claims about the earth system, which are both robust and
flexible enough to meaningfully capture phenomena of a ‘Planet under Pressure’.7
In doing so, these boundaries would then not be necessarily described exclusively
by scientific knowledge-claims. The authors of the planetary boundaries concept
themselves call their proposals where the individual boundaries should be located
in a trivialised manner ‘a first guess’ (Steffen et al. 2011: 5). This indicates that also
the second and third attempt of specifying the boundaries will not result in very
precise answers.
On the one hand, such considerations seem to run counter to the strong notion on
‘solid science’, which should underline the planetary boundaries concept. On the
other hand, however, the nine boundaries identified are introduced as ‘broad and
vague concepts’, which may be the only applicable way (in ’t Veld 2012: 43–58).
Furthermore, the authors of the planetary boundaries concept clearly acknowledge
the following distinction. While system thresholds are ‘absolute’, i.e. set by the
inner logic or functional conditions of the earth system, a ‘boundary’ is based on a
‘normative judgement, determining a safe distance of how societies choose to deal
with risk and uncertainty’. Boundaries are ‘human-determined values of the control
variable set at a ‘safe’ distance from a dangerous level’ (Rockstrom et al. 2009a: 3).
7 For ‘Planet under Pressure’ see Steffen et al. (2004). This is also the title of a major conference of
the earth system science research community, London, 2012, which will, among other things,
elaborate further on this concept: http://www.planetunderpressure2012.net/
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Hence, a boundary is related to society’s adversity towards the risk of being
pushed into the ‘unknown’ once a threshold is passed. If we believe – based on
whatever sort of reasons, including scientific reasons – that two degrees will still
result in ‘manageable’ climate change, we may set the boundary accordingly. If we
conclude differently, we may tighten or loosen this boundary. As a ‘heuristic’, the
boundaries come along with a ‘zone of uncertainty’, see Fig. 5.2 below. This zone is
located between the boundary chosen and the expected actual threshold or danger-
ous zone, which position we do not know precisely. The ‘width’ of this zone is
related to the societal acceptance of risky or risk-adverse strategies. Setting a
boundary at different levels, say, a global mean temperature in relation to 300,
350 (as the proposed climate boundary), 450, 550 ppm or more/less, will result in
very different outcomes and will require different climate policies. For instance,
one reason to explore options for climate engineering is constructed around the
notions of urgency and severity of the problem. Similar considerations apply for the
other boundaries as well. Choices will have to be made; choices that will be more or
less difficult based on the level of ambition put forward by the level at which the
boundary should be set. Hence, at the core of this lies the idea that such kind of
state-of-the-art scientific knowledge is only partially ‘neutral’ as it is from the outset
a political act, say, a ‘normative judgement’ to set these boundaries.8 This is,
Fig. 5.2 Rockstrom et al. (2009a)
8 ‘The position of the boundary is a normative judgment, informed by science but largely based on
human perceptions of risk.’ (Steffen et al. 2011: 2) In this context one may complain about the fact
that neither politics nor science wants to take ‘ultimate responsibility’ for the existence of the two-
degree target related to global climate change. This is also exemplified by endless, possibly still
necessary reiterations of the ‘policy relevant but not policy prescriptive mantra’ of international
science-policy processes such as the IPCC. However, as this article argues, the fuzziness of
‘boundary objects’ may be rather a strength than a weakness which should be appreciated. This
does not mean that one has to merge science and policy.
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obviously, a way less clear-cut but socially informed scientific contribution to
solving the challenges of transitions towards sustainability than a set of fixed
numbers may have pretended. However, there are three important limitations of
the concept that deserve mention.
First, the proponents of the concept are very clear about the fact that the
planetary boundaries focus only on the Earth as a complex system and less directly
on the human enterprise, i.e. they focus on one dimension of sustainable develop-
ment (Steffen et al. 2011: 2). This focus on the earth system may be acceptable for
rather analytical reasons until the concept is sufficiently established, but then it has
to follow the coupled system-thinking as a second step of its incarnation. If, for
instance, the phosphorous boundary is set almost exclusively in relation to the
increased phosphorous inflow to the oceans (Rockstrom et al. 2009b: 13–14),
discussions about ‘peak phosphorous’ in relation to the role of phosphorous for
food production are largely ignored, even if such discussions could quite well be
framed along the lines of (global) boundaries. The same is true for other boundaries.
The global availability of a resource such as water, soils or nitrogen per se speaks
little for social systems, which are driven by development trajectories on the one
hand, and issues such as access, affordability, fairness or minimum requirements
such as liters or calories per day on the other. If one adds ‘social boundaries’ such as
full access to food, water, shelter, good health et cetera, the ‘safe operating space’
will look different. Such a truly coupled ‘safe operating space’ is much harder to
define, however, it would avoid an oversimplified or disjunctive picture by focusing
on the Earth System alone.9
Second, it is – politically speaking – problematic to say that (only) the planetary
preconditions are ‘non-negotiable’ (Rockstrom et al. 2009b: 2).10 This statement is
correct if, and only if, it refers to the fact that the ‘rule of nature’ is different than
social rules. The rules of nature are indeed ‘re-negotiation proof’.11 However, in the
context of sustainable development, such wording is not helpful for reaching a
common understanding about and agreements for human issues. Even more, it falls
9 See for a discussion of the differences between the planetary boundaries concept and other
concepts such as ‘Limits to Growth’ Rockstrom et al. (2009b). Interestingly, the authors mainly
highlight in this brief comparison the inability of the ‘Limits to Growth’ concept to capture non-
linear changes or tipping points, but do not reflect its potential advantage which comes from the
inclusion of socio-economic dimensions such as economic or demographic developments.
A following discussion should indeed delve a bit deeper here, as the planetary boundaries concept
has to become a truly integrated concept, or should present ways to ‘couple’ it with comparable
approaches.
10 See also Rockstrom et al. (2009b: 5–6): ‘The planetary boundaries approach does not propose
economic boundaries to be given equal weight, but that the ecological and biophsyical boundaries
should be non-negotiable, and that social and economic development (should) occur within the
safe operating space provided by planetary boundaries.’
11 See, for example, Eric Neumeyer (2001) who discusses specific problems of re-negotiations
within social systems as this relates to agreements made for (international) environmental
governance.
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(potentially) behind the Brundtland consensus. Or to put it differently: the right to
development should not be re-negotiated either. Above all, science does not take
place in a vacuum and a well-known argument of the climate discourse is starting to
come to the surface in the debate about ‘planetary boundaries’ too. If ‘the North’
has been mainly responsible for an already ‘limited safe operating space’, why
should ‘the South’ accept global boundaries as a consequence? Natural systems will
not care about this line of thinking, but if one wants to implement ideas into an
increasingly sensitised ‘global social fabric’ related to these kinds of questions,
such resentments cannot be ignored.12
Third, social systems prove that setting boundaries causes these boundaries to be
reached. Setting limits, more often than not, has unleashed the logic of
maximisation to reach these limits. From zoning in land use management, to the
concept of carrying capacity, to issues such as defining a fiscal budget deficit, good
(or not so good) intentions have often led to adverse effects and the maximum
(yield) became the norm. Now: imagine the boundary was set incorrectly, – for
example, to high – but social systems have adjusted their inner logics in accordance
with this limit. Hence, the promises of clear-cut boundaries or predictions come at
some expenses. They may be necessary indeed, in order to govern increasingly
complex and interdependent systems. At the same time, they may lead to a loss of
adaptive capacity or responsiveness following a wrong sense of certainty produced
by them (Dessai et al. 2009), not to speak of the fundamental problem of applying
their ‘logic’ to reflexive, open and hence non-predictable social systems, as Roel
in ’t Veld has stressed at various occasions (in ’t Veld 2012).
5.4 Systemic and Cumulative
Some of the boundaries may entail real ‘tipping points’, that is, they will result in
abrupt regime shifts once a critical threshold is passed. This may be the case, for
example, for the climate boundary, but is less clear for other boundaries. A further
decline of (global) freshwater and soils as well as biodiversity will be characterised
rather by an increasing deterioration of the respective systems and less by clear
regime shifts. A regime shift may or may not happen in these cases as a result of the
cumulative effects of these system’s deteriorations. Figure 5.2 presented in Sect. 5.3
highlights this difference. There is no need to argue that one of these types of
boundaries is more important or challenging than the other. However, it presents an
important difference that needs to be taken into account, certainly in the moment
when the respective governance responses are addressed. It may be concluded
that governance functions such as early warning are particularly important for
12 See Young (2010), concluding chapter, and Breitmeier et al. (2006), concluding chapter, who
clearly demonstrate that institutional arrangements must be perceived as ‘fair’ by those who
should be governed by them.
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sub-systems characterised by thresholds, as a small step could lead to a massive
change in the state of the system. On the contrary, it could be said that assessment
and early warning tools are equally important for the other kind of sub-systems,
because it has been proven as crucial but particularly difficult to install effective
monitoring and governance responses for ‘creeping crises’ such as the global
deterioration of fertile soils, where the ‘sense of urgency’, the ‘notion of emer-
gency’ or the ‘threat of abrupt changes’ cannot be applied that easily (Vlek 2005;
FAO 2011).
A comparable differentiation in global environmental change research along the
lines of ‘systemic versus cumulative’ was presented already back in 1990 (Turner
et al. 1990, now again Hulme 2010a). Some problems of global environmental
change are ‘systemic’ global problems while others only add up to a global problem
due to their ‘cumulative’ effects, but they are occurring differently at different
places on earth. Building on this distinction and the intense debate related to the
governance implications resulting from it, it could be questioned fundamentally, if
it is possible for governance systems to make use of such highly aggregated
knowledge-claims resulting from concepts such as the planetary boundaries.
Thus, can this kind of knowledge be transformed into policy responses that go
beyond intuitively plausible considerations?
Assuming that the answer to this question is ‘yes’, it is not difficult to imagine
that a governance architecture, building on the concept of planetary boundaries,
would have to be very complex. At the same time, this could only be a complexity
that will not apply one-size-fits-all-solutions (Meuleman 2012). Hence, it is
misleading to expect that the way forward involves implementing a top-down
‘global governance machinery’ to orchestrate the planetary boundaries. This
would, among other things, also require a fundamentally different global gover-
nance system than the one in place.
One line of critical argumentation in this respect was put forward by Hulme
(2010a) concerning the limits of ‘global kinds of knowledge’. Even though his
argument addresses the two-degree target of global climate governance, it counters
all ‘uniform’ or ‘place-insensitive’ kinds of knowledge-claims. Hulme argues that
these global scientific kinds of knowledge ‘are all de-contextualised, top-down
views of planetary knowledge, knowledge-making detached frommeaning-making,
according to Jasanoff. It is the view from everywhere’ (Hulme 2010a: 560).
With Hulme we may have to conclude that global kinds of knowledge may have
brought us into the crisis instead of helping us out of it, as they disconnect ‘neutral
scientific knowledge’ from value-laden and context-specific meaning. The first
without the latter will not lead towards informed decision and action. However,
there is no reason to be naı̈ve. The ‘meaning’ entrenched in social practices is
still, on the one hand, contributing to creating the problems of global change.
However, it can also lead, on the other hand, to finding the solutions to address
these problems effectively. As the current focus in global environmental change
and sustainability research increasingly shifts from understanding the problems to
identifying solutions to these problems – i.e. addressing questions of what should be
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done – relying on global knowledge about the earth system alone may become an
increasingly poor fit for the challenges at hand, if not detrimental in its effects.
As for the theoretical implications, Hulme is inclined to follow Ulrich Beck’s
cosmopolitan perspective of the world in an era of a second modernity (Beck 2006,
2010). Under such circumstances, clear-cut boundaries, say ‘either-or-distinctions’,
become less important and ‘distinctions between global and local, between quanti-
tative and qualitative knowledge’ are blurred and dissolved (Hulme 2010a:
562–563). ‘A cosmopolitan perspective would suggest the ‘global’ is less about
scale or aggregation than it is about embracing plurality in the making, accrediting
and mobilising of knowledge.’ (Hulme 2010a: 563) There are two possible readings
of this reasoning applicable to the boundaries concept. On the one hand, it could be
concluded that it is this plurality that is coming under attack, if highly aggregated
knowledge-claims about the climate or the earth system and so on are being made.13
But understanding planetary boundaries as ‘boundary objects’, on the other hand,
could indeed ‘embrace plurality’ while mobilising different kinds of knowledge,
including scientific knowledge. As the concepts of ‘second modernity’ and ‘knowl-
edge democracy’ help understanding (in ’t Veld 2012), scientific knowledge should
be neither the only ‘truth’ responsible for defining the correct positioning of the
boundaries, nor should it be irrelevant. It just loses its monopoly.
Such questions are not new, also not for scientists. The focus on planetary
boundaries gives a special knowledge-related twist to an old debate. That different
problem structures call for different governance responses is a cornerstone of the
governance debate about the institutional dimensions of global environmental
change. For example, while a global treaty regime may be indeed the best approach
for systemic problems such as the ozone challenge, it may need adjustments for
cumulative, place-specific challenges such as freshwater or soils.14
5.5 Governance Challenges
A closer look at concrete cases of (global) institution-building reveals that the
diverse, if not blurry world of cosmopolitism is already among us. The analysis of
Frank Biermann (2010) of the global climate regime post Copenhagen presents the
case-in-point in this respect. Biermann highlights the parallel existence of top-down
13 See a similar line of argument related to a ‘new science for climate change’ in O’Brien et al.
(2010).
14 See Young (1999, 2008a). See Gupta (2008) on the challenges of multi-level governance. See
Conca (2006), who put forward a very forceful argument against a globally uniform governance
response to the freshwater crisis that is based almost entirely on the distinction between global and
place-specific institutional arrangements. See Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008) who present a multi-level
governance approach towards global water governance and see Schmidt (2011), (especially Chaps.
3 and 4) who presents a regime theory inspired attempt to capture globalwater governance without
running the risk to become subject to Conca’s criticism of international regimes.
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and bottom-up, of state and non-state actors, of global and local, concluding that the
future of the climate regime will be more strongly influenced by non-state actors
and/or by states. How does the planetary boundaries concept fit it? What concrete
governance challenges are associated with the knowledge-claims put forward by the
concept and what governance reforms may be able to implement its policy-relevant
insights? The authors of the planetary boundaries concept call for quite profound
governance reforms as a result of their considerations. They claim:
Ultimately, there will need to be an institution (or institutions) operating, with authority,
above the level of individual countries to ensure that the planetary boundaries are respected.
In effect, such an institution, acting on behalf of humanity as a whole, would be the ultimate
arbiter of the myriad trade-offs that need to be managed as nations and groups or people
jockey for economic and social advantage. It would, in essence, become the global referee
on the planetary playing field. (Steffen et al. 2011: 5)
The quest for governance for sustainable development has been challenging the
notion of state sovereignty from the very beginning, for example due to the
transboundary nature of many problems (Young 1994, 1999; Z€urn 1998;
Rechkemmer 2004; Conca 2006; Pattberg and Stripple 2008). To operate ‘above
the level of individual countries’ is no new ground for practitioners and researchers
in this field, even though the outcomes of international environmental governance
are at its best mixed 20 years after the Rio Summit and 40 years after the Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment (Young 2008b; Simon 2010).
The notions of ‘authority’ and ‘ultimate arbiter’ may point more precisely into
the direction of what the authors may have in mind and what they may perceive as
new kinds of institutions and diplomacy necessary to implement insights presented
by the planetary boundaries concept. ‘Authority’ could be understood in different
ways, both as a top-down ‘referee’ and as a knowledge-based ‘soft power’ mecha-
nism such as advisory councils and peer-review processes. Their establishment for
monitoring our proximity to the planetary boundaries is even realistically conceiv-
able in the near future, but only in the case of the latter. The notion of an ‘ultimate
arbiter’ however – who is managing the myriad trade-offs – seems to call for a
(legally-binding) regulatory framework, which is more ambitious and not likely to
emerge quickly. To call for ‘some creative thinking’ and using the idea of an ‘Earth
Atmospheric Trust, which would treat the atmosphere as a global common property
asset’, may not be sufficient in this respect (Steffen et al. 2011: 5–6).
The discussions in the issue area of global water governance by Arjen Hoekstra
(2006) or Holger Hoff (2009) highlight nolens volens the difficulties of far reaching
calls for governance reforms. Both authors present – in a different but comparable
way – a case for the need for global water governance, i.e. for a resource that is
mainly and correctly governed at local to maximum regional level. In making the
case for governing water globally, they sketch out on the one hand a world that
would have to be restructured or reconfigured according to water challenges. For
example, the export of agricultural products would not be driven (mainly) by an
economic interest in trading agricultural commodities but by the availability of
water resources needed to produce these products. In such a world, the availability
of water would determine the global market for agricultural products as well as
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decide and regulate who should export and who should import food.15 On the other
hand however, the concrete governance proposals made by these two authors in
their concluding paragraphs are much less far reaching. They either refer in a
general sense to Elinor Ostrom’s concept of polycentricity, as many contributions
to governance challenges do these days (Hulme 2010a; Underdal 2010; Steffen
et al. 2011), or they suggest governance measures such as strengthening
assessments or advisory councils, which are providing ‘softer’ or simply different
functions than strict regulation.
One approach of conceptionalising various institutional functions was put for-
ward by Young (1999, 2010) that is worth highlighting in this context. In his
analysis, Young made clear that beyond ‘classic’ regulatory functions, institutions
can perform procedural (e.g. providing a forum for negotiations and discussions on
a regular basis), generative (e.g. reframing a problem such as the protection of
nature towards sustainable use of ecosystem services) or programmatic functions
(e.g. action programmes based on international agreed upon goals and targets).16
The message from such a line of analysis for those who seek to establish new
institutions based on the planetary boundaries concept is twofold.
First, to establish a legally-binding global regulatory regime or an international
organisation with far-reaching authority to manage the ‘myriad trade-offs’ is
neither politically easy to implement – again, nature will not care much about
this – nor necessarily the best option (Meuleman 2012). Second, even if regularly
arrangements for governing the planetary boundaries will not emerge in the near
future, other governance functions should not be neglected. We may appreciate the
generative potential of the concept that helps understanding the integrative nature
of the earth system in the era of the ‘Anthropocene’, but we may be careful with
calls for a global regulatory ‘referee’ who governs the boundaries in a top-down
manner.
Regardless what the above quote of the authors of the concept means in the end,
the proponents of the planetary boundaries conclude along similar lines. They
present the following main functions that should be delivered by a governance
arrangement which is informed by the concept of planetary boundaries: (a) early-
warning systems, (b) dealing with uncertainties, (c) multi-level governance and (d)
capacity to assimilate new information (Steffen et al. 2011: 5). Three out of these
four functions clearly address the generative aspect of governance as just
introduced. How could the concept be put in practice?
15Given that water is well within its boundary, according to the concept of planetary boundaries, a
narrow-minded application of the concept could lead, hypothetically speaking, to the conclusion
that the water community would (always) lose in making choices about the myriad trade-offs. For
a political science analysis of these kinds of trade-offs see Zelli (2008) who presents a framework
for understanding the battle among different issues in their quest for money, attention and
definition power.
16 See also Young (2008c), where Young states that governance research is still not well-equipped
to understand the role globally agreed upon goals and targets play as acts of governance.
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First, concerning its generative governance function, any of these boundaries is
backed already by a more or less well organised scientific process in order to
generate the information and knowledge needed for governing these issue areas
sustainably. These research and assessment processes range from scientific and
technical bodies as part of an established regime (Ozone) to intergovernmental
panels or platforms for climate change (IPCC) and biodiversity (IPBES) to broader
status reports such as the World Water Development Report (WWDR) to status
reports on (agricultural) lands to more bottom-up driven scientific networks such as
work on ocean acidification, the ‘International Nitrogen Initiative’17 or the ‘Global
Phosphorous Research Initiative’.18 What a planetary boundaries perspective could
contribute is the consideration of understanding different issue areas as an
integrated ‘system’. Such an integrative approach is already well-established within
earth system science and it is partially and in an ad hoc manner already practiced in
international environmental governance.19 To think about a better institutiona-
lisation of integrative assessment processes seems to be a candidate for a still
small but transformative change in the context of Rio20+ and its focus on institu-
tional reform for sustainable development governance. The planetary boundaries
concept could help in this respect.
Second, how to govern the boundaries in relation to each other is not only an
issue of creating integrative and transdisciplinary assessment processes. It also
raises the question of how to set up multi-level and multi-sectoral governance
arrangements within the spectrum of fully integrated approaches on the one hand
and fully specialised approaches (one problem, one institution) on the other.20 As
the planetary boundaries concept points out, in addressing the challenges related to
one boundary, the consequences of such action for other boundaries have to be
taken into account. This has also been partially institutionalised within the UN
system, for example, by inter-agency mechanism such as UN-Water or the Joint
Liaison Group of the three Rio Conventions (Simon 2010).21
For example, the inter-agency mechanism UN-Water, for instance, was (re-)
established in 2003 just after the Johannesburg Summit. It is worth highlighting that
UN-Water could build on a relatively strong multi-sectoral approach in this policy
17 http://initrogen.org/
18 http://phosphorusfutures.net/
19 One concerted political attempt was presented by the ‘Bonn 2011 Conference The Water,
Energy and Food Security Nexus. Solutions for the Green Economy’ of the German Government,
http://www.water-energy-food.org/de/
20 The special issue on governance and resilience edited by Duit et al. (2010) dwells upon this as
one of its major analytical problems to resolve. It is not surprising that the focus on resilience, a
holistic concept itself, is both amble to capture and forced to ‘solve’ this classic dilemma of
organization theory and practice (integration vs. specialization) as it is a litmus test for putting
resilience into practice.
21 The three Rio Conventions are the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change), the UNCBD (United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity) and the
UNCCD (United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification).
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field. To ‘think outside the water box’ is one of the slogans in this regard, which
pays attention to the fact that the most powerful drivers and possibly greatest
leverages to better or to worse the global water crisis are found outside the water
sector (WWAP 2009). If UN-Water performed its coordinative and synergistic
function effectively, it would certainly add a new, not revolutionary but transfor-
mative nuance to the fairly complex institutional framework for sustainable devel-
opment in general and global water governance in particular. In this respect,
UN-Water may or may not be informed by the specific insights of the earth system
science concept of the planetary boundaries. At the same time, science could pay
more attention to this ‘case study’ of how integrative governance arrangements
could be institutionalised (Baumgartner 2011; Schmidt 2011).
However, integration goes already deeper in these days. Areas that are governed
by rather strong international organisation, such as land by FAO, increasingly
explore options of multi-sectoral, say, integrative governance approaches. Hence,
the launch of the FAO-led ‘Global Soil Partnership’ not only connotes the soil
aspect of sustainable land management a bit more forcefully as it has been done so
far, it also puts forward a partnership model that addresses the multi-sectoral and
multi-actor character of the challenge at hand. Thus, the interesting observation is
that even ‘strong players’ seek the ‘softness’ of new governance forms and
functions in order to implement their goals and visions more effectively. Even if
climate change, to give another example, is first and foremost related to handling
greenhouse gas emissions in a better way than has been done so far, it can be said
that 20 years of climate change negotiations have also demonstrated that solving the
climate challenge will both influence and build upon action taken in issue areas
such as those represented by the nine planetary boundaries.
Without claiming to be exclusive in the considerations presented here, it can be
concluded that two main governance innovations can be identified and supported by
the planetary boundaries concept, whose implementation is feasible, despite its
ambitions. First, it was argued to better institutionalise integrative transdisciplinary
assessment processes along the lines of the interconnected nature of the planetary
boundaries. Second, cross-sectoral linkages have to be institutionalised more effec-
tively as well, which can be supportive in the end of mutually beneficial actions,
e.g. for climate change adaption, food security, water and soil sustainability et
cetera. This can also prevent situations in which ‘my silo solution’ increases ‘your’
vulnerability. If these two contributions or functions are key, which forms need to
be put in place in order to implement them successfully?
5.6 Functions and Forms
Following the line of the ‘both-and-thinking’ applied by the TransGov project in
general (in ’t Veld 2012), the critical comments above from a governance angle on
the planetary boundaries concept should not be understood as fundamental
arguments against its relevance. The challenge is rather to find global solutions
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which are sensitive to local realities and which do not cut off meaningful action of
individuals and individual groups. Therefore, this section very briefly introduces
options for institutional reform mainly within or associated with the UN system.
These processes may be relevant for implementing insights from the planetary
boundaries concept. It may be added that these processes started within the UN
system but are currently including a more cosmopolitan perspective as well. The
role of partners within UN-Water for example vis-à-vis the adoption of a human
right to water and sanitation in 2010 could be mentioned as a case-in-point. That is,
this human right was pushed very much from outside the UN system and was finally
adopted by the UN system. The same will be true, hopefully, for its implementation.
It would be a surprise if ‘substantial’ changes will come out of the institutional
reform debate at the conference in Rio in 2012, using the experiences of some
15 years of difficult negotiations in the realm of International Environmental
Governance (IEG) as a ‘yardstick’ for measuring ‘substantial’. To make things
even more challenging, IEG and the debate about upgrading the United National
Environmental Programme (UNEP) (Biermann and Bauer 2005; Young 2008b;
Simon 2010), presents just one part of the overall picture of an institutional
framework for sustainable development. At the same time, enlarging a problem
more often than not has led to finding (new) solutions. In this respect, a proposal
was made which calls for an umbrella arrangement that combines the environment –
and development agendas along the lines of the consensus of Rio 1992 (Simon 2010).
These two options are certainly not mutually exclusive but different in nature. In
case there will be sufficient momentum for an UN Environment Organisation, some
functions, such as the coordination of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs), may be more effectively implemented than other functions. Cross-sectoral
coordination beyond the environmental realm, for example, may be better
performed by an umbrella arrangement. Even though this debate is not at the centre
of this article, the choices put forward within this institutional reform debate may
also inform the debate about governing planetary boundaries. This is captured in
Fig. 5.3. The horizontal axis highlights the two main governance functions that the
concept of planetary boundaries could offer, as discussed in this article. The vertical
Fig. 5.3 Choices for governance arrangements for planetary boundaries in the context of Rio20+
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axis lists two options to frame the challenge, i.e. whether the concept will remain an
environmental concept or can and should it be transformed into a governance
approach relevant to sustainable development.
A first message is: Already today, every cell is covered, either by governance
responses in reality or by proposals made in the past. In case the planetary
boundaries concept is ‘only’ an environmental one, UNEP is the main focus of
attention for reform proposals. Concerning assessment and monitoring of the state
of the planetary boundaries, an upgraded Global Environmental Outlook (GEO)
process seems to be the obvious candidate. GEO may have to be transformed
marginally or substantially in the future, for example, to play at least partially a
coordinative role vis-à-vis other assessment processes. The novelty would mainly
be to develop a better integrative approach to the topics addressed by GEO and the
process leading towards its results in order to understand planetary processes as a
complex, coupled system.
Cross-sectoral coordination is the second important candidate for reform. Under
a ‘light’ and obviously less challenging scenario, such coordination could be
performed by the existing Environmental Management Group (EMG), an UNEP-
led inter-agency mechanism of the UN system. In case the proposal for a UN
Environment Organisation will be adapted, this coordination would get a stronger
hierarchical notion and may be able to better integrate – most likely without fully
merging – exciting MEAs. This could bring, among other things, some of the
planetary boundaries already under one ‘roof’. However, since many important
processes would still be handled largely outside UNEP, such as land or water, an
UNEO would also have to pay close attention to UN system-wide coordination.
It is time, 20 years after Rio, to re-consider the mandate and the functions provided
by the UN Commission of Sustainable Development (UNCSD) as well – the often
forgotten fourth institutional innovation of the Rio Summit (Beisheim et al. 2011).
The fact that two of its ‘policy sessions’ collapsed in the past few years adds further
reasons to this necessity for reform. UNCSD could be rather strong on the side of
knowledge-production and facilitation of using this knowledge, for example in the
form of its deliberations and negotiations of non-legally binding recommendations
(Kaasa 2007). Since its reinvention of 2003, it has been a recurring pattern that the
review sessions of UNCSD, which are not under pressure of policy sessions to
produce a negotiated consensus outcome document, were perceived as constructive
and even innovative learning platforms. They provided some space for ‘outside the
box thinking’ and for thinking beyond the lowest common denominator (Kaasa 2007;
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2010; Schmidt 2011).
As an established intergovernmental process, and maybe in different incarnation
as a Sustainable Development Council after Rio 2012,22 such a body may be a
surprisingly good candidate to take care of the assessment and monitoring-related
22 Beisheim et al. (2011) present different formats for such a Sustainable Development Council
that go well beyond the focus on how to institutionalise insights from the planetary boundaries
concept.
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governance functions identified for the planetary boundaries concept. This cell in
Fig. 5.3 is thus highlighted, where one may find the best fit or form in the current
system for the most promising functions provided by the planetary boundaries
concept.
The fourth and final cell focuses on cross-sectoral coordination of the different
domains of sustainable development. This could either be done as an inter-agency
coordination, which would further highlight the role of the Chief Executive Board
(CEB) within the UN system. As its coordinative character may not be sufficient,
the proposed umbrella arrangement may be the right level of formalising this.23
Again, along the lines of a ‘both-and-thinking’, an upgrade of UNEP would then not
be an alternative but the other side of the same coin, i.e. a reform of UNEP and a
reform of UN CSD/the establishment of a (new) umbrella arrangement. Both actors
could pool resources and competences in governing the planetary boundaries. There
is no need to perceive effective integration as a matter of fully merging existing
structures and processes. Instead, taking into account a comprehensive picture and
applying an integrative governance approach as required by the planetary
boundaries concept may in the end only be achieved by actors who are connected
to each other by being built on ‘multiple engagements’ in different institutional
arrangements, as Roel in ’t Veld (2012) has argued. Such a ‘configuration’ of a
common agenda leaves ample room for diverse approaches.
5.7 The Costs of Inaction
As our world will reach more than nine billion people by the middle of this century,
it may be pushed towards its limits and hard regulatory measures may be up for
debate pretty soon. Inaction, i.e. if we do not achieve a transition towards
sustainability, will aggravate this situation further. If one reflects on the current
ability and willingness of key actors (nation state and non-nation state actors alike)
to set up binding and effective regulatory arrangements at all levels of governance,
it seems to be ‘wise’ to try our utmost to stay within what we currently perceive as
‘our boundaries’. If we manage a transition towards sustainability, we may still
have some room for ‘maneuvering’ and achieving desired outcomes even with less
‘firm’ governance responses. If the ‘safe operating space’ continues shrinking as we
get closer to the individual boundaries, somewhat harder measures may be needed
to remain stable within a ‘limited terrain’. In this respect, this article has explored
the question: can the planetary boundaries function as useful ‘warning signs’? The
answer is: yes; but. Klaus T€opfer continuously stressed during the research process
of the TransGov project that keeping ‘alternative pathways’ open is key, if sustain-
able development for an open society should remain a meaningful concept. To cut
23 The proposal of a World Environment and Development Organization as discussed by Bierman
and Simonis (1998) is not discussed in detail here.
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off alternatives for us and for future generations is the real price we may have to pay
for our currently unsustainable practices.
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Chapter 6
Emergency Response: Clustering Change
G€unther Bachmann
Abstract Truth is always concrete, as are emergencies. If truth and reliability of
good decisions is what, in general, nourishes change and the readiness of people to
trust in transformation, emergency response should be at the heart of this.
Responding to emergency situations is about immediate decisions and action. If
carried out incorrectly or badly performed, it not only fails in substance, but is
likely to destroy and delegitimise any further attempts to transform constraints and
contingencies which have caused the emergency situation in the first place.
Neither the recent debates on international environmental governance nor those
focusing on the multilateral governance framework for sustainable development,
emphasise the issue of emergency response. This reluctance is most likely due to
the fact that dealing with emergency control is still regarded as a strictly national
task. This article believes that this approach is inadequate. It argues that the
character of emergencies is changing. Whereas conventional emergencies are
mostly local, it is clear that limited and calculable nuclear accidents and the adverse
effects of climate change, demonstrate that the modern generation of emergencies
has the potential to surpass geographic limits, national borders and to be long term.
Therefore, this article argues that emergency control may have an important role in
clustering change processes and transition efforts, at least under certain conditions
and whilst framed by the concept of transgovernance.
6.1 Emergency Response: Triggering Change?
We may speak of an emergency when a situation or a disastrous event cause great
damage, destruction and human suffering, and overwhelms local capacity,
necessitating a request to national or international emergency response capacities.
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A disaster is often caused by nature (blizzard, hurricane, floodings, earthquake,
tsunami, drought), but can also have human origins (e.g. chemical spills, nuclear
incident, climate impact irregularities and climate engineering), and in particular
the emergency implications of a disaster are increasingly determined by social and
economic factors and the vulnerability of human settlements. The emergency itself
is of unforeseen and often of a sudden nature. The extent to what the emergency has
been unforseeable in substance and in process is subject to scientific and social
debate, but is not substantial for the definition.
If successfully carried out, emergency response delivers ‘hard’ solutions while the
‘sustainable development’ delivers ‘soft’ aspiration and bearing points in a broader
sense. Both are connected. This connection is neither merely circumstantial nor is it
hard wired. It is rather a soft binding or coupling, making the connection by learning
and accepting (or opening) new choices and new lines of responsibility through
knowledge based informed debates. If however this reflexivity cannot be achieved,
action might fail both regarding the aspect of the practical problem on the ground as
well as the wider aspect of building societal values towards a sustainable future.
Sustainable Development is a societal aspiration which invites and involves
people to share their values and to empower their abilities and competences for a
better future. However, it can never be as concrete as the striking problems which it
sets out to remedy. There is a two anchor process of change: the first is driven by the
urgency of today’s problems and those of the foreseeable future, whilst the other is
enforced by the aspiration of people and their thinking with regards to fundamental
issues of human life, nature and prosperity.
Emergencies have the potential to play a major role in change processes. This
assumption sounds strange, at first glance.1 Change processes often rely on design
whilst emergencies do not. Emergencies happen haphazardly and at random, not by
design. Change is perceived as a rather long term lineup of a multitude of steps
whilst emergencies involve individuals. Change and transition are often perceived
as a function of time. They assume at least some kind of stretched time line or even
linearity. Emergencies on the other hand, with their emphasis on the ‘now and here’
are quite the opposite. In terms of governance issues, change is seen as something
which one can manage (you can manage what you can measure, or: what you can
measure gets done). In trying to define the rationality of change processes, devel-
opment is often back cast when focus is on these characteristics. Emergencies,
however, do not fit into this kind of rationale.
1 Of course, any disaster, whether natural or human, certainly creates opportunities for change. The
question always as to what is the power angle of change and who is benetting from it. The power
aspect of disasters is very well discussed by Naomi Klein (2007: 558). The book elaborates on the
assumption that the radical neoliberal free market policies, in some countries, were pushed through
while people were scared by disasters or upheavals. The author implies that lobby groups may
have intentionally created some of these man-made crises in order to push through unpopular
economic reforms. I mention this book as a reference to the change-agent-character of
emergencies although I see it oversimplifying the case. One may not too ready see conspiracies
where all-too-human pattern of confusion and helplessness, good intentions and greed may as well
give a sound explanation.
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Whether or not they contribute to change processes depends on how societies react
to emergencies. Any society perceives risks as the realisation of possible future
emergencies which should be avoided at all costs. The way societies assess these
risks is not a matter of physical patterns alone, nor are they the most important part.
Technical and social factors are interwoven. Most important is whether a society sees
alternatives – technical and social – to avoid or mitigate these risks. The existence of
alternatives is fundamental for the scale and extent to which risks are perceived.
Modern emergencies mean that this relation becomes increasingly complex.
Emergencies which result from risks and challenges in modern societies, are
beyond those which can be pre-calculated. An example of this type of emergency
would be a major nuclear accident. They are without pre-set geographic limits and
their materiality may easily develop un-predictable (and most probably unmanage-
able) features. What is more, geographic distances do not translate into social
distances; with the opposite more likely to be the case. All of this is demonstrated
by the German case in dealing with the Fukushima meltdown.
Another feature adds to this perception of risks and emergencies. It comes with
the era of sustainability as policy concept and refers to the character of information
and values. The contemporary context seems to accept social values only if they
imply a shared meaning (and risks are perceived as something which bear a
collective meaning beyond the actual physical impact). Information, in this respect,
is only then socially accepted as information if it is based on open sources. If this is
not the case, information is simply data and its relevance to public decision-making
is denied or under doubt (in ’t Veld 2010). Successful emergency response is
deemed to be based on open-source information.2
Amidst the wide array of environmental and social problems – both global and
regional – emergencies call for immediate action and the ethics of help, remedy and
facilitation of new thinking. They do not necessarily call for textbook solutions.
Emergency response is designed to manage the unexpected, and if this does not
happen, then it has failed. Occasionally, the urgency of the situation at hand
requires taking action which may contradict the usual logic of procedures without
waiting for decisions to be taken by the regular chain of command. Whether this
works out or not, is subject to the situational intelligence of those in command.
Whether decision routines, both in the public and private sector, are ready to
perform transformative action, is characterised to no small extent by the after-
event reaction of the governance routine: will it punish or learn? Will it punish
those in charge for any mistakes or inappropriate behaviour which might have
caused or influenced the situation? Or will it use mistakes in order to learn how to
perform better in times of stress, and how to make better use of the knowledge
2 In Germany, the Fukushima event caused meaningful political decision taking. The report Ethics
Committee which was in the process of being established right after the initial nuclear accident in
Japan, built its report on the facts elaborated here. Most important was the checking of scientific
facts and figures which could only then be operational for building consensus when information is
based on open sources. Non disclosed information will fail even if the data turns out to be adequate
(Ethik-Kommission Sichere Energieversorgung 2011).
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available for disaster control, forecast and precaution action? Will it develop
reflectivity or prolong any command-and-control mechanics which it had in place
before? Would the dominant reaction display a reflexive or a compressed attitude:
readiness to u-turn and change mode as opposed to the fortress attitude of simply
building higher walls when under attack? Will it emphasise openness and reflexiv-
ity in a time of knowledge democracy and second modernity, or will it devalue and
discourage change?
6.2 Differentiating Change, Transition and Transformation
The discourse on sustainable development seems to use the terms transition,
transformation and change more or less synonymously. A more differentiated
view however, might help to understand the different characteristics of events
and what transformative governance is (or could be) about.
From the above mentioned terms, change is the least specific. It is used to signal
that there is something happening, that we know about this, and that we should take
action to better understand what is going on. An example of this is climate change
or demographic change. Change can mean anything; this term does not denote
going in a direction which is better or worse. Sometimes, the term change agent is
used to characterise an attitude of people. An example of this would be in the
business sector or in a civil society which empowers other people to act in their
own, unrestricted way, but along the pre-set and collective lines.
Transition, I suggest, should be used for pre-defined processes which are
designed to lead from A to B. The access of countries to the European Union is a
good example. A full acceptance of the Aquis Communautaire, the rules and
regulations the European Union has built up, can only be accessed during a (from
country to country different) certain period of time. This time can be called
transition time. Transition is a regulatory administrative action, driven by targets
and timetables (tartim).
Transformation is a term we may speak of when point A is concretely known,
whereas the goal in point B cannot be described in the same concrete way.
Quantitative targets are used as orientation and benchmarks; the most high profile
objective being to keep the global climate change lower than an additional 2C in
global mean temperature (WBGU 2011). There is also no clear final end or stage of
transformative action. Action is mostly driven by programs and measures (promes).
Another example is the current world’s financial debt crisis combined with
destabilising characteristics of the global financial market which are out of control.
Added to these is the transformative process which the globally leading currencies
find themselves submitted to. Another example is the so called Green Economy.
This is part of the private sector which is deliberatively changing the business case
by taking up sustainability solutions, changing gear and performance, or even
developing completely new business models (World Business Council for Sustain-
able Development 2010). It is characterised by the fact that the green part of the
economy is increasing, but remains far too small to exert dominating power.
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Conversely, the conventional part of the economy is still in command although does
not seem to be in a position to deliver ways and means which could respond
successfully to the crisis of a non sustainable globalised economy.
In other words, change is what we find ourselves in, more or less constantly,
without being formally invited. A transition is something which is set up to
technically manage a process in order to get from A to B. Transformation marks
a way for society to reflexively monitor opportunities and urges in order to
formulate decisions. Emergencies may be conceived as a lens which is clustering
all of these processes, bringing about a repertoire of action that takes choices and
has the openness to change the logic of action.
6.3 TINA Is Not a Friend
From a governance point of view, the most problematic notion is expressed by the
acronym TINA. It means ‘There-Is-No-Alternative’. The German debate on
whether and how to phase out nuclear energy, in essence, is a debate on the choices
the society must make in order to come up with alternative, safe energy supply
structures (including the demand side, the grid, and most certainly including the
informed debate of conflicts of interest regarding costs, climate emissions,
dependencies, and so on).
Political decisions can hardly rely on textbook protocol-type solutions if being
taken in times of crisis. Obviously, there is a certain urge to defend decisions by
arguing that there is no alternative. The no-alternative narrative nourishes the
popular expectation that ‘things have to go on’, and however disruptive an impact
might have been, it will not disturb the way of life. This has recently been used in
the course of the financial and economic crisis when decisions regarding bail-out
options had to be taken (too-big-to-fail or too-big-to-save?). TINA pretends linear
steadiness where there is substantial change. Thus, the notion of ‘there is no
alternative’ reproduces its own precondition, defines everything else as not realistic,
and accepts this makeup reality as a limitation on development. Most of the
governance features which are in operation today are TINA-related. They are
designed for permanence in a non-disruptive development. Even the specific
governance elements recently called upon by political strategies towards sustain-
able development are characterised by linearity in this respect. These elements
consist of management by quantitative objectives, verification by indicators, man-
agement rules, and involvement of stakeholders. They are characterised by an
understanding of ‘time’ as a steady and linear resource. There are no provisions
made for sudden and unexpected breaking up of social structures, or emergencies.
While these governance features are both necessary and relevant in order to respond
adequately to the systemic pressure of non sustainable trends, they are incomplete
because they deny the existence of change clusters.
Besides the continued pressure from long term systemic patterns of non sustain-
able production and consumption or from the emission of green house gases, other
sources of pressure might add to change clusters. In particular, environmental,
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nuclear, or financial emergencies are clustering change: all of a sudden they are
erratic, discontinued, and forcefully sporadic, with turnover capacity. From the
European industrial transformation period of the nineteenth century as well as the
realm of the environmental agenda since 1972, we have seen many examples of
accidents, unforeseen impacts, chemical spills, and contaminations. The images of
burning landfills, oil on rivers with fish stock floating belly up, abandoned industrial
sites, cut away rain forest, arable land turned into desert and soil loss, carry with
them iconographic power. Equally powerful are the metaphors of silent spring, the
ozone hole, or the extinction of species.
Major disasters and emergencies underline the fact that nothing is without an
alternative. The 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima reminds us that unexpected
events and irregularities can happen even if they are clearly beyond what a
‘rational’ risk calculation can predict. Nuclear accidents and meltdowns are peak
events, but basically, they represent a number of emergencies which high-tech
societies find themselves confronted with.
In order to sustain a planet with nine billion people who stress the environment
and the natural resources, mankind must invent a number of alternatives. While the
pursuit of the old myth of economic growth is deteriorating societies and the
ecology, the alternative is not. The greening of society is a license to growth,
provided growth strategies are informed and guided by the notion of sustainability.
Learning from emergencies should enrich the governance debate on how to achieve
sustainability.
6.4 Conventional Versus High End Emergencies
The first industrialisation has brought about many emergencies such as explosions
of steam machines, railway disasters, mining catastrophes and technical
dysfunctions of all sorts. The ‘frontiers’ (Osterhammel 2010) have been exploited
as an unlimited reservoir of resources, both in the ‘new world’ and in the old world.
The notion that the extent of danger and risk can be calculated and reduced to the
minimum, is still true for commonplace accidents such as exploding steam
machines or discharges of hazardous substances. During the industrialisation,
these conventional types of accidents and emergencies led to an incremental
improvement of technologies and to advancing liability schemes and concepts for
insurance coverage. Unconventional ‘high end’ emergencies however, such as
adverse effects of climate change and geoengineering, ocean degradation, or
nuclear meltdowns, are impacting man and nature. There seem to be no immediate
limits on these emergencies which have irreversible impacts and the potential to
develop follow up impacts beyond control. These emergencies do not stop at
borders, they are not linear, and they are beyond the scope of existing governance.3
3 The contingency of emergencies is being neglected by mainstream research into governance.
It should be noted that one won’t find the term ‘emergency’ on http://bit.ly/rUTSsY
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However, a crucial but absent measure is an analysis of how irregularities as
expressed by emergencies relate to the governance of change and transformation.
An example of this would be during the time of the first and second industrialisation
(Br€uggemeier 1996).
Today, we are faced with the increasing probability of environmental
emergencies. However, these are different to the emergencies which we have
come to expect. The industrial style emergencies of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries were ready-to-control, in the sense that the impact could be contained and
controlled. In the following years machinery was improved and procedures adapted.
While conventional emergencies still occur in contemporary times, another type
of emergency is characterised by non-controllability. Examples of such
emergencies are the impacts of nuclear hazards, climate migration, or food
disasters. In addition, the examples of major flooding show that the increased
vulnerability of human settlements tends to develop natural disasters into social
emergencies. It is debatable whether a financial mega crisis such as the financial
meltdown of 2008/2009 can be categorised as a high end emergency. Ulrich Beck
analyses the delimited and social character of risks in what he calls the second
modernity (Beck 1986, 2009).
The definition of risk as a product of likelihood of occurrence and scale of
damage is conventional. There are risks (and emergencies) which are beyond this
definition, because they are highly complex, the magnitude of impact is beyond
being calculable and/or they are on a global scale. This challenges the conventional
concept of risk and the way these risks have been dealt with. Not knowing (in the
sense of absence of positive information) as well as deliberate ignorance and denial
are forming part of modern risks (Table 6.1).
The appearance of extended risks alone is an important change of course.
Adding to this, a growing number of emergencies can be expected in the future
stemming from the fact that more and more people live in areas which are subject to
extremely vulnerable conditions. Another contributing factor is the deteriorating
pressure on food and ecosystem services, a factor which is on the increase. Another
reason comes with the embedded runaway risks of accidents in nuclear facilities.
As demonstrated in Fukushima, a major nuclear dysfunction may cause response
action which is far beyond that which is expected and possibly far beyond what is
eco-nomically and ecologically maintainable.
It must be understood that not each and every environmental problem causes an
emergency. In legal terms, a situation is called an emergency when it places man
and nature at immediate harm or a risk, which is not tolerable. This impact is of
such a dimension that it must be immediately addressed regardless of whether it is
expectable, foreseeable or otherwise predicted or not predicted.
Table 6.1 Types of emergencies
Nineteenth and twentieth century style emergencies High end emergencies
R-2-C (Ready to Control),
accessible for insurance
S-b-L (Systemic beyond Limits),
not pre-calculable
Triggering selective learning
(if not wasted to oblivion)
Clustering collective change processes
(if not wasted to oblivion)
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The term emergency is special because of its legal consequence. As it has thus
far been applied, it legitimises and enforces ‘illiberal’ intervention. An emergency
legitimises (and requires) governments to directly and immediately intervene.
Emergency response will not worry about vested interests such as property rights
or facility permits. There is always a momentum of urgency involved. A good role
model is the Emergency Response Action carried out under the US Superfund
legislation. There are also emergency response routines in Europe which are mostly
carried out on the national level by police or army, and by specialised branches of
the fire department.
The term emergency is often synonymously used with the concept of ‘danger’.
This is relevant in a broader sense. Some environmental damages stipulate a danger
for humans; others do not (yet). Globally, the man-earth system and the biocapacity
are under stress. Increased stress means that the occurrence of emergencies is more
probable. Thus, deteriorated and restricted or even denied access to fresh water, fish
stock, or food security, and a depletion of sources, may develop into regional
emergencies. This assumption is based on knowledge. There is no point in ‘crying
wolf’ or producing gloom and doom messages, but there is also no point in denying
this trend.
6.5 Framing Future
The year 2050 is near. Those who will occupy your positions and assume your
functions as leaders in sustainability are sitting in our schools and universities. The
40 years leading up to 2050 will mark 40 years of their lives as active members of
society, of their business and family life, and of their life in social and local
communities. By 2050, the world will look very different, with nine billion people
living on it, all with high consumption standards. This world will be resource-
constrained, carbon-constrained, and will exhibit profoundly changed geopolitics.
It is abundantly clear that governance will be key. The more this is the case, the
more the world will care about how to share the ever-increasing wealth of available
scientific knowledge. Knowledge and democracy – along with accountability and
transparency – are the building blocks for governance.
The European approaches (EU COM 2011) currently brought into play in
preparing the 2012 UNCSD, reflect the political dynamics of the European project.
For hundreds of years Europe was a byword for permanent war. The European
Union, emanating from lessons learned, is a peace project. It is run on a machinery
of hard and soft regulation, and builds administrative institutions in collectively-
shared responsibility. Still, it is incomplete, and the project continually struggles
with how to free up multilateral action and how to link national and European
action. In a sense, the story of Europe can be seen as the story of how to integrate
diverse views, habits, drivers and cultures.
Europe has learned that ‘integration’ does not work because good instruments
are in place, but instead works on a ‘must do’ basis designed to achieve collective
goals and objectives. The enlargement of the European Union and the specific
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processes of accession are a good case in point. The European carbon reduction
objectives and the long-term goals of the European Union are further examples.
They work through strong administrative arrangements, be them legal or commu-
nicative, enforced or implemented, voluntarily or on the basis of persuasive
instruments. Having established this, it will likely come as no surprise to learn
that the EU and Germany, of course, are strongly supportive of the idea of
upgrading UNEP and promoting UNEP to the status of specialised agency. In a
wider sense, it seems necessary to realign the performance of the UN system with
the agenda of sustainability. An umbrella organisation approach seems to be
reasonable. The underlying understanding of this position is one of integration
and the role that organisation building can play in this respect.
In the UN system, an upgraded UNEP would have to serve as a core element in
order to re-integrate environment. International environmental governance, after
Rio 1992, seems to have been running in disintegration mode. Additional tasks
have been implemented by adding new organisations to the existing ones. The
re-unification of the environmental case resembles a piece of homework that is
needed to reach out and improve the integration of the environment in the wider
task of sustainability and into the Bretton Woods instruments.
• In this respect, the Green Economy poses particular challenges and opportunities.
Environmental policies must and can deliver benchmarks and guidelines for
roadmapping the green economy. Roadmaps are required and must be moulded
into new governance instruments. They are needed in order to tackle upcoming
agenda items such as the launch of a recycling exercise for those materials which
today are not recycled at all (e.g. rare earth, industrial metals). Roadmaps provide
an opportunity to design solutions beyond one-point-regulations.
• Best practice examples may create new ways of thinking and reach agreed
objectives (EEAC 2011). Award schemes are best suited to provide a competi-
tive level playing field that may serve for collective sharing of approaches
avoiding window dressing from happening and delivering benchmarks for
progress (Deutscher Nachhaltigkeitspreis 2008–2011). Peer Review processes
may help to benchmark best practice approaches, and to prevent the green
economy from developing into exclusive partiality.
• Enforcing capacity building (sustainability skills) and the involvement of the
private sector. Business and civil society already play important roles in the
transition process towards sustainable development. There are good examples
for changing gear, developing new business models, and re-arranging the supply
chains by taking sustainability criteria on board. It is for civil society and politics
to draw the line and to make progress and success towards the green transition
more tangible. Councils for Sustainable Development can make a difference, as
demonstrated by the German example of awarding sustainability performance,
ranking efforts, and the dialogue-style elaboration of a German Sustainability
Code (Rat f€urNachhaltigeEntwicklung 2011).
A more visioning governance debate should also cover the aspect of fiscal
sustainability, an aspect which all-too-often is completely neglected. However,
without any (near-stable) fiscal sustainability, virtually none of the remaining
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approaches to sustainability will ever come to fruition. By the same token, imple-
mentation of a green economy must prove that it will deliver innovation and decent
jobs as well as qualitatively justifiable growth, and that it can alleviate poverty
(Bachmann 2010).
Change rarely comes from within organisations. This, at least, is true of the
concept of organisations as we have come to know them. In addition, it is undoubt-
edly true that the UN system has so far, not been able to mainstream the sustain-
ability task.
For this reason, the governance debate should highlight the nexus between
national and multilateral action. With regard to making the nexus between national
and sub-national levels viable, and working towards promoting sustainable devel-
opment action, National Sustainable Development Councils in European Member
states have proven very meaningful and have enabled a broad set of different
procedures in governance, and between the public and private sector. For this,
multi stakeholder bodies are a good proxy. ‘International Environmental Gover-
nance’ and ‘Institutional Framework on Sustainable Development’ should encom-
pass also the private sector. If the notion of Green Economy is to be taken for real
the governance debate should reflect this. Judging from the German experience, the
corporate community (the most advanced part of it, that is) already displays a
number of approaches and governance features designed to mainstream ‘Sustain-
able Development’ into corporate performance and to distinguish those efforts from
mere window-dressing.
In general, the governance debate may gain momentum when it begins to
combine administrative, corporate governance, and the governance of social respon-
sibility, and when it takes trajectories into account that are driven by emergency
responses. With the concept of the green economy, this step seems compulsory.
6.6 Emergency and Emergency Response
6.6.1 A Knowledge Case
The notion of an environmental emergency associates a knowledge base with the
legal right (and contingency) which allows for an enlarged set of interventions, a so
called emergency response. The conceptual framework of environmental policies is
deeply rooted in dealing with and learning from emergencies, although systematic
descriptions of environmentalism tend to dismiss and replace event-enforced
learnings by more theory grounded cases of environmental policies (Speth 2005;
WBCSD 2010; Radkau 2011). Historically, emergency response action was one of
the prime ‘sources’ of environmentalism, some of those emergencies have been of
national significance and required extensive coordination among government
agencies in order to prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies.
Mostly, responding to emergencies requires immediate action such as shutting
down ongoing operations, on site access to facilities and (mostly) emissions
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discharges and any other law enforcement activities. Emergency response allows
for the most effective action providing it is bound to the goal of taking control of an
otherwise harmful situation. These actions may deliberately not be constrained by
any previously issued emission right or discharge permission. In an extremely
dangerous situation there must be no legal limit to site access.
What qualifies as an environmental issue, to be handled as an emergency, is
subject to intense debate and profound scientific research. In the context of human
toxicology for example, the research focuses on dangerous substances, hazardous
substances, exposure pathways, dose–response systems, interpolation from test data
and field evidence, and linkages with human disposition.
The notion of emergencies stipulates a burden of proof. It must be proven that a
dangerous situation can lead to concrete harm for people or the environment.
Furthermore, the dangerous situation may not be ‘only’ some kind of general
(abstract) event which may or may not put people and the environment at unac-
ceptable risk. There are different metrics being used to prove this, all of which are
linked to high-end scientific measurement and verification of the evidence:
• Direct measurements (if direct measurement is ethically acceptable and techni-
cally possible, however this is seldom the case);
• Epidemiological proof (given the population at risk is large enough in number to
calculate the statistics [and to separate a concrete add-on harm from what is
perceived as circumstantial or normal risk given the way of life, the terms of
operational security, or the ubiquitous background situation]);
• Extrapolation from appropriate field experience given that there is an analogy in
the first place;
• Circumstantial evidence such as open burning of hazardous material, evidence
of uncontrolled explosives, dead fish stock.
The use of a single metric may not be ruled out. However, it is safe to assume
that a combination of these metrics is often used (Bhopal, Love Canal, cases of
dioxin spills, children’s blood lead levels associated with urban outdoor activities,
major cases of groundwater pollution in the US and in Germany, the dangerous
exposure to toxics in residential areas that have been built right on top of hazardous
waste dumpsites). Combining metrics is a clear choice whenever uncertainties are
great, predicted costs for remediation are high, and more people are directly
affected (health, mortality).
6.6.2 The Metrics of Adverse Effects and Danger
as Scientific Challenge
Environmental governance as expressed by, for example, international regulations
and discourse on the International Environmental Governance, has not yet pro-
foundly touched on the case of emergencies. Emergency response action is left to
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national governments. Following this subsidiary approach, the otherwise well
designed research into climate forcing and environmental depletion is not yet linked
to the work profile of emergency response and its operational engineering expertise
where they exist.
• The most important indicator characterising the state of climate change is given
as global mean temperature. Being highly aggregated, it cannot stipulate or even
trigger any emergency response measure which responds to the regional impacts
of dangerous climate change. This is not coherent.
• What is globally modeled and predicted (the global mean temperature, the global
biocapacity, food supply) is not connected to emergencies clusters which require
evidence, measurement, reporting, and verification.
• The term ‘damage’ as in damage thresholds, has been defined in many respects
as public health policies4 and environmental protection. The Commission on the
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, the so-called
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission, prominently supports this point (Stiglitz
et al. 2009; Rat f€urNachhaltigeEntwicklung, Gesch€aftsstelle 2010). The Com-
mission believes that it is necessary to have indicators that designate thresholds
which, when exceeded, give rise to concerns that harmful environmental damage
will occur. In particular the Commission emphasises a need for a clear indicator
pointing out dangerous levels of environmental damage.
Fundamental questions of knowledge, certainty and burden of proof arise in this
context. They demand scientific research into the effects of environmental pollution
as well as on the political and conceptual approach to evidence-based decisions.
The definition of a danger correlates to damage. Damage is not a given minor
impairment, disruption or inconvenience, but is a serious and unacceptable
impairment or burden which is currently happening or for which there is sufficient
probability that it will occur. Sufficient probability does not in itself denote a
certainty that damage will directly occur; then again, the mere abstract possibility
of damage occurring does not warrant the fundamental assumption of danger.
Instead, there must be a well-founded concern that the danger will materialise,
for example by virtue of a dangerous situation arising if existing trends are allowed
to continue unhampered.
4 For example in assessing dangers to public health or human working conditions the critical end
point is seen as being an adverse effect that can be traced back to the exposure to a specific
contaminant. The damage threshold is largely uniformly defined at the international level. It is
determined by impact-related body doses that indicate either no-effect levels, no-observed
adverse-effect levels, the lowest observed adverse effect level or any other (barely) tolerable,
reabsorbed doses of pollutants. In terms of their definition, methods for derivation and inter-
polation and the level of protection associated with one of the levels those reference levels
are largely stipulated by the World Health Organisation (WHO) or other organisations
such as the Environmental Protection Agency in the USA. With regard to carcinogenic effects,
statistical probabilities of occurrence are generally considered to be the threshold values (Eikmann
et al. 2010).
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Warding off danger is linked to the idea of preventing emergencies from
happening. This is the purpose of the precautionary principle.5 As the guiding
principle of international declarations such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol, the
third North Sea Conference of 1990, as well as the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED)
of 1992 the principle is also entrenched in the EU’s legal basic documents
and various European action programmes. The aim of the precautionary principle
is to conserve natural resources and livelihoods in order to preserve their value,
efficiency and functions in the long term. A key characteristic of precautionary
measures is that often, neither the probability of occurrence nor the extent of
damage is specifically known or quantifiable. The IPCC introduces the terminology
‘robust findings’ (IPCC 2007) and ‘key uncertainties’, in order to ascertain how
much secured knowledge (certainty) is available on the impact of the damage.
In other words, how reliably a detrimental impact threshold in a protected property
is indicated (forecast).
6.6.3 The Case of Climate Emergency
In 2011 the Security Council finally issued the long debated statement on the
possible security implications of climate change.6 The Security Council notes that
in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security under its
consideration, conflict analysis and contextual information on, inter alia, possible
security implications of climate change is important, when such issues are drivers
of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or
endanger the process of consolidation of peace. The Security Council expresses its
5 In German environmental policy, this concept has been broached by introducing a soil protection
law (Bodenschutz-Recht) (Cf. German Government 2000).
6 At the 6587th meeting of the Security Council, held on 20 July 2011, in connection with the
Council’s consideration of impact of climate change under the item entitled ‘Maintenance of
international peace and security’, Ambassador Peter Wittig as acting President of the Security
Council made a statement on behalf of the Council on the substance of security implications of
climate change. Beforehand, the Security Council debate had not reached a consensus. In April
2007, the British government initiated a Security Council debate on climate change as a security
risk. If climate change was a threat to international security, intervention by the United Nations
should be legitimate. While the British initiative was supported by the European Union and the
majority of its Member States, the U.S., G77, China and Russia opposed it. Especially India
expressed its worries fearing that acknowledging climate change as a security risk would open the
floodgates for industrialised countries to circumvent the sovereignty principle of the UN Charta.
In particular they opposed any attempt to widening the interpretation of the application of Chap. 7
of the Charta. The definition of emergency seems to be a crucial argument anyway. The represen-
tative of Russia to the UN appealed to ‘avoid panicking and overdramatising the situation’ and the
representatives of Brazil, Pakistan, and China emphasised that climate change is foremost a
sustainable development issues. Thus, sudden emergencies due to climate change are meant to
be kept outside of the political debate.
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concern that possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run,
aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security such as
water scarcity, desertification of arable land, food crisis and flooding. The Security
Council also expresses its concern that possible security implications of loss of
territory of some States caused by sea-level-rise may arise, in particular in small
low-lying island states.
With this statement, the Security Council recognises the potential threat of
climate change to international peace and security. In this regard, the Council
requests the Secretary-General to ensure that his reporting to the Council contains
such contextual information, in particular on climate change and its possible
security implications and future generations, connecting to recent academic
debates. Defining emergency in the context of climate change is crucial for political
action. The debate thus far reveals both scientific and political uncertainty regard-
ing climate change impacts. ‘Trans-governmental’ approaches are needed to assess
and handle climate emergencies. This is the point that the following case scheme
seems to suggest.
Climate protection has been the subject of lengthy discussions. It is agreed that
greenhouse gas emissions shall be reduced to such an extent that the global mean
value of global warming does not rise by any more than 2C as compared to the pre-
industrial level. This threshold is the response currently given to the question
arising from the objectives of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change:
human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases [. . .] and that this will result on average an additional warming of the
Earth surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.
Consequently, the question is: where is the limit that differentiates harm and
harmful effects from undesirable, but not yet harmful effects? In the context of
climate protection, the so-called 2C target represents a preliminary response
(Luhmann 2010). The term ‘emergency’ has only surfaced in the last 2 years,
with its main purpose to underscore and legitimate the 2C goal as a critical
level. Once surpassed, this level is believed to trigger all kinds of follow-up
reactions which can lead to all kinds of adverse impacts. There are difficulties
and uncertainties in determining sensitivity,7 regional impacts, vulnerability and
long term impacts.
7Weitzmann especially argues that it remains difficult to narrow-down the probability density
function of climate sensitivities. In this context, climate sensitivity is understood as ‘the equilib-
rium mean surface temperature response to a doubling of atmospheric CO2’. As a consequence,
Weitzmann emphasised that ‘some very few but very important real-world situations have
potentially unlimited exposure due to structural uncertainty about their potentially open-ended
catastrophic reach’. (Weitzmann 2009). In order to circumvent the difficulty in determining the
exact correlation of mean global temperature, climate sensitivities and emergency situation, the
point of intervention could be shifted to multiple interventions on a regional level. This could not
only strengthen national and regional acceptance for climate policy. It could also be more adequate
to prevent DAI.
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In politics, the 2C target is conceived as a mostly scientific finding; scientists
treat this objective as a mostly political matter (M€uller-Jung 2009).8 A comparable,
concretely defined damage threshold for other problems such as soil, nutrition basis,
natural resources and biodiversity is not yet available.
The objective of the UNFCCC 1992 is to prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference (DAI).9 Article 1 speaks of the ‘adverse effects of climate change’
meaning changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate
change. The legal language of UNFCCC refers to a level of climate change
which may have significant deleterious effects, and establishes the ultimate goal
of the international community to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
from taking place.
The mean global temperature is the one and only point of intervention10 that the
international climate policy community has agreed upon so far. This does not match
the requirement of UNFCCC to show an adverse effect and help to prevent DAI.
Preventing DAI from occurring will require more than just one point of intervention
because disruptions and catastrophes are bound to the regional and local level.
A multi-point intervention approach would better match the regulatory require-
ment. It would endorse a set of national/regional points of intervention which would
refer to factors such as permafrost and glaciers, regional concentration of black
carbon, and changes in natural habitats (migration of vegetation zones) which are
faster than natural attenuation.11
The question of which impact might qualify for a DAI has not yet attracted
enough attention, neither in the sector of policy making nor in the scientific
discourse. The language found in key papers on climate research varies a great
deal and does not provide clear terminology. The terms ‘adverse’, ‘dangerous’,
‘significantly deleterious’, ‘serious and/or irreversible consequences’ and
‘harmful’, are used synonymously. This may be interpreted as blur. In its Third
Assessment Report, the IPCC acknowledges the difficulty to define a DAI:
The basis for determining what constitutes ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ will
vary among regions, depending both on the local nature and consequences of climate
change impacts. (IPCC 2001; Schneider et al 2007; Weitzmann 2009)
8 Translation from ‘Politiker haben es (das 2C-Ziel) wie ein wissenschaftliches Ergebnis
behandelt, Wissenschaftler als eine politische Angelegenheit’ by Jaeger, Carlo and Julia Jaeger;
as cited by Joachim M€uller-Jung: Warum sollten maximal zwei Grad die Welt retten? Die große
Zielmarke der Umweltpolitik ist keine Erfindung der Klimaforscher. Ihre Erfindung kam eher
zuf€allig zustande und liegt drei Jahrzehnte zur€uck. Potsdamer Forscher erz€ahlen erstmals die
Geschichte http://bit.ly/ohP8hV
9Article two of the UNFCCC sets out the Convention’s objective.
10 A point of intervention is defined by an environmental quality that ultimately signals that action
is required. Examples: lead levels in children’s blood (1980th), PCB in arctic wildlife birds’ egg.
11 It is well understood that this indicator alone has to be well referenced, which is not the purpose
of this paper.
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It is debatable whether an aggregated indicator such as a global mean tempera-
ture can possibly be used as a trigger for emergency response measures.12 These
impacts, however, react to significantly different vulnerabilities. Large-scale, irre-
versible and systemic changes in geophysical systems may vary in kind, geographic
dimension, and time.
Key security risks are pointing to indirect reinforcing effects of climate change,
namely border disputes and migration due to incrementally changing landmasses,
energy supply due to increases in competition over scarce energy resources, increased
shortages of other resources such as freshwater supply, and societal stress through an
aggravation of poverty and inequalities through climate change or even unforeseen
impacts of deliberate climate engineering. One key security risk relates to humani-
tarian crisis in the case of extreme weather events and sudden disruptive climate
change. The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015,13 provides some guidance
as to the actions which should be taken in response to major natural disasters.
All countries fear that unilaterally defining emergency will undermine their
sovereignty. In general, differentiating ordinary problems and accidents from
dangerous effects and even from emergencies, is an open question. This is true
for climate change as well as for nuclear meltdowns, and the social and infrastruc-
tural impacts which may follow from major natural disasters. What is the degree of
evidence that is substantial enough to legitimate any external intervention? Is there
such a degree anyway? Who would be in the position to clarify different
viewpoints?14 Who would be legitimised to check data, to detect undisclosed
data, and to ask for missing metrics? How do independency, reliability, and (!)
12 In the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC this is especially dealt with in Chap. 19 of WG II
where it says: ‘A significant category of key vulnerabilities is associated with large-scale,
irreversible and systemic changes in geophysical systems. [. . .] central to nearly all the
assessments of key vulnerabilities is the need to improve knowledge of climate sensitivity –
particularly in the context of risk management [. . .] where the greatest potential for key impacts
lies’ (IPCC AR4, WGII, Chap. 19: 804).
13 The Hyogo Framework for Action is the main document resulting from the World Conference
on Disaster Reduction in January 2005.
14 Detached from the debate in the Security Council, there exists the idea to widen the interpreta-
tion of Chap. 7 of the UN Charta by establishing the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) as legal norm
in international law. While the concept has been on the agenda for some time now, an initiative by
the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, to establish the R2P was not entirely
successful. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued
from the perspective of the concerned population. They recommended establishing the following
criteria to legitimate intervention: ‘right intention’, ‘last resort’, ‘proportional means’, and ‘rea-
sonable prospects’. However, the World Summit in 2005 including the high-level preparatory
panel took up a different perspective. To them, the main purpose of R2P was to strengthen the
international security systems (instead of taking the perspective of the concerned population). In
the final document, R2P was taken up. But it was not attached to any criteria. Especially the US
wanted to keep a leeway for wide interpretation of intervention. However, intervention was limited
by the definition of four cases of application, namely genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing, and
crime against humanity. Crisis due to natural disasters have deliberately been excluded. While
‘responsibility to protect’ has been confirmed in the sense it was already established in interna-
tional law, no ‘right to protect’ has been established.
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effectiveness in handling data build up credibility? Is the process of verification part
of the solution or part of the problem?
6.7 Transformation and Governance
The term transformation often suggests big machinery and rightly so. The term
associates itself with big challenges and ‘thinking-big-solutions’. Its agenda is
bigger than life. It forces the followers to be part of something bigger. People
generally like this as it does not contradict with what they would do anyway.
The term is used in singular form since it has been used by Polanyi (1978, 1944).
This evokes the idea of a simple solution (a pass-partout thing, a one-way option).
The term somewhat excludes those who are actually carrying out transformation.
It invokes passiveness. A rhetoric example: If there is a revolution, there are
revolutioners. This is not the case with transformation. Who would actually do
the transformation? Transformationers? A Transformateur?
The term suggests, in a way, some kind of ‘Big – Bang-ism’ where development
constantly needs and provides a sense of scale (something is scaling up). The era of
sustainability proposes proportionality rather than scale as major references. Trans-
formation, probably, has no scaling mechanism at all. Learning from historial
analyses of the first and second industrial revolution one may extract some features
of transformation that might give an idea of what the world is running into with
thriving towards nine billion people with increased life support systems
(Osterhammel 2010; IASS 2011). Discontinuity, purposelessness, locality seem to
be such kind of patterns. There are specific elements of transformation which we
must know about and must accept: how to enhance credibility? There is no way to
force other stakeholders (those responsible) to do something without the next step
being performed by the original self (there is no free meal). How to build trust into
‘green economy’ when there is no trust in economy? How to ensure the reversibility
of the good action?
6.8 Transgovernance
Ulrich Beck’s concept of second modernity expects the old institutions, enterprises
and players to remain in place while the new happens. Change, in this sense, is not
sequential but rather happens through parallel channels and competitive structures.
There is little doubt that the occurrence of emergencies will increase. Indeed
with up to nine billion people living on a planet with carbon constraints and
restricted resources, in 2050 the human settlements will be more vulnerable. As a
runaway problem with a ‘fat tail’ the climate change will cause a number of
emergency situations. Nuclear facilities are also a potential threat. The recent
nuclear meltdown in Japan has prompted profound and renewed thinking about
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the ethics of how much risk a society can bear and whether the idea of risk is still
adequate if no society is in the position to simply absorb social distortion by
evacuating densely populated areas, dealing with contaminations and, last but not
least, with an un-clearly lurking emergency situation arising from not controlling
the nuclear power plants.
This think piece is not setting out to emphasise emergencies per se as some kind
of change making mechanism. Emergencies may catalyse change as they can lead
to stand still behaviour. Their political impact is open ended, and we can see
examples which have stirred a renaissance style follow up, when the way an entity
(society, enterprise, organisation) ‘digests’ an emergency is trying to rest orate
behaviour. Change is not symmetric in time or thoroughness. Rather, it is asym-
metric, and this is why there is the case for advanced studies to better understand
change and the change as clustered by and in emergency situations. This depends on
the responsiveness of democracy and how democracies digest knowledge, in
general and under the concrete contingency.
A preventive democracy, in fear of populist and the public debate demagogically
destroying forces, may choose to hide itself behind a shade of rules and ‘ever
existing’ procedures denying open political access and fighting change clusters as
irregularities which might pass by anyway if not given attention. It would choose to
rely on elitist groups of experts legitimised by function and routines. It will hardly
accept the perspective of transgovernance.
A flat democracy allows and invites social media and networks of all kinds to
directly influence decision-making schemes. It is amorphous and will refrain from
taking sides. ‘Flat’ means that, technically, access is granted to everyone. It may not
be media-controlled in the sense of the private sector owning newspapers and
tv-channels. It may rather invite market players and especially consumers to act
as a crowd and to use demand side power in order to enforce sustainability features
in production, product and consumption. Key words and concepts are ‘responsible
consumption, lifestyle-of-heath-and-sustainability, political consumption, carrot
mobs, green procurement’. While these elements may enlarge and improve demo-
cracy, a flat democracy is likely to create the notion that those in charge are
increasingly alienated from those who run the action on the ground, and maybe
this is really the case (Friedman 2008). Seen from a governance perspective, a flat
democracy may tend to let governance structure fade away. It replaces procedures
by presence. Procedures with checks and balances would then be replaced by the
direct influence of leaders who may have no legitimate voice other than through the
web-crowd. A flat democracy may even choose to deliberately discard legitimised
representative procedures (and their legal derivates, the sitting and permitting
procedures) by allowing and enforcing social networks and populist ‘leadership’
appearances. A transgovernmental perspective will probably be seen as something
that is alienated from the flat democracy.
A representative parliamentary democracy that would increase its responsive
and participatory lay out options could be called ‘transdemocracy’. Building on
both procedures and preferences it would count on the democratic lifestyle and
social responsibility of people and institutions. It would enlarge legal procedures
not by consuming even more time and resources, but by making legal access easier
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and legal procedures faster. It would clearly not be fail-proof, but by not wasting
mistakes for the incremental improvement of the governance approach it will build
fire walls against the democratic fatigue and as far as transformation is concerned,
against disappointment as well. This concept of democracy will most likely use
transgovernmental concepts to better deal with the unpredicted.
In this respect, governance issues, and transgovernance in particular, should also
cover the private sector. The corporate community displays different governance
approaches for the implementation of sustainability management schemes and
addressing social responsibility. Indeed this is a long standing agenda which the
private sector and the civil society including the nongovernmental organisations,
have in common.15
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Taking Boundary Work Seriously: Towards
a Systemic Approach to the Analysis
of Interactions Between Knowledge Production
and Decision-Making on Sustainable
Development
Stefan Jungcurt
Abstract The concept of boundary work has been put forward as an analytical
approach towards the study of interactions between science and policy. While the
concept has been useful as a case-study approach, there are several weaknesses and
constraints when using the concept in a more systemic analysis of the interactions
between knowledge production and sustainable development decision-making at
the international level, such as its inability to capture the diversity of institutions
involved in such boundary work. Another inability involves a lack of conceptua-
lisation of the impacts of the specific conditions of intergovernmental decision-
making, such as rules for representation and the mode of negotiation. This chapter
suggests complementing the concept of boundary work with a configuration
approach based on a two-dimensional conceptualisation of the boundary space in
international decision-making that allows the positioning of institutions with regard
to their degree of politicisation and their position in terms of national and regional
representation. Such an approach could be a useful guide in the further conceptua-
lisation and application of the boundary concept.
7.1 Introduction
In the study of interactions between science and policy in sustainable development
decision-making, the concept of boundary work has recently emerged as a promising
approach which focuses on the social processes at the boundary between the produc-
tion of scientific and other types of knowledge as well as decision-making processes.
The concept goes against earlier representations of the science-policy interface which
are based on science and policy as distinct and separateworlds depicting science as the
world of neutral and independent facts and policy making as the world of values.
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Instead of questioning how scientific knowledge is best transferred into the policy
domain in order to ‘inform’ politics, boundary work focuses on the various types of
interactions which take place in the sphere between science and politics. This opens
the ‘black box’ of the science policy interface as a simple line acrosswhich knowledge
must be transferred. It also questions the implicit assumption that such transfers can
take place in a manner that is value neutral and without modification of knowledge
content. Furthermore, boundary work assumes bidirectional exchanges and discourse
between knowledge production and policy making, leading to the notion that science
and social order are co-produced in mutually interdependent processes rather than
independent social domains.
While the concept is originally developed in the context of studying science-
policy interactions in national decision-making processes, it has also been effec-
tively applied in the context of international decision-making on sustainable
development. In their evaluation of the effectiveness of scientific assessments in
influencing international decision-making on environmental issues, Mitchell et al.
note that assessments
have influence to the extent that they involve long-term dialogue and interactions in which
potential users of an assessment educate scientists about their concerns, values priorities,
resources and knowledge of the problem, while scientists educate potential users about the
nature causes, consequences and alternatives for resolution of the problem at hand as well
as the ways such knowledge is arrived at. Co-production implies that assessments are
influential to the extent they are bidirectional, with science shaping politics, but also
politics shaping science. (Mitchell et al. 2006: 324)
In their earlier review of knowledge systems for sustainable development, Cash
et al. (2003) find that
those systems that made a serious commitment to managing boundaries between expertise
and decision-making more effectively linked knowledge to action than those that did not.
Such systems invested in communication translation and/or mediation and, thereby more
effectively balanced salience, credibility and legitimacy in the information they produced.
(Cash et al. 2003: 8089)
Both of these conclusions are based on the analysis of large numbers of case
studies, many of which have used the concept of boundary work as a heuristic guide
or as an analytical lens through which to evaluate the effectiveness of specific
assessments and other knowledge producing processes in influencing international
decision-making on environmental issues.
This contribution will explore the application of the boundary work concept in a
broader sense to describe the work of the various types of institutions, actors and
processes which populate the space between science and policy on the international
level. It will also examine their contributions to managing the boundary, and the
interrelations among them. The following section reviews the origins and key
features of the concept. Section 7.3 discusses its application to interactions between
science and policy making both in general terms, as well as with a view to adopting
a more systemic perspective which captures the diversity of institutions and actors
involved in boundary work at the international level. Section 7.4 proposes
complementing boundary work with a configuration approach which captures this
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diversity and directs attention to the interactions between the multiple processes
involved.
7.2 Boundary Work: The Concept and Its Origins
Thomas Gieryn (1983) describes the phenomenon of boundary work as
ideological efforts by scientists to distinguish their work and its products from non-
scientific activities [. . .by attributing. . .] selected characteristics to the institution of science
[(. . .)] for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual
activities as non-science. (Gieryn 1983: 782)
Based on an analysis of such demarcation efforts of scientists against religion,
‘pseudo-sciences’ defend the autonomy of science against efforts to restrict its
activities in the name of national security. Indeed, Gieryn shows that boundary
work is a rhetorical style which can be used by ‘ideologists of a profession or
occupation’ to: expand authority or expertise into domains claimed by other
professions or occupations; monopolise professional authority and resources in
order to exclude rivals; protect autonomy over professional activities by excluding
members for consequences of their work; and may even be used within science to
demarcate boundaries between different disciplines (ibid.: 791). He further
concludes that boundaries of science are ambiguous because: the characteristics
attributed to science are sometimes inconsistent; boundaries are contested by
scientists with different professional ambitions; and boundaries result from the
simultaneous pursuit of separate professional goals requiring boundaries that are
built in different ways (ibid.: 792).
In short, Gieryn’s work shows that the original concept of boundary work is seen
as a rhetorical tool applied by scientists primarily to further the interest of their
profession rather than establishing unambiguous, scientifically grounded definitions
of what constitutes science or how science is defined in a certain discipline. Despite
the fact that they are applied by scientists, the establishment of boundaries cannot
necessarily be considered a scientific exercise in itself.
Sheila Jasanoff (1987, 1990) applies the concept of boundary work to investigate
interactions between scientists and policy makers. She starts from the observation
that science has been able to maintain its status as ‘provider of truths’ even though it
is widely recognised that knowledge is indeterminate and can be interpreted in
many ways, because of the adherence to shared ‘Mertonian’1 norms ‘that foster
1 Introduced by Robert K, Merton, the Mertonian norms are a set of institutional priciples that
describe the ‘ethos of modern science: Communalism (results of scientific research are common
property of the scientific community); Universalism (all scientists can contribute to science
regardless of race, nationality and gender); disinterestedness (scientists should not mix personal
beliefs or activism with the presentation of their research results); originality (scientific claims
must contribute new knowledge); and scepticism (validation through critical scrutiny). See:
Merton (1973).
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cohesiveness in science, even though its practitioners come from divergent geo-
graphic, cultural or linguistic backgrounds’ (Jasanoff 1987: 196). The authority
derived from these norms is reinforced by a number of rules which govern the
practice of science such as high standards for entry into the scientific professions,
rules for quality control exercised by ‘invisible colleges’, ‘research circles’ or other
informal networks that control the diffusion of scientific knowledge’ (ibid.). This
cognitive authority of science comes under pressure when scientists are called upon
by policy makers to provide advice in areas which are at the frontiers of science,
and where knowledge is particularly uncertain and indeterminate resulting in a most
fragile consensus among scientists (ibid.: 197).
Earlier models depict science advice as a unidirectional process of scientists
delivering facts or ‘truth’ to decision makers as basis for informed decisions about
issues affecting, or affected by the physical laws of nature. In direct contrast to this,
Jasanoff develops a model in which
‘truth’ emerges from an open and ritualized clash of conflicting opinions, rather than from
the delicate and informal negotiations that characterize fact-finding in science. (ibid.)
According to her model, legitimacy in decision-making is achieved through the
‘public reconstruction of the scientific basis for regulation’. The process gives rise
to competing claims of authority between science and policy making with regard to
the interpretation of scientific findings, which in turn challenges the disinterested-
ness and certainty of science. The result is a ‘partial removal of cognitive authority’,
which renders explicit the assumptions and uncertainties embodied in scientific
research and thereby allows policy makers to show that ‘the interpretation of
indeterminate facts reflects the public values embodied in legislation as well as
the norms of the scientific community’ (Jasanoff 1987: 198).
While the process of science’s public deconstruction followed by reconstruction
of the rationale for decision-making in the policy arena increases the legitimacy of
policy making, it challenges the self-image of science as a disinterested search for
truth. Furthermore, the public demonstration of uncertainty and disunity among
scientists may damage the public image of scientists and may lead to questions
about whether or not they truly merit the status as well as the symbolic and material
rewards which they enjoy in society. To protect themselves from such negative
impacts, scientists have to establish and continuously reinforce the boundaries
between science and policy. The boundary is thus a contested space around
which scientists and policy makers compete for cognitive authority over the
interpretation of indeterminate facts. In essence, the contested boundary arises
out of different views over how much decision-making power should be granted
to scientists in areas where scientific knowledge is insufficient for decision-making –
either because of lack of data and uncertainty, or because of the indeterminacy of
knowledge. This gives rise to competing claims which make it impossible to take
‘legitimate decisions’.
In her 1987 paper, Jasanoff investigates three ‘contested boundaries’ (or more
precisely three strategies to establish the boundary between science and politics,
and thus the distribution of decision-making authority): trans-science, risk
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assessment and peer-review. Trans-science addresses the grey zone between sci-
ence and policy, which is characterised by questions such as ‘which can be asked of
science and yet which cannot be answered by science’ (Jasanoff 1987: 201; citing
Weinberg 1972). Scientists argue that the cognitive indeterminacy revealed by the
policy making process lies outside of ‘real’ science in the realm of trans-science.
This separation is used to argue that, while policy makers may claim authority over
issues of trans-science, science itself should remain the undisputed preserve of
scientists. Therefore deconstructionist techniques should only be regarded appro-
priate for issues of trans-science, not genuine science. Jasanoff shows that
Weinberg’s main objective is to ‘shield science against the taints of subjectivity,
bias and disharmony that it acquires in the policy environment’. In her conclusion,
Jasanoff states that this approach ignores the key procedural concerns of policy
making, most importantly the question of who should decide on issues which fall
within the boundaries of science and policy, that is, where science is unable to
provide unambiguous answers to the questions that policy makers have to address.
Similarly, Jasanoff argues that risk assessment and peer review are used to
advance particular views about the extent to which scientists should control
decision-making at the frontiers of knowledge. Peer review of suggested regulation
by scientific experts, for example is often demanded by the industry in order to shift
the balance of decision-making power away from regulatory agencies. Indeed, from
the perspective of the industry, these agencies may well be biased towards exces-
sive or overly strict regulation. Because of their impact on the distribution of
decision-making power, boundary strategies can be instrumentalised by those
who have stakes in the regulatory decisions at stake.
These considerations give rise to further research on the activities which take
place at the boundary between science and policy making and the actors and
organisations involved in such work. In her 1990 book ‘the fifth branch’ Jasanoff
explores the work of science advisers in policy making (Jasanoff 1990). Here,
Jasanoff makes the case for a more detailed analysis of the processes which
determine decision-making and the role that science has within these processes.
She depicts two schools of thought with regards to the role of science in decision-
making. The first school of thought is the technocratic view, according to which,
bureaucrats are technically incapable of distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ science
and therefore call for a greater involvement and influence from scientists in the
decision-making process. The second school of thought is the democratic view,
which holds that decision makers fail to incorporate a sufficient range of values in
their decision-making, favouring the inclusion of a broader set of viewpoints in the
decision-making process beyond narrowly technical viewpoints. In line with the
idea that contending views over the role of science in decision-making represent a
struggle of different interests over discretion in decision-making, Jasanoff observes
that commercial and industrial interests favour the technocratic view, while interest
groups such as environmental, labour and consumer movements support the demo-
cratic view (Jasanoff 1990: 15–16).
Based on a review of the work carried out by scientific advisory committees in
US regulatory agencies, Jasanoff derives a number of conclusions with regard to the
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characteristics of successful boundary processes. First she highlights that what is
considered to be ‘good’ science in decision-making is the result of negotiations,
since ‘when stakes are high, no committee of experts, however credentialed, can
muster enough authority to end the dispute on scientific grounds’ (Jasanoff 1990:
234). Negotiation is at the heart of the construction of regulatory science, which
highlights the role of advisory committees as forums where scientific and political
conflicts can be negotiated simultaneously. The role of the scientific expert is then
to stabilise the results of negotiation against further attempts of deconstruction
through his or her ability to validate research, certify scientific methods, define
standards of adequacy of scientific evidence and approve inferences made from
scientific studies and experiments (ibid.: 237). The conduct of scientific advice as
negotiation provides legitimacy to the outcome.
In order to be successful, boundary work should be non-adversarial to avoid an
unproductive deconstruction of science and fostering of appearance of capture (ibid.:
246). Committee membership should reflect disciplinary breadth, which may be
challenging for small committees. The advisers populating committees also need to
be more than mere technical experts to be able to transcend disciplinary boundaries,
synthesise knowledge from several fields, and to understand the limits of regulatory
science and the policy issues confronting the agency (ibid.: 243). These requirements
may make it difficult to find a sufficient number of policy advisers, which may lead to
conflicts of interests resulting from long-term and encrusted relationships between
agencies and a small group of skilled advisors. Finally, Jasanoff notes that the
advisory process must recognise that scientific knowledge is in perpetual flux and
demands constant renegotiations, which in turn calls for allowing more flexibility in
the rules and norms which govern the work of advisory committees than those of
administrative decision-making. The problem of advisory processes then, is not so
much to protect decision-making from capture by scientific experts who are
influenced by technocratic interests, but to ‘harness the collective expertise of the
scientific community, so as to advance the public interest’ (Jasanoff 1990: 250).
In short, the work of Gieryn, Jasanoff and their colleagues directs attention
towards the processes of negotiating the boundary between science and policy as
well as the rules and organisations which structure such processes, including the
rules for selecting participants of advisory committees, structuring the discourse
within these committees, and for the type of outputs expected from them.
Further research concentrates on the role of boundary work and how it stabilises
the boundary between science and politics. This is achieved through investigating
the role of boundary organisations and their outputs, known as boundary objects or
standardised packages. The rationale for conducting such research is, on the one
hand, the concern that constructivist arguments about the contingency of these
boundaries could lead to a dangerous erosion ‘of the cognitive authority of science
by legitimizing relativism’, and a fear about a decay of the mutually productive
relationship between science and liberal democracy (Guston 1999: 89). On the
other hand, scholars believe that by clearly portraying science as it is practiced,
constructivist accounts can help to improve the position of science in society and
‘recover the human face beneath science’s rationalist mask’ (ibid.).
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Star and Griesemer (1989) introduce the notion of ‘boundary objects’ as common
products of negotiations at the boundary between science and policy. Boundary
objects are knowledge products, such as reports, methodologies or interpretative
frameworks which are ‘both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity
across sites’ (Star and Griesemer 1989). A similar concept is that of ‘standardized
packages’ which is a means to ‘define a conceptual and technical work space [. . . by
combining] boundary objects with common methods in more restrictive but not
entirely definitive ways’. Standardised packages seek to homogenise and facilitate
repeated interactions among practitioners from both sides of the boundary between
different social worlds while maintaining their integrity within their respective
worlds (Guston 1999, citing Fujimura 1992). In this way, they effectively function
as interfaces for the translation and transfer of different kinds of knowledge for the
purpose of collaborative knowledge development.
David H. Guston further develops the concept of boundary organisations using
principle agent theory. He suggests that the relationship between policy makers and
scientists can be represented as a contractual relationship, similar to that between
other economic agents, in which policy makers ‘hire’ researchers to deliver exper-
tise on specified issues. The principal is faced with the problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection may lead to the identification of
scientists pursuing a specific agenda in relation to the policy problem at hand,
whereas moral hazard describes the agent’s incentive to cheat or shirk or otherwise
exploit the principal’s lack of information. To address these problems, the principal
will put into place mechanisms for monitoring the agent’s behaviour and for
verifying the results of his research. Such mechanisms include procedures for
accountability, in particular financial accountability, but will also lead to the
development of boundary objects and standardised sets. In Guston’s case study of
innovation and technology transfer originating from the US National Institute of
Health, boundary objects include procedures for ‘innovation disclosure’ which
facilitate the collaborative identification of research results with innovative or
market potential, as well as incentives and procedures to facilitate the application
for patents. The collaboration between governmental research laboratories and non-
federal actors such as private firms, is governed by Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CARDAs). Indeed, Guston identifies these as the key
standardised set of the boundary institutions in his case study. Based on these
observations Guston identifies the following shared characteristics of boundary
organisations (Guston 1999: 93):
• ‘They provide a space that legitimizes the creation and use of boundary objects
and standardized packages;
• They involve the participation of both principals and agents, as well as
specialised (or professionalised) mediators; and
• They exist on the frontier of two relatively distinct social worlds with definite
lines of responsibility and accountability to each’.
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The specialised mediators in his case study are technology transfer experts who
oversee the collaborative process of technology transfer and report to the govern-
mental agent. The government creates incentives for them which directly depend on
the effectiveness of technology transfer, thus establishing a new intermediary agent
who is himself in a principal-agent relationship with the researcher.
To summarise, the emergence of the boundary concept has shifted the way in
which science and knowledge are perceived in decision-making. They are no longer
viewed in terms of the ‘pipeline’ and ‘information deficit’ models which presume
that knowledge is produced by and delivered to decision makers very much like a
commodity or resource towards a model of co-creation or joint fact finding, in
which knowledge holders and decision makers work together to develop common
understandings of problems and available pathways of action as a basis for legiti-
mate and socially robust decision-making. The boundary model directs attention to
the procedural aspects of knowledge creation and use for decision-making. Rules
for participation and balance of influence emerge as important factors for successful
boundary work next to the mere quality and appropriateness of the knowledge at
hand.
7.3 Boundary Work in International Decision-Making
in Sustainable Development
Most of the research on boundary work has thus far been carried out in the national
context, with the majority of studies analysing science-policy interactions in US
decision-making processes. This raises the question of whether the concept can be
usefully applied to boundary work on the international level. A number of
differences come to mind with regards to both the representation of ‘policy’ and
‘science’ as well as in the institutions which frame the interactions. These
differences may not be in line with the explicit and implicit assumptions of the
boundary work.
Miller (2001) discusses three weak assumptions of the boundary concept which
influence its applicability to the international context. First, the concept ignores the
diversity of institutions and practices which exist within both science and politics.
Scientific practices and discourses vary with disciplines, institutions and networks,
and scientists within disciplines frequently disagree about the representation of
their knowledge and the implications derived from it. Similarly, perceptions, policy
styles and forms of interaction vary across institutions and sectors. On the national
level, the assumption of uniformity may nevertheless be acceptable, since decision-
making on sustainable development takes place within policy domains which have
distinct styles of policy politics – a specific combination of cognitive styles and
interaction. Over time, this combination generates particular public epistemologies
about the validity and use of different types of knowledge within the domain
(Hoppe 2010: 181). On the international level, however, boundary work must
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span the diversity of scientific and political institutions from a large number of
countries and policy domains which interact with each other. This leads to
confrontations not only between different national policy styles, framings and
policy theories, but also between diverse and culturally determined perceptions as
well as different ways of identifying and describing problems in different languages
(ibid.).
Second, the concept oversimplifies the boundary between science as a ‘fine
bright line’ using inadequate representations of pure science and pure politics.
This ignores the diversity of institutions that exist between the two sides which
are neither science nor politics ‘but combine elements of the two in remarkable
different ways’. Miller illustrates this diversity with a map of institutions involved
in boundary work on climate change. The map (Fig. 7.1) includes both institutions
inside and outside the formal climate change regime, as well as US national
Fig. 7.1 US and international Organisations involved in boundary work on climate change
(Source: Jasanoff andWynne (1998)). Note: NCAR ¼ National Center for Atmospheric Research;
WMO ¼ World Meteorological Organisation; UNEP ¼ U.N. Environment Programme; IPCC ¼
U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; IGBP ¼ International Geosphere-Biosphere
Programme; SBSTA ¼ U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice
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institutions. The entire landscape includes 11 institutions, each of which produces
its own ‘amalgamation of norms, practices, discourses and knowledges’ on climate
change (Miller 2001: 485, citing Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).
The third weakness identified by Miller is that the boundary concept presents an
overly static view of science and politics. The last two decades have seen the
emergence of a vast array of new institutions involved in boundary work on the
international level which has led to a constant rearrangement of institutions and
how they relate to each other. At the same time ‘definitions and standards for
expertise are deeply contested across cultural and geopolitical divides, as are
notions of appropriate political institutions for carrying out public sector manage-
ment for the planet as a whole’ (Miller 2001: 485). This means that institutional
arrangements are constantly in flux and there is rarely a negotiation process which
ends with the same constellation of institutions involved with which it started.
One may add a fourth weakness here, which becomes relevant if one looks at
boundary in an intergovernmental context rather than from the perspective of
domestic engagement in international decision-making, as Miller does. Boundary
work on the international level takes place within the constraints and practices of
intergovernmental decision-making. This means that the discourses and processes
of boundary work will always be affected by the rules for representation and
decision-making which characterise political processes on the international level.
Since states are the main actors of multilateral decision-making, any form of
boundary work has to provide for adequate codes of representation in order to be
considered legitimate. This has a number of implications for the conduct of
boundary work in an international context. First, the criterion of representation of
states competes with the criterion of representation of relevant knowledge and
scientific expertise. Subsidiary bodies and smaller expert panels in particular suffer
from difficult debates about balance in representation either on a country or
regional level (Kohler et al. 2011). In most cases, the concern about representation
trumps the concern for diversity and relevance of expertise of the individuals that
who will be invited as experts. The need for representation limits both the number
of experts who can participate from a given country or region, as well as the
individuals chosen by countries. The more politicised an issue is, the more countries
will tend to send diplomats rather than experts.
Assessment processes attempt to circumvent this problem by establishing
criteria for the scientists and experts to be nominated by countries. However
many countries will select their participants in a way which ensures that the
contribution from those experts is not against their political positions in the
negotiation process at hand. Any institution or forum involved in boundary work
on the international level will in one way or another be affected by the need to
ensure national representation as well as representation with regard to different
types of expertise and knowledge. In many cases the intergovernmental negotiation
setting will act as a bias which will give primacy to the national requirement.
The second constraint arises from the mode of decision-making in international
fora. The great majority of intergovernmental decision-making processes require
unanimity by all member states to take decisions. Rules of procedure which allow
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for majority voting are the exception and are only established within a framework
that clearly identifies which decisions can be taken by voting. An example can be
seen with repetitive operational decisions such as subjecting new species to the
trade restrictions under CITES or adding new chemicals to the list of substances to
be monitored by the Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Materials. In theory, the
unanimity rule makes it possible for a single country to block consensus, even if an
acceptable amalgamation of values and knowledge has been achieved among all
other participants. In reality, the pressure to achieve an outcome often leads to a
race to the bottom in terms of the substantive content of an agreement as the
majority accepts to water down elements of a decision in order to accommodate
minority concerns. Scholars in international relations have identified the pattern
that international agreements tend to be either ‘broad and shallow’, meaning that
many states participate in an agreement with limited impacts; or ‘narrow and deep’,
meaning that a small group of states participates in an agreement which yields large
benefits from cooperation (Barrett 1999: 525). If one can consider the breadth and
depth of an agreement as preliminary measures of the success of boundary work
during the negotiation phase of an agreement, then one can expect that the logic of
negotiation under the unanimity condition creates an additional hurdle for boundary
work on those issues which are most difficult to agree upon.
In decision-making bodies which operate under the one-country-one-vote and
unanimity principles, the main participants are country delegates who are bound by
the instructions of their capitals. The instructions themselves are the result of
processes of policy development and decision-making that may have included
boundary work to varying extents, depending on the practices, cognitive styles
and modes of interaction of the policy domains involved. Delegates have thus
limited flexibility to accommodate the concerns of others both in terms of
bargaining as well as with regard to their ability to embrace new concepts and
boundary objects that may be developed in the course of the negotiation or
presented by other participants, such as civil society actors. On the other hand,
delegates’ instructions usually do include some flexibility for making concessions
in order to be able to strike mutually agreeable deals with their opponents. Whether
these flexibilities can be used for the creation of new boundary objects again
depends on the political culture and practices in different countries. Some countries
give their delegates a lot of autonomy to decide how they will represent the interests
of their countries, for instance by providing instructions that are formulated in terms
of general objectives. In contrast, other delegates must work with narrowly
formulated options for operational text. Delegates from some countries have to
ask permission from their capitals for even minor changes, while other countries
select their delegations such that the relevant policy domains and fields of expertise
are represented at the meeting to allow for the delegation to react to new proposals
which could not be anticipated. A typical phenomenon at the final stages of
negotiations are delegates who make hectic last minute phone calls to get permis-
sion to agree to the final deal, which often involves explanations of a new compro-
mise formula.
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The situation is further complicated by the fact that many countries negotiate in
coalitions or regional blocks. This involves another level of decision-making at
which boundary work may or may not occur. The amalgamation of individual
positions inevitably involves further discussions on facts and values within
coalitions and regional groups. However, similar to the international level
negotiations, it depends on the mode of decision-making and the flexibility of the
delegates’ instructions as to whether the result will lead to a further increase in
the robustness and acceptance of the common position or a watering down of the
agreement towards a lowest common denominator.
In assessment processes, the practice of ‘negotiating scientific consensus’ can
lead to oversimplification and inadequate reduction of the complexity of both the
science and the values that are behind the effort-reduction to the lowest common
denominator replaces amalgamation. While assessment processes publish compre-
hensive reviews of the state of the art in science, including a consideration of
different viewpoints and in some cases even contradictory findings, what gains
traction in the policy making process are the severely reduced summaries for policy
makers – sometimes even only parts thereof. Only these can be considered as
outcomes of completed boundary work, since only these parts become the basis
of decision-making. On the other hand, the knowledge produced by assessment
processes becomes the basis for boundary work in numerous other institutions and
forums that act as additional channels through which they can have an indirect
impact. IPCC assessment reports, for instance, are the most important reference for
making the case for action against climate change through advocacy groups or
policy think tanks. These actors engage themselves in boundary work at different
levels which has an influence on national positions as well as the course of the
negotiations in international decision-making forums. Many of their outputs should
thus be seen as intermediary boundary objects which enable boundary work in other
channels.
The third constraint of boundary work emerges from the negotiation mode which
prevails in the majority of international decision-making forums. Any outcome of
international negotiations is either designed as international law, or will be
interpreted in the context of existing international law and obligations. Soft law
instruments, such as declarations or non-legally binding treaties and decisions for
implementation have proven to exert substantial influence on policy making in
many countries and, in many common law countries they can have a direct impact
on court decisions. Therefore, many countries treat any negotiations as if the
outcome would be legally binding, even if that is not provided for by the mandate,
or the decision on the legal nature of an instrument will only be decided at the very
end of a negotiation. This means that in the final stages, and often throughout the
entire process, negotiations are led by legal, rather than scientific experts. Legal
experts however will focus on legal issues, such as consistency with existing
international laws and obligations, compatibility with national legal systems and
legal clarity. This is often at the cost of scientific adequacy and relevance. Once
negotiations have entered into the legal ‘codification’ mode, they tend to become
less receptive to new knowledge and ideas, at least as long as this knowledge is
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communicated by non-legal actors. Furthermore, the final stages of a process are
often marked by a decrease in trust among participants as confusion over legal
concepts may lead negotiators to accuse others of trying to reverse previous
agreements or of using existing decisions and other legal arguments strategically
to their own advantage. The erosion of trust is further aided by the fact that
countries become increasingly aware of the costs and benefits of proposed
agreements and therefore switch to strategies of distributive bargaining: ensuring
fairness in the distribution of costs and benefits takes primacy over the common
objective of solving global problems.
The final stages of a negotiation are therefore carried out under the shadow of
both existing law and the anticipated legal impact of the text under negotiation.
Under certain conditions, this shadow can extend far into the early stages of a
negotiation, thus leading participants to engage in distributive legal bargaining at
a point in time when there has not yet been enough boundary work done to provide a
basis for a successful completion of the negotiation. In other words, the amalgam-
ation of facts and values is not yet sufficiently mature to withhold the erosion of
trust in the process of legal bargaining.
This extension of the shadow of the law can occur for several reasons. One is the
informal rule prevailing in many negotiating forums not to reopen text for discus-
sion which has been previously agreed. Despite the formal rule that agreements are
adopted as a package and thus ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, the
request to make changes in agreed language is often interpreted as bad faith by
other delegations. While this rule is a necessary convention to prevent legal
negotiations from backlash and endless circles of revisiting the same issues, it
can also prevent delegates from testing different framings and approaches during
a negotiation to select the most suitable approach. What is more, when trust is low,
some delegates will categorically disagree with any text on the table in order to
ensure that they keep their options open until the very end. In extreme cases this
practice can neutralise previous informal agreements, including any boundary
objects which may have been embodied or referred to in the initial text.
Another factor is that boundary work and legal negotiations are often carried out
under the auspices of the same institution, notably subsidiary bodies that provide
advice to a governing body or conference of the parties of the same process.
Without a mandate which clearly identifies the nature of the subsidiary body’s
work and delimits it from the actual negotiation process, such bodies tend to
transform into preparatory meetings for the actual negotiation process. If countries
expect that the outcome of a subsidiary body will be a draft decision which may be
difficult to reopen for further discussion, they will send legal experts rather than
scientists to represent them in these processes. The longer the shadow of the law,
the more reluctant countries will be to let non-legal experts speak and engage in an
open form of discourse, for the fear that their proposals will become fixed into legal
concepts that may be interpreted against their own interest or original intention.
To summarise, the intergovernmental setting and the shadow of the legal
negotiations of international sustainable development decision-making have fun-
damental impacts on the way in which boundary work is conducted at the
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international level. Much more than in national decision-making processes, it must
be recognised that boundary work is not a simple bridging process between science
and policy that is carried out in a single locus, but that it is composed of many
processes in a complex web of loci which deliver partial amalgamations of facts and
values from different perspectives. These partial amalgamations are often comple-
mentary, but in many cases they compete, since they represent different
configurations of values brought forward by different sets of stakeholders and
scientists who have participated in the process.
Secondly, it must be recognised that the negotiation process is an integral part of
boundary work on the international level. Similar to the inseparability of
discussions on facts and values, international boundary work is inseparable from
the multilateral negotiation process. Delegates as well as scientists will always be
influenced by, or even pressured to, represent the positions of their countries. The
degree to which representation influences the outcome of boundary work can be
depicted as the distance from the actual negotiation process. The more influence a
process of boundary work can be expected to have on a negotiation process, the
stronger the participants’ bias towards their countries’ positions in the negotiation
processes itself. The closer a boundary organisation is located to decision-making,
the more politicised its deliberations will be.
7.4 From Boundary Work to Boundary Configurations
In order to account for these factors, it is useful to conceive of the boundary
between knowledge production and decision-making in an intergovernmental
setting as a two-dimensional space defined by the axes of science and policy as
well as national and international processes (Fig. 7.2). The further to the right a
process or institution is located, the more politicised it can be expected to be. The
higher up it is situated, the stronger will be the constraints of representation in the
conduct of boundary work. An exception may be the intermediary organisations
which are depicted here in the middle of both axes. This group itself represents a
large diversity of institutions which may or may not be internally organised
according to representative principals. Such organisations may participate as
experts in assessment processes, as observers or representatives of civil society or
major groups in subsidiary bodies and negotiations. These organisations often
provide different types of knowledge to boundary work in other institutions or
processes, or are themselves loci of boundary work.
The main assumption underlying this representation is that the boundary space is
populated by different institutions and organisations which produce partial
amalgamations of facts and values that are influenced by their position within the
space as well as other factors such as membership, interests or ideological
conceptions. This representation should also allow for the location of different
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institutions and processes involved in boundary work with regard to their position
in terms of politicisation and constraints through presentation and negotiation in
intergovernmental decision-making processes. This enables the development of a
more differentiated conceptualisation of the types of processes and discourses
taking place within these organisations and how these are influenced by their
position. In addition, this also develops their relationships to one another. For
instance, it may be possible to develop conjectures about the conditions under
which institutions or actors occupying similar or overlapping positions within the
boundary space will behave competitively or collaboratively. Similarly, one may
ask under which conditions institutions positioned on opposite ends will comple-
ment each other. This is done either by delivering ‘compatible’ partial
amalgamations of facts and values which can be consolidated into inclusive and
robust decisions, or by further developing boundary objects provided by other
actors in the space.
Figure 7.3 presents the configuration of institutions and processes involved in
boundary work from a US perspective, based on the work of Jasanoff and Wynne
(1998) presented in Fig. 7.2. It should be noted that the location of the different
institutions is for illustration only. The exact locations would need to be determined
based on extensive empirical research including a methodology for comparing the
degree of politicisation in each organisation and the extent to which the work is
influenced by the mode of representation. Nonetheless, some interesting questions
can be asked based on this representation. The first is that of potential divergences
Fig. 7.2 Institutions and processes involved in boundary work on international sustainable
development decision-making (compiled by the author)
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between the mandate and the de facto impact of a boundary organisation. The IPPC,
for example, is structured as a scientific assessment based on review and synthesis
of relevant scientific information. Its reputation and the political nature of climate
change issue, however, have the effect that its outputs have a much more direct
impact on the negotiations than assessments in other areas. IPCC Scenarios and
results are often cited by delegates and other actors in the negotiation process, and
even if they are not intended to be policy prescriptive, they may turn out to have
exactly that effect by locking in negotiations on a certain scientifically formulated
target. An example of this impact is the 2 target for climate change put forward by
many in the run-up to the Copenhagen climate change talks.
Another approach could be to compare the position, internal processes and
outputs of IPCC and SBSTA. Despite the fact that both bodies are seen to be
scientific in nature, their processes, outputs and impacts on the negotiations may
vary considerably.
Comparison across issue domains could also be an interesting avenue to com-
plement the concept of boundary work. Figure 7.4 provides an illustrative position-
ing of the main scientific institutions involved in boundary work on biodiversity
decision-making. For simplicity, the representation considers only the major inter-
governmental institutions involved, while displaying EU institutions to illustrate
the positioning of regional groups. The main differences illustrated here are as
Fig. 7.3 Configuration of institutions and organisations involved in boundary work on interna-
tional decision-making on climate change (Source: compiled by the author based on Jasanoff and
Wynne (1998))
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follows: (1) the major scientific assessment (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment)
spans the international and regional level through the inclusion of sub-global
assessment processes on the basis of an inclusive stakeholder approach. (2) The
new Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES) is, according to its mandate, positioned further to the right than
IPCC. This is because its mandate is to evaluate the results of other assessments and
provide recommendations on concrete policy options, rather than providing mere
scientific synthesis. Its de facto impact may however be less significant than that of
the IPCC because of the higher complexity of biodiversity issues and an overall
lower politicisation of the issues at hand. The CBD’s SBSTTA on the other hand is
more political than the UNFCCC’s SBSTA as it has evolved into a preparatory
meeting for the Conference of the Parties rather than a body for scientific
deliberation.2
Finally, this illustration also displays additional processes of boundary work at
the regional level, in this case within the European Union. They are carried out
both in the network of European Environment and Advisory Councils (EEAC) as
well as in regional coordination processes under the EU Council or the EU
Commission.
Fig. 7.4 Illustrative configuration of institutions and processes involved in boundary work on
biodiversity decision-making (Source: compiled by the author)
2 Recent reforms in the SBSTTA mode of operation, may have changed its position towards the
left.
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These examples illustrate the potential of a configuration approach to a more
systemic study of boundary work in international sustainable development
decision-making. Such an approach would combine a number of theories and
methods to expand and complement the concept of boundary work.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the challenges and constraints of applying the concept of
boundary work to interactions between knowledge production and international
sustainable development decision-making. The analysis finds that, while the con-
cept of boundary work has proven useful as a case-study approach, it must be
complemented in order to gain a more systemic view of international science-policy
interactions. Several conceptual weaknesses must also be addressed, including its
inability to capture the diversity of institutions involved in boundary work at the
international level and the implications and constraints of the modes of representa-
tion and negotiation present in boundary work in the context of intergovernmental
decision-making. The chapter suggests the development of a configuration
approach which allows the positioning of institutions involved in boundary work
with regard to their degree of politicisation and mode of representation. Such an
approach would yield a more systemic understanding of boundary work for inter-
national sustainable development decision-making. In addition it could guide the
development of theories and specific hypotheses on how the positioning of
institutions influences the processes of boundary work taking place within them,
as well as their behaviour towards other boundary institutions and organisations.
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Chapter 8
Transgovernance: The Quest for Governance
of Sustainable Development
Roeland Jaap in ’t Veld
Abstract In this chapter, the Summary andRecommendations are included of the first
report of the TransGov project of IASS, Potsdam, authored by Roeland J. in ’t Veld.
For this report the contributions to this volume were used as source of inspiration.1
8.1 Summary: Rethinking Sustainability Governance
8.1.1 Points of Departure
This report aims for innovation by adopting and amalgamating advanced insights
in order to add value to the debate on the governance of sustainable development.
We adapt a specific view on the present patterns of evolution of the world using the
term knowledge democracy (in ’t Veld 2010a). We interpret the recently developed
theories on transitions and transformations with respect to governance, and accept
thinking on second modernity (Beck 1992) as a background idea. Moreover, we
concentrate on dynamics, because the term development necessitates a dynamic
view, and because each societal phenomenon or system is simultaneously
influenced by endogenous and exogenous dynamics. Furthermore, we add ideas
from reflexivity theory, configuration theory and governance theory. We will argue
that the proposed combination of these advanced concepts leads to a new approach
of sustainability governance which we call transgovernance (Fig. 8.1).
R.J. in ’t Veld
Waterbieskreek 40 2353 JH Leiderdorp, Netherlands
e-mail: roelintveld@hotmail.com
1 The full final report can be downloaded as open source publication at http://www.iass-potsdam.
de/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Transgovernance_-_The_Quest_-_Nov_2011.pdf.
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8.1.1.1 Knowledge Democracy
We refer to the evolutionary pattern of democracy as knowledge democracy
because the interactions between politics, media and science have adapted a new
shape with far reaching consequences, in many nations, regions and localities and
on a global level. Representative democracy, as the dominant concept, appears to be
in decay. Its ability to govern the present complex problems is met with wide spread
scepticism. The mediatisation of both politics and science has changed the charac-
ter of both, but also their interaction. As a consequence, the problem-solving
potential of societies is affected.
The Curse of Success?
During the last decade, an influential debate has been conducted on the ‘knowledge-
based economy’. This concept has even become the main policy objective of the
European Union, the Lisbon Strategy. However, there are signs that the strength of
the argument for the knowledge-based economy is weakening rapidly.
The current worldwide economic crisis leads to new, very challenging questions.
These questions refer mainly to the institutional frameworks of today’s societies. It
is therefore time for a transition to a new concept which concentrates on institu-
tional and functional innovation. As the industrial economy has been combined
with mass democracy through universal suffrage and later by the rise of mass
media, one might suggest that the logical successor of knowledge economy is a
new type of governance context, which has been called knowledge democracy (in ’t
Veld 2010) (Fig. 8.2). Knowledge democracy is an emerging concept with political,
ideological and persuasive meaning. The relations between politics, science and
media in the twentieth century, the corners in the triangle, are prone to profound
change, indicated in second-order relationships (Fig. 8.3):
• The bottom-up media do not only supplement the classical media, but also
compete with them.
Fig. 8.1 Combination of theories and concepts leading to transgovernance
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• Participatory democracy is complementary to representative democracy but is
also considered as a threat to the latter.
• Transdisciplinary design or research is not only a bridge between classical
science and the real world but also produces deviant knowledge and insights.
As a consequence we are confronted with tensions, threats and opportunities
which are indicated in third-order relationships, also shown in Fig. 8.3. The tensions
are those we find in second modernity. Society is enriched by the extensions of the
corners of the triangles but it has to cope with the tensions. The first- and second-
order tensions do not disappear in a knowledge democracy but do change character
in the presence of third-order tensions. With regards to empirical research on this
matter, comprehensive studies have not yet been conducted.
As we may observe, the outer points of the extended triangle also strengthen and
stimulate each other. Transdisciplinarity nears participatory democracy, and social
media play crucial roles in large scale communication processes. With this, the
tensions relate mainly to the inside-outside relations in the triangle while the stimuli
relate to the outer point of the corners. Moreover, we might observe relations
between each inner and each outer corner (Fig. 8.4).
This has far reaching consequences for the governance of sustainable develop-
ment in knowledge democracies. We can combine other insights here. The concept
of change from within (intraventions, see Sect. 8.1.4 [in this chapter]) is brought
into practice both in transdisciplinarity and in participatory democracy. Social
change is designed or brought about here bottom-up, out of deliberations between
individuals who are concerned.
The fruitful development of relationships between science and policy making
has been characterised by co-evolution, but as we shall see the conditions for that
are not always met. Indeed, even less than before, the so-called wicked problems
which require a ‘dealing with’ approach rather than an approach which defines
simple solutions, dominate political and corporate agendas. Knowledge democracy
marks the transition of representative democracy to a more mixed political system
in which more direct participation in decision-making by citizens and societal
Fig. 8.2 Twentieth century relationships between politics, science and media
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groups is introduced. It also sees the appearance of social media as an alternative to
the classical media, and the rise of transdisciplinarity to accompany the pre-
dominant disciplinary character of science. For the corporate community, knowl-
edge democracy marks the transition of mere business cases (the business of
business is business) to a responsible ‘green economy’ business case. This involves
stakeholders, and public reporting, with a vision towards the future roadmaps of
producing and consuming, and a sustainable corporate performance.
These developments cause new societal relationships between old and new
institutional arrangements, which are full of tensions. They should neither be
ignored nor can they be solved: they have to be dealt with and if possible made
productive.
I think it is the direction in which we all have to go. Whether you call it green economy or
sustainable development, basically it is aimed at finding production and consumption
patterns that are more in line with the natural limitations of the planet. They are unavoid-
able. They are a must. We are coming up to relatively short term turnaround points; we
must take a U-turn in the next five decades. (Karl Falkenberg)2
Fig. 8.3 Knowledge democracy: Three orders of tensions (After in ’t Veld 2010)
2 This is the first of a series of quotations taken from interviews with influential decision makers or
experts, held for the TransGov project in May/June 2011.
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8.1.1.2 Second Modernity: ‘And’ Instead of ‘Or’
The second concept we embrace is the second modernity viewpoint (Beck 1992).3
This notion states that today’s societal evolution is characterised by the emergence
of tense relationships between contradictory phenomena, by ‘and’ instead of ‘or’.
We accept the viewpoint of Ulrich Beck and others, that the specific character
of the era we live in is no longer determined by the substitution of the former
institution by a new one, but by the emerging tense coexistence of both. They need
each other although there are controversies, and continuous tense relationships.
Rosenau’s (2005) definition of fragmegration, identifying sustainability both as
fragmentation and integration, is a typical example of that character. Another
instance of this is globalization, which on the one hand describes the simultaneous
enlargement of scales of economies, of institutional arrangements and of thinking,
whilst also arguing for local identities and intimacy. In order to properly understand
the meaning of this observation we must digress on globalisation. This phenome-
non, made possible by technological innovations, has led to unknown potentials to
Fig. 8.4 Old and new forms co-exist and influence each other
3 Beck’s research focus is ‘reflexive modernization’ (1992), which explores the complexities and
uncertainties of the process of transformation from ‘first’ to ‘second’ modernity.
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influence economic and other developments elsewhere in a massive manner within
a split-second by transactions on capital markets and others.
Knowledge democracy also has second modernity characteristics: representative
democracy does not disappear because of the rise of participatory democracy. The
classical media stay alive while social media grow, and disciplinary science goes
on, while transdisciplinarity begins to flourish. The relationships however are full of
tensions, and governance in the context of sustainable development will either be
effective or ineffective depending on its ability to handle such tensions.
8.1.1.3 Techno-social Systems: Reflexivity
We have organised our worlds in order to master technologies, to produce goods
and services according to human preferences, to enable people to pursue happiness,
and to avoid as well as fight disagreeable actions and events. The patterns of
organisation are immensely varied and interconnected.
People have organised themselves in stable social systems like tribes, villages,
cities, regions and states, but can be observed also as flows of fugitives, masses,
publics, crowds and other temporary shapes. Moreover, people live in a technolog-
ical manner, that is, they are surrounded by applications of technologies in nearly
every aspect of their activities, and themselves are increasingly becoming parts of
technological systems. Moreover, people are (parts of) ecological-biological
systems, or at least are surrounded by such systems.
All systems are due to change over time, but they evolve in very different ways.
Some seem to change according to an S-curve, while others show tipping points.
We may be able to analyse the change of ecological-biological systems with the
support of natural sciences which lean heavily on regularities, often formulated as
causalities. These regularities shape bodies of knowledge. This type of knowledge
is accumulative in nature: our knowledge about stars nowadays is better than it was
a century ago. Indeed, it can be utilised to forecast, to steer, and to develop.
Social systems however are functioning according to the way in which reflexiv-
ity, as we refer to it, operates. This concept is concerned with human competence to
learn, and to adapt. This competence enables people to learn from any source,
experience, practice, information, knowledge, theory, and so on, and to re-orientate
behaviour subsequently. The inner logic of this learning process is unknown to any
outside observer. As a consequence, the future behaviour of a social system in
general cannot be forecast properly. It is doubtful whether knowledge regarding
social systems can be characterised as accumulative: social systems will learn from
any knowledge known to them. As a consequence, the knowledge may lose its
validity. Knowledge on social systems is volatile in principle.
These considerations about the reflexive nature of social systems and
interactions shed more light on one point addressed further (Sect. 8.4 [in this
chapter]) under the rubric of configurations theory. Systems can often be influenced
from outside. We call a purposeful attempt to influence a system from outside an
intervention (or steering action). We call an attempt to influence a system from
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inside an intravention. The volatility of knowledge concerning social systems
provides a major hindrance in attempts to formulate adequate outside policies for
interventions pointing at change, because the knowledge base is not trustworthy as
far as the functions and characteristics of social systems are concerned. Reflexivity,
or in Giddens’ (1991) terminology reflexive monitoring, leads to intraventions.
8.1.1.4 Configuration Theory and Intraventions
In order to grasp the way in which actions of a certain actor may influence other
actors, we can build on configuration theory (e.g. Van Twist and Termeer 1991).
This theory offers a profound insight into the essential aspects of organising and the
specific approach of organisations. It helps us to develop a more satisfactory vision
on multi-level governance. Organising, according to this theory, takes place via
reflexive processes of argumentation and communication. These processes are
taking place repeatedly and intensely between the members of a group. They
gradually shape a common understanding, a common sense, a common frame, a
common view on reality, and moreover a common idea of meaning within the
group. We call the result of such processes a configuration. A configuration
develops along two dimensions, the social and the cognitive dimension and thus
truth claims emerge with regards to both substance and social relations.
As argumentation and communication decrease in intensity because of the
internal consensus found, fixation begins. The configuration has grown up, but
the danger of a standstill starts to grow. The disappearance of reflection creates
stability but learning stops. Innovation becomes problematic. Inclusion and exclu-
sion go hand in hand.
How can grown-up configurations still then innovate? Not by steering from
outside, but also not primarily by impulses from the leader, the centre, because
the centre is the centre due to social fixation – firm beliefs, vision, leadership, and so
on. The centre, to a certain degree, could even be called the least plausible source of
innovation.
People however live in different configurations: the peer group, the firm, the
church, and so on. They are multiply included in several configurations. Multiple
inclusion may be a ‘burden’, however, it also enables the multiply included actor to
introduce ideas existing in configuration A and also in configuration B. He or she
will be more credible in this role as he or she is engaged in both worlds and hence in
a position to ‘transfer’ meaning. The fact that such an actor may be more often than
not a marginal actor in both configurations may rather contribute to his or her
capacity to bridge divides rather than hindering them. Configuration theory teaches
us to abstain from naı̈ve classical planning, steering or instructing, because the
overwhelming majority of configurations live in the phase of fixation.
We have to reform the existing institutions from within. That is a slow and gradual
approach which requires leadership – and at the moment there is no leadership – but that
is what we need to do. [. . .] The pressure to reform and strengthen existing international
institutions is necessary, and needs to come from civil society too, with a call for reform
8 Transgovernance: The Quest for Governance of Sustainable Development 281
through the merger of existing organisations. We have for example the UNEP and the UN’s
Commission on Sustainable Development– and governments can play these two
organisations off against each other. At the UNEP they say that it is not the forum to
discuss this issue, we have the Sustainability Commission for that – and they do the same
the other way round. And they are running around, fooling themselves and the electorate
when they do so. (Jan Pronk)
More advanced intervention approaches, leaning on the awareness of multiple
inclusion as a device for change, are necessary. Successful steering takes place from
within configurations, not from outside interventions. Therefore we need ‘intraven-
tions’more than interventions.
8.1.1.5 Governance Theory
We can define governance as a collection of normative insights into the
organisation of influence, steering, power, checks and balances in human societies.
With this said, ‘good governance’ is a pleonasm. Governance relates to social
systems. These are reflexive in nature. They learn continuously, with the support
of experience, knowledge, revelation and so on. Creating governance means shap-
ing and influencing social systems, so governance should be reflexive in itself.
Moreover, reflexivity is the engine of learning, and therefore of dynamics, so
governance should be formulated in terms of dynamics. Any governance which
hampers learning, intentionally or not, is doomed to fail in the realm of sustainable
development.
Metagovernance in the definition of Meuleman (2008), is an approach which
aims to design and manage a – situational – preference for a mix of institutions,
consisting of elements of hierarchical, market and network governance. Each of
these exists on its own, but metagovernance can help understand how they should
be related. It is important to note that metagovernance is not exclusively a state
approach: each societal actor can develop a metagovernance attitude.
We are confronted with the well-known puzzle of infinite regress once we raise
the question of how to realise ideas on metagovernance: we would have to decide
first, how to decide on governance, but in order to do so we must first decide how to
decide on metagovernance, and so on. In our world the production of goods and
services is realised by enterprises. The governance of societies is partially governed
by governments, or better parliamentary democracies, and other institutional
arrangements. Governance is also not solely government.
We have not yet found a solution for how they [companies and NGOs] could be more
directly involved. There are open sessions in which NGOs and stakeholders can be present,
so that is certainly a plus. But when the real decisions are made, it is hard to see how you
can involve all of them. (Jos Delbeke)
According to transition theory (see Sect. 8.1.2.6 [in this chapter]) it is necessary
that during transitions changes at each of the relevant levels ‘landscape’, ‘regime/
structure’, and ‘niches’, reinforce each other. The focal term is re-structuration.
Learning is conditional for each actor. Fruitful developments are possible once the
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actors reach a certain degree of congruency: ‘Re-structuration not only involves a
co-evolution between innovative practices and structural change, but also includes
the emergence and evolution of new normative orientations’ (Grin et al. 2010: 319).
In order to learn, iteration is crucial. Iteration should be indicated as a necessary
activity of policy makers. Thus, governance of transitions/transformations is
all about dealing with interactions, asymmetries, congruency, unforeseeable
emergencies, and co-evolution of politics and science in informed debates.
8.1.2 The Challenge of Sustainability Governance
8.1.2.1 Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is all over the place. The concept is broad and vague. The
vagueness of the concept has a Janus face. It has been called a unifying concept
because its vagueness breeds a consensus which might be utilised later. Vagueness
is an asset if it triggers action.
It has been generally accepted nowadays that humankind is able to bring about
irreversible change which partially diminishes the options of future generations.
‘Sustainability’, in this context, is thought to be an answer to the exhausting and
devastating way economies and societies are predominantly using social and
ecological resources, in contemporary times. The normative insight derived from
this notion of sustainability is formulated as the precautionary principle. This
principle leads to the norm that we should abstain from action that reduces the
valuable future options for choice. This norm refers to intergenerational justice.
The concept of sustainability concerns the three major dimensions of human
societies: the economic, social and ecological dimension, also known as the three
P’s of people, planet, profit or prosperity. The reconciliatory character of the
concept raises specific questions as to the judgement on changes which lead to
the improvement of two dimensions but to a deterioration in the third. Until now we
have lacked a satisfactory multidimensional measuring rod in order to pass judge-
ment on these types of changes.
Sustainable development is a container notion. The use of the singular form fits
with holistic viewpoints. The supporters of these viewpoints speak about the
climate, the earth system, the emissions, the planetary boundaries. All of these
are at stake, and global disasters are a constant threat. Such constructs enable us
subsequently to deal with a global challenge that should be met in a well-
coordinated manner. So the normative construction, or better the predominant
framing, of the problematique leads to a specific line of argumentation on gover-
nance. The supporters of this view may be found in international organisations
which make continuous efforts to produce agreement on international binding
agreements, in order to prevent disasters. Basic metaphors like the exhaustion of
the earth are then very useful.
However, people do not experience the climate but a climate in the
neighbourhood. They pursue a good life according to their own values and in
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many cases try to find a satisfactory relationship with the surrounding nature. Their
visible world is not abstract or systemic but specific and concrete. Entrepreneurs
make attempts to design and apply more sustainable technologies. These are also
specific.
Therefore, major discrepancies may exist between views on the systemic world
on one hand and the daily life world on the other. In governance concepts both
views are legitimate, and both should be taken care of. Transgovernance, in the
context of sustainable development and transformations (plural), must also embrace
the human view and must not restrict itself to the systemic view. Restricting
governance notions to the latter might prohibit people and other societal actors
from utilising their competences in order to change the path of development.
We are more aware of what sustainable development is than what it is not. We
feel more comfortable with judgements on improvements of unsustainable
technologies than with notions of optimal sustainability. In some theories on social
integration, the core of social integration is understood as shared unvalues, more
than values. Sharing unvalues, give recommendations as to what should not been
done, and leave more space for variety than the necessity of consensus on necessary
action. The analogy is clear: getting rid of unsustainable technologies leaves room
for varied roads (and roadmaps) towards sustainability.
8.1.2.2 Values
Values are social and psychological concepts. They are rooted in cognition and
emotion, and they can be informed by various sources, including insights. They
concern the beautiful, the good, the true, and the trustworthy. Values urge for
reflection, interventions and intraventions. Socialised values lead to norms that
regulate human behaviour. People live values. Values that are lived, albeit in the
shape of explicit norms, constitute culture. The specific culture of a certain social
system is its identity. Cultures and identities may change over time. This change
however takes place in a reflexive manner. Developments in accordance with
values make sense.
Well-understood self-interest might lead to collective action which respects
ecosystem services and social welfare, and may even produce collective goods.
Egocentricity and free-rider behaviour however demand violence monopoly over a
group in order to ensure sufficient collective goods production.
8.1.2.3 Cultural Diversity
Views on sustainable development vary with cultural backgrounds. How should we
deal with cultural diversity in relation to sustainability, and in particular to the
precautionary principle?
Culture is the production of meaning, and meaning relates to values. Without
values there is no meaning, and no culture. Humankind has brought forward many
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varied cultures. In a certain normative orientation we experience cultural variety as
richness. However, our basic attitude to cultural diversity is more critical than our
attitude towards biodiversity. A society needs a certain cohesion, which is produced
as a moral order, based on consensus on some fundamental values and norms.
Indeed, culture within a society is also sharing some common substantial and
relational values. A society consists of configurations. A configuration possesses
a specific culture but as observed earlier, this leads to outside walls and thus
tensions arise. In particular, the tensions between emerging identities on one side,
accompanied necessarily by outer walls, and the need for cohesion and collective
action on the other will never disappear. Shaping governance therefore, is walking a
high wire.
We may conclude that biodiversity and cultural diversity are both components of
sustainability. We may mourn the loss of a language somewhere on this planet as
much as we may about the loss of a species. However, this does not represent our
general insight. We do not believe that each culture is intrinsically good. On the
contrary, some cultures are horrifying to many. As sustainability also implies the
economic and social dimension, we realise that ‘diversity always is a bedfellow of
inequality’ (Van Londen and De Ruijter 2011: 14). Inequality might be a threat to
sustainable development and thus our attitude towards cultural diversity is
ambiguous.
I think that what is missing is a clear regional and culturally rooted process of development
management. It is not the same to do something for the Arctic people as for people in El
Salvador. Both have the same problems but have very different outcomes. (. . .) At the local
level one of the key issues is to involve women, especially as they are directly related to
survival, and especially in the very poor countries. The World Bank has understood that in
the micro credit system they have a better return rate if they do it with women than with
men. (Úrsula Oswald Spring)
According to second modernity it is probable that from the tense relations
between emerging opposites, variety further increases. Striving for sustainable
development urges us to take these tensions fully into account when dealing with
governance. Governance is a relational concept. Hierarchy needs dependent
subjects, network governance requires interdependency between partners, and
market governance necessitates independent relationships.
Hence, it is fair to assume that different governance styles also reveal how
people consider other people’s values. Complex metagovernance combines the
different archetypes, so that different patterns of relational values are also assem-
bled. In system theory it is held that diversity promotes resilience, while uniformity
breeds fragility. This may also be the case regarding cultural diversity. Diversity
alone leads to chaos; what is probably needed is institutional redundancy, similar to
redundancy in ecosystems.
Reflexivity is the strongest engine of social dynamics. It also relates to gover-
nance. The interaction of the general laws of diminishing effectiveness and of
subsequent policy accumulation as indicated above, lead to crises which enable a
phoenix to arise from the ashes, and to invent new governance arrangements. We
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are aware of the inevitability that government as a major component of governance
will consciously destroy variety according to predominant substantial values, but
also profoundly influence social relations and relational values. How the latter
evaluate is due to reflexivity. We may better observe, with the support of the
foregoing schemes, how these evolutions emerge. We will realise in shaping
governance that tensions are not going to disappear but tend to intensify as
governance solidifies. We understand that the precautionary principle sometimes
demands the destruction of cultural variety. We know that biodiversity and cultural
diversity have similarities but also major differences.
Governance of sustainable development is extremely complex as it must deal
with all the tensions described above and their dynamics, while at the same time it is
itself subject to reflexivity. Aiming at compatibility instead of assimilation appears
to be a useful recipe.
Putting all your eggs in one basket and relying on government seems dangerous, I think you
have to find other ways to do this. Maybe social media will help here – I think the private
sector can also be very helpful here, although they can also cause a backlash. So you have to
try all of these things in the absence of strong government and of institutions that aren’t that
effective – you need a multidimensional, multi-track approach. (Eileen Claussen)
8.1.2.4 Planetary Boundaries
Recently a powerful new concept about global developments has been published:
the idea about planetary boundaries. How to deal with the governance implications
of this concept? The major difficulties that the concept causes are the following
(Schmidt 2012):
• The boundaries are solely formulated in one of the three dimensions.
• The aggregate level of the truth claims seems to necessitate central decision-
making.
• It remains unclear how to disaggregate the boundaries in order to create a frame
of reference for other, de-central decision-makers.
Regarding the first cause, it is worthwhile, or maybe even necessary, to identify
planetary boundaries in the other dimensions of sustainability, in order to restore
equilibrium again. In economics for instance, the concept of a ‘positional good’
resembles the boundary concept. The core idea here is that the utility of certain
goods and services decreases once the supply enables mass consumption. This
decrease may be gradual, but the loss of sociability which Hirsch forecasts as a
fatal consequence of the expansion of the relative share of positional goods in total
consumption, might bear a tipping point character.
When dealing with cultural diversity we have already concluded that a minimum
of social cohesion within a society is needed in order to produce the worthwhile
public goods. This cohesion may be protected by the existence of a democratic
nation-state, but the minimum condition is valid in other regimes too. With this in
mind, loss of social cohesion as it is described in the literature on social capital, also
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leads to the awareness that we trespass a critical boundary if we lose too much
cohesion, for instance either by intense individualisation or by the predominance of
greed in economic affairs.
The third cause should be seen as challenging scientific excellence: The concept
of co-evolution between decision-making and science must be focussed on this
cause. Further research is required as well as think pieces which dig deep into the
question of whether and how global boundaries would be derived from local and
regional boundaries. Transgovernance (as a concept, a method, as a dialogue-style
policy) is again the key here. Geopolitical stratification (the world of a nine billion
population with emerging economies, and new alliances, a multipolar power
system) will be in desperate need for this kind of – as we suggest calling it in line
with our transgovernance concept – mosaic-style way of putting planetary
boundaries together and making them useful for policies.
8.1.2.5 Dealing with Emergencies
Uncertainty prevails in long term decisions. The consciousness of threats or
emergencies creates the sense of urgency which is often necessary to take decisions
at all. As Bachmann (2012) points out, historically emergency response action has
been one of the prime ‘sources’ of environmentalism. However, here the distinction
between the two categories of long term problems is also decisive for the kind of
action to be taken. If the objectives of actions to meet threats are formulated too
roughly, like greening the economy or a change of less than two degrees in mean
global temperature, it remains unclear which measures should be taken, and
whether one should aim at resilience or at persistent interventions.
Adoption of the resilience approach might lead to delay of decision as the best
approach, because in the case of a long lead time between action and effect we may
delay as long as we respect the lead time.
The whole domain of sustainable development is filled with dangers, threats,
risks, emergencies, and related phenomena, but also with options, opportunities,
chances, beginnings and stories of success and progress. Often, environmental
emergencies may serve in a lens-like way to clarify options and problems. In
conventional governance systems – due to their focus on institutions and regulations
– the ‘sudden chance’ and the unforeseen impact are frequently excluded.
In addition, here we should examine both sides of the coin: on the one hand these
phenomena produce a sense of urgency, a momentum for action. This may be
important and precious because many political systems in general are rather
lethargic as the transaction costs of action appear high or are deliberately perceived
as high even when, in fact, they are not higher than the costs of non-action.
On the other hand, hypes, momentum, and the like, are volatile: ‘they do not
keep longer than fish’. Additionally, the transaction costs of regaining momentum
are often considerably higher. Indeed, unless the emergency is gradually converted
in more fundamental components of value patterns and competences in knowledge
and responsible action, the net result of an emergency as far as sustainable devel-
opment is concerned might still be negative. This, again, is a field for
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transgovernance concepts which bring knowledge and action, responsibility and
awareness, engagement and reasoning together. Letting options for transforming
pass by unused is the worst result of a crisis or an emergency.
8.1.2.6 Transformations
Sustainable development is often described as a great transformation in Polanyi’s
(1944) terminology. Our insights into the nature of profound change are deepened by
recognising the insights produced by the advanced transition/transformation theory – as
developed, for example, by Grin et al. (2010). It deals with the multi-level and multi-
scale evolution of technical and social systems utilising a multi-level approach along
the distinction landscape-regime-niche. What happens in the niches is not altogether
separated from regime changes, but the relationships are loose and complex.
We suggest using the term transformation in its plural form. In a world of high
complexity and multifactor drivers of development it seems reasonable not to single
down transformation into a one-size-fits-all approach. The notion of ‘wicked
problems’ supports concepts for transformations that always include a variety of
pathways and features. Furthermore, by using the singular, a large-scale perspective
is often applied or suggested. Yet many if not most of transformative changes are
taking place at a very small-scale level ranging from technological innovations in
niche-markets to adjustments in individual behavioural patterns leading to pro-
found changes if aggregated. Transgovernance is rather about finding and nurturing
such small-scale transformative changes instead of neglecting them for the sake of
large-scale systemic interventions.
8.1.2.7 Towards Transgovernance: Beyond Conventional Governance
How does sustainability governance look when we recognise the concepts of
knowledge democracy and second modernity? The best answer might be that we
do not need a new paradigm, a new orthodoxy, but should develop the sensitivity to
look beyond governance conventions. This implies an approach beyond traditional
forms of governance, beyond disciplinary scientific research, towards more
transdisciplinarity; beyond borders formed by states and other institutions, towards
trans-border approaches; beyond conventional means to measuring progress,
towards new and more interactive measuring methods; beyond linear forms of
innovation, towards open innovation; beyond cultural integration or assimilation,
towards looking for compatibility. In other words, governance for sustainable
transformations requires thinking beyond standardised governance recipes, towards
a culturally sensitive metagovernance for sustainable development. The combination
of these steps beyond familiar sustainability governance, we call transgovernance.
Transgovernance is an approach rather than a recipe. Using this approach,
solutions may differ. We have suggested a number of these possible solutions,
such as global innovation networks of governments and corporations, innovation
tournaments for small and medium enterprises, nation states in a new role as
process architect, and a new diplomacy for international agreements.
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The challenges for sustainability governance leadership go beyond designing
solutions. It is essential to have a long-term orientation, in order to understand the
complexity of our time and to understand the lesson that changes of real-world
configurations often come from inside (intraventions). Leadership needs sustainability
skills. The conventional hard skill/soft skill approach is being challenged.
We see today that individuals play a big role. There are a few leaders in their
countries making a difference. I also think it cannot be just individuals. We need to
make sure that all the things we talked about there is proper information, we
organise structures, discussions we collectively set frameworks that behaviour is
moving in a more knowledgeable, knowledge-based direction. We do need leaders.
Leaders dependent on polling results are not what we need for the fundamental
change (Karl Falkenberg).
8.2 Recommendations
Our Summary introduces several concepts which are crucial for rethinking
sustainability governance: knowledge democracy, cultural diversity, planetary
boundaries and reflexivity, as well as structural changes through emergencies.
Below, examples are provided of possible consequences of using and linking
these conceptual cornerstones. These insights are formulated as recommendations
and are presented on ten sustainability governance themes:
• Developing societal networks that trespass the traditional boundaries of gover-
nance arrangements, involving private and public actors: ‘co-decentral’
arrangements.
• Conditions for better long-term decisions.
• A new diplomacy for international agreements.
• Conditions for a more transdisciplinary science system.
• Checks and balances in science communication.
• Upgrading the relevance of city initiatives.
• Nation states in a new role of process architect.
• Crowdsourcing and volatile publics.
• Creating space for new institutions, and allowing for old institutions to be phased
out or to be transformed into new ones.
• Measuring progress through metrics which are to be found in dialogue-style
search procedures.
8.2.1 New Private-Public Networks: Co-decentral Arrangements
for Technological Evolution
Conventional governance respects boundaries between public and private actors.
Hierarchy and regulatory power are reserved for public actors. Our insights into
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reflexivity bring the observation that many conventional arrangements are useless
as far as fundamental change is concerned. In order to further this we need new,
semi-horizontal relationships. We call these relationships co-decentral. It is possi-
ble to design a private-public network, consisting of corporations, citizen groups
and scientific bodies, that will further sustainable technologies, while public bodies
ensure a level playing field.
Technology and sustainable development have complex and crucial
relationships. On one hand, the precautionary principle produces critical attitudes
towards technological developments that may bring with them considerable risks
and possibly produce irreversible and unfavourable effects. On the other hand, new
technologies may enable humankind to take production in a far more sustainable
direction. An important example is renewable energy.
The technological development in a number of domains lies mainly in the hands
of large enterprises, but in other less mature developments multitudes of very small
firms are responsible for innovations.
Big business has a huge role – the Walmarts of this world – they have a huge possibility of
putting demands down the whole demand chain, the whole structure. And by that – in
combination with what politicians do, in combination with the right price structure, in
combination with civil society and the awareness rising among citizens – they start to just
do things differently to what they did only five years back. (Connie Hedegaard)
We design two institutional arrangements which cope with this diversity:
Proposal 1: A Global Sustainable Innovation Network
Most technology driven markets for consumer goods and services are worldwide
oligopolies. Because of this a limited number of enterprises are in a leading
position. Although they cooperate with universities and other scientific centres,
they themselves provide the leadership for the direction in which the technological
development moves. In many cases they operate in business to business chains with
suppliers and subcontractors. Nowadays they report to the public at large about
their general position towards sustainable development.
The employees in the higher ranks within large companies are – more than on the
average – sensitive to sustainability issues. Within R&D departments, professionals
develop value patterns which are often closely linked to those of important NGOs in
the same domain. Therefore employers with a high sustainability profile are very
attractive to conscious and competent professionals, and vice versa. Thus such a
profile is rewarding in at least two relationships, with clients and with employees.
Public authorities may regulate broadly, in attempts to prohibit unsustainable
developments or to further innovations, but they can hardly influence the paths of
technological evolution chosen by large companies because governments neither
sufficiently understand the most advanced elements of technologies nor the crucial
trade-offs which entrepreneurs are confronted with. Moreover, in large parts of the
world, public authorities cannot dispose of policy instruments which force
entrepreneurs to select a specific critical path for their technological innovation.
Sustainability is one of the main challenges for the decades ahead and the market will not
produce sustainable outcomes – so then there is a major task for international institutions –
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for international institutions, for national government, but also for local government to set
standards and to issue laws within which and on the basis of which sustainability can
advance. The market itself will not produce sustainability to the extent that is necessary.
(Jan Pronk)
However, the competitors and subcontractors, and even remote enterprises
which utilise either identical or related technology, in general have a far better
understanding of these positions.
Generally speaking there are various roads towards more sustainable
technologies. Competitors and scientific partners can make reasonable judgements
with regards to the direction which a certain company chooses.
Consumers, clients – also being citizens – are increasingly sensitive in the long
run to matters of sustainable development. They organise themselves in numerous
ways. These consumer organisations could be powerful allies in the combat for
sustainable development.
We need a regulatory framework in which individual companies function. We all want
market economies, but we all know that they don’t work without rules. Environmental
collateral damage needs to be taken into account. There are cost-producing damages that
society is not capable of shouldering anymore. We have to stop polluting in the way we
have so far, and there are only two ways of getting there: (1) regulate what emissions are
acceptable, and (2) put a price in order to incentivise innovation, in order to better
accommodate the limits of the planet. (Karl Falkenberg)
If we consider the aforementioned chains, networks and other relevant
relationships as a potential landscape for the evolution of governance, we might
envisage the following scenario, which is of course not a blueprint:
• Public authorities may design a regulatory regime which ensures level playing
fields for enterprises that strive for sustainable technological evolution. That
means among other things the following: the competitive advantage that is
collected by entrepreneurs utilising a less sustainable technology should be
considered as false competition. The public market regulators could be enabled
to burden these entrepreneurs with fines, or peculiar taxes.
• The 250 largest companies in the world will set up a co-decentral network in
order to make judgements regarding the preferable patterns of technological
evolution in many different sectors. They will promote the erection of networks
within each sector which encourage the empathic cooperation of suppliers,
manufacturers and subcontractors in sustainable directions. The (global) net-
work will provide a system of communication that produces possibilities for
naming, faming and blaming.
• The existing national and international competition authorities spend the income
they collect on fining to fund prizes and rewards for excellent entrepreneurial
performances in sustainable solutions.
• The network is connected with communities of clients and NGOs who contribute
to dialogues and the collection of information on entrepreneurial practices.
Crowd sourcing is not only used in order to detect data on facts, but is also
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utilised to discover fraud. The power of clients and consumers then is fully
mobilised.
• Research institutes all over the world will be stimulated to select their patterns of
cooperation with companies in such a way that they will be connected with the
strongest sustainability directed networks and chains.
• In this manner the consumer and the citizen would be reunited in a governance
arrangement which combines the value structures of entrepreneurs with the
moral standards of citizens/consumers in a knowledge democracy landscape.
(. . .) if we are all together in this – citizens, business, municipalities, government - then in
the UN structure you should also have more formal representation of for example the
business community; yes I believe that they should be there. (. . .) But I just want to
emphasise that in the end, and that also goes at the UN level, governments, elected
governments have the responsibility. (. . .) You can include business, you can hear them,
you can do a lot of things, but you cannot – I cannot foresee – a system where you have one
country here and you have this huge top 50 company over here – sitting on a par – no I don’t
think that. You should also in the UN system have somebody who is accountable to people
in the end. (Connie Hedegaard)
The existing differences inside the corporate community will shift in direction
and the forerunners will join forces, which will in turn stimulate the mainstream in
the direction of jumping on the bandwagon of sustainability. It would help to enrich
the governance of already existing policies such as the 10 year Framework
programme on sustainable production and consumption. Moreover, links should
be created with existing innovative ideas and initiatives like the Vision 2050 report
of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).
I think it is an inevitable development because we have a world that is increasingly resource
and pollution constrained. The only way to deal with that is by pushing resource efficiency
and less polluting solutions. That is what is happening. At the same time, though, in a world
which is constrained like that you see competition for resources and for who is going to be
the leading supplier of solutions. There is a race – a green race – and the leading actors are
some of the Asian countries like China. If you want to win the green race you have to
change your domestic market to build scale and demand and skills – that is what China is
doing with its next 5 Year Plan. It is a game plan for the green race. (Bj€orn Stigson)
Proposal 2: Sustainable Innovations Tournaments for Small and Medium
Companies (SMEs)
The above formulated recommendation will also concern those small and medium
size companies which function as subcontractors for the large oligopolists that
shape the network. However, in many domains small companies will contribute
to new technologies without such strings. It will be worthwhile to organise on a
global scale large tournaments for sustainable innovations domain by domain,
where small companies and groups from knowledge institutions may compete for
considerable prizes to be offered by the UN. The already existing networks of cities
could play major roles here too. When compared to many others they are more
aware of rising small stars in the world of sustainable entrepreneurs.
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[Collaborations on sustainability] are happening in large corporations across the globe, but
primarily in developed economies. Small and medium size enterprises, which account for
over 90% of the world’s businesses and 50% to 70% of national GDPs, are not there yet.
(Juan José Daboub)
8.2.2 Better Conditions for Long-Term Decisions
Sustainability governance has an intergenerational dimension, which implies that
long-term decisions should play an important role. Such decisions require specific
governance conditions (Meuleman and in ’t Veld 2009) which should be addressed
in an innovative way. Transitions such as the typology of developments influenced
by long term decisions are societal reconfigurations. The main conditions are:
• Take into account that different types of long-term decisions require different
approaches. We should distinguish at least two types of long-term decisions:
– Cases with a relatively long period between the policy intervention and the
intended effects: a long lead time. This type demands firm leadership in order
to collect sufficient momentum for the focal decision.
– Cases that demand a long-lasting series of interventions that as a whole is
necessary to cause a favourable effect, following the ‘drop in the bucket’ –
metaphor. This type asks for perseverance, consistency, continuity and
reflexivity.
• Sustainable development requires the consideration of long-term futures; uncer-
tainty and complexity prevail. In some cases we are able to forecast to a
considerable degree, then we may anticipate. In the majority of cases we must
meet the existing uncertainty by concentrating on the acquirement of resilience.
I think we need to come to this broader societal consensus so politicians can take longer
term perspectives. The funny thing for politicians is, these short term conditions make it
easier for them to make longer term commitments. [Example Obama] It’s going to be ten
presidents down the line in terms of fulfilling targets they have made. So it goes both ways.
We need collectively to make sure that they are politically responsible people, that what we
get from them is not only income tomorrow morning and income in 50 years. (Karl
Falkenberg)
• Long-term decision-making therefore requires governance which is primarily
reflexive and resilient, supported by (legal) safeguards to keep issues on track
longer than one or two political cycle(s), and to maintain a certain level of
reliability and stability. In many cases it requires some dominance of network
governance, with hierarchical and market governance ‘running in the back-
ground’. Such a governance mixture presupposes that institutions involved in
long-term decision-making are able to act in a resilient way. This implies
investing in flexibility and in alertness (creating ‘watchdog capacity’), without
making the institutions unstable and unreliable.
• Furthermore, it is important to recognise that long-term impacts of decisions
may become underestimated, because the problems which lead to the decisions
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have reached the end of their policy life cycle. Long-term decision-making may
require policy mechanisms that prolong the policy lifecycle of policy issues.
• It is also important to be transparent and realistic about the limitations of
decision support systems, and to ensure that ethical and political assumptions
in decision support systems are chosen in the political arena.
• The knowledge basis for long-term decisions requires a comprehensive
approach. Knowledge production for long-term decision-making should be a
combination of future orientation, design and research (F-ODR4) bearing many
elements of transdisciplinarity. This demands different process requirements
than the requirements for ‘normal research’ and conventional ‘future-oriented
research’. Participation of actors is one of the key requirements.
• Investing in increasing the long-term oriented values of citizens may make long-
term decision-making more politically feasible: it will be less risky in terms of
losing support from voters.
• The consequences of using the wrong ‘best practices’ in long-term decision-
making processes may be even more damaging then in short-term decisions.
Instead of copying ‘best practices’ it is better to translate them into a form which
works in a specific situation, tradition and culture. The crucial question is: What
works where and why?
Whether we like it or not, we are locked into each other going forward in a way were not in
the past. When we look at these partnerships, there is the question of the role of civil
society. I see civil society as the supplier of trust for these solutions. Even if we are in
agreement in government and business about what should be done, none of us enjoy a high
degree of trust. So we need cooperations with civil society to provide trust for the solutions
and to gain political acceptance of some of the solutions going forward. (Bj€orn Stigson)
8.2.3 A New Diplomacy for International Agreements
Until recently, international agreements have played a major role in the furthering
of sustainable development. It seems, however, that the past years have hardly
shown any further progress.
The speed by which climate agreements are reached at is determined by the slowest player.
For that reason I think that measures at the national level also have to take place in parallel
to these international agreements for us to make progress. (B€arbel Dieckmann)
Widespread dissatisfaction on the effectiveness of many treaties and other
international agreements is one explanation for the stagnation. Our second possible
explanation is that the reflexivity on behalf of the younger nation-states as to the
predominant approaches, concepts, methods and instruments which are put into
practice in international relations has founded the sentiment of being victims of
hegemony.
4 See Meuleman and in ’t Veld (2009).
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There is this discussion if we should, every time we have a new convention, create a new
institution around it. For biodiversity, for Montreal, for climate, for whatever. . .The tricky
thing is: if we spend a lot of time fighting over these institutional things, while we really
need to get some action done, how do we balance these things? . . . I think that what will
bring us most is a structure that supports the mainstreaming and [does] not isolate. (Connie
Hedegaard)
With this in mind, the call for institutional but also cultural variety in governance
is increasing. Indeed, the attempt at agreeing on percentages of reduction of
emissions must resemble a postcolonial hegemonic gesture for those former
colonies which had earlier experienced a delay in economic development and are
only now seeing their economic growth percentages increase. This has produced a
lot of resistance to continuation of the routines leading to yet another binding treaty.
The second modernity viewpoint does not allow the recommendation that from now
on we should abstain from efforts on the global stage to reach agreements, but that
they need to be modified considerably in the following directions:
• Because we have to deal with wicked problems, the complexity of solutions
should match the complexity of the problems, as Hoogeveen and Verkooijen
(2010) rightly argue. This is because such complexity may be better met by a
variety of arrangements working towards a common goal rather than a mono-
lithic, holistic arrangement which tries to capture every aspect of it itself.
• Each party has to realise that cultural variety does not only relate to the
substance of sustainable development but also to the scope, shape and
instruments of binding arrangements themselves; also with respect to these
components fear of hegemony might cause stagnation.
• If on a global scale the differences are too considerable in order to reach
unanimous agreements, it might be wise to concentrate on regional agreements
which would unite a number of more homogenous countries. These differences
may be between actors, which includes culture variety, differences in their stages
of ‘development’, differences in power, or belongings to powerful sub-groups
such as the EU or G77/China.
• Each international agreement must be accompanied by efforts of nation-states to
bring about national and sub-national complementary and synergetic additional
arrangements.
• A new diplomacy is needed, because the variety of relevant actors has increased,
and because the complexity exceeds the competences of traditional diplomats. In
addition, here transdisciplinary trajectories are indispensable, leading both to
cooperation between policy-makers and scientists, as well as between policy-
makers and stakeholders.
• A single treaty, a single instrument is in many cases inferior to a portfolio
approach, if the portfolio successfully arranges for a level playing field.
• Under certain conditions, voluntary agreements with a strong moral appeal,
accompanied by effective naming, blaming and faming mechanisms, might be
at least equivalent to legally binding agreements.
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8.2.4 The Organisation of the Scientific System
One thing that troubles or occupies me greatly is how one can have uncontested knowledge
and information – and yet not act upon it. (B€arbel Dieckmann)
Has science lost public authority? If so, than the support for action perspectives
based upon knowledge has lost its legitimacy. Maybe it is too easy to argue that
public authority as such has disappeared in any societal domain to a considerable
degree. Some specific explanations are offered here.
8.2.4.1 Science and Media
The first explanation is primarily concerned with the manner in which scientists
often behave while appearing in the mass media. Modern science has developed
mainly evolutionary patterns of specialisation into disciplines. Disciplines deal with
an aspect of the world: economics studies choice under scarcity, astronomy studies
the physical and chemical aspects of the universe, and so on. As a consequence, the
main product of scientific activity, namely knowledge, is formulated in terms of
regularities concerning relations between independent and dependent variables
under the condition ceteris paribus.5
All facts have only a value if they can stand the criticism. So you need validation. The
IPCC, which is a huge validation machine and the fact all these researchers wherever they
come from talk to each other, and argue, you know it is quite expensive in terms of
investment but that needs to be done. (Jos Delbeke)
The validity claim is formulated within the specific methodological constraints
agreed upon within the discipline. The methodology serves as an internal tool for
communication, but also as a device in order to immunise against outside criticism.
Contradictory viewpoints may arise, and are even normal, but will be analysed
according to the methodological rules of the game. Among many scientists it is in
confesso,6 that the roots of scientific knowledge are hypothetical in nature.
Scientific disciplines have outer walls. Representatives of different disciplines
may communicate but they will experience language problems. Specific words
have specific meanings within a specific discipline. In the political realm however
societal problems are dealt with. They never bear a monodisciplinary character and
thus monodisciplinary knowledge is never immediately applicable in the solution of
a real world problem. Therefore it has to be amalgamated with other scientific
insights, and moreover with value judgements.
If a scientist responds to the invitation to present scientific insights to a broader
public, he is tempted to leave out all of the complicating remarks about the
5 Latin: ‘All other things being equal or held constant’.
6 Latin: ‘Acknowledged’.
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methodological constraints under which the insight has been formulated.
Journalists do not like such considerations. Moreover it is often assumed that the
scientist’s viewpoint is immediately relevant in relation to the solution of societal
problems. Indeed, the scientist is systematically invited to publically exaggerate the
unconditional character of the truth claim of his insights. In the scientific world he
would make himself vulnerable or even ridiculous by doing so, but in the media
realm this behaviour is a condition for survival as a commentator. Contradictory
viewpoints then become conflicting truth claims, and even real world controversies.
The scientist has entered the world of politics.
Politics is a power game. In politics all weapons are admissible. One of the
popular techniques in politics while dealing with wicked problems is to play two-
level-games: the fight on the level of substance is supplemented with an additional
fight on the truthfulness of the different knowledge sources. In this manner
politicians become interested in blaming the quality of the knowledge producers
who support the hostile viewpoint. This of course results in a decrease of the public
authority of science.
8.2.4.2 Science and Politics: Transdisciplinarity
The second explanation concerns the way in which the scientific system relates to
the other actors in the political realm. As explained above, the satisfactory manage-
ment of so called wicked problems – that nowadays dominate political agendas –
demands transdisciplinary trajectories. Sustainable development is the prime
wicked problem on this globe. Orthodox scientists hesitate to participate in these
exercises, because they hate to move outside of their comfort zones.
The scientific system is organised in such a way that monodisciplinary products
earn the highest prestige. Transdisciplinarity is the trajectory performed by
scientists and policymakers together in order to develop robust action perspectives
by amalgamating scientific and normative political viewpoints. Transdisciplinarity
is seldom punished because the participant in the aforementioned trajectories will
easily step on hostile political toes. In addition, politicians decide on the allocation
of many resources for science.
In some European nation-states we have even observed recently that many
interdisciplinary scientific institutes have disappeared. Moreover, many boundary
work organisations which have built bridges between science and politics have
been abolished.
According to principles of second modernity, the organisation of the scientific
system following distinctions in scientific disciplines should not disappear but be
supplemented with constructions – not necessarily permanent ones – that could
further transdisciplinarity. With this in mind, reorganising the scientific system in
the direction of positive incentives for participation in transdisciplinarity is a
necessary condition for better fits between science and politics in relation to
sustainable development. A number of splendid examples exist which could be
multiplied. Jungcurt (2012) suggests complementing the concept of boundary work
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with a configuration approach based on conceptualisation of the boundary space in
international decision-making which allows the positioning of institutions with
regard to their degree of politicisation and their position in terms of national and
regional representation. Such an approach could be a useful guide in the further
conceptualisation and application of the boundary concept.
The German Ethics Commission on the future of energy was an innovative attempt – I don’t
think we had something like that ever before. It reminds me a bit of the common
programme of unions, business and politicians we had in the 1970s for solving the
economic crisis situation. The question is if something like the Ethic Commission can be
achieved for other issues. I think that big problems should indeed be tackled by more
inclusive deliberation. The Internet can help to connect people with different interests.
(Jo Leinen)
8.2.4.3 Natural and Social Sciences
The third explanation specifically concerns the way in which physicists, chemists
and some biologists frame and formulate their problems. They often seem to
assume that such formulations are objective or neutral. As a consequence they are
quite offended once an outsider points out that these formulations are far from
neutral, and that therefore their positions are political by nature. The earlier
discussion in this report on planetary boundaries is a good but by far not the only
example. It would be recommendable that the above-mentioned scientists pay some
attention to the evolution of the social science discourses during the last century.
Neo-positivist claims on objective social science have gradually become the view
of a small minority.
8.2.5 Checks and Balances in Science Translation
and Communication
In the last paragraph we have paid some attention to the roles played by scientists
outside their own communities. However, other actors also play major roles in
translation and communication of scientific knowledge. If one counts for instance
the unnecessary scandals caused by sloppy, careless or stupid communication by
politicians (and other public officials without sufficient expert knowledge) regard-
ing scientific matters, one would pay more attention to the division of responsi-
bilities concerning scientific communication.
Close to the heat of political conflicts, emergencies or disasters, the political
demand is often to centralise all communication and concentrate it in the hands of
politicians or their delegates. As a consequence only politicians or their spin doctors
speak up. However, they lack authority in scientific matters, and are often careless
in presenting the existing degree of uncertainty. With this in mind, the public
mistrusts them, and mentions so in the social media, where any gold digger can
speak up with suggested equal authority.
Following this, politicians, disliking the mistrust, look for support, and seek
scientists who are willing to state that the politicians are right. In doing so however,
298 R.J. in ’t Veld
these scientists leave out the careful messages about the hypothetical character of
their knowledge, nor do they mention the methodological constraints under which
their truth claim holds. As a consequence, pointless conflicts between scientists on
television destroy the remaining authority of science, and the conflicts have taken
a more complex shape as they now bear a wicked twofold character: dissensus
exists in two dimensions, values and knowledge.
Who should speak up in public then? Trustworthy communication should be in
the hands of trustworthy people. Politicians are trustworthy in the debates on
political choices but in dealing with expert knowledge they only remain trustworthy
if they mention very prudently the knowledge base which they rely on.
Experts in public communication should accompany scientists who produce
public statements. In general the intermediary bodies between science and politics
like the planning bureaus in northern European democracies are the best equipped
communicators. However, even they find themselves under pressure not to mention
things which are disagreeable to the power brokers.
Special attention should be paid to the public communication on transdisciplin-
ary trajectories. These bear a specific character: design of action perspectives is the
essence! The public should be informed both about the character of the endeavours
and their results. In this way the confusion could be avoided which causes citizens
to entertain the idea that pure science is at work. ‘Transdisciplinary Panels’ might
do the job as long as they remain clear with regards to their character.
In general, it would be worthwhile to pay still more attention to the necessity of
checks and balances by establishing Neutral Public Editors of scientific information
who receive public resources in order to intervene in public and even political debates
once they conclude that the communication on scientific knowledge has been too one-
sided. The NPE should be independent from political parties, NGOs, as well as existing
corporate or social media and should be rooted in scientific organisations.
Last but not least, scientific knowledge is elitist because most new knowledge
and discourse takes place in commercial academic journals which are not accessible
for everybody. Sustainability governance would, as any other field in which knowl-
edge and innovation is important, profit from broader application of the open-
source method (as used for this report and the accompanying academic book).
8.2.6 City Initiatives
Themajority of humankind lives in cities nowadays. In 2050, the percentage will be 75.
The density of cities is a very important characteristic and the empirical driving forces
of real-world reflexivity, knowledge democracy and the phenomenon of the second
modernity are at work here specifically. The urban habitat is precious. The urban
infrastructure is a crucial factor in energy consumption. Urban agglomerations may
transform into energy neutral real estate and transport systems. The quality of air may
improve considerably once more sustainable technologies are introduced. The UN has
identified cities as a major opportunity for sustainable development, as demonstrated in
the Global Report on Human Settlements 2011 - Cities and Climate Change, UN
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Habitat, 2011. Cities appear to be able to develop private-public partnerships in this
domain easier and quicker than national governments.
Cities tend to learn from each other faster than many other actors. Sustainable
cities are attractive cities and attractive cities are strong cities. Strong cities can be
selective with regards to the access granted to new enterprises. Prioritising sustain-
able new firms will make accumulative progress possible.
I would say that for challenges on a global level, the bottom-up is still important and
needed. The local or city level will agree on policy because it is an easier landscape of
actors. We see that cities are driving things much more than countries, and countries more
than international institutions and agreements. In light of the disillusionment with interna-
tional processes, that local level is what you have to set your hopes on. [. . .] Activities at
that level can help us really move towards sustainability – quickly. (S€oren Buttkereit)
City democracy adapts more easily than other public bodies to the new potential
of participatory democracy. Moreover cities, when compared to others, may better
recognise the niche players who bring real innovation and try to connect these to
related actors and ‘regime’ decision makers. Glocalisation is also related to cities.
A strong movement is developing that urges food producers to be nearby. Regional
and local food gain in popularity and moreover metropolitan agriculture is a
winning concept.
It would be a quiet revolution if national governments would be able to redefine
their positions towards cities in such a way that they would feel responsible for the
optimisation of the constraints under which cities could strive for sustainable
development, instead of trying to prescribe to cities how to act. A striking analogy
could be found with the position of nation-states in the domain of fair competition
aiming at the provision of level playing fields.
8.2.7 National Governments in Transition
Although nation-states are embedded in trans-, multi-, inter- and supra-national
networks, they also still possess a considerable amount of power and discretionary
space themselves. They will not disappear as relevant actors, but their functions and
duties are complicating: they can no longer behave as the authorities which simply
decide either to regulate an aspect of life themselves or to contribute in an interna-
tional global environment the willingness to close binding treaties which will settle
things on a global scale.
The reflexive nation-state will continuously reveal combinations of substantial
and relational values that guide the choices as to the metagovernance of sustainable
development. These choices concern:
• Where to rely on existing/emerging markets;
• Where and how to encourage or regulate private-public partnerships that con-
cern aspects of sustainability;
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• How to improve the implementation of existing international environmental
treaties, and how to deal with expiring global environmental treaties, as well
as where to support new initiatives;
• Where and when to create or close transnational or regional agreements;
• Where and when to stimulate local internal public programmes;
• How to produce a brand of representative and participatory democracy in
decision-making;
• How to build transdisciplinary trajectories towards decisions;
• When and where to utilise crowd sourcing and involvement of publics.
The choices are interrelated: once you leave a matter of concern to a private-
public partnership you cannot at the same time regulate it one sided in any legal
text. With this in mind, the governance arrangements are partially substitutes, but as
we will see below they are also complementary, and reinforce each other. The
argumentation that should be constructed has at least the following building stones:
• How close will the result of a certain arrangement be to the defined optimum?
• How large is the probability of success in the preparation of a decision?
• How large is the probability of successful implementation of the decision?
• How large are the transaction costs of action and how large are the costs of non-
action?
• How synergetic will a certain arrangement function in relation with others?
• Most importantly, who is legitimised to pass judgement on all of this, in
particular in transgovernance setups?
Accepting second modernity fully one has to argue that the effectiveness of
global institutions is furthered by the simultaneous existence of local and regional
institutions. This demands a well thought out division of scarce attention. If
agreements between neighbours are generally more effective, the streamlining
through a global organisation only would even be harmful.
Indeed, the complexity of the position of nation-states is illustrated by this:
reasoning in second modernity terms they will continuously ask themselves how
a certain arrangement on a certain level, for instance a global treaty, should be
accompanied by arrangements on other levels in order to produce synergies. They
will accept the need for complementarities. Although the world has become more
polycentric than before, nation-states appear to be the natural process architects in
order to both operate in a global landscape and combine the complementary efforts
on different levels by a varied collection of actors.
If you look for what could come out of Rio+20 [. . .] about sustainable development, in the
best case you can have some agreements on a general goal, but the real action has to be done
on the ground floor – at the level of states and local governments. And as you said of course
it’s also all about the individuals’ behaviour. If each of us uses electric lights or other
electric machines – normally we use them because this is what all people need and do. So
changing behaviour will be a big step. Just because we still think that what ‘I’ do will not
really affect much or anything. (Staffan Nilsson)
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8.2.8 Crowds/Publics/Social Tipping Points
The world has become connected, flat, spiky and lateral. Traditionally we speak
about levels of governance, ordered by hierarchy, but this type of order is in
disarray. The vertical order is not disintegrating altogether but lateral arrangements,
enabled by the Internet and communication technology, could possibly mean that
a local initiative becomes a global hype within a very short time. Our analysis of
societies must therefore also take into account new shapes of social organisation
with potential influence like crowds and publics.
The wisdom of crowds may prove to be doubtful as universally characteristic (see
Barbara Tuchman’s TheMarch of Folly, 1984), but crowd sourcing is often effective.
Of course it demands a thorough approach to define the objectives of the search, the
nature and size of the crowd, and the method used to select the collected information.
A crowd is not necessarily a random crowd. Expertise within the crowd is relevant.
If you look now, we have spring; there are a lot of observations in the nature of birds, of
animals, of the flora, of what is happening. And a government can never, never monitor this
without the help of engaged people in organizations looking for the birds’ life or walking in
the forest reporting, to take just an example or two. So it is really in my view a bottom-up
approach which is needed, both when we make and when we implement policies. (Staffan
Nilsson)
‘Publics’ are even more difficult to approach. Publics are event related. As
Basten (2010) argues, publics may gain political momentum, once there is an
institutional void in the respect that the traditional democratic institutions fail to
solve problems. However, it is also possible to utilise publics: the supporters of
soccer clubs have convinced many local public authorities that it would be proper to
subsidise professional soccer.
Each actor who is interested in sustainable development may attempt to activate
the existing or emerging publics in that domain. With this, the repertoire of each
actor is enriched but also complicated. The choice of the mix of approaches to apply
is a matter of primary concern: the classical method of building alliances with the
well-established actors like governments on different levels, or designing networks
can be supplemented with crowd sourcing and the utilisation of publics. In some
instances publics – for instance gathering on a large square – mark a social tipping
point, and may gain so much political influence that regimes topple down, as can be
seen once more in the spring of 2011. It appears that not only governing bodies but
also and maybe in particular NGOs should reflect upon the opportunities offered by
the potential meetings with crowds and publics.
8.2.9 New Institutions and Fading Away of Old Ones
I don’t think you have support for new institutions. Not at the moment. I certainly can’t see
the U.S. subscribing, and it’s going to be a struggle to keep up our ability to work within the
already existing ones. (Eileen Claussen)
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8.2.9.1 Courts and Truth Committees
New institutions belong to the dreams of many structuralists in the dialogue. We
have already discussed the continuous plea for a global decision-making body
which would enable strong coordination. We have also raised doubts about the
question of whether such a body would be able to cope with the existing cultural
heterogeneity.
Some have formulated ideas on new institutions for conflict resolution. The
erection of an international court is one of them.7 Indeed, in 2002 a large interna-
tional group of judges had already concluded that ‘an independent judiciary and
judicial process is vital for the implementation, development and enforcement of
environmental law’. The idea of the Forum is that that the Court could impose
sanctions such as declaratory relief, fines and sanctions of restoration and rehabili-
tation of damaged habitats. Not only states but also NGOs, corporations and
citizens would have access to the Court. It appears inevitable however to agree
on a treaty that would establish the Court. Every one shares the opinion that it would
take quite some time to decide on such a treaty. It is improbable that all nation-
states will become Signatory States, which would harm the universal character of
the judiciary.
Meanwhile, there is room for other mechanisms of conflict resolution. As the
long run future of sustainable development should be characterised by harmony, the
installation of truth committees operating according to the South African example
would maybe be preferable. The moral authority of such committees would not
necessarily be inferior to that of the Courts.
8.2.9.2 Informal Communities
The rapid rise of the social media enables all kinds of new communities. Many of
them will be quite volatile, like publics and crowds, but some might become stable
and unfold actions, or even programmes. In an earlier paragraph we have designed
a private-public network, consisting of corporations, citizen groups and scientific
bodies, which will further sustainable technologies, while public bodies ensure
a level playing field.
We need an international level playing field for companies – otherwise they will only
compete on the basis of cost reduction and not on the basis of sustainability. (Jan Pronk)
The level playing field is, however, not an undisputed concept. Level playing
fields are more or less paradoxical because they define equality in conditions in
order to enable market actors to cause inequality.
7 See for instance www.earthsummit2012.org for the Stakeholder Forum published in February
2011: Environmental Institutions for the twenty-first century: An International Court for the
Environment.
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There are no level playing fields. It is nice to say but it will never happen. When I was in
business, I wanted a playing field that was supportive of what I was trying to do – not what
others were trying to do. (Bj€orn Stigson)
Building institutions is a slow process. Attempts at acceleration are dangerous.
When we deal with long term problems we have already formulated a number of
recipes: depending on the character of the problem either persistent or resilient
action is needed. The gradual establishment of institutions demands persistency
during a longer period of time. As we argued while dealing with configurations,
gradual solidification both in the cognitive and in the social dimension takes place.
Such institutions might avoid the usable market failures, but maybe also the non-
market failures which states inevitably reproduce. The existing actors should
become aware of the possibly benign functioning of such new institutions and
create spaces where initiatives could breed.
The dynamic conservatism and the resilience of unsustainable institutions are
matters of concern for many observers. Some argue in favour of a crusade against
such anomalies. In our approach we would not prepare for external interventions,
but would instead aim at the possibility of intraventions, hollowing out such
institutions from the inside. Implosion would be the ultimate success.
8.2.10 Governance Indicators and Assessments
Many people are fond of performance indicators. They clarify the details of the test
which must be passed by accountable decision-makers. They create a transparent
dialogue. They specify what it is all about. Alas however, the empirical results are
often disappointing because:
• The indicators apparently do not adequately reflect the values of the parties
concerned.
• Behavioural reactions and immunising strategies gradually devastate the mean-
ing of the indicators.
• The indicators appear insufficiently flexible, and so became obsolete.
The points mentioned above are only a few of the many explanations for failure.
In reaction to the observation of failure some policy designers have returned to the
world of principles, and have re-introduced principle based accountability as
opposed to indicator or rule based accountability and supervision.
In earlier situations the indicators themselves are decided upon by the highest
hierarchical actor. In a knowledge democracy the performance indicators (what
counts?) would be decided in societal dialogues. Those would bear an iterative
character. Learning experiences would be collected continuously. Relevant changes
in values would become visible at the earliest possible moment.
To sustain these dialogues, periodical societal ‘balance sheets’ on aspects of
sustainable development would be produced by knowledge brokers such as advi-
sory councils, think tanks and planning bureaus, whereby progress or deterioration
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would be mentioned. Such balance sheets, sometimes using the metaphor of traffic
lights, have already become more popular over the last few years.
Thermometers for the quality of democracy, in particular participatory democ-
racy, could also be designed. Even very specific assessment on the evolution of the
green arrows in our knowledge democracy scheme could take place. Timely
renewal of all decision support mechanisms would be crucial.
8.2.11 Concluding Remarks
We have concentrated on governance, not on domains. By doing so, we do not
suggest that the distinction in domains is irrelevant. Of course the situation with
regards to forestry differs from the carbon emissions environment. Of course, a
contingent approach is necessary for each domain. However, the interdependencies
of all biosphere systems also demand overview and linkages.
We have hardly touched on the myth of urgency, of momentum, and of
opportunita. Macchiavelli has already said a lot on the latter. It is the genius of
leadership, or the collective intuition of communities which will be the decisive
factor here.
8.2.12 Who Should Do WHAT and WHEN?
In open societies the reflection upon and creation of governance are a matter for all
citizens, and many private and public organisations. In accordance with values and
responsibilities each organisation will act in its own way. Firms will accept their
responsibilities for fair markets and more sustainable technologies, while public
actors will provide level playing fields, collective goods and redistribution in
accordance with preferences on distributive justice. Everyone can accept a morally
binding obligation, but the monopoly on creation of legally binding arrangements is
in the hands of states. Complementary positions demand empathy as relational
value all the time.
The complex interactive relationships which characterise transitions necessitate
for each actor a high degree of consciousness on possible options for new
combinations, and continuous learning capacity. In knowledge democracies, ‘mind-
fulness’ marks the competence to operate in cultural diversity, and to aim at
compatibility and congruence of values and actions. Action perspectives have to
be multi-fold.
Transdisciplinarity and participatory democracy contain the intraventions that
enable change, transition, and transformation. As sustainable development should
be rooted in adequate value patterns and frameworks of competences, the efforts of
many should be directed towards learning processes that further these values. The
value of setting up time tables and indicators is well understood if those are used a
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benchmarks and bearing points. Any overestimation and any misunderstanding as
absolute physical planning items make them obsolete, because under these
circumstances they produce many adverse effects in reflexive environments.
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